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Abstract 
  The banking sector in South East Europe Countries (SEECs) has changed dramatically from 
the start of the transition process. The change in market structure has been associated with a 
change in market shares of banks. This thesis investigates factors that determine a bank’s market 
share. According to the literature, the main determinant of a bank’s competitive position is its 
efficiency. Hence, the first part of the thesis investigates a bank’s efficiency and its determinants, 
while the second part uses these efficiency estimates along with other bank-specific factors and 
regulatory variables to investigate the determinants of a bank’s market share. The analyses are 
conducted in eight SEECs for the 2000-2012 period.  
 Stochastic Frontier Analysis, specifically the Random Parameters Models (Greene, 2005) 
and the Battese and Coelli (1995) models, are employed for estimation of the bank’s cost 
efficiency. The empirical findings suggest that the choice of methods of investigation matters, 
with the Battese and Coelli models performing poorly, which supports the critique that these 
models are data dependent. The banking sector in Slovenia is the most efficient in the region 
while that in Serbia is the least efficient.  
 The thesis then investigates the market share of banks which is argued to depend on 
“inside” bank determinants (cost efficiency, investment in quality of service, risk-taking, capital, 
ownership structure, etc.) and “outside” bank determinants (regulatory and supervisory practices 
and macroeconomic variables). A direct theory of market share is undeveloped in the literature; 
hence, several related strands of theory are examined to develop a model for estimation. It is 
argued that a bank’s market share is the result of a dynamic process; hence dynamic panel 
estimation is applied. The empirical findings suggest that the effect of efficiency on a bank’s 
market share depends on its size. Taking more risk, being a more capitalized bank relative to the 
industry average and investment in quality (expanding branch network) contribute to higher 
market share. Stringent capital requirements, private monitoring and official supervisory power 
are found to be associated with a less concentrated banking industry. However, the effects of 
regulation on bank-level market share are found to vary with different risk-taking behaviour of 
banks.  
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The contribution of the financial sector to economic growth is well established in the economic 
literature of the last two decades (Pagano, 1993; Levine, 1997; and Wachtel, 2003). The financial 
sector plays an important role in the economy by, for instance, improving the efficiency of 
resource allocation in the economy, facilitating financial intermediation and screening and 
monitoring economic agents who seek and borrow funds from financial institutions. The process 
of monitoring and supervision of the projects is less costly because of the intermediation 
undertaken by specialist institutions and further facilitated by economies of scale. Furthermore, 
the financial sector enhances the saving rate by launching new and customer tailored attractive 
financial instruments, products and services. These new instruments, products and services, along 
with the intermediary role of these institutions, create possibilities for risk sharing, diversification 
and liquidity. In a nutshell, the financial sector plays a vital role in the overall performance of all 
economies. 
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In emerging market economies of South Eastern Europe, however, as Wachtel (2003) argues, the 
banking sector predominantly plays the role of an intermediary and the financial system is a bank-
dominated system because the capital markets have been underdeveloped in these countries. To 
this end, one of the most important elements of economic policy during the process of transition, 
as recognized by international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, has been 
the establishment of a competitive banking system, independent of the state but regulated by it 
(Drakos and Konstantinou, 2005). Today, more than twenty years after the start of the transition 
process, the banking sector in South East European Countries (SEECs) has changed dramatically 
both in term of size and structure, regulatory framework and technological progress.  
 
The development and role of the banking sector has been extensively investigated from different 
perspectives in the context of developed economies, but studies related to transition economies 
are fairly limited and this is the motivation for this thesis. The aim of this chapter is to present an 
overview of this thesis, including the research questions and how they are addressed in later 
chapters. Moreover, this chapter provides the necessary background on the development of the 
banking sector in SEECs for other chapters. The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 
presents the aims, research questions and specific objectives of the thesis. Section 3 elaborates 
the structure of the thesis, while the evolution of the banking sector in SEECs is discussed in 
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the chapter. 
 
1.2 AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This thesis aims to investigate the factors influencing the cost efficiency and market structure in 
the banking sectors in SEECs (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia and Slovenia) in the first decade of 21st century (the period of analysis is from 2000 to 
2012). The first part of the study focuses on analysing cost efficiency and its evolution in the 
banking sector while the second part concentrates on identifying the potential determinants of 
market share in banking, considering factors under the control of a bank (“inside” bank 
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determinants) and factors beyond its control (“outside” bank determinants). It will therefore 
contribute to the knowledge of the development of the banking sector in transition economies. 
The thesis has several objectives: 
1. To critically review the literature on the methods of estimation of bank efficiency and the 
empirical literature on cost efficiency in banking with special emphasis on transition 
economies; 
2. To develop an empirical model in order to estimate banks’ cost efficiency in the SEECs 
using different econometric methods;  
3. To critically review the literature on market structure in order to identify the potential 
determinants of market share in banking. 
4. To develop an econometric model in order to investigate the identified potential 
determinants of a bank’s market share in SEECs, highlighting the “inside” bank and 
“outside” bank determinants.   
5. To discuss some policy implications of the thesis and provide recommendations to the 
Supervision and Regulation authorities of the National Banks on the effect of regulation 
on the competitive position of banks.  
 
In order to pursue these objectives, the following interrelated research questions have been 
formulated and investigated in the different chapters of the thesis. (i) What is the most 
appropriate method for investigating cost efficiency? (ii) What is the level of cost efficiency of 
banks in the SEECs and has there been any improvement in their cost efficiency over time? (iii) 
Has there been any technological progress that reduces the total cost of banks, hence improving 
their efficiency? (iv) What is the role of ownership, EU accession and the last financial crisis on the 
cost efficiency of banks in SEECs? (v) does cost efficiency matter for banks’ market share in SEECs? 
(vi) What are other potential determinants of banks’ market share? (vii) Is there a systemic 
variation in determinants of market share across different bank size-classes? (viii) Is there a 
systemic variation in the effect of regulatory and supervisory practices across different risk-taking 
behaviour on banks’ market share? (ix) Are there lessons for bank managers and policy makers 
on how to improve their efficiency and also their competitive position? 
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The motivation and importance of this thesis is in its contribution to enriching the literature on 
efficiency and market share in banking in the context of the SEECs. The novelty of this research is 
reflected in: (i) the estimation cost efficiency for banks in SEECs in the most recent years, including 
the period of the financial crisis, using a relatively new econometric method previously not 
applied to transition economies which is theoretically preferred to the models applied in the 
existing studies; (ii) opening the “black box” of what determines the market structure, specifically 
a bank’s market share, in the banking sector in the SEECs, in particular which factors facilitate a 
bank’s growth and which factors hinder its growth.  
 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
In this section a brief outline of the individual chapters of the thesis is presented. Chapters 2, 3 
and 4 represent the first part of this thesis which deals with the question of cost efficiency in 
banking in SEECs, while Chapter 5 and 6 constitute the second part of the thesis examining the 
determinants of market share of banks in this region.  
 
Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical concepts of efficiency followed by a review of the methods of 
investigation of efficiency. Initially, this chapter identifies the appropriate definition of efficiency 
after presenting various definitions and concepts related to firm’s efficiency. The next issue 
considered in this chapter is the choice of preferred method for the empirical analysis of bank’s 
cost efficiency, which is the subject of analysis in Chapter 4. The choice of the appropriate method 
for analysis is based on extensive and detailed discussion of the large variety of methods of 
estimation. Based on this review, the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is selected as the 
appropriate approach, in particular because it allows for the estimation of time-varying efficiency 
and controls for unobserved heterogeneity. Other issues that are considered in this chapter are: 
(i) whether the efficiency “frontier” is estimated for individual countries or for the region as a 
whole, (ii) the choice of the functional form which explains the shape of the relationship between 
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output and inputs in the banking sector, and (iii) the nature of inputs and outputs of the banking 
system (are banks producers of financial service or just simple intermediaries?). 
 
Chapter 3 presents a critical review of the empirical studies on cost efficiency in banking with 
special reference to transition economies. Given the conclusions of Chapter 2, this chapter 
focuses on empirical studies estimating cost efficiency in banking using the SFA method. First, it 
presents the methods of estimation applied in the empirical studies of cost efficiency in the 
banking sector. Second, it reviews the existing literature on efficiency in the banking sector in 
transition economies, aiming to compare similarities and differences with respect to questions 
tackled and methods of investigation used in various studies. The review will identify the 
drawbacks in the current literature and address the gap in knowledge in this field with special 
reference to SEECs. This chapter is a bridge between the theory in the previous chapter and the 
empirical analysis in the following chapter.  
 
Chapter 4 is devoted to the estimation of banks’ cost efficiency, drawing on the theoretical and 
empirical evidence discussed in the two previous chapters. This chapter is of importance not only 
because it attempts to fill a gap in the literature on cost efficiency estimation in the banking sector 
in transition economies, but also because the predicted efficiency scores resulting from the 
estimation procedure are used as a determinant of the market share in the banking sector, the 
focus of the second part of the thesis. The chapter consists of developing an econometric model 
for cost efficiency estimation, followed by a discussion of the data which is of special importance 
in this thesis (the limited data on countries under consideration available in the Bankscope 
database has been extended through the considerable effort of the author). The chapter then 
analyses the empirical findings on cost efficiency.  
The second part of the thesis deals with the development of the theoretical and empirical work 
on market share in banking. Chapter 5 develops a conceptual framework for the study of 
determinants of market share in the banking sector in transition economies. Given that the 
literature on market share in banking is very scarce, the chapter adopts an eclectic approach and 
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draws on various strands of economic literature. These include the literature on measuring the 
extent of competition based on efficiency (Boone, 2000, 2004, 2008), the Endogenous Sunk Cost 
theory (Sutton, 1991, 2000), the role of total capital (equity) (Berger and Bouwman, 2013), 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), probability of bank failures (Buchinsky and 
Yosha, 1995), lending standards and screening in banking (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; 
Ruckes, 2004) and the effect of regulation on competitive position in banking. By analysing this 
range of literature we identify two categories of potential determinants of market share: the 
“inside”- and “outside”-bank determinants, the former category being under the control of a 
bank’s management and the latter being beyond the control of the bank. Possible “outside” bank 
determinants (regulation and supervision) are even less investigated in the literature than 
“inside” bank determinants, because the main concern of the literature on regulation in banking 
is securing a safe and sound banking sector with special reference to risk-taking, rather than with 
the regulation of market share.  
 
Chapter 6 aims to empirically investigate the potential determinants of a bank’s market share. 
The specification of the empirical model is based on the discussion and the “derived” theoretical 
framework in Chapter 5. Given that market share is of a dynamic nature, the specified empirical 
model is a dynamic panel model, estimated by General Methods of Moments (GMM). In addition 
to the baseline analysis (the effect of “inside” bank and “outside” bank determinants on market 
share) and in line with the theoretical framework (Chapter 5), additional testable hypotheses are 
defined to explore the possibility of systemic variation across different risk-taking behaviour and 
different size-classes of banks.  
 
Finally, Chapter 7 formulates the conclusions of the thesis. As a part of this chapter, special 
emphasis will be put on the contributions to knowledge provided in this thesis, the limitations of 
this research project and possibilities for future research. Some policy recommendations in terms 
of cost efficiency and market share will also be presented in this chapter even though this thesis 
is not primarily driven by policy considerations.  
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1.4 AN OVERVIEW OF THE BANKING SECTOR IN SEECs AFTER 
20 YEARS OF TRANSITION 
This section sets the scene for the research questions and provides relevant background 
information on the banking sector in SEECs which is necessary for the analysis of the subsequent 
chapters of the thesis. Given that the SEECs underwent a turbulent transformation from socialism 
to free market economy, we briefly describe the banking system in SEECs during the era of 
socialism (until 1990), followed by a discussion of its transformation during the early stage of 
transition (until 1999). The period from 2000-2012, which we refer to as the later stage of 
transition, is of special interest because it is the period covered by this investigation. We analyse 
the banking developments in SEECs only from those aspects relevant to our research objectives 
presented in Section 1.2. 
 
1.4.1 Banking system under Socialism until 1990 
During the era of the socialism (or central planning) in SEE, two types of banking systems were in 
existence. The most common, the monobank (or the single-tiered banking) system, was 
predominant in almost all socialist countries while the former Yugoslav Republics (at that time 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia and two 
autonomous provinces Vojvodina, and Kosovo and Metohia) had introduced a kind of “two-tier 
system” (replacing the monobank with eight separate national banks and a number of commercial 
banks) since the early 1960s.  Although, the “form” of the banking system in Yugoslavia was similar 
to that in market-oriented economies, in essence its role and its functioning was very similar to 
the monobank system. In particular, all the national banks and commercial banks belonged to a 
uniform operational system, responsible for the implementation of the common monetary, credit 
and foreign exchange policies formulated and negotiated in the Federal Assembly and decided by 
the Federal Government of Yugoslavia, all under the control of the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia (Green and Petrick, 2002).  
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1.4.2 Building a market economy: Banking system in the early stage of 
transition (1990-1999) 
The transition period from a centrally-planned economy towards a free market economy in the 
SEECs started in the beginning of the 1990s.1 Transition was a process of complex transformation 
of the economy, polity and society. Along with reforms in all aspects of economic and wider social 
life, the transition in the financial sector had the goal of developing market-oriented financial 
institutions. This involved establishing a genuine two-tier banking system, liberalization of interest 
rates, abolition of central credit and cash plans, restructuring and privatisation of state banks and 
the entry of new private banks.  
 
Following the initial measures for the establishment of a market-oriented banking system, all 
SEECs established a two-tier banking system, with the Central Bank in charge of the creation and 
implementation of the monetary policy and regulation and supervision of other banks. Although 
the commercial banks were separated from the central banks, at the outset these (new) 
commercial banks along with the speciality banks and the saving banks were state owned with a 
few banks dominating the new banking system and with usually one bank being “a monopolist in 
rudimentary retail banking” (Bonin, 2001).  
 
However, the introduction of the two-tier banking system had the seeds of failure embedded in 
it from the beginning, because the newly created commercial banks inherited the loans issued 
under the previous system, with soft budget constraints with no obligation for repayment. 
Additionally, the elimination of subsidies to firms and market liberalization significantly weakened 
the ability of firms to repay their loans even when they wanted to meet their obligations (Tang et 
                                                        
1 In former Yugoslavia the transition process started later than other CEE and SEE countries because of the outbreak of war 
in this country in 1991 (starting with the separation of Slovenia) followed by civil wars in Croatia (1991-1992), in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (1992-1995) and in Kosovo (1999). 
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al., 2000). This led to enormous accumulation of non-performing loans which resulted in the need 
for intervention by respective governments. Moreover, the liberalization of banking was expected 
to introduce competition in the sector, hence many countries applied lax licensing criteria and 
lenient regulation designed to attract new banks, resulting in the entry of many undercapitalized 
and poorly managed private banks (Barisitz, 2009). This further increased the riskiness and 
instability of the sector. A majority of loans were granted on ad hoc basis to state-owned 
enterprises without screening their creditworthiness because the banks lacked appropriate 
monitoring technology and human capital capacities and because such practices were completely 
new to banks in these countries. There was an inherited habit of granting loans according to the 
requests and the needs of the government.  
 
All this resulted in bank failures and governments were forced to intervene to “rescue” the 
unhealthy banks due to the large volume of non-performing loans (Bonin, 2001; Bonin and 
Wachtel, 2004) in order to maintain financial stability. The SEECs approached the banking sector 
rescue operations in different ways. For example, Bulgaria and Macedonia adopted the 
recapitalization of the poorly performing banks, whilst Croatia and Slovenia established state-
owned hospital banks or similar asset management companies that took over from the non-
performing loans of banks. The success of the intervention process was limited, since it targeted 
only the current stock of non-performing loans while the flow of new bad loans was beyond the 
scope of the intervention (Bonin et al., 2008). 
 
The two-tier banking system and the forced introduction of competition in the sector by new 
banks entering the market under lax licensing criteria were not enough to secure well-functioning, 
efficient and sustainable banking systems in the SEECs. A number of other factors also played 
their role. The lack of prudential regulation and supervision, corruption in institutional 
environment allowing weak internal governance practices, politically motivated lending, and the 
underdeveloped protection of creditor rights which prevented them from seizing collaterals and 
recovering loans, all contributed to the worsening of the financial position of banks (Tang et al., 
2000; Riess et al., 2002).  
 10 
 
 
As Bonin and Wachtel (2002) emphasize, an important prerequisite for an efficient and 
sustainable banking sector is the existence of financially healthy banks, independent of the state 
and independent of the heritage of socialism (those that developed under the soft budget 
constraint). Privatization could produce benefits such as the gradual disappearance of political 
influence in credit allocation and the adoption of screening technologies and risk management 
practices which influence the riskiness of banks’ activities (Reininger et al., 2002). In addition, 
state-owned banks were generally considered to be overstaffed, poorly equipped technically and 
reluctant to adopt banking innovations (EBRD, 1998). Consequently, the advent of privatization 
in banking, as in the other sectors of the economy, was inevitable and all SEECs had started this 
process by the mid-1990s. By 1999 the progress of privatization was classified as gradual in most 
of the SEE countries (EBRD, 1999). In the early stage of the privatization, banks in SEECs were 
owned by many small owners or by enterprises and the government (Tang et al., 2000). However, 
the dispersion of the ownership hindered the improvement in corporate governance of banks as 
many banks were owned by non-financial firms (usually major clients of the banks) and individuals 
without any expertise in managing banks (Kraft, 2004). Therefore, as extensively advocated in the 
literature, competition could be enhanced only by the entry of foreign capital. It improved 
corporate governance, increased efficiency of the banking sector and produced positive 
externalities in the sector (Thorne, 1993; Anderson and Kegeles, 1998; Bonin et al., 1998 and 
Kraft, 2004). However, initially there was scepticism among government officials about the 
benefits of the foreign capital and the process proceeded very slowly until the late 1990s (Slovenia 
was the last to allow foreign capital in 1999).  
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Table 1.1 Descriptive statistics of the banking sector, end-1999 
Country Albania BIH Bulgaria Croatia Macedonia Slovenia FRYa  
Number  of banks 13 61 34 53 23 31 81 
Majority foreign owned 8 9 14 13 5 5 0 
Banks (per million people) 3.9 16.5 3.3 11.6 11.3 15.6 9.9 
Total bank assets (US$ billion) 1.8 3.1 4.2 10.6 1.2 13.65 11 
Assets of top five banks (% of total bank assets) 87 / 63 62 71 63 60 
Non-performing loans (in % of total loans) 32.7 58.7 17.5 20.6 62.6 9.3 10.2b 
Asset share of state-owned banks (%) 37 76 50.5 39.6 6.47 42.2 89 
Asset share of foreign-owned banks (%) 63 3.8 42.8 40.3 11.5 4.9 0.4 
Credit to enterprises (% of GDP) 3.6 3.6 14.6 22 11.3 35.9 19 
Required capital adequacy ratio 12 8 12 10 8 8 8 
Actual Capital adequacy ratio 8.2 n/a 43.1 19.3 28.7 14 n/a 
EBRD Index of banking sector reformsc 1.7 2.3 2.7 3 3 3.3 n/a 
Source: Pissarides (2001), EBRD and World Bank 
Note: a) The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) consisted of Serbia and Montenegro during the late 1990s. It was officially renamed Serbia and Montenegro in 2003, and in June 2006, 
Montenegro became an independent country; b) Data refer to Serbia only as presented in the EBRD Report (2004); c) This indicator provides a ranking of progress in liberalisation and institutional 
reform in the banking sector, on a scale of 1 to 4+. A score of 1 represents little change from a socialist banking system apart from the separation of the central bank and commercial banks, 
while a score of 2 means that a country has established internal currency convertibility and have liberalised significantly both interest rates and credit allocation.  A score of 3 means that a 
country has achieved substantial progress in developing the capacity for effective prudential regulation and supervision, including procedures for the resolution of bank insolvencies and 
establishing hardened budget constraints on banks by eliminating preferential access to concessionary refinancing from the central bank. A score of 4+ represents a level of reform that 
approximates the institutional standards and norms of an industrialised market economy, as represented, for example, by the Basle Committee’s Core Principles on Effective Banking Supervision 
and Regulation. 
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Table 1.1 presents some descriptive statistics of the banking sector in SEECs at the end of 1999. 
In particular, by the end of the 1999 the number of banks substantially increased in all countries, 
possibly as a result of the loose entry requirements. The level of non-performing loans was high 
in all SEECs except in Slovenia. In Macedonia and BiH this indicator was extremely high. The 
presence of foreign capital in SEECs by the end of 1999 was low in general, except for Albania, 
Bulgaria and Croatia.  The generally low percentage of credit to enterprise relative to GDP 
suggests that the credit activity of the banks was still in stage of development. The actual capital 
adequacy ratio was far above the minimum required level in all SEECs. According to the reports 
provided by EBRD the banking reforms were still at an infant stage in Albania and to some extant 
in BiH, while the other countries considered had undergone heavy restructuring processes. 
 
An important element of the transition process in banking is the establishment of prudential 
regulations (including the Basel standards for capital adequacy requirements, loan classification 
and provisioning), revision of the licensing criteria and an effective legal framework, enhancing 
the banking supervision, and adoption of international accounting standards (Tang et al., 2000). 
Although most of the legislative and other administrative acts were established in the first decade 
of transition, there was lack of effective implementation. In 1998 EBRD conducted a survey to 
assess how effectively countries in the region enforced financial laws and regulations so as to 
foster confidence in the banking sector. The results are presented in Table 1.2. Albania and BiH 
(with a low rating of 2 for effectiveness) had still not implemented standards with respect to 
capital adequacy, related party lending and transactions, and bank insolvency, had not adopted 
international accounting standards and did not perform regular on-site supervisory examinations. 
Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia (with a score of 3 for effectiveness) had reasonably 
comprehensive financial laws and regulations, but could benefit from further refinements in some 
areas so as to raise standards in line with core principles. Bulgaria (with a score of 4 for 
effectiveness) had comprehensive banking regulations, but some refinement was still needed in 
at least one important area. Detailed explanation of the rating score is presented in Appendix to 
Chapter 1, Section 1.1, and Table A1.1. 
Table 1.2 Extent and effectiveness of financial laws and regulations, 1998 
Country Extensiveness Effectiveness 
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Albania 2+ 2 
BiH 3 2 
Bulgaria 4 4- 
Croatia 3 3 
Macedonia 3 3- 
Slovenia 4 3 
 Source: EBRD Transition Report; Note:  The higher the rating scores the better financial laws and regulations. 
 
Following the deep transition recession, economic growth restarted in most countries under 
consideration around mid-1990s, the macroeconomic situation temporarily stabilized, banking 
sectors started to consolidate, and one could argue that a market-oriented economy was almost 
re-established in the region (Barisitz, 2009). 
 
1.4.3 Banking systems of SEECs in the later stage of transition (2000-2012) 
The developments in the banking sector in SEECs in the later stage of transition (2000-2012) are 
of special interest as this thesis is concerned with this particular period. This section focuses on 
selected aspects of banking development in SEECs which are of relevance to our research 
questions. Specifically, this section:  
(i) Illustrates common trends across, and major differences between, countries under 
investigation.  The graphical presentations aim at mainly showing the similarities in 
patterns and major variations in individual countries over time.   
(ii) Compares specific banking system indicators at two points of time, 1999 and 2012 (the 
end of our dataset).   
Several events marked the late 1990s and the second decade of transition. In particular, the 
collapse of the Pyramid Ponzi scheme in Albania in 1997, the severe financial crisis in Croatia 1998, 
the war in Serbia in 1999, the civil conflict in Macedonia in 2001 and the international financial 
crisis in 2008 and beyond affected the SEECs seriously. At the same time, all countries under 
consideration experienced sustained output growth from 2002 until 2007, as presented in Figure 
1.1, with an overall average real growth per capita of 5.3 per cent at 2005 constant prices. 
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However, growth was negatively affected by the last financial crisis, with an overall average 
growth per capita of -4.7 in 2009. The most affected country was Slovenia (with real GDP per 
capita growth of -8.8 per cent) and the least affected was Albania (with real GDP per capita growth 
of 3.5 per cent). All SEECs quickly recovered from the recent recession, but as argued by EBRD 
(Transition Report 2013, p.13) “the growth rates have remained low, not only compared with the 
boom period of 2004-08, when output in the transition region as a whole expanded by 6.6 per cent 
a year, but also compared with the five-year period preceding the boom.”  
 
Figure 1.1 Annual GDP per capita growth in 2005 constant prices (in %) 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (database) 
Although there was overall economic growth in these countries during the later stage of 
transition, there was still a huge gap between countries in terms of their development. Figure 1.2 
presents the GDP per capita (in 2005 constant prices) in the two years, 1999 and 2012, clearly 
showing that Slovenia and Croatia are the two most developed countries in the region, while 
Albania is the least developed country (even though it had the highest average real GDP per capita 
growth, 5.7 per cent, over 1999-2012). It is important to note that Slovenia and Bulgaria have 
joined the European Union during the analysed period, in 2004 and 2007, respectively. Croatia 
gained full membership in 2013.  
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Figure 1.2 Real GDP per capita in thousands US dollars (in 2005 constant prices) 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (database) 
 
The SEECs succeeded in stabilizing the inflation, which was a serious macroeconomic problem at 
the beginning of transition, during the second stage of transition. Over the period 1999-2012 
inflation was generally relatively low in the region (the overall average during 1999-2012 in SEECs 
was 4.5 per cent with Serbia having the highest rate of 10.3 per cent). During the financial crises 
in 2008 the average inflation in the region reached 8 per cent (see Figure 1.3 for details). 
 
Figure 1.3 Inflation based on Consumer Price Index for the period 1999-2012 (in %) 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (database) 
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Size and Market Structure in Banking in selected SEECs. During the second stage of transition the 
banking sector in SEECs was significantly strengthened and the principles of a competitive and 
free banking system were fully adopted by all government. In addition, the banking system 
stability was considerably improved and the banking sector became capable of resisting shocks, 
hence reducing the likelihood of disruptions in the financial intermediation process.2 This resulted 
mainly from: the process of privatization which enforced competition in banking and transformed 
banks into profit maximizing firms; the reduction in the role of the state in the banking system; 
and the introduction of prudential regulation including the adoption of the Basel standards, which 
contributed to enhancing the quality of banks’ portfolios, as well as the rapid increase of the 
foreign ownership of banks. In what follows, we discuss these developments in the banking 
system in SEECs as they seem to be important factors affecting banks’ efficiency and their 
competitive position over time.  
 
 
Figure 1.4 Assets-to-GDP ratio in SEECs during 2000-2012 
Source: Annual Reports from national banks and authors’ own calculations 
The banking sector became the major player in the financial markets in SEECs after the process of 
recovery and transformation, a role which it has retained to the present time, because the capital 
markets are still underdeveloped. The progress of the financial intermediation in the banking 
                                                        
2 According to the definition of financial stability by European Central Bank. 
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systems is presented in Figures 1.4 and 1.5 which respectively illustrate the trend of assets-to-
GDP ratio and the domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP. These indicators of financial 
intermediation clearly suggest a considerable increase in the overall activities of banks. Financial 
intermediation was the highest in the EU member states of Slovenia, Bulgaria and Croatia (the 
total assets in these countries were also higher than other countries). Montenegro had the lowest 
financial intermediation in terms of assets-to-GDP, although in 2008 it reached the level of 
intermediation of Croatia, it declined sharply with the onset of financial crisis. Albania had the 
lowest level of domestic credit to private sector issued by banks.  
 
 
Figure 1.5 Domestic credit to private sector issued by banks (% of GDP) 
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators (database) and EBRD Transition Reports 
As discussed in Section 1.4.2, the lenient entry requirements at the beginning of transition led to 
a significant deterioration of the quality of banks’ portfolios instead of intensifying competition in 
banking. However, in the later stage of transition the banking legislation was revised and with 
government almost completely marginalized, competition has allowed healthy and well-
functioning banks to survive, resulting in the consolidation of the banking sectors and a 
substantial reduction in the number of banks in most of the countries, except Albania and 
Montenegro (which started and ended the period with relatively low numbers of banks) (see 
Figure 1.6 for more details). 
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Figure 1.6 Number of banks across countries in the period 1999-2012 
Source: EBRD Transition Reports and Annual Reports from national banks 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, measured in terms of total assets) and CR3 (the market share 
of the largest three banks in each country, measured in terms of total assets) are used to present 
the concentration of the banking sector in SEECs. The former indicator is presented in Figure 1.7, 
while the latter in Figure 1.8. According to the HHI by the end of the 2012 none of SEECs were 
characterized by a highly concentrated banking sector (HHI>1800). Montenegro had the highest 
market concentration with a HHI of 1574, while the Serbia had the least concentrated market, 
with an HHI of 715. It is noticeable that CR3 did not follow the declining trend of HHI - it increased 
in BiH, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia and decreased in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia and 
Slovenia. The variations in the market structure across SEECs may play an important role with 
respect to banks’ efficiency and the competition environment of individual banks. 
  
Figure 1.7 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (based on total assets) 
Source: Bankscope and author’s own calculations 
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Figure 1.8 Market share of the largest three banks in % (based on total assets) 
Source: Bankscope and author’s own calculations 
Note: The first available data for Montenegro and Serbia is 2003 
The different trend of HHI and CR3 although it seems contradictory, it could be explained using 
the consolidation in the banking sector in SEECs and the recent literature on competition. At first 
glance, it is expected that consolidation in banking would increase the overall market 
concentration, this was not the case and market concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI, measured in terms of total assets) reduced considerably over the period. 
Although in general it is expected that bank consolidation would increase the overall market 
concentration, this is not necessarily true, and depends on the specificities of the process in each 
country. Moreover, the recent literature (as discussed in Section 5.1) emphasise that these 
indicators should be treated with caution as the degree of competition, or concentration, in a 
market depends not just on the market share of one or a few large firms, but also on the share of 
remaining firms and other market specificities. 
 
Ownership Structure. Most of the development in the banking sector in SEECs can be attributed 
to the entry of foreign banks. Such consideration results from their experience in intermediation 
and provision of banking services, their knowledge of how to compete under free market 
conditions and the positive spillover effects on domestic banks (in particular with respect to 
accelerated development in human capital (Litan et al. 2001; Papi and Revoltella, 1999).  Foreign 
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banks with their know-how and advanced technology, including sophisticated risk-management 
practices, have contributed to greater stability of the banking system in SEECs. As Lensink and 
Hermes (2004) argue, foreign banks have positively affected the creation and implementation of 
new regulatory and supervisory practices because regulators have come across “new” ways of 
doing business in banking introduced by foreign banks. Hence banking regulations were changed 
to incorporate these new practices and activities and were revised in line with regulations in the 
developed countries. In terms of the effect of foreign banks on efficiency in the banking sector, 
although theoretically this is expected to be positive (more on this in Chapter 3), the empirical 
findings are rather mixed. The impact of foreign ownership on efficiency is one of the research 
questions investigated in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
 
The significant influx of foreign capital in banking occurred in the period after the privatisation 
process. Figure 1.9 illustrates the change in the share of foreign capital in the banking system of 
countries under consideration in the period 1999-2012, while the shares of foreign, private 
domestic and state ownership in 1999 and 2012 are presented in Figure 1.10.  
 
 
Figure 1.9 Foreign ownership in the banking sector in % (based on total assets) 
Source: BSCEE Annual Reports and Annual Reports from national banks 
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These graphs highlight several points. First, at the beginning of the period under review, countries 
differed in terms of foreign ownership, with Albania having the highest presence of foreign capital 
(over 60 per cent) and BiH having very little foreign capital, possibly due to the still vulnerable 
political situation. The banking sector in other countries is now fully dominated by foreign capital. 
Slovenia has been resisting the entry of foreign banks but, given the aspiration to join EU, it was 
impossible to continue to keep out foreign capital. However, even at the end of the period under 
consideration the Slovenian banking sector is not dominated by foreign capital. Regarding state 
ownership in the banking sector, Figure 1.10 shows that this type of ownership is now negligible 
in most countries except in Slovenia and Serbia. By the end of 2012 the private domestic capital 
is more present in Slovenia and Bulgaria than other countries (Bulgaria is the only banking sector 
in which the share of private domestic capital has increased over this period, at the expense of 
state ownership). Such rapid and considerable change in ownership structure is expected to affect 
the banks’ efficiency and changes in efficiency to be experienced in the short-run mainly due to 
the better know-how of the foreign management and the introduction of advanced technology 
and the range of new products (this effect is empirically investigated in Chapter 4). Additionally, 
the enhanced competition introduced by the foreign capital can be expected to affect the 
competitive position of banks in the market – an issue which is empirically examined in Chapter 
6.  
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Figure 1.10 Ownership Structure in the banking sector in % (based on total capital: equity) 
Source: BSCEE Annual Reports and Annual Reports from national banks 
Note: The first available data for Montenegro and Serbia dates from 2002 
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Efficiency, Quality of Portfolio and Capital Adequacy Ratio. Other important aspects in the 
evolution of the banking sector which are of interest to this thesis are efficiency, risk-taking 
behaviour and the level of capital of the banks. Several indicators are presented in order to depict 
the trends of these important features over time. An indicator that arguably reflects the efficiency 
of the banking system is the interest rate spread as it presents the cost of intermediation. It may 
also suggest either enhanced competition or market power of some banks. The interest rate 
spread in the banking sector in SEECs during 1999-2012 is presented in Figure 1.11. It is noticeable 
that it has a generally declining trend until the onset of financial crisis in 2008 since when the 
interest rate spread has broadly stabilized.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.11 Interest rate spread (lending rate % minus deposit rate % ) 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (database) 
At the outset of the financial crisis the bankers in SEECs, as with those in developed countries, 
became more vigilant regarding the realization of the current and future lending and, hence, in 
some countries the lending interest rates increased, because of the expected higher risk in that 
period. However the interest rate spreads have marginally increased, because the deposit interest 
rate increased as well. By the end of 2012, a considerable difference in the interest rate spread is 
noticeable, for example in Macedonia and BiH it is about 4 per cent, while in Bulgaria, Croatia and 
Serbia it is above 6 per cent.  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Albania BiH Bulgaria Croatia
Macedonia Montenegro Serbia Slovenia
 24 
 
The number of banks per capita in a country may be associated with the exploitation of economies 
of scale. This indicator is presented in Figure 1.12 for 1999 and 2012. Apart from Albania and 
Montenegro, the number of banks per 100,000 inhabitants has decreased in these countries, 
mainly due to the consolidation process discussed earlier. Although this indicator has almost 
doubled for Albania it is still among the lowest in the region, together with Bulgaria and Serbia. 
By the end of 2012, Montenegro has by far the highest number of banks per capita. Given that 
this indicator varies considerably across countries, it may offer banks the possibility of achieving 
scale economies and hence enhance efficiency.    
 
Figure 1.12 Number of banks per 100,000 people 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
The quality of the loan portfolio in SEECs during 1999-2012, represented by the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans, is presented in Figure 1.13. Despite the stabilization of the 
banking sector in SEECs in the late 1990s, all countries under consideration except Slovenia, had 
a two-digit non-performing loans ratio (Macedonia’s was more than 60 per cent). Given that a 
loan takes time to be categorised as non-performing, it is reasonable to assume that such loans 
date from the turbulent period when the free market economy and hard budgeting were not yet 
fully established. However, after 2000, when state ownership declined significantly and foreign 
ownership became dominant, the quality of loan portfolio considerably improved in all SEECs until 
2007 (apart from Serbia). As expected, the onset of crisis meant that non-performing loan 
increased in almost all countries under consideration. 
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Figure 1.13 Non-performing loans in SEECs during 1999-2012 (in % of total loans) 
Source: EBRD Transition Reports and BSCEE Annual Reports 
 
The higher quality of the banks’ loan portfolio can be related to several factors (further discussed 
in Chapter 5). The expansionary macroeconomic environment of the years under consideration 
brought more prosperous borrowers, with a higher probability of realizing their undertaken 
projects and increasing capability for repaying their loans. A characteristic of the banking sector 
in SEECs is the stringent lending process, particularly the high level of collateral required by banks 
prior to a positive lending decision. The improvement in the quality of loan portfolio may be due 
to the influx of foreign capital, especially the managerial know-how reflected in the sophisticated 
risk-assessment practices. The development of comprehensive legislation for regulation and 
supervision of the banks may also have been a crucial factor for restricting the risk-taking 
behaviour of the banks. However, as presented in Figure 1.13 the quality of the loan portfolio has 
deteriorated since 2007-08. Although this period includes the recent global financial crisis, most 
of the countries in this study have not been substantially affected by the financial crises compared 
to the developed countries, as the banking sector in these countries still pursue traditional 
banking. Arguably the increase in the proportion of non-performing loans may be due to the large 
credit growth in the previous period, as presented in Figure 1.4 and 1.5, particularly as it takes 
time for a loan to be classified in this way. 
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The trend of the capital adequacy ratio in the banking sector in SEECs during 1999-2012 is 
presented in Figure 1.14. In 1999 most SEECs had a very high actual capital adequacy ratio which 
may be a reason why there was financial stability in these countries despite the very high share 
of non-performing loans. However, as the financial intermediation has deepened and the credit 
growth increased, the capital adequacy ratio declined sharply (with the exception of Slovenia 
which has had constant capital adequacy ratio). Presumably a large portion of this capital was also 
invested in profitable projects (lending). Nevertheless, during the period under consideration all 
countries have held a significantly higher per cent of assets than required by the regulators (which 
varies from 8 to 12 per cent).   
 
 
Figure 1.14 Actual capital adequacy ratio in SEECs during 1999-2012 (in %) 
     Source: BSCEE Annual Reports and Annual Reports from national banks 
 
Regulation. Banking regulation and supervision attracted much attention during the transition 
period because prudential regulation and supervision are prerequisites for banking sector 
development and stability. All SEECs banking sectors have undergone a long process of 
preparation and implementation of financial laws, regulation and supervision processes. As 
previously presented in Figure 1.2 using the EBRD Survey from 1998, this process was not 
progressing at the same pace in all countries. According to the EBRD index of banking sector 
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reforms, presented in Figure 1.15, it is noticeable that SEECs countries are still at different stages 
at the end of 2009, although these differences are quite small. As Figure 1.15 shows, between 
2000 and 2009, the greatest progress was achieved by Montenegro and Serbia. Their score of 1 
in 2000 indicated little change from a socialist banking system apart from the introduction of a 
two-tier banking system, whereas the score of 3 in 2009 suggest that these countries have 
achieved significant progress in developing the capacity for effective prudential regulation and 
supervision, including procedures for the resolution of bank insolvencies and establishing hard 
budget constraints for banks by eliminating preferential access to concessionary refinancing from 
the central bank. By the end of 2009, the progress in the banking sector of Albania, BiH and 
Macedonia gives the same score of 3. On the other hand, this level of reform was already achieved 
by Croatia, Bulgaria and Slovenia in 2000, hence their progress over the period was marginal, 
except for the Croatian banking sector which achieved a score of 4 in 2009, indicating significant 
progress in banking laws and regulations towards the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
standards, along with well-functioning banking competition and effective prudential supervision. 
Of course, by 2009, none of the SEECs had achieved the score of 4+ which suggests that the 
banking sector has incorporated the standards and performance norms of advanced industrial 
economies, such as full convergence of banking laws and regulations with BIS standards (including 
Basel II) and the provision of full set of competitive banking services.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.15 EBRD index of banking sector reform 
Source: EBRD Transition Reports 
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Another important aspect in terms of regulation and supervision of the banking sector is the 
implementation of the Basel principles. The Basel principles date from 1988 when the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision introduced a credit risk framework, named Basel I, which 
defines the capital standards in order to limit banks´ risk taking and to strengthen the financial 
system. The Basel I accord was revised and extended in 2004 in order to be in accordance with 
the new developments in the banking sectors in general, hence Basel I was replaced by the Basel 
II Accord. Basel II, whose main objective is to secure a safe and sound (international) financial 
system, consists of three pillars (minimum capital requirements, supervisory review, and market 
discipline).3 
 
The Financial Stability Institute (FSI, established by BIS and Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision) has carried out several waves of surveys on Basel II implementation, the latest 
conducted in 2012 for countries which are neither members of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision nor members of the European Union. Hence, Table 1.3 presents the process of Basel 
II implementation in the countries under consideration, except for Bulgaria and Slovenia which 
were EU members in 2012 and were thus excluded from the survey (details are provided in 
Appendix to Chapter 1, Section 1.2, Table A1.2). These two countries adopted Basel II in the period 
2007-2008.4 Croatia and Serbia adopted Basel II standards by 2010 (Banks Bulletin, 2011) and 
2012, respectively, while Macedonia and Montenegro have been gradually progressing 
throughout the period. However, during the period of analysis, the implementation of Basel II 
standards was in an infant stage in Albania and BiH. Thus, according to the FSI survey, SEECs differ 
considerably with respect to the stage of adoption of the Basel II standards, indicating that banks 
in SEECs operate under different conditions which may be relevant for their competitive 
positioning. 
 
                                                        
3 Although nowadays the focus and interest is on adoption of Basel III (proposed in 2010-2011 with the period for adoption 
2013-2015) our focus is on Basle II because the introduction of Basel III standards is after the period of analysis in this thesis. 
Appendix to Chapter 1, Section 1.2, Table A1.3 presents the implementation of Basel III in the countries under consideration. 
4 National Bank Annual Reports for 2007 and 2008 for Bulgaria and Slovenia.   
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Table 1.3 Implementation of Basel II 
Elements Country Status Year Country Elements Status Year 
SA Albania 1 2012 BiH SA 1 2016 
FIRB  1 NA  FIRB 1 2016 
AIRB  1 NA  AIRB 1 2016 
BIA  1 2012  BIA 4 2009 
TSA  1 2012  TSA 1 2016 
AMA  1 NA  AMA 1 2016 
P2  1 2013  P2 1 2016 
P3  4 2013-14  P3 1 2016 
SA Croatia 4 NA Macedonia SA 4 2012 
FIRB  4 NA  FIRB 1 2014 
AIRB  4 NA  AIRB 1 2014 
BIA  4 NA  BIA 4 2012 
TSA  4 NA  TSA 4 2012 
AMA  4 NA  AMA 1 2014 
P2  4 NA  P2 4 2009 
P3  4 NA  P3 4 2007 
SA Montenegro 4 2008 Serbia SA 4 2012 
FIRB  1 NA  FIRB 4 2012 
AIRB  1 NA  AIRB 4 2012 
BIA  4 2008  BIA 4 2012 
TSA  4 2008  TSA 4 2012 
AMA  1 NA  AMA 4 2012 
P2  4 2012  P2 4 2012 
P3  4 2012  P3 4 2012 
Note: The following abbreviations are used in the table: Pillar 1 – Credit risk: SA = Standardised approach, FIRB = Foundation 
internal ratings-based approach, AIRB = Advanced internal ratings-based approach); Pillar 1 – Operational risk: BIA = Basic 
indicator approach, TSA = Standardised/alternative standardised approach, AMA = Advanced measurement approaches; P2 
= Pillar 2; P3 = Pillar 3.  Status indicators are as follows: 1 = Draft regulation not published, 2 = Draft regulation published, 3 
= Final rule published, 4 = Final rule in force, NA = Not applicable 
Year denotes the year in which the draft or final rule was or is expected to be published or when the final rule was or will be 
in force. NA means that the jurisdiction is not planning to implement this component or is planning to implement the 
component but does not know the year in which it will be implemented. 
Source: Financial Stability Institute Survey (2012) 
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1.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The first part of this chapter formulated the aims and the specific objectives of the thesis together 
with the research questions addressed in the thesis which set the scene for this investigation and 
for the subsequent chapters. The first major concern of the thesis, the cost efficiency of banks in 
SEECs, is subject of the analysis in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 while the second major concern, 
determinants of market share in banking is subject of the analysis in Chapters 5 and 6.  The second 
part of this chapter provided a brief review of the development of the banking sector in SEECs as 
the context for the following chapters. In particular, although all the SEECs have similar general 
features, especially due to their past socialist system and the pattern of transition process, they 
differ in terms of the development of their economies in general and their and banking sectors in 
particular-as well as their status in relation to the European Union.  In developing the models of 
cost efficiency and market share, this description of the banking sector suggests it will be 
important to incorporate changes over time as well as country specific differences. These issues 
are further explored in the subsequent chapters. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The analysis and estimation of cost efficiency are at the heart of this thesis. It is the subject of 
investigation in the present chapter and the following Chapters 3 and 4. It is also used later as an 
explanatory variable in the analysis of market structure in the banking sector in Chapters 5 and 6.  
The aims of this chapter are to discuss the theoretical concepts of efficiency followed by a review 
of the methods of investigation of efficiency levels. In doing this, a number of important issues 
have to be highlighted and their role in this thesis discussed. 
 
The first important issue is what is meant by efficiency, the different types of efficiency used in 
the literature and the choice of an appropriate measure of efficiency for the purpose of this thesis. 
The concept of efficiency has evolved through time and various dimensions have been developed. 
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It is therefore important to establish the notion of efficiency given the aims and objectives of this 
thesis and discuss its scope and limitations in the rest of this thesis. The second main issue of 
interest is the choice of appropriate methods of investigation, which involves several decisions 
(the approach and method of estimation of efficiency, the choice of functional form, the type of 
frontier against which efficiency is estimated and the definition of the bank) and each of them is 
addressed separately. We consider two dimensions for each issue: (i) the theoretical 
underpinnings, and (ii) the concerns of this thesis as presented in Chapter 1.  
 
On the second issue, the first of these decisions sheds light on the approaches and techniques for 
estimation of efficiency. In particular, there are parametric and nonparametric approaches, and 
a range of techniques under each of the two approaches. The choice of approach and technique 
is based on: (i) the recent theoretical literature; and (ii) the arguments presented in Section 1.4.2 
and 1.4.3, specifically that the banking sector in SEECs has undergone substantial reforms and 
restructuring in the last two decades, hence it can be expected that banks will also experience 
changes to their cost efficiency. Hence, the review of the preferred technique is mainly focused 
on the identification of models which allow for estimation of time-varying efficiency. Also, the 
choice of the appropriate model arguably needs to take into account the latent (unobserved) 
heterogeneity, which can be easily mixed with inefficiency (Greene, 2008). Besides unobserved 
heterogeneity, there is also observed heterogeneity in these models and this issue is further 
discussed in this chapter. 
 
A further matter related to the methods of investigation is the definition and types of “frontier” 
against which the efficiency is predicted and arguments as to whether it should be common or 
country specific. This is important for this thesis because our dataset is comprised of a set of 
countries which, although similar to each other in some respects, are still quite different in other 
respects, as discussed in Sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.3. Next relevant issue to be considered is the 
choice of the functional form of the underlying production function, that is, the form of the 
relationship between output and inputs. Given the nature and complexity of banking services, the 
definition of the inputs and outputs are not always clear cut and alternative measures need to be 
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discussed before embarking on the process of estimating efficiency. There are two main 
approaches to nature of banking services, the production and intermediation approaches, and 
the inputs and outputs in each approach are different. 
 
Thus this chapter is structured around the two main issues: first, discussing the underpinnings of 
the concepts of efficiency and, second, exploring various methods of estimation of (in)efficiency, 
including many issues that need to be addressed prior to embarking on the estimation process. 
Specifically, the structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 defines the concept of efficiency, 
its evolution and various dimensions. Methods of estimation are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 
considers the types and the choice of the “frontier” against which efficiency is supposed to be 
estimated, while the choice of “functional form” is subject of analysis in Section 5. Section 6 
discusses the nature of a bank, that is, bank as a producer or an intermediary. The chapter finishes 
with the concluding remarks in Section 7 which summarises the choices made with respect to the 
method of estimation (which will be applied in Chapter 4). 
 
2.2 THEORY OF EFFICIENCY 
In the 1930s economists developed the argument that the failure of a firm to achieve the 
theoretical maximum reflects some form of inefficiency in the organisation of production. Hicks 
(1935) argues that people managing companies in monopoly positions do not strive to minimize 
the costs of operations (or fully reach the conventional objectives) because the absence of 
competitive pressure allows them to operate with higher costs than is theoretically possible. 
Hicks’s  well-known statement was “The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life” (1935, p.8). 
Leibenstein (1966, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1987 and elsewhere) developed the concept of X-
inefficiency maintaining that production is bound to be inefficient because of the presence of a 
variety of problems such as: motivation, information, monitoring and agency problems within the 
firm. Leibestein’s X-inefficiency has been criticized by Stigler (1976), and others, on the grounds 
that it reflects an incompletely specified model rather than a failure to optimize. However, Coelli 
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et al. (2005) emphasize that the difficult problem of model specification (including a complete list 
of constraints, technological and others such as regulatory, and a proper specification of the 
objective function) has faced us forever, and will continue to do so. 
 
Optimal production is defined as the maximum obtainable outputs from given inputs for a given 
level of technology. The production frontier that defines the set of maximum outputs from the 
available inputs is obtained by the production function. According to Koopmans (1951), a 
producer is technically inefficient when with less of at least one of the inputs it can produce the 
same output (input-oriented measure of efficiency) or if it can produce more of at least one 
output with the same bundle of inputs (output-oriented measure of efficiency). Debreu (1951) 
introduced a measure of technical efficiency defined as one minus the maximum equi-
proportionate reduction in the bundle of inputs that still allows the production process to 
continue. Economic efficiency could be associated with cost, revenue and profit efficiency, which 
depends on the optimization process, in other words the objectives which the firm aims to achieve 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Coelli et al., 2000 and Greene, 2005). As this thesis is concerned 
with estimation of cost efficiency for transition economies, it is this aspect of efficiency that is 
explored in detail in what follows.5 
 
Farrell (1957) maintains that economic efficiency consists of technical and allocative efficiency. 
According to Farrell, a producer is inefficient either by producing less than the maximum output 
available from a given bundle of inputs (technically inefficient) or by not using the best mix of 
inputs given their prices and marginal productivities (allocatively inefficient). Such a definition 
considers cost minimisation as a producer’s objective and in turn reflects how cost efficient the 
producer is. The analysis of efficiency defined in Farrell’s seminal paper (1957) is graphically 
presented in Figure 2.1 (as originally used by Farrell) using the input-oriented approach which is 
used in this thesis and is suitable for measuring cost efficiency. 
                                                        
5 In the remaining text cost and economic efficiency are used interchangeably. 
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Figure 2.1 Technical and allocative efficiency measures (Farrell, 1957) 
To explain this figure and for simplicity consider three firms using x1 and x2 as production factors 
for producing a single product (q) and subject to constant returns to scales. SS’ is the isoquant 
curve which represents various minimum combinations of x1 and x2 per unit of output required. 
Firms using any combination of the two inputs which corresponds with the isoquant SS’ are 
technically efficient (TE). Hence, firms operating at Q and Q’ are technically efficient firms, while 
a firm operating at P is technically inefficient. The distance between the two firms operating at Q 
and P (QP) presents the technical inefficiency of the firm at P and the ratio QP/OP represents the 
extent of inefficiency, or the proportion by which x1 and x2 need to be reduced for the firm at P 
to become technically efficient. Hence, technical efficiency (TE) is measured by the ratio: 
𝑇𝐸 = 1 −
𝑄𝑃
𝑂𝑃
=
𝑂𝑄
𝑂𝑃
 
This ratio is bound between 0 and 1, where 1 stands for fully technically efficient firm, such as at 
the firm at Q. 
 
If the input prices are known and a particular behavioural objective such as cost minimisation is 
introduced the cost efficiency of a given firm (which is of special interest to this thesis), can be 
measured. The slope of the isocost line AA’ is the ratio of the prices of the two inputs. The 
tangency point of isocost and isoquant is the cost efficient position, because it represents the 
minimum cost combination of inputs for producing q. The firm operating at Q’ is cost efficient. 
The cost efficiency of firm P can be presented with the vector of inputs associated with firm at P 
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and the cost-minimizing input vector associated with firm at Q’, hence the cost efficiency of firm 
at P is defined as the ratio of input costs and the corresponding input vector of that firm and the 
firm at Q’ or using the distances in the diagram it would be: 
𝐶𝐸 =
𝑂𝑅
𝑂𝑃
 
Given this the overall efficiency, which the literature refers to it as either “cost efficiency” or 
“economic efficiency” (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Coelli et al., 2005 and Greene, 2005) presents 
a broader concept than technical efficiency and includes allocative efficiency. This overall 
measure of efficiency is obtained by the multiplication of both technical and allocative 
components, 
𝐶𝐸 = 𝑇𝐸 ∗ 𝐴𝐸 =
𝑂𝑄
𝑂𝑃
∗
𝑂𝑅
𝑂𝑄
=
𝑂𝑅
𝑂𝑃
 
 In this section the concept of efficiency, along with its different types, have been briefly 
presented using the original work of Farrell (1957). The analysis suggests that firm’s efficiency is 
measured against a “frontier” which represents the optimal combination of minimum inputs for 
production of a certain output given the budget constraint. Hence, any deviation from the 
“frontier” indicates that the firm is not fully efficient.  Efficiency is measured on a scale from 1 to 
0, with 1 being a fully efficiency firm.  This thesis investigates cost efficiency, which includes both 
the technical and allocative types distinguished in above.  
 
2.3 METHODS OF ESTIMATING EFFICIENCY 
The estimation of efficiency in the economic literature is a quite complicated issue as it involves 
not only different broad methods but also a number of technical questions that need to be 
answered. Here, we shall review the different methods used to estimate efficiency and argue for 
the approach we will take in our estimation process (Chapter 4).  
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2.3.1 Parametric vs. Non-parametric approach 
The level of bank efficiency can be estimated by either nonparametric or parametric approaches 
(see Berger and Humphrey, 1997; and Bauer et al., 1998 for a comprehensive discussion of these 
approaches). The differences between parametric and non-parametric approaches are primarily 
in the assumptions imposed on the data with regard to how much shape is imposed on the 
frontier (the functional form, i.e. more restrictive parametric functional form versus a less 
restrictive nonparametric form), and distinguishing between the random error term and 
inefficiency. Specifically, in the parametric method, random fluctuation is possible whereas there 
is no random element in nonparametric approach, thus the former approach aims to distinguish 
between random error and inefficiency, while in the latter all deviations are considered as 
inefficiency (Berger and Humphrey, 1997, pp. 4-5). 
 
The most popular non-parametric approach in the literature is the Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA)6, developed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978). It is a mathematical linear 
programming-based technique which measures efficiency by enveloping a quasi-convex hull 
around the data representing the highest output that could be generated given the inputs, or the 
lowest level of inputs given the outputs. The hull defines the efficient subset; hence all producers 
inside the hull are classified as inefficient (Greene, 2008 p. 112). A useful feature of DEA is that it 
performs without parameterizing the technology, meaning that no explicit form of specification 
of the underlying input-output relationship is required. Because of this feature, DEA is considered 
as principally atheoretical (Greene, 2008 p. 113). 
 
The literature points out several disadvantages of DEA. Firstly, it can be very vulnerable to the 
number of variables included in the model. As the number of variables increases relative to the 
sample size, DEA might overestimate the firm’s efficiency since the probability that a firm would 
                                                        
6 Besides DEA, another nonparametric approach is Free Disposal Hull developed by Deprins et al. (1984), since it is not 
frequently used in empirical studies of the banking industry, we do not include it in the discussion.  
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locate and apply a set of weights to its outputs and inputs that would make the firm efficient is 
increased (Yunos and Hawdon, 1997). In other words, according to Bauer et al. (1998, pp. 9-10) 
many firms could be presented as 100 per cent efficient, but only because the DEA method itself 
is not efficient when too many dimensions are included which leaves a firm isolated in terms of 
comparing with the other firms. This problem is of concern when measuring efficiency for the 
banking sector because of the importance of including quality and environmental controls, which 
greatly increase the number of variables included in the model (Bauer et al., 1998 p. 10).  
 
Secondly, the main flaw of DEA is the absence of a random error term, thus any deviation from 
the frontier is labelled as inefficiency (Berger and Mester, 1997, pp. 11-12). Consequently, DEA 
does not give any statistical properties, hence no hypotheses testing. In other words, any random 
error, which may be for instance due to measurement problems associated with using accounting 
data, may be counted as differences in efficiency. Different accounting practices were used in the 
early years of transition and the introduction of international accounting standards and their 
implementation in most SEECs took a number of years to be completed (as discussed in Sections 
1.4.2 and 1.4.3). This may result in random measurement errors. Another reason for expecting 
“randomness” is associated with shocks in the environment, which can affect firms differently. 
This is important for SEECs given that, as discussed in Chapter 1, their macroeconomic 
environment underwent considerable changes due to the process of transition. Hence, employing 
DEA in our case might produce biased efficiency estimates. The aforementioned problems of DEA 
suggest that this approach would be inappropriate for the estimation of cost efficiency in the 
banking sector of the countries of interest in this study. 
 
The three parametric approaches to the specification of the efficiency frontier are the Stochastic 
Frontier Approach (SFA), the Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) and the Distribution-Free Approach 
(DFA). SFA, which is sometimes referred to as the econometric frontier approach, specifies a 
functional form for the cost, profit, or production relationship among inputs, outputs and 
environmental factors and also allows for a random variation element. SFA assumes a composed 
error model where random errors follow a symmetric distribution, usually the standard normal 
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distribution, while inefficiencies are assumed to follow an asymmetric distribution (the half-
normal, exponential, gamma or truncated distributions).  
 
TFA, introduced by Berger and Humphrey (1991 and 1992), does not require restrictive 
assumptions with respect to the distribution and the independence of the error components and 
this is an advantage over SFA. Contrary to SFA, it does not assume a one-sided error term, hence 
does not present a conventional frontier approach for estimating efficiency (Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000). Specifically, as discussed by Berger and Humphrey (1992, p. 257) the TFA approach 
estimates two cost functions, first for the lowest average cost quartile of banks which are 
assumed to be above-average efficient and to form the “thick frontier” and the second for the 
banks in highest-cost quartile, which are assumed to be less than average efficient. Given this, the 
error terms within the cost quartiles presumably reflect only random error (measurement error 
and chance), whilst the predicted differences between the top and bottom cost quartiles are 
assumed to reflect combination of exogenous influences and cost inefficiencies (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1992; Bauer et al, 1998 and Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Consequently, the 
inefficiencies are entrenched in the difference in predicted costs between the lowest and highest 
cost quartiles (Bauer et al., 1998, p. 13). Having said this, the foundation of this analysis is the 
division of the firms in quartiles with respect to the average cost distribution (since we are 
interested in cost efficiency). TFA gives an estimate of the general level of overall efficiency, but 
does not provide point estimates of efficiency for all individual firms. As Kumbhakar and Lovell 
(2000) argue, TFA aims to give some indication of the possible magnitude of inefficiency without 
being econometrically accurate.  
 
As Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p. 178-179) point out, TFA has some serious limitations. Firstly, 
it is common for TFA to employ quartiles based on average cost, but if instead the quartiles are 
equally distributed and/or banks are divided in less or more groups (for example, tertiles or 
quintiles), then estimated cost efficiency would decrease or increase, respectively. Secondly, the 
more quantiles employed the fewer observations available for efficiency estimation. For instance, 
if we use quartiles or quintiles we use only 50 or 40 per cent of the data respectively. Such loss of 
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degrees of freedom is critical especially in small data sets as is the case in the banking sector of 
SEECs. Finally, TFA generates only a single cost efficiency estimate, not individual estimates for 
each firm, and this is indeed the main shortcoming of this approach. Although Bauer et al. (1998) 
findings suggest a similar magnitude of cost efficiency estimates relative to SFA, this approach is 
inappropriate for the purpose of this thesis. In particular, we need to estimate the efficiency level 
for each bank as the efficiency variable will be used as a potential determinant of banks’ market 
share in Chapter 6.  
 
DFA, developed by Berger (1993), is plausible only in the context of panel data and is similar to 
the Schmidt and Sickles (1984) model in the framework of SFA, which is further discussed in 
Section 2.3.2). Like TFA, and contrary to SFA, it makes no assumptions regarding the specific 
distributions of the inefficiency component of the error term, leaving the data to tell the story, 
which is considered as one of the useful features of this approach. As discussed by Berger (1993, 
p. 263), distributional assumptions are avoided by assuming stability over time to differentiate 
inefficiencies from random error. In particular, DFA assumes that cost differences due to 
(in)efficiencies are persistent, whilst random errors tend to cancel out over time. Berger (1993, p. 
263) originally explains “… good management maximizes long-run profits by keeping costs 
relatively low over long periods of time, although costs may fluctuate from trend because of luck 
and measurement error.” The stability of each bank's inefficiency over time, as suggested by 
Schmidt and Sickles (1984), is based on the notion of a firm-effect of efficiency. 
 
Given that this approach requires panel dataset it can be estimated by the traditional panel 
models, in particular the WITHIN method (fixed-effects panel model) and Generalized Least 
Squares (random-effects panel model), adjusted for the analysis of efficiency (discussed in Section 
2.3.2). In the context of the fixed effects model, a bank specific intercept is taken to be the bank's 
measure of inefficiency (efficiency is estimated as difference in the intercepts for each bank, 
where at least one bank is 100 per cent efficient). Similarly, in the case of the random effects 
model inefficiency of banks is measured relative to the bank with the smallest average residual 
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(the most efficient bank), with average residuals of each bank over time being obtained from the 
panel estimates.  
 
The main drawback of DFA is the assumption of time-invariant efficiency (Berger, 1993), which is 
not sustainable as T increases (Kumhakar and Lovell, 2000 and Greene, 2008). In addition, in the 
case where banks experience changes in their relative efficiencies over time DFA estimates only 
their average efficiencies for the period (Berger, 1993, p. 265). Also, the random error may not 
cancel out if a short panel data (small T) is at disposal (for more details see Berger, 1993). Hence, 
this assumption requires a long panel, which in turn confronts the assumption of time-invariant 
efficiency estimates. Most importantly, as discussed in Section 1.4.3, the banking sector in SEECs 
underwent extensive transformation in many aspects and, therefore, changes in the efficiency of 
banks are expected in the short run. Consequently, we do not find this approach appropriate for 
the estimation of cost efficiency for the banking sectors in SEECs.   
 
There is no consensus among researchers on the preferred frontier model. While parametric 
approaches impose a particular functional form which assumes the shape of the frontier, non-
parametric approaches impose less structure on the frontier but do not allow random error. If the 
functional form is not specified correctly, the measure of efficiency may be confounded by 
specification errors. Therefore it is very difficult to determine which of the two major approaches 
dominate the other, since the true level of efficiency is unknown. Adding more flexibility to the 
parametric approach and allowing for noise into the nonparametric frontier models may 
contribute to finding a solution to this matter. There are some recent efforts in this direction 
which are thoroughly examined by Simar and Wilson (2008). These new/adjusted frontier models, 
which are still in the early stage of development, are neither always easy to implement nor have 
they become generally accepted approaches as yet. Therefore, they are beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  
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Many empirical studies do not find evidence of differences in the inefficiency estimates in using 
DEA and SFA.7 However, these studies are not concerned with the banking sector in their analysis. 
When it comes to the empirical findings for the banking sector, research has found DEA and SFA 
to produce different inefficiency estimates. For example, Ferrier and Lovell (1990) and Bauer et 
al. (1998) estimate the efficiency for a large sample of U.S. banks and document major differences 
in the estimates from parametric and nonparametric approaches. In a nutshell, the discussion 
provided in this section demonstrates that the parametric approach is preferred over the 
nonparametric approach for efficiency estimation. Further, from the three parametric methods 
discussed, SFA, TFA and DFA, the SFA is the most appropriate because it allows for estimates of a 
time-varying efficiency for each country and each bank included in the dataset separately, which 
is also in line with the research questions of this thesis.   
 
 
2.3.2 Estimating cost efficiency using Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
Early studies that applied Farrell’s work are by Aigner and Chu (1968), Seitz (1971), Timmer (1971), 
Afriat (1972) and Richmond (1974). Their contribution to the literature of production and cost 
functions is the introduction of deterministic production (cost) frontiers and estimating them 
either by using linear programming  techniques or modified least squares regression techniques. 
SFA fundamentals originate from the late 1970s. This approach was independently introduced by 
three teams, Meuseen and Broeck (1977), Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Battese and Cora 
(1977) in the context of a cross-section data model, while Pitt and Lee (1981) and Schimdt and 
Sickles (1984) are the first to develop the SFA in the context of panel data models. Since the 
introduction of SFA, many researchers have contributed to further developments of SFA. Here we 
present the underpinnings of SFA along with the developments which allow estimation of time-
varying cost efficiency.  
                                                        
7 For example, Bjurek, Hjalmarsson and Forsund (1990) investigate the Swedish social insurance system; Forsund (1992) 
analyzes the Swedish ferries ; Ray and Mukherjee (1995) study the U.S. electricity generation; Murillo-Zamorano and Vega-
Cervera (2001) examine the U.S. electricity generators; Cummins and Zi (1998) question the U.S. insurance industry; 
Chakraborty, Biswas and Lewis (2001) explore the public education in Utah. 
 43 
 
CROSS SECTIONAL MODELS. Figure 2.1 presented in Section 2.2 explains the concept of cost 
efficiency implying that cost efficiency is measured against a “frontier”, expressed as 𝑐(𝑦, 𝑤), 
representing the minimum costs given the input prices [𝑤 = (𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑛)] to produce particular 
outputs, [𝑦 = (𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑚)]. The cost of banks for producing a given output is 𝑤
𝑇𝑥 = ∑ 𝑤𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑛 , 
where [𝑥 = (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)] denotes the vector of inputs. Cost efficiency (CE) is measured as a ratio 
of minimum costs to observed costs, that is 𝑐(𝑦, 𝑤)/𝑤𝑇𝑥. The cost frontier against which cost 
efficiency is measured can be expressed as a single-equation model, which allows for estimation 
of the technology parameters (factors of production) and bank-specific cost efficiency estimates. 
The basic requirement for estimating this model is data on the prices of inputs employed, the 
quantities of outputs produced and total costs for each bank. Moreover, given that this is a 
stochastic frontier analysis, it assumes that costs may be affected by random shocks beyond the 
control of banks. Hence the stochastic frontier can be expressed as8: 
Ci ≥ c(yi, wi;  β) ∙ exp{vi}  i=1,...,N, where N is the number of banks   … (2.1) 
Where Ci = 𝑤𝑖
𝑇𝑥𝑖 = ∑ 𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑛  is the total cost incurred by bank i, 𝑦𝑖 = (𝑦1𝑖, … , 𝑦𝑀𝑖) is a vector 
of outputs produced by bank i, 𝑤𝑖 = (𝑤1𝑖, … , 𝑤𝑁𝑖) is a vector of input prices faced by bank i, 
𝑐(𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑖; 𝛽) is the cost frontier common to all banks, where β is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated. Exp{vi} is a bank-specific random part, which captures the effects of random shocks 
coming from outside the bank and any events within the bank, all beyond its control and is 
expected to have a mean of zero. In particular, the Eq. 2.1 represents a stochastic frontier because 
it comprises two parts: a deterministic part c(yi, wi;β), common to all banks and a bank-specific 
random part, exp{vi}. Given the definition of cost efficiency 𝐶𝐸(𝑦, 𝑥, 𝑤) = 𝑐(𝑦, 𝑤)/𝑤
𝑇𝑥, the cost 
efficiency measure is: 
CEi =
c(yiwi;β)∙exp{vi}
Ci
                                                … (2.2) 
which defines cost efficiency as the ratio of the most cost-efficient bank (minimum cost attainable 
in a given environment, accounting for vi) to observed total cost of any other bank subject to 
analysis. A bank has CEi=1, if and only if it manages to produce at the lowest feasible cost level 
                                                        
8 The work of Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) is used for the mathematical representation of the model.  
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(no further reduction in the costs could maintain the same output level), otherwise CEi<1. In other 
words, the cost efficiency has a range between 0 and 1. It is expected that at least one bank to 
have a score of 1, presenting the best-practice bank against which the other banks will be 
compared with respect to cost efficiency. The further a bank is from 1, and closer to zero, the less 
efficient that bank is.  
 
Now, to convert the cost stochastic frontier into an estimatable model, a particular functional 
form needs to be imposed defining the relationship between inputs and outputs. For brevity of 
explanation, a Cobb-Douglas functional form (further discussion in Section 2.4 for other functional 
forms which are used in SFA and the choice of the preferred functional form used in Chapter 4 for 
estimation of banks’ cost efficiency in SEECs) is used for the deterministic part of the Eq. 2.1, such 
that the stochastic cost frontier model in Eq. 2.1 can be expressed as 
 
lnCi = β0 + βylnyi + ∑ βnlnwni+εin           … (2.3) 
where εi is a two component error term, εi = vi+ui. This two component error term is an 
identifying mark of SFA and burdens the estimation procedure. Aigner et al. (1977, p.24) argue: 
“The economic logic behind this specification is that the production process is subject to two 
economically distinguishable random disturbances, with different characteristics”. vi is the two-
sided statistical-noise component, which is assumed to capture the influences beyond control of 
the bank’s management and the measurement errors of the variables included in the model. In 
general, it follows a normal distribution with a mean of zero.  ui is the one-sided nonnegative part 
of εi, representing the proportion by which the bank fails to achieve the minimum obtainable 
costs for providing the particular level of services. That is, it measures the bank’s inefficiency. The 
statistical noise is assumed to be symmetric and independent, and identically distributed. Both ui 
and vi are assumed to be not correlated with the regressors and independently distributed from 
each other. In estimating the cost function it is necessary to impose the homogeneity assumption 
which ensures that the cost function is homogenous of degree 1 in input prices (the sum of the 
coefficients of the input prices equals 1).  
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Eq. 2.3 can be estimated by OLS. The OLS estimators of the slope coefficients are consistent, 
except for the intercept, since ui>0 and producer-specific efficiency cannot be estimated. Two 
approaches are proposed as a remedy for this deficiency by amending the OLS procedure, 
corrected OLS and modified OLS (details on the estimation procedure can be found in Kumbhakar 
and Lovell, 2000 and Greene, 2008). However, neither corrected OLS nor modified OLS frontiers 
by construction envelope the data from below, because they are parallel to the OLS (Kumbhakar 
and Lovell, 2000). Therefore, a different estimation technique is required for obtaining consistent 
estimates of all the regressors, including the intercept, and consequently obtaining bank-specific 
efficiency. This method is maximum likelihood (ML) which requires additional distributional 
assumptions. A two-step procedure is used: in the first step the model is estimated by OLS and 
the estimates serve as starting values for the ML estimation to obtain the estimates for the 
technology parameters, the intercept and the variances of the two error components. However, 
between the two steps the skewness (the third moment) of the OLS residuals are checked. If they 
have the “wrong” skewness (for cost frontier right-skewness is expected), then ML estimator is 
simply OLS for the production parameters (the slopes) and for σv
2, and zero for σu
2 (LIMDEP 
Manual, 2007, E33-14). Greene (2008) argues that in this case the data do not fit the SF model. 
However, that this is a potential problem of the SFA method is rarely discussed in the literature. 
As stated by Simar and Wilson (2008), so far, there are no published papers in which the reported 
composite residuals are with the “wrong” skewness. According to this, they argue that some 
authors may possibly manipulate the empirical process (i) either by “modifying” the model 
specification or (ii) by omitting some observations up to the point where the desired skewness is 
obtained. Simar and Wilson (2009) emphasize the importance of this issue with respect to the 
inference. Given their findings, publication bias may exist. 
 
The ML method requires distributional assumptions for the inefficiency component of the 
composed error term. In the literature, there is no clear cut view regarding the distribution of ui, 
just the agreement that it is one-sided and positively skewed, since ui>0. However the most 
commonly assumed distributions are half-normal, exponential, truncated and gamma 
distributions, expressed as: 
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ui~iid N
+(0, σu
2) nonnegative half-normal (Aigner et al., 1977); 
ui~iid G(λ, 0) exponential with mean λ (Aigner et al., 1997 and Meeusen and van den Broeck, 
1977) 
ui~iid N
+(μ, σu
2) truncated normal (Stevenson 1980) 
ui~iid G(λ, m) gamma with mean λ and degrees of freedom m (Greene, 1980 and Stevenson, 
1980). 
As can be noted from the above expressions, the half-normal and the exponential are used in the 
seminal papers of SFA, with the main rationale being to model the assumption that in the real 
world it is more likely that firms are relatively more efficient rather than relatively less efficient, 
implying a cluster of banks that score well on the efficiency scale, that is towards 1 (Coelli et al., 
2005). This would be appropriate in an industry with high degree of competition. Moreover, half-
normal and exponential distributions are quite rigid distributions. Unlike both of them, the 
truncated normal and the gamma models are flexible and allow for a wider range of distributional 
shapes which enables the data itself to reveal the efficiency “story”, but their limited use is due 
to the computational complexities. Stevenson (1980) proposed the truncated-normal distribution 
in order to generalize the half-normal distribution by enabling a nonzero mode. This distribution 
has an additional parameter to be estimated, the mode, and it collapses to half-normal when the 
mode is zero. The truncated normal distribution allows the mode of ui to take either positive or 
negative values. Greene (1990) generalizes the one-parameter exponential distribution, by 
including an additional parameter to be estimated, thus providing a more flexible distributional 
shape for 𝑢𝑖, the gamma distribution. When this additional parameter is zero, the gamma 
distribution collapses to exponential.9 Gamma distribution is rarely employed in the empirical 
analysis due to the complex estimation procedure (Greene, 2008, p. 126). 
 
                                                        
9 Kumbhakar and Lovel (2000) and Greene (2008) summarize the properties of these distributions in greater detail.  
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There is an ongoing debate in the literature about the choice of the distributional assumption that 
provides the best estimates the efficiency scores. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) provide a 
comparative study of the effects of different distributional assumptions on the estimation of cost 
frontiers and mean efficiency scores based on Greene (1990), using the Christensen and Greene 
(1976) electricity production data. Kumbhakar and Lovell obtain rank correlations for estimates 
of inefficiencies from the four distributions and the score is in the range from 0.75 (exponential 
and gamma) to 0.98 (half normal and truncated normal). Greene (2008) repeats and extends the 
same exercise using a full translog model and applying a better algorithm for the simulation based 
estimator for the gamma model, which more accurately estimates the complex function 
compared to the Kumbhakar and Lovell’s approach. Even though for the cost frontier parameters’ 
estimates he found considerable differences, the estimates of efficiency were almost identical, 
recording just minimal deviations. Greene (2008) compared the results for the four distributions 
and with respect to efficiency estimates he found that exponential and half-normal distribution 
are virtually identical, with correlation coefficients reaching up to 0.99. Coelli et al. (2005, p. 252) 
also conducted an exercise to compare the ranks of firms on the basis of technical efficiency and 
their findings suggest that rankings are usually robust to distributional choice. 
 
Despite the high rank correlation, Lee (1984) and Schmidt and Lin (1984) offer several tests for 
various distributional assumptions of the one-sided error component. The limited applicability of 
these tests is due to the procedural complexities, because the four distributions are not nested. 
Vuong (1989) proposes a test for nonnested models but it can only compare two models at a time. 
Coelli et al., (2005, p. 252) assert that an appropriate choice of a distributional assumption 
depends on theoretical considerations of the research objective. They explain that sometimes 
researchers circumvent the half-normal and exponential distributions since by construction, due 
to the zero mode, the efficiency estimates are around 1. Arguably we can say that it is the 
researcher’s choice to decide whether it is reasonable to expect such outcome. Much evidence 
suggests that it is better to choose a simple distribution rather than a more flexible and complex 
one according to the principle of parsimony (Coeilli et al., p. 252).  
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The discussion so far has been a prelude to the estimation of cost efficiency for each bank, 𝑢𝑖, 
which is the main objective of SF models. In the first few years of the introduction of the SF 
modelling, researchers failed to estimate efficiency on an individual level, and instead predicted 
the average efficiency, for example the mean efficiency of the whole banking sector, because they 
could not disentangle the two part of the error term at the individual level. The seminal paper of 
Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and Schmidt (1982) [hereafter JLMS] made an immense contribution to 
the SF literature, even to the present time, by providing a solution to the problem of predicting 
the individual efficiency. Their approach solves the problem of separation of the composed error 
term, 𝜀𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖, that is, they estimate the contribution of the inefficient one-side error part 𝑢𝑖 
and the random error 𝑣𝑖 to 𝜀𝑖, given that the model provide estimates of 𝜀𝑖 (Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000). More precisely, JLMS consider the expected value of 𝑢𝑖 to be conditional on the 
estimated 𝜀𝑖, which contains the information on 𝑢𝑖. 
 
 Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) adapt the JLMS procedure to the estimation of cost efficiency when 
𝑢𝑖 follows half-normal distribution 𝑢𝑖~𝑁
+[0, 𝜎∗
2] the conditional distribution of 𝑢 given 𝜀 is: 
𝑓(𝑢|𝜀) =
𝑓(𝑢,𝜀)
𝑓(𝜀)
=
1
√2𝜋𝜎∗
2 . 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
(𝑢−𝜇∗)
2
2𝜎∗
2 } [1 − 𝛷 (
−𝜇∗
𝜎∗
)]⁄ ,         … (2.4)  
Where: 
𝜇∗ =
𝜀𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎2
⁄                          𝜎∗
2 =
𝜎𝑢
2𝜎𝑣
2
𝜎2
⁄                       𝜎2 = 𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑣
2                     𝜆 =
𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣⁄  
Given that 𝑓(𝑢|𝜀) is distributed as 𝑁+[𝜇∗, 𝜎∗
2], the mean of this distribution may serve as a point 
estimator of 𝑢𝑖, hence: 
𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) = 𝜇∗𝑖 + 𝜎∗ [
𝑓∗(
−𝜇∗𝑖
𝜎∗⁄ )
1−𝐹∗(
−𝜇∗𝑖
𝜎∗⁄ )
] = 𝜎∗ [
𝑓∗(
𝜀𝑖𝜆
𝜎⁄ )
1−𝐹∗(
−𝜀𝑖𝜆
𝜎⁄ )
+
𝜀𝑖𝜆
𝜎
]         ... (2.5) 
where 𝑓∗ and 𝐹∗ describe the standard normal density and cdf, respectively. 
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𝑢𝑖 can be estimated only indirectly, since the obtainable estimates are those of 𝜀𝑖 (Greene, 2008, 
p. 176). Fried et al. (2008) emphasize that the individual efficiency estimates are unbiased, but 
inconsistent in a cross-sectional framework given that a bank is observed only at one period in 
time. The inconsistency can be improved only if 𝑇 → ∞ (further discussed in Section 2.2.2). An 
increase in N in the cross-sectional context does not improve the efficiency estimates. On the 
contrary, Greene (2008, p. 178) emphasizes that by construction JLMS estimator cannot produce 
unbiased efficiency estimates. In particular, he argues (p. 178) “The JLMS estimator is unbiased as 
an estimator of 𝑢𝑖 only in the sense that it has the same expectation that 𝑢𝑖 does. It does not 
estimate 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
unbiasedly in the sense that in repeated sampling, the mean of a set of observations 
on 𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) would equal 𝑢𝑖. They would not.”  In order words, Greene explains that 𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝜀𝑖) is an 
estimator of the mean of the distribution that produces the n-observations included in the dataset 
with particular Ci, yi, and wi. The JLMS procedure also applies in the case of normal-exponential 
distribution; for the normal-truncated and for the normal-gamma distributions details are 
presented in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) and Greene (2008). For brevity they are not presented 
in the chapter.10 
 
Based on the hitherto discussion, the cross-sectional models in SFA context allow for estimation 
of cost efficiency of each bank individually. Hence, if a stochastic frontier is estimated for each 
observed year, cost efficiency estimates can be obtained on a yearly basis, which are expected to 
vary across years for each bank. This seems to be a satisfactory condition in favour of the cross-
sectional models in SFA, given that in this thesis we allow bank efficiency to vary over time (based 
on the discussion in Sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.3).  However, the estimation of efficiency in a cross-
section context has shortcomings. Schmidt and Sickles (1984) are among the first to discuss the 
problem of cross-sectional analysis. They emphasize the following three problems: 
                                                        
10 Another common estimator for u is the Battese and Coelli (1988). However, given that this approach provides similar 
results compared to JLMS estimator and the latter is incorporated in LIMDEP we do not provide detailed discussion on 
Battese and Coelli (1988) and more on this estimator can be found in Kim Schmidt (2000), Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) and 
Greene (2008).  
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(i) The JLMS (1982) technique for decomposition of the composed error term into an 
inefficiency component and random noise is applicable in the cross-sectional analysis, but 
the efficiency estimates are not consistent, since the variance of the distribution of the 
efficiency, conditional on the composed error term, does not approach zero as the sample 
size increases. Moreover, Kumbhakar and Lothgren (1998) found a negative bias in the 
estimated inefficiencies when the sample size is less than 200; 
(ii) the strong distributional assumptions needed for both the maximum likelihood 
estimation and the composed error term; and 
(iii) the strong assumption of the independence of the inefficiency component of the error 
term and the independent variables (input prices and output quantity). However, it is 
likely that lower efficiency is a result of the selected input mix, which may call into 
question the validity of this independence assumption. 
(iv) To circumvent these problems researchers have further advanced the SFA by developing 
and adjusting panel data models for the framework of SFA and this is discussed next.  
 
PANEL MODELS. Panel data sets contain far more information than does a single period cross 
section data set. This provides the possibility of relaxing some of the restrictive distributional 
assumptions in the cross-sectional analysis, and also in efficiency estimates with more desirable 
statistical properties. The introduction of panel models in SFA contributes toward overcoming the 
problems of the cross-section analysis and opening up numerous challenging possibilities.  
 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p. 96-97) have summarized the advantage of moving over from a 
cross section analysis to panel data analysis. First, by having the opportunity to observe the same 
firm across time, the efficiency levels may be estimated consistently, as T→+∾, where T is the 
time-series component in panel data. Thus, the inconsistency problem is reduced by observing a 
firm through time, since by that more information can be collected for the firm. However, 
according to Greene (2008, p. 179) this is the case only for panel model which assumes time-
variant 𝑢𝑖𝑡, because “like any common effects model, a method of moments estimator of the 
‘effect’ is consistent in T.”, otherwise JLMS estimator does not converge to 𝑢𝑖𝑡. He continues that 
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holding efficiency constant with respect to T, requires complex economic justification. Hence, this 
advantage of panel estimators is somewhat overstated. Second, not all of the panel data 
estimators require strong distributional assumptions, in that the repetition of observations for 
each firm inside the sample can be a substitute for strong distributional assumptions. Finally, most 
panel data estimators provide estimates of the technological parameters and efficiency without 
the assumption of no correlation between cost efficiency and the independent variables. The 
time-series component of the panel data set models can be considered as a substitute for the 
assumption of no correlation.  
 
The work of Schmidt and Sickles (1984) represents an introduction of the traditional panel models 
in the stochastic frontier literature. From then onwards, numerous panel model estimators have 
been developed. The estimators that were commonly used in the early stages are the 
conventional estimators (fixed effects and random effects) as well as the maximum likelihood 
estimator. Initially, the conventional panel data estimator is suggested by Schmidt and Sickles 
(1984). Their proposed model for cost frontier is: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑜 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖                                             … (2.6) 
Where 𝐶𝑖𝑡  presents total costs, 𝑥𝑖𝑡  represents both input prices and output(s) for simplicity of the 
presentation, 𝑣𝑖𝑡  is the random noise and 𝑢𝑖≥0 represents time-invariant cost inefficiency, where 
the 𝐶𝑖𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑡  and 𝑣𝑖𝑡  can now vary across banks and time. As discussed in the previous section, the 
assumption of homogeneity of first degree in input prices should be satisfied, hence the sum of 
the estimated coefficients of input prices should equal 1. 
 
In order to estimate fixed or random effects models there is no need for a particular distributional 
assumption on 𝑢𝑖  (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984). However, the two models differ in two assumptions 
with respect to the correlation between 𝑢𝑖 on one hand and the regressors and 𝑣𝑖𝑡  on the other 
and regarding the randomness of 𝑢𝑖. In the fixed effects model 𝑢𝑖 are allowed to be correlated 
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with the regressors and 𝑣𝑖𝑡, but are fixed, whereas in the random effects model the correlation 
of 𝑢𝑖 with the regressors and 𝑣𝑖𝑡  is not allowed, but the 𝑢𝑖 are random (Greene, 2010). Moreover, 
the fixed effects model does not allow for the estimation of the effect of time-invariant variables, 
but the random effect model does allow for such estimation. The fixed effect model is estimated 
by the within groups (dummy variables) least squares estimator (LSDV), whereas the random 
effect model is estimated by Generalized Least Squares (GLS) (technical details of the estimation 
procedure for both models is available in Schmidt and Sickles, 1984; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; 
and Greene, 2008). 
 
Besides the conventional panel data estimator, SFA in a panel data framework also makes use of 
maximum likelihood estimation. Pitt and Lee’s (1981) random effects model is among the first to 
introduce this kind of analysis. As in the cross-sectional model, imposing a distributional 
assumption is necessary even with the panel data model when MLE is used. The MLE procedure 
in panel data context is structurally similar to the one used for cross-sectional data and technical 
details of the estimation procedure could be found in the corresponding studies as well as in 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).  
 
Greene (2005a), however, emphasizes serious flaws in both models (fixed and random effects) 
and these are presented in what follows. He argues that the individual identity of the estimated 
inefficiency is obscured in the fixed effects model as a result of the loose parametarization, 
namely the individual efficiency can only be estimated relative to the “best”. On the other hand, 
the random effects model has a tighter parameterization, thus the inefficiency term in the model 
can be estimated directly. In the fixed effects model, there is ambiguity in the treatment of the 
time invariant effects. Greene considers the assumption of no correlation in the random effects 
model as an unreasonable assumption in stochastic frontier models, specifically when any of the 
variables of production relate to capital or its cost. Another common and serious shortcoming for 
these models is the possibility of 𝑢𝑖 being biased if any latent (unobserved) heterogeneity (time-
invariant effects) exists among the firms which is not related to inefficiency, as this it is forced 
into the firm specific term 𝑢𝑖 or 𝛽(𝑡)𝑢𝑖, hence 𝑢𝑖 no longer reflects only the bank’s inefficiency, 
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instead it picks up other time-invariant effects. Greene not only acknowledges this flaw, but also 
provides evidence of a large distortion of the results caused by the unobserved heterogeneity. In 
addition to the above problems, the major problem of these models is their treatment of cost 
efficiency being time invariant. Hence, in what follows models which primarily allow for 
estimation of time-variant cost efficiency are analysed, followed by models which are able to 
account for latent heterogeneity.  
 
TIME-VARIANT PANEL MODELS. A perennial question in the panel context is whether efficiency 
should be treated and modelled as constant over time, or time variant – which is arguably a more 
favourable and logical assumption. Given that consistency is improved in panel models as T 
increases, longer panels are preferred, but the longer the time period, the less sustainable the 
assumption of time-invariance. This issue is of more importance the longer the time period of the 
observations in a panel, since over time the firm may invest in new technology which will cause a 
shift in the frontier and/or or the managers benefit from “learning by doing”, resulting in 
improvements in the firm’s efficiency and inefficient firms are forced out by market pressures. 
This argument is particularly relevant to this thesis, given the restructuring in the banking sector 
in SEECs, including the extensive ownership transformation during the process of transition as 
discussed in sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.3. 
 
There is no clear cut solution to the problem of how long (how many years) can a firm’s efficiency 
be reasonably treated as time-invariant. Greene (2011) proposes that in 10 years it is to be 
expected that firms will make changes in the efficiency level, whereas up to 5 years it can be 
assumed that there are minor, if any, changes in efficiency level. The period between 5 and 10 
years is unclear and it mainly depends on the nature of the examined sector. We assume that in 
our context five years are long enough period to expect changes in cost efficiency to occur as 
discussed in sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.3. Greene (2004) makes use of the panel models in which 
efficiency is modelled as time-variant where the particular panel data set has a time-series 
dimension of 5 years. Greene (2008) emphasizes that after many years of research on stochastic 
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frontier modelling and numerous empirical investigations, efficiency estimates are sensitive to 
the assumption of time invariant efficiency.11  
 
Many researchers have developed models which allow for time-varying efficiency. Among the 
early models of this kind are Cornwell et al. (1990), Kumbhakar (1990), Lee and Schmidt (1993), 
and Baltagi and Griffin (1988). This study does not aim to review the complete literature on time-
varying panel data models, instead the focus is on a selection of such models, chosen according 
to the following particular criteria: (i) the models are widely used in the empirical literature, with 
special reference to transition economies and (ii) the time-varying model which controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity, given the earlier discussion of Greene (2005b). The empirical 
literature on efficiency in banking, especially in transition economies, mostly employs the models 
of Battese and Coelli (1992, 1995), while Greene (2005b) proposes a set of models, such as “true” 
fixed-effects and “true” random-effects as well as Random Parameters Models which control for 
latent heterogeneity. Therefore, these two strands of models are presented next, based on Eq. 
2.6, but the emphasis is on specification of the inefficiency component of the error term, that is 
𝑢𝑖𝑡.     
 
I. Battese and Coelli (1992): the time “decay” model 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖 = {𝑒𝑥𝑝[−𝜂(𝑡 − 𝑇)]}𝑢𝑖,               𝑡 ∈ Υ(𝑖); 𝑖 = 1,2, …  𝑁;                     … (2.7) 
where, the one-sided error term reflecting inefficiency, 𝑢𝑖 is assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed non-negative truncations of the 𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎2) distribution; 𝜂 is the additional 
scalar parameter Υ(𝑖) to be estimated for the set of Ti time periods. By construction in this model 
the variation in efficiency is provided systematically, given that the model comprises of two parts, 
the first being the time invariant 𝑢𝑖 as in the case of Pitt and Lee (1981) and the second being the 
                                                        
11 Greene (2008) finds that efficiency estimates are quite robust with respect to the choice of the panel model (fixed or 
random) and to the different distributional assumptions. Efficiency estimates are robust regardless of the methods used, in 
particular Bayesian or classical. 
 55 
 
time varying, which is specified as function of time, 𝑒𝑥𝑝[−𝜂(𝑡 − 𝑇)], where 𝜂 is parameter to be 
estimated, t denotes the year and T is the terminal year. Given this, in the last year the latter part 
is 1, hence 𝑢𝑖𝑡 collapses to 𝑢𝑖. This is a very strong assumption and applies “artificial” variation in 
the predicted efficiency. Moreover, given that the main component is time-invariant inefficiency, 
it implies that it incorporates time-invariant unobserved factors, that is the predicted estimates 
of efficiency reflects any time invariant firm specific heterogeneity in addition to the efficiency 
itself. This model is estimated by MLE. 
 
 
II. Battese and Coelli (1995): the observed heterogeneity model (environmental effects) 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝛿 + 𝑊𝑖𝑡              … (2.8) 
Where 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is a positive truncation of the 𝑁(𝑧𝑖𝑡𝛿, 𝜎
2) distribution and it is assumed to be 
independently distributed. 𝑊𝑖𝑡, is a random variable “defined by the truncation of the normal 
distribution with zero mean and variance 𝜎2, such that the point of truncation is −𝑧𝑖𝑡𝛿, i.e.,𝑊𝑖𝑡 ≥
−𝑧𝑖𝑡𝛿 (p. 327)” and 𝑧𝑖𝑡  is a (1 x m) vector of explanatory variables associated with the cost 
inefficiency of banks over time; and 𝛿 is an (m x 1) vector of parameters to be estimated. This 
extension, BC (1995), allows for inclusion of explanatory variables, which explicitly affect the 
inefficiency of the bank (bank-specific and other environmental characteristics), in addition to the 
time function when modelling 𝑢𝑖𝑡. In other words, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 by construction is a function of explanatory 
variables, 𝑧𝑖𝑡, and the parameters to be estimated, 𝛿. In the case where all estimated coefficients 
of the explanatory variables are insignificant (zero), then the cost inefficiency effects are not 
associated with these variables, hence the half-normal distribution is obtained. Greene (2008) 
emphasizes that the BC models produce satisfactory results only when the data is consistent with 
the model, otherwise extreme results may emerge, for example due to suspicious quality of data 
and this being an inappropriate model specification, (LIMDEP Manual, 2007, E33-53).  
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III. True random effects model (Greene, 2005b) 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = (𝑤𝑖 + 𝛼) + 𝜷
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝑁[0, 𝜎𝑣
2] 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = |𝑈𝑖𝑡|, 𝑈𝑖𝑡~  𝑁[0, 𝜎𝑢
2] 
𝑤𝑖~𝑁[0, 𝜎𝑤
2 ] 
                                … (2.9) 
This model is a half-normal stochastic frontier and presentation of the whole model is necessary 
given the differences in its initial construction. The motivation for this model is to model the 
heterogeneity and allow this to be time-invariant, while inefficiency to be time-variant. Time-
invariant heterogeneity is allowed in a common way by variation in the constant term, given this 
is a random-effects model. It seems very optimistic to have a regression model with three 
disturbances, (𝑤𝑖 + 𝛼), 𝑣𝑖𝑡  and 𝑢𝑖𝑡, which is inestimable, but in fact it is a model with two 
disturbance terms in it, that is (𝑤𝑖 + 𝛼), where 𝑤𝑖 is the random firm specific effect and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 =
𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, which has an asymmetric distribution. Hence, the approach is to fit the SF model and 
then decompose the 𝜀𝑖𝑡 using JLMS. This model is estimated by maximum simulated likelihood. It 
is estimated as a form of random parameters model, where the only random parameter in the 
model is the constant term which also includes the latent heterogeneity (the random effect) and 
becomes 𝛼 + 𝑤𝑖. Therefore, it can be expected that estimated inefficiencies from the Pitt and Lee 
(1981) random-effects model, in which the inefficiency term contains all other time invariant 
unmeasured sources of heterogeneity, are larger than those from the true random effects model, 
where bank-specific unobserved heterogeneity appears as a separate parameter from the 
inefficiency term, that is 𝛼 + 𝑤𝑖. Considering Battese and Coelli models, they represent a middle 
ground in time-varying panel data models, although it seems that they are closer to the time-
invariant models, than to freely time-variant efficiency models, such as the Greene’s true random 
effects model and true fixed effects model. The true fixed effects model is not presented here, 
given that only (additional) variables which vary over time can also be included in the function 
(LIMDEP Manual, 2007, p. E33-75). However, in our model as presented in Chapter 4 there some 
variables which are time-invariant, which makes this model inappropriate for our analysis, hence 
further discussion is not provided. 
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IV. The Random Parameters Models (RPM) 
In the true random effects model, the only random parameter is the constant term, which makes 
this model a special case of the broad family of RPMs. In particular RPMs allow for another 
formulation of the SF model, that is these models allow the function to vary more generally across 
firms and model the cross firm heterogeneity in the form of continuous parameter variation 
(Greene, 2005b). Following Greene (2005b) the general form of the random parameters SF model 
is expressed as: 
(1) 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟: 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜷
′𝐱𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 
𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝑁[0, 𝜎𝑣
2], 𝑣𝑖𝑡 ⊥ 𝑢𝑖𝑡. 
(2) 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟: 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = |𝑈𝑖𝑡|, 𝑈𝑖𝑡~  𝑁[𝜇𝑖, 𝜎𝑢𝑖
2 ], 
𝜇𝑖 = 𝝁𝑖
′𝒛𝑖, 
𝜎𝑢𝑖 = 𝜎𝑢 exp(𝜃𝑖
′𝒉𝑖). 
(3) 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑦: (𝛼𝑖, 𝜷𝑖) = (?̅?, ?̅?) + ∆𝛼,𝜷𝒒𝑖 + 𝜞𝛼,𝜷𝑤𝛼,𝜷𝑖  
𝜇𝑖 = ?̅? + ∆𝜇𝑞𝑖 + 𝛤𝜇𝑤𝜇𝑖 , 
𝜃𝑖 = ?̅? + ∆𝜃𝑞𝑖 + 𝛤𝜃𝑤𝜃𝑖 . 
              … (2.10) 
where (𝛼𝑖, 𝜷𝑖), 𝝁𝑖 and 𝜽𝑖 are vectors of random parameters to be estimated and each subvector 
of the full parameter vector, (𝛼𝑖, 𝜷𝑖), 𝝁𝑖 and 𝜽𝑖 is allowed to vary randomly with mean vector 
(?̅?, ?̅?) + ∆𝛼,𝜷𝒒𝑖, ?̅? + ∆𝝁𝒒𝑖  and 𝜽𝑖 = ?̅? + ∆𝜽𝒒𝑖, respectively. 𝑞𝒊 is a set of M related variables 
which do not vary over time and which enter the means (optional) of the random parameters. ∆𝑗  
is a coefficient matrix (NxM), which forms the observation specific term in the mean. 𝑤𝑗𝒊 is an 
unobservable Nx1 latent random term in the i-th observation in j, where 𝑗 = (?̅?, ?̅?), 𝜇, 𝜃 and is 
assumed to have a mean of zero and known variance. 𝛤𝑗 is a lower triangular matrix which 
produces the covariance matrix of the random parameters (more technical details in Greene, 
2005b and LIMDEP Mannual, 2007; Section E17.8). The parameters of the model are estimated 
by the technique of maximum simulated likelihood.  
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2.3.3 Heterogeneity in Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
An important issue in stochastic frontier modelling is the between firm heterogeneity, which has 
been already introduced in the time-varying panel data models. In the conventional 
representation of the stochastic frontier models we assume that the technology and the 
inefficiency distributions across individuals and time are homogeneous (Greene, 2008). The only 
reason for between firms differences is the existence of the random noise, 𝑣𝑖𝑡, which is a firm and 
time-specific shift factor. However, heterogeneity may be introduced in stochastic frontier 
modelling in various ways. Prior to this, it is important to distinguish between observable and 
unobservable heterogeneity. Observable heterogeneity appears when specific variables that 
present observable differences across firms that impact their cost function or the efficiency 
distribution are available but omitted from the model. Unobserved heterogeneity almost always 
occurs because as well as from the input prices, there are other variables that affect a firm’s 
output that are missing. For example, in service industries quality is an important aspect of firm’s 
performance, but it is very difficult for it to be measured. There are some proxies (for instance, 
number of branches, well established customer service departments, etc.) that measure the 
quality, but these are only partly correlated with the underlying variable. Therefore, according to 
Greene (2008) under unobservable heterogeneity is the awareness of important factors that 
should enter the model, but are not observable, which is a complicated problem to deal with. 
Another possibility that may give rise to unobserved heterogeneity, as argued by Greene (2008), 
is the possibility that the parameters might vary over firms, which implies that different models 
are appropriate for different groups of firms, if they vary in some manner identifiable by the 
groups (in line with the Random Parameters Models). Greene (2011) argues that in his study of 
the World Health Organization, this kind of unobserved heterogeneity might appear because of 
the existence of specific diseases in different regions in the world. The unobserved heterogeneity 
has been modelled in the Random Parameters Model (and the special case the true random 
effects model as discussed above).  
 
Next, we turn our focus on the observable heterogeneity, that is inclusion of additional 
explanatory variables, which suggest observable differences across firms, hence should be 
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introduced in the model; otherwise there is a problem of “excluded variables” which may lead to 
biased estimates. In the early stage of the development of the SFA, the usual procedure to explain 
the variation in efficiency [using other factors, named Zs] was to use a two-stage procedure, 
where in the first step the efficiency estimates are obtained by for example using SFA and the 
JLMS technique (as explained above), and in the second step the efficiency estimates are 
regressed on the Zs in order to explain the effects of the Zs on efficiency. Although, this two-step 
procedure seems a neat process of not only estimating the efficiency but also explaining its 
variation, from econometric point of view there are several problems that should be addressed. 
Wang and Schmidt (2002) investigate the properties of the two-stage procedure and of the 
advantages of the “scaling property” that uit can be defined as a function of Zs times ui 
independent of the Zs. They identify two sources of bias with respect to the two-stage procedure. 
The regression parameters in the first stage are biased if the Zs and the Xs are correlated and the 
former are not included in the model. The second source of bias, which is less acknowledged is 
that, even if Zs and Xs are independent, the estimated inefficiencies are under-dispersed when 
we ignore the effect of Zs on inefficiency, thus in the second stage the estimates of the effect of 
Zs on inefficiency is biased downward (toward zero).This is true regardless of whether Xs and Zs 
are correlated. Consequently, the possibility of estimating something about the determinants of 
efficiency, regardless of the “quality” of the second-step is questioned. Finally, the inefficiencies 
are assumed to be identically distributed in the first-step, but in the second-step it is assumed 
that they are related with the Zs with a certain functional form. Given these problems, Fried et al. 
(2008) expect that there will be no more studies using the two-stage approach. 
 
A perennial question is whether these additional factors (Zs) are relevant for the cost function 
itself or somehow they enter in the distribution of the inefficiency term (the observed 
heterogeneity). The location of the frontier might depend not only on the inputs but also on the 
Zs. Both the input prices and the Zs are treated as exogenous. The Zs may affect the structure of 
the technology by which inputs are transformed to outputs, or they may influence the efficiency 
with which inputs are transformed into outputs. In the case when the Zs are thought of as factors 
that influence the production process, usually factors that are beyond the control of the 
managers, they are included directly in the model in the same way as the technology parameters 
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(the inputs). In this case the Zs affect the output directly, by shifting the production function up 
and down. The structure of the conventional stochastic frontier model remains unchanged, thus 
the estimation techniques are also the same. In addition, Zs do not influence the efficiency, but 
define more precisely the relationship between the inputs and the output(s). When using 
maximum likelihood estimation, it is then required that Xs and Zs are both uncorrelated with vi 
and ui. This formulation contributes to a more accurate determination of the production 
opportunities and more precise efficiency estimates, but does not contribute to explaining the 
variations in efficiency.  
 
On the other hand, if there is a prior knowledge that some Zs directly affect the level of efficiency 
and cause changes in the efficiency distributions, then the Zs should be entered directly in ui 
function through a certain functional form. However, the positioning of particular Zs either as a 
part of the function of the production process or in ui is still an on-going debate in the literature. 
Greene (2011) argues that this issue should be left to the researcher herself to decide. We argue 
this decision primarily depends on the theoretical grounds of the research topic or on empirical 
evidence if a theory does not exist. The decision on this issue in the context of our empirical 
analysis is further discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
2.4 THE CHOICE OF FUNCTIONAL FORM 
Hildreth (1955) argued that "the principal disadvantage of continuous models lies in the biases 
which may accrue if an inappropriate (functional) form is used" (p. 64). The functional form 
represents the relationship between output and inputs. The growing number of available 
functional forms complicates the creation of an empirical model. This might be a reason for many 
researchers trying to circumvent this issue and resorting to the criteria “widely used in the 
empirical work”. Griffin et al. (1987) highlight the complexity of choosing the “right” functional 
form, resulting from the absence of a single criterion for its selection. They present four categories 
of criteria for selection of an appropriate functional form (homogeneity, homotheticity, elasticity 
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of substitution and concavity) with respect to the proposed hypotheses (assumed to be true, 
though not tested as part of the analysis).  
 
In order to obtain a better fit of the relationship, less restrictive functional forms are preferable. 
A function may gain in flexibility by augmenting a restrictive form with additional terms. However, 
the more flexible the functional form the higher the costs regarding the maintained hypotheses, 
degrees of freedom, possible multicollinearity and the complexity of parameter estimation.  
Greene (2008) argues that the choice of functional form in a production (or cost) model involves 
a range of implications regarding the shape of the implied isoquants and the values of elasticities 
of factor demand and factor substitution. For example, in the SFA literature, two functional forms 
dominate, namely Cobb-Douglas and translog. The Cobb-Douglas production function and the 
implied cost function have universally smooth and convex isoquants. The virtue of the Cobb-
Douglas functional form is its simplicity, which unfortunately provokes two major problems. 
Firstly, it can be used solely in the case of a single-output, otherwise the curvature properties are 
violated (Hasenkamp, 1976); and secondly, important from econometric point of view, if the true 
function of a particular production process is more complex than the Cobb-Douglas functional 
form, then the omission of modelling this complexity will end up in the error term, which may 
lead to biased efficiency estimates (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Consequently, the arguments 
support the choice of a flexible (second order) functional form.12 In general, these flexible 
functional forms differ with respect to definitions of flexibility, mathematical expansions, 
separability and regular regions (Thompson, 1988).  Defining flexibility is the primary ground for 
comparison between functional forms and the notion of flexibility is divided to local and global 
flexibility. Local flexibility, also named as Diewert flexibility, entails that an approximating 
functional form gives a perfect approximation for both the arbitrary function along with its 
derivatives (first and second-order) for any particular point in the domain (Griffin et al., 1987). No 
restrictions are imposed on the value of the function or its first two derivatives in the locally 
flexible form. Functions representing second-order Taylor series expansion are locally flexible 
functional forms. The translog functional form is the second-order Taylor series approximation of 
                                                        
12 For more details see Griffin et al. (1987), Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), Greene (2008). 
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the transcendental function and is arguably the most popular flexible functional form in SFA 
studies. It has advantages over the strong assumptions of the Cobb-Douglas functional form, since 
it relaxes the restrictions on demand elasticities and elasticities of substitution, but on the other 
hand the function is not monotonic or globally convex. Salvanes and Tjotta (1998) discuss the 
methodological problems of imposing an appropriate curvature on a translog model. Berger and 
Mester (1997), McAllister and McManus (1993), Mitchell and Onvural (1996) argue that the 
translog function has problems with fitting data that are far from the mean with respect to output 
size or mix, leading to differences in the results for scale economies.  
 
A remedy for the above problem might be even a more flexible functional form, which is a global-
flexible. Global flexibility can be assessed by the Sobolev norm (a distance measure) which 
provides a measure of error incorporated both in the derivatives and in the approximating 
function (Gallant, 1981). The Fourier-flexible (FF) functional form is Sobolev-flexible and has 
nonparametric properties. Global-flexibility is desirable due to: (i) small average bias predictions 
(Gallant 1981); (ii) substitution elasticities are estimated consistently (Elbadawi et al., 1983); and 
(iii) there is no spurious rejection when testing procedures are performed (Gallant 1982). The FF 
functional form, introduced by Gallant (1981, 1982, 1984), is an extension of the translog which 
adds Fourier trigonometric terms (sine and cosine), becoming more flexible compared to the 
translog form and represents a global approximation of the cost function. If the Fourier terms 
equal zero, the FF form is the translog. Thompson (1988) argues that global-flexibility is preferred 
over local-flexibility in mathematical and statistical terms. However, he emphasizes two reasons 
why local-flexible functions are more widely used than the global-flexible ones. The first is the 
complexity of specifying and estimating a FF functional form, and the second is the complication 
in calculating the standard errors of Fourier parameters. Moreover, an increase in flexibility is 
usually achieved by mathematical expansion, but it comes at a cost, that is (i) multicollinearity, as 
a result of inclusion of various parameters obtained by the transformation of the already existing 
variables in the model as well as plenty of interaction terms; (ii) difficulties in meeting the 
regularity conditions; (iii) the intricacy of interpreting parameter estimates; and (iv) a substantial 
reduction in degrees of freedom. Griffin et al. (1987) argue: “Because reductions in maintained 
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hypotheses come at a cost, added flexibility is not always desirable, and there are likely to be cost-
effective opportunities to achieve particular dimensions of flexibility (p. 217)”.  
 
Using the data on U.S. financial institutions, many authors such as McAllister and McAnus (1993), 
Mitchell and Onvural (1996), Berger et al. (1997a), Berger et al. (1997b), Berger and DeYoung 
(1997c) and Berger and Mester (1997d) provide evidence that the FF functional form fits the data 
better than the translog specification. Moreover, Girardone et al. (2009) find that the FF is 
preferable over the translog form after conducting a set of structural tests and comparisons for 
the case of banking industry in 15 EU countries. Kraft et al. (2002) also favour the FF functional 
form by finding that it provides better model specification for the study of the efficiency of 
Croatian banks compared to the tranlsog form. Berger and DeYoung (1996) find that estimated 
inefficiency under a translog specification is about twice the size of that specified under Fourier-
flexible functional form. Although there are advantages in using FF over the translog form, the 
aforementioned limitations are rather serious in the context of our analysis, especially the 
substantial loss of degrees of freedom relative to the sample size used in this thesis.13 Moreover, 
given that Random Parameters Models are included in the analysis, where coefficients are 
estimated for each unit of analysis, causing a substantial loss of degrees of freedom, further loss 
is not affordable given the size of the data set available. Under these circumstances, we have 
decided to use the translog functional form for the estimation of cost efficiency in Chapter 4. 
  
2.5 COMMON OR COUNTRY-SPECIFIC FRONTIER   
 Another important issue is to decide on the “frontier” against which the efficiency is predicted 
and this could be a common frontier for the whole dataset or a country specific one. In the former 
case, all banks from different countries are put under the same frontier against which each bank’s 
                                                        
13 The calculation of the degrees of freedom is not straight forward and depends on factors determined within the empirical 
procedure, mainly by the researcher; however, we could not calculate them at this stage, because it depends on the model 
specification. However, a small change in these factors can cause a substantial increase in the parameters to be estimated 
and it can easily reach over 100 parameters. 
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efficiency is estimated. The latter is a frontier against which only the banks in a particular country 
are compared and their efficiencies estimated. In the literature this issue is considered by Berger 
(2007), who discusses fully the advantages and disadvantages of the two types of frontiers, based 
on an extensive review of the literature. To our knowledge this is the only paper that emphasizes 
the importance of “modelling” the frontier for cross-country studies, thus this section draws 
largely on Berger’s work and arguments.  
 
The country specific frontier was mainly used in the early studies of efficiency. The comprehensive 
survey of Berger and Humphrey (1997) regarding the financial depository institutions includes 
122 studies. Only six of them deal with more than one country, while 66 out of the 116 single-
country studies analyse the efficiency of financial institutions in the USA, with the rest largely 
considering developed European countries. After this survey the number of single-country 
studies, particularly studies related to countries of interest to this thesis expanded.14 The nation 
specific frontier is appropriate for the analysis of the effects on efficiency resulting from: (i) bank 
regulation; (ii) domestic banks mergers and acquisition; and (iii) size and organization of banks. 
This frontier is useful when comparing different methods of efficiency measurement and the 
efficiency of state-owned banks versus privately-owned banks. It is also suitable when examining 
the effects of market power on efficiency, the source of productivity change and the efficiency of 
branches of a particular bank.    
 
Despite the extensive application of the country specific frontier, the main disadvantage is its 
unsuitability for comparing banks on international level. Specifically, this frontier cannot give any 
estimates about which countries have more efficient banks. The only possible comparison of 
efficiency predictions among countries, using country specific frontiers, is to gain insight into 
which countries the banks operate at an efficiency level closer to the best-practice bank in that 
                                                        
14 Argentina (Delfino, 2003; Berger et al., 2005), Australia (Otchere and Chan, 2003; Strum and Williams, 2004), China (Berger 
et al., 2009), Croatia (Kraft et al, 2006), Hungary (Hasan and Marton, 2003), Malaysia (Matthews and Ismail, 2006), Pakistan 
(Bonaccorsi di Patti and Hardy, 2005), Poland (Havrylchyk, 2006), Portugal (Barros and Borges, 2004), South Korea (Gilbert 
and Wilson, 1998),  Thailand (Leightner and Lovell, 1998; Chantapong, 2005) .  
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country. Although a common frontier across countries enables comparisons across borders, this 
approach has difficulties associated with differences in the economic environment between 
countries, such as: discrepancies in the economic development of the countries; different 
regulatory and supervisory practices; and differences in the level of development of financial 
markets. In his review, Berger (2007) asserts that the early studies applying the common frontier 
do not control for such discrepancies in economic environments, which leads to conflicting 
results. However, the studies after 2000 introduce better control variables which improve the 
efficiency estimates. The additional variables in the models include: measures of the banking 
market conditions, for instance income per capita, population, deposit and branching density; 
market structure indicators such as concentration ratio; and regulation measures such as the 
average equity capital ratio, risk and firm specialization. 
 
Berger (2007) argues that although the current literature is huge improvement on the early 
studies using a common frontier, limitations still exist. In particular, many economic 
environmental features are difficult to incorporate in the model such as: institutional, cultural, 
and demographic; settlement cycles and methods, and payments systems; and financial market 
development. As a result it is possible that measured differences in efficiency are due to 
unmeasured environmental variations rather than actual efficiency differences. As far as banks in 
SEECs are concerned, they face some similarities in their environments (as discussed in Chapter 
1), that is all of them are former socialist countries that went through the privatization of state-
owned banks, with foreign banks often taking large market shares. This is a leading argument 
used by researchers for applying common frontier studies already conducted for transition 
economies, for example Fries and Taci, 2005; Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel, 2005; Rossi, Schwaiger, 
and Winkler, 2005; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007.  
Bos and Schmiedel (2007) introduce a new strand in the literature on bank efficiency. They apply 
the meta-frontier methodology from Battese et al. (2004) to envelope the previously estimated 
country specific frontiers in order to estimate banks’ efficiency across a set of countries. The 
essence of the meta-frontier is first to test for possible technology differences among the 
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countries involved. Once this hypothesis is supported, in the next step a meta-frontier15 is applied. 
However, this approach is criticized as it tends to attribute efficiency differences to the 
"technology gap" which is in itself an unclear concept, specifically when banking sector is 
concerned.  
 
In this thesis we are interested in the cost efficiency of individual banks in the SEE region, including 
between banks in different countries. These estimates are used as independent variables in 
Chapter 6 as a possible determinant of market share in banking.  Thus the cost efficiencies will be 
estimated against a common frontier.  
 
2.6 A BANK: INTERMEDIARY OR PRODUCER?  
Another important question to be addressed before estimating efficiency is the definition of 
inputs and outputs in banking. This issue is quite controversial for financial institutions because 
of the complex nature of their activities and has an implication for what is regarded as outputs 
and inputs when estimating efficiency. Berger and Humphrey (1997) discuss the lack of consensus 
in the choice of inputs and outputs when banking institutions are considered. In particular, two 
main views describe the nature of the banks’ business: the production approach and the 
intermediation approach. These different perspectives initiated the ongoing debate in the 
literature regarding the definition of the inputs and outputs in the banking sector. The discussion 
sheds light particularly on the role of deposits, namely whether deposits are inputs, outputs or 
they share the characteristics of the both.   
The production approach (Berger et al., 1987) defines banks as providers of services for account 
holders. In other words, this approach assumes that the banks use inputs such as capital and 
labour to produce outputs as loans and deposits. In particular, the production approach considers 
                                                        
15 They define the meta-frontier as “a deterministic parametric function (of specified functional form) such that its values are 
no smaller than the deterministic components of the stochastic frontier production functions of the different groups involved, 
for all groups and time periods” (p. 3, Battese et al., 2002) (originally taken from Bos and Schmiedel, 2007) 
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deposits as outputs because they contribute in the creation of value added by providing liquidity, 
safekeeping and payments services to depositors. On the other hand, the intermediation 
approach (Sealy and Lindley, 1997) regards banks as mediators between savers and investors, 
using the raised funds deposited by the account holders to offer loans to investors. This approach 
argues that the deposits and their costs (the interest rate paid to the depositors) should be 
considered as inputs and the loans and investments as outputs to be used in the estimation of 
bank efficiency, because the former present a raw material to be converted into the latter.  
 
Neither the production nor the intermediation approaches fully captures the dual roles of 
financial institutions as (i) providing transactions/document processing services and (ii) being 
financial intermediaries that transfer funds from savers to investors. Berger and Humphrey (1997) 
discuss the advantages of each approach. They argue that the  production approach fits better for 
evaluating the efficiencies of branches of banks, because branches primarily process customer 
documents and branch managers almost have no influence over bank funding and investment 
decisions. The intermediation approach seems more suitable for evaluating an entire bank 
because at the bank level interest expenses often accounts for one half to two thirds of total costs, 
which are not considered in the production approach.  
 
Berger and Humphrey (1991) and Bauer et al. (1993) put forward the modified production 
approach, suggesting a consideration of both input and output features of the deposits. In 
particular, the interest paid on the deposits is considered as an input, while the volume of deposits 
is accounted as an output. Other efficiency studies have first treated deposits as an input and 
then as an output. These investigations find that efficiency is somewhat higher when deposits are 
treated as an output. Since the treatment of deposits in efficiency models can affect the efficiency 
estimates, this aspect of model specification may be of some importance to the outcome. There 
are empirical studies that compare the efficiency estimates using the two approaches and some 
of them find differences in the estimates, while others argue they are very similar regardless of 
the approach employed. In support of the former, Berger and Humphrey (1997, p.32) assert: 
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 “Overall, it appears that inferences regarding efficiency may be importantly affected by how 
output is measured, a result which is usually less dependent upon investigator choice than 
availability of data.” 
 
Tortosa-Ausina (2002) adds that the choice of appropriate approach depends on the given 
circumstances, related initially to theoretical basis then data availability. She emphasizes little 
attention is paid to this issue compared to the choice of technique for efficiency estimation, albeit 
its importance derived from different output definitions could bias the efficiency estimates.  
 
This thesis employs the intermediation approach (Sealy and Lindley, 1997) because 
intermediation is still the primary activity of a bank (IMF, 2012). Moreover, the bank’s role as an 
intermediary is even more prominent in SEECs, given that the capital markets have been 
underdeveloped in these countries (discussed in Section 1.1) and banks are main providers of 
capital. Finally, Berger and Humphrey (1997) argue that intermediation approach is more suitable 
for the estimation of the efficiency of each bank.16  
2.7 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter various concepts of efficiency were considered initially and “cost efficiency” as 
defined by Farrell (1957) was selected as the concept investigated in this thesis. That estimation 
of efficiency is a challenging task is highlighted by Bauer et al. (1997, p. 2) that “... there is really 
no consensus on the preferred method for determining the best-practice frontier against which 
relative efficiencies are measured.” This argument is reflected in the analysis of the methods of 
investigation for estimation of efficiency which was the main focus of this chapter.  
                                                        
16 In this chapter and the rest of the thesis we refer to a “bank” in its entirety as the unit of analysis (not individual branches 
or parts of a bank providing a special service). 
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The initial issue discussed as a part of the methods of investigation was the choice of estimation 
approach, namely parametric or nonparametric. The preferred approach was the parametric one 
because it has statistical properties and distinguishes between random error term and 
inefficiency, which is not the case for the nonparametric approach. There is also a range of 
parametric approaches for estimation of cost efficiency as discussed in this chapter, but SFA was 
selected as the suitable method for estimation of cost efficiency in banking in SEECs, the subject 
of analysis in Chapter 4. The rationale for this choice is based on the theoretical characteristics of 
SFA, in that SFA allows for estimation of time-varying efficiency and controls for latent 
heterogeneity. Specifically, the Random Parameter models are chosen as the most appropriate in 
the context of SFA because they possess the above mentioned features. However, given the 
popularity of the Battese and Coelli (1992, 1995) models, we decided to employ these models as 
well in Chapter 4 for comparative purpose. 
 
Several other issues such as the choice of functional form, the “frontier” type and the definition 
of bank’s inputs and outputs were also discussed in this chapter. In terms of the functional form 
we argued for the use of translog functional form, although there are advantages in using more 
flexible functional forms, but there are serious limitations of the latter in the context of our 
analysis, on the grounds of degrees of freedom given the available data set. Next, it was decided 
that bank’s cost efficiency should be estimated against a common frontier, because our data sets 
includes the SEECs and besides their similarities, these countries experienced different 
transitional pace and economic development as discussed in sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.3 and this will 
be done in Chapter 4. Finally, in terms of the role of the bank, it was decided to treat banks as 
intermediaries because of the fact that intermediation is the primary role of banks in SEECs and 
also because we aim to estimate cost efficiency of each bank.  
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 2 the concept of efficiency was presented along with a number of relevant issues 
associated with the methods of estimation of cost efficiency in the banking sector. The empirical 
approach to the estimation of cost efficiency in this thesis has been determined on the basis of 
the theoretical framework, including the new developments in theory of stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA), and in line with the aims of this thesis, that is estimating cost efficiency which is 
time-variant (Section 1.2). However, before we proceed with this empirical analysis, this chapter 
reviews the empirical literature on cost efficiency estimation in banking, with special reference to 
transition economies, thus, serving as a bridge between the previous chapter and the empirical 
analysis of the thesis in Chapter 4. 
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In reviewing this literature the chapter aims to: (i) identify the knowledge gap in the field of cost 
efficiency in banking with special reference to transition economies; (ii) identify the variables 
which should be included in the estimation of cost efficiency in banking, including those reflecting 
observable differences across countries (and the banking industries) and across banks; and (iii) 
following the discussion in Chapter 2, confirming our decisions regarding the methods of 
investigation for the empirical analysis in Chapter 4. 
 
Given these aims, the focus of the discussion in this chapter is on the methods of estimation of 
the SFA applied in the empirical studies of cost efficiency in banking and this is presented 
systematically in line with the structure of Chapter 2. By doing this we can compare similarities 
and differences with respect to relevant aspects of the methods of estimation and the empirical 
questions tackled in the respective analyses. The review is accompanied by a critical assessment 
of the studies examined, identifying the drawbacks in the current literature and the knowledge 
gap associated with the estimation of cost efficiency in banking using SFA. This literature review 
focuses almost exclusively on the studies conducted for the transition economies (an exception 
being Section 3.2 that briefly discusses the early studies of efficiency estimation in banking). The 
rationale for this is fourfold: First, the countries under consideration in the empirical work in this 
thesis are all transition countries. Second, the application of models discussed in Chapter 2 
requires decisions related to specificities of the industry and countries under consideration. Given 
the discussion in Sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.3 the transition economies have undergone massive 
restructuring in the banking sector and present a separate group of countries with specific 
similarities and differences very distinct from other countries that have been studied and, 
therefore, should be studied separately. Third, given that the bank level data for these countries 
is still limited (even in the Bankscope database), only studies on transition economies are useful 
in the process of identifying the specific variables used in the estimation process. Studies for 
developed economies use disaggregated data for the variables of interest, for example the input 
prices and outputs of each bank, but such data are not available for SEECs. Finally, and possibly 
most importantly, to our knowledge these empirical studies follow the approaches used in the 
studies for the developed economies. We follow this approach as long as the literature on 
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transition economies provides good coverage of the methods of investigation. If the coverage is 
not achieved we will go beyond this literature.   
 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 contains a brief discussion of the early studies of 
estimating banking efficiency. Section 3.3 presents the empirical studies and developments in 
estimating banking efficiency in transition countries. In particular, Section 3.3.1 provides an 
overview of the single and cross-country studies. An examination of the methods of investigation 
applied in the estimation of cost efficiency in banking in transition economies is the subject of 
analysis in Section 3.3.2. Section 3.3.3 identifies the variables of relevance for the empirical 
analysis in Chapter 4. Section 3.3.4 provides a comparison of the results in terms of banks’ cost 
efficiency in transition economies obtained from the studies reviewed here. Section 3.3.5 
discusses and extends the two important empirical studies which are most relevant and help to 
establish our contribution to knowledge used as a basis in Chapter 4. Finally, Section 3.4 concludes 
the chapter.  
 
3.2 EARLY STUDIES ON COST EFFICIENCY IN BANKING 
Efficiency estimation for the banking sector began in the late 1980s. In the early stage, a 
remarkably high number of studies were conducted for the U.S. compared to the developed 
European countries’ banking sectors. Berger and Humphrey (1997) present a comprehensive 
survey of the early studies of the efficiency of financial institutions. The survey comprises of 130 
studies, of which 122 examine financial depository institutions and eight analyse efficiency in 
insurance companies.17 Sixty-six out of the 122 studies examine efficiency in the U.S. banking 
sector and 41 studies are predominantly focused on the developed European countries, but none 
of these studies considered transition economies (for obvious reasons). Almost all of these studies 
focus on a single country (accounting for 116 out of 122 studies), but during the 1990s several 
                                                        
17 In the discussion that follows, the studies of insurance company are excluded, since the interest of this thesis is on the 
banking sector alone. 
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authors extended their datasets to include additional countries. For example, three studies 
evaluate efficiency in the Scandinavian banking sectors, one study considers eight developed 
countries and one study examines 15 developed countries. 
 
Regarding the technique of estimation applied, the reviewed early studies make use of at least 
five different frontier approaches, in particular 69 studies use nonparametric techniques (Data 
Envelopment Analysis, DEA, and Free Disposal Hull, FDH) and 60 make use of parametric 
techniques (SFA, DFA, TFA). As discussed in Section 2.3.1 the differences between the two broad 
techniques are in the extent of shape imposed on the frontier and the existence of a random error 
in addition to inefficiency. Comparing the results of the vast number of early studies, Berger and 
Humhprey (1997, p.45) find that the efficiency estimates from the nonparametric and parametric 
frontier models are similar, but the mean efficiency estimates obtained from the nonparametric 
techniques are somewhat lower and have greater dispersion compared to those obtained from 
the parametric techniques (more specifically, the mean efficiency for the nonparametric and 
parametric techniques is 72 and 84 per cent, respectively). However, in terms of the efficiency 
rankings of the financial institutions when nonparametric and parametric techniques are applied 
(only presented in few of the reviewed studies), these ranking are inconsistent across the 
techniques. Additionally, some of the reviewed studies find a strong relationship between the 
findings of different techniques while some of them find only weak relationships (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997). 
 
In their review, Berger and Humphrey summarize several shortcomings of these early studies on 
efficiency in the banking sector. First, they argue that researchers decide upon the method/model 
used in the study in line with the idiom “the lesser evil”. Choosing “the lesser evil” results from 
the complexity of efficiency estimation as discussed in Chapter 2, hence the chosen 
method/model was usually the one which is easily applicable. Such approach for choosing a 
method/model is inappropriate, because this kind of decision should be based on theory and 
evidence. Second, they emphasize the limitations of the nonparametric and parametric methods, 
namely the absence of random error term in the former method and restriction on the frontier 
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shape in the latter method. Given this, they call for further developments and improvements in 
both methods so that the data will arguably yield efficiency estimates that are more accurate and 
more consistent across different approaches. Third, they encourage efficiency estimation analysis 
to be conducted for banking sectors across the world, given that studies are predominantly 
focused on the US and some developed European countries. Moreover, they assert the necessity 
of cross-country investigation of efficiency in banking, since such studies were limited at the time 
of their review. Finally and vey importantly, they point out that, although the early studies find 
that financial institutions are not fully efficient, little has been said about the possible factors that 
may affect efficiency and by that explain why inefficiency exists along with efficiency differences 
among financial institutions and its persistence over time in market economies. However, even 
the few studies that examine determinants of efficiency by regressing efficiency estimates on a 
set of explanatory variables in a second stage, manage to explain only a small portion of the total 
variation in efficiency. In addition to Berger and Humphrey criticism although the two-stage 
studies opt for the analysis of determinants of efficiency, they overlook the limitations of the two-
stage procedure as discussed in Section 2.3.3, which is a deficiency in the early studies that carried 
out this process.    
 
3.3 STUDIES ON COST EFFICIENCY IN BANKING IN 
TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
None of the vast number of studies reviewed in the survey by Berger and Humphrey (1997), and 
discussed in the previous section, covered any of the transition countries. However, researchers 
began to show interest in estimating banking efficiency for this group of countries in the late 
1990s. The empirical studies for transition countries are quite diversified with respect to the 
methods of investigation and findings, therefore this literature review is organized in such manner 
that analyse different issues in separate subsections in line with the structure of Chapter 2. 
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3.3.1 Single versus Cross-country studies 
The first paper to examine the banks’ efficiency in transition economies dates back to 1998 by 
Kraft and Tirtiroglu, focusing on the Croatian banking sector for the period 1994-1995 and applies 
the SFA technique. From then onwards, the archive considering transition economies expands. 
Similar to the studies surveyed by Berger and Humphrey, in the early stage of these studies, the 
interest is mostly in analyzing single countries Nikiel and Opiela (2002) for Poland, and Taci and 
Zampieri (1998) for the Czech Republic (as cited in Fries and Taci, 2005). Kraft et al. (2002) 
evaluate the relative efficiency of state-owned, private and foreign banks in Croatia using 
different models and functional forms. Hasan and Merton (2003) analyse the performance and 
efficiency of Hungarian banks in the post-privatization era with an emphasis on the dynamics of 
bank efficiency and the effect of foreign banks entering the market. Mertens and Urga (1998) 
examine the progress of the banking sector by estimating cost and profit efficiency in Ukraine. 
 
The focal point of the more recent studies is cross country comparisons for transition economies, 
in particular the Central and East Europe countries (CEECs) that are already members of EU and 
counties in SEE with prominent EU aspiration which are working on their EU accession. This 
stream of studies comprises of the following empirical contributions. Weill (2003) and Kasman 
(2005) estimate cost efficiency for the banks in the Czech Republic and Poland, with special 
reference to the effect of the presence of foreign ownership in the banking sector in both 
countries. Rossi et al. (2005) aim to investigate cost and profit efficiency of the banking sector in 
nine transition economies and to examine the impact of managers’ behaviour on the efficiency 
levels. Fries and Taci (2005), Bonin et al. (2005), Kasman and Yildirim (2006) examine the cost 
efficiency and the effect of the influx of foreign ownership in the banking sectors of 15, 11 and 8 
transition economies in the process of restructuring, respectively. Fries and Taci (2005) and 
Kasman and Yildirim (2006), in addition, attempt to show the country-specific and bank-specific 
factors that are related with higher/lower cost efficiency, as well as to portray the progress of 
financial integration before joining EU. Mamatzakis et al. (2008) focus on the banking sectors in 
ten of the new EU countries and estimate both cost and profit efficiency. Furthermore, they 
investigate the convergence of the efficiency levels and the efficiency differences. Yildirim and 
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Phillipatos (2007) aim to estimate cost and profit efficiency of banking sectors and their 
determinants in 12 transition economies, including both EU members and non-EU members. 
Likewise, Kosak and Zajc (2006) and Kosak et al. (2009) analyse the eight new EU members. The 
former evaluate and compare banks’ cost efficiency and aim to identify the factors that influence 
the level and differences of cost efficiency scores, whereas the latter examine the evolution of 
efficiency and the factors that enhance that development in the banking sectors. Kosak and Zoric 
(2011) examine the cost efficiency in the eight new EU member countries, by employing different 
models and methods of estimation with special reference to the importance of properly 
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
The discussion, so far, reveals that the empirical contributions considering transition countries 
deal almost exclusively with the countries that recently joined EU; the exceptions are several 
studies that include Croatia in their set of countries (this country, too, has been an EU member 
since 2013) and Macedonia (in three studies only).  To the best of our knowledge, there is only 
one empirical study evaluating cost efficiency in the banking sector for the SEECs (that is, BiH, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro), conducted by Staikouras et al. 
(2008). Although, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, are subject to analysis in the other studies 
focusing on the new EU member states, most of the successors of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro as a separate countries and BiH) are not examined before this study, indicating the 
small amount of research on this region. Moreover, Albania is not included in any of the reviewed 
studies. 
 
The time span of investigation in the aforementioned studies is largely in the period from 1993 to 
2003, i.e., in the relatively early stages of transition. Only the study of Kosak and Zoric (2011) 
covers the later period of 1998-2007. It is remarkable that although all of these studies emphasize 
the aim of evaluating bank efficiency in the new EU member states, only this last study covers the 
period after the countries acceded to the EU. Most of these countries joined the EU in 2004, with 
the last two joining in 2007.  
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Table 3.1 Methods of investigation used in the reviewed studies for cost efficiency in the banking sectors in transition economies using SFA 
Author(s) Period No. of countries List of countries Data source No. of obs. 
Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998) 1994 1 Croatia National Bank of Croatia 86 
Mertens and Urga (2001) 1998 1 Ukraine UICE 79 
Kraft et al. (2002) 1994-2000 1 Croatia National Bank of Croatia 363 
Nikiel and Opiela (2002) 1997-2001 1 Poland National Bank of Poland 301 
Hasan and Marton (2003) 1993-1998 1 Hungary HFSEA, NBG, HMF 193 
Weill (2003) 1997 2 Czech and Poland Banskcope 47 
Fries and Taci (2005) 1994-2001 15 Bulgaria, Czech, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, 
Slovakia and Ukraine 
Bankscope, EBRD Transition 
Reports, IMF’s IFS 
1897 
Bonin et al. (2005) 1996-2000 11 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia 
Bankscope 856 
Rossi et al (2005) 1995-2002 9 Czech, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia 
Bankscope 1170 
Kasman (2005) 1995-2000 2 Czech and Poland Bankscope, IMF’s IFS, WBI 261 
Kasman and Yildirim (2006) 1995-2002 8 Czech, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia 
Bankscope 997 
Kosak and Zajc (2006) 1996-2003 8 Czech, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia 
Bankscope 429 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) 1993-2000 12 Czech, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia 
Bankscope 2042 
Staikouras et al. (2008) 1998-2003 6 BIH, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Macedonia and Serbia-
Montenegro 
Bankscope 515 
Mamatzakis et al. (2008) 1998-2003 10 Cyprus, Czech, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
Bankscope 766 
Kosak et al. (2009) 1996-2006 8 Czech, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia 
Bankscope 1055 
Kosak and Zoric (2011) 1998-2007 8 Czech, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia 
Bankscope 928 
Source: Author’s own compilation
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Although in the study by Kosak and Zoric (2011) one part of the time period under investigation 
covers the first years of EU membership for all the countries included in their analysis, they do 
not control for the period before and after joining the EU. It could be expected that once a 
transition country becomes an EU member it faces a single market with different environment 
characterized with respect to the size of the financial market, the diversity of available products 
and activities, competition, human capital and expertise, albeit the enhanced progress towards 
financial integration and accepting the legislative of EU during the process of negotiating. Table 
3.1 presents a summary of the scope of the analysis of the studies discussed above. 
 
3.3.2 Methods of investigation 
As elaborated in Section 2.3, the efficiency estimation requires decisions on a number of issues 
when setting the empirical model for efficiency estimation. Therefore, this section aims to present 
the methods of investigation employed in the reviewed studies for the banking sectors in 
transition economies with respect to these relevant issues. We replicate the structure of Section 
2.3 where the theoretical underpinnings are elaborated for the issues of concern, but in this 
section, we analyse them from a perspective of their application to the empirical studies on 
transition economies. Table 3.2 (presented at the end of this section, after the individual items of 
this table are discussed in the following sub-sections) summarizes the issues related to the 
methods of investigation used in the studies reviewed in this chapter (initially presented in Table 
3.1) 
 
Type of model and estimator. Irrespective of whether the aforementioned studies analyse single 
or multiple countries, at one point in time or over time, they employ different estimation 
techniques (Table 3.2). These empirical studies use various estimation techniques for cross-
section and panel data models. A typical representative of cross-section studies is Mertens and 
Urga (2001) examining the Ukrainian banking sector for 1998, using the least-squares estimator. 
But, in the context of SFA, this estimator has serious shortcomings: it does not necessarily 
envelope the data as closely as possible from above, and not all observations are enveloped by 
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the regression line (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, pp. 70-72). The former indicates a possibility of 
“superefficient” firms and the latter indicates that no firm is efficient.  
 
The cross-section study of Weill (2003) estimates a system of equations (translog function and its 
input cost share equations) by the Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression (ITSUR) technique 
using a maximum likelihood estimator for Poland and the Czech Republic for 1997. It is a common 
approach for the method of Maximum Likelihood to be applied in SFA. However, both cross-
section studies provide inconsistent cost efficiency estimates (see Section 2.3.2) which is a 
problem with cross-section data models. 
 
Besides these two studies, several studies estimate cost efficiency using data for more than one 
year. However, not all of these studies take full advantage of the panel data models, since they 
employ pooled estimation. Among these studies are: Kratft and Tirtiroglu (1998), Hasan and 
Marton (2003), Bonin et al. (2005), Kasman (2005), Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) and Staikouras 
et al. (2008). It should be noted that some of these studies are placed in this group in this 
discussion because the type of the model used in the study is unclear in that it is neither discussed 
in the study nor can be identified from the model presentation or the empirical results that it is a 
panel model. As in the “pure” cross-section studies, the cost efficiency estimates in the pooled 
models are inconsistent, since there is no time component which increases the likelihood of 
consistent efficiency estimates as T→∞, as discussed in Section 2.3.2. However, there are also 
studies dealing with cost efficiency in the banking sector in transition economies which apply 
panel data models, making use of the time component appropriately, hence increasing the 
probability that efficiency estimates being consistent. Studies that are included in this category 
are: Kraft et al. (2002), Fries and Taci (2005), Rossi et al. (2005) and Kasman and Yildirim (2006). 
A common feature of this group of studies is that the same estimator is used in the analysis, 
namely all of them exploit the estimators of Battese and Coelli (either 1992 or 1995), which are 
discussed in Section 2.3.2. 
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Distribution of ui. The next issue to be addressed is the choice of distribution of the inefficiency 
error term. In the reviewed studies a variety of distributional forms are applied (Table 3.2). Some 
studies employ more than one distributional form, mainly to compare the results obtained from 
different distributional forms. For example, Kraft et al. (2002) apply two different assumptions for 
the distributional form of the inefficiency error term, half-normal and truncated. Using the 
Likelihood Ratio Test (given that the two models are nested as discussed in Section 2.3.2), the 
results suggest no preferences for either of the two distributional assumptions. Kasman (2005) 
makes three different assumptions regarding the distribution of the inefficiency error term: half-
normal, exponential and truncated. Similarly to Kraft et al. (2002), Kasman (2005) obtains similar 
results from the three models with the different distributional assumptions. Only the study of 
Weill (2003) considers the gamma distribution for the inefficiency error term; this may be due to 
the complicated computation, because as originally argued by Greene (2008, p. 110): “The 
restriction that all sample residuals must be kept strictly positive for the estimator to be 
computable turns out to be a persistent and major complication for iterative search methods.” 
Like studies for the developed economies, the most common distributional assumptions for the 
inefficiency component of the composed error term are either half-normal or truncated. The 
former distribution is applied in Mertens and Urga (2001), Kraft et al. (2002), Bonin et al. (2005), 
Rossi et al. (2005) and Kasman (2005), whereas the latter distribution is used in Kraft et al. (2002), 
Hasan and Marton (2003), Fries and Taci (2005), Kasman (2005), Kasman and Yildirim (2006), and 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007). In addition, the truncated distribution is an integral part of the 
models of Battese and Coelli and thus also used in the studies discussed at the end of the previous 
sub-section. 
 
Time (in)variant efficiency estimates. As argued in Section 2.3.2 the feature of time-variant 
efficiency is found to be a significant factor for the differences in the efficiency scores obtained 
from estimation. However, in a number of studies under review in this section a different 
treatment of the efficiency with respect to time can be noted (Table 3.2). Some of the studies, 
Weill (2003) and Yilidirim and Philippatos (2007), treat cost efficiency as constant over time. Other 
studies present efficiency estimates for each year of the period included. Kasman (2005) and 
Hasan and Marton (2003), in particular, use pooled data models where the average yearly 
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estimates are calculated by simple average of each year’s bank efficiency obtained from the 
estimates of the pooled model. Bonin et al. (2005), by inclusion of time dummies, aim to control 
for differences in each year’s estimates. We refer to these methods of presenting time-varying 
efficiency as “quasi-time-variant” efficiency levels. Kraft et al. (2002), Fries and Taci (2005), Rossi 
et al. (2005), Kasman and Yildirim (2006), Kosak and Zajc (2006) and Kosak et al. (2009) obtain 
efficiency estimates that vary from year to year which results from the attributes of the Battese 
and Coelli (1992, 1995) estimators (Section 2.3.2). The wide use of these models is not really clear, 
given that the reviewed studies do not provide a detailed discussion regarding the criteria upon 
which the particular model is chosen for the empirical analysis. The argument of Greene (2008, 
2011) that the majority of the empirical studies employ the Battese and Coelli models (1992, 
1995) is further supported by this review of studies. Greene (2011) suspects the wide use of these 
models is possibly due to the implementation of Battese and Coelli models in the STATA software. 
No other SFA models have been available in STATA in a user friendly way. The popularity of these 
models is arguably the main reason for their consideration in the empirical work in Chapter 4. 
Moreover, it is a good opportunity to compare the performance of these models with the other 
chosen models, that is the true random effects model of Greene (2005) and the RPMs, as 
discussed in Section 2.7.    
 
Kosak and Zoric (2011) is the only study, to our best knowledge, which estimates time-varying 
efficiency and control for unobserved heterogeneity using, among the other models, the true 
random effects model proposed by Greene (2005). Given that this is one of the theoretically 
preferred models for estimation of efficiency in the banking sector in SEECs in Chapter 4 (as 
discussed in Section 2.7), this study is further discussed in Section 3.2.4. It is important to be noted 
that none of the empirical studies on efficiency in banking in transition economies makes use of 
RPMs. Therefore, we look wider and search the literature on efficiency in banking beyond those 
considering transition economies, for example studies examining the US or the EU banking sector. 
Despite an extensive search on the EconLit and Google Scholar, at the time of writing this chapter, 
we could not find any study employing RPMs, except the original study of Greene (2005) which 
considers the banking sector in the US to demonstrate the application of the true random effects 
and RPMs in the framework of SFA. Based on this discussion we identify a knowledge gap in the 
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empirical literature on efficiency estimation. In particular, the estimation of efficiency in banking 
using RPMs will further contribute to this literature. In terms of the true random effects model 
the contribution to knowledge is discussed in Section 3.2.4.    
 
Table 3.2 Methods of investigation used in the reviewed studies for cost efficiency in the banking sectors in transition 
economies using SFA 
AUTHOR(S) Type of 
Analysis 
Estimator Variation ui  Distribution 
of ui 
Functional 
form 
Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998) Panel ITSURa (MLEb) No Half-normal Translog 
Mertens and Urga 2001 Cross-section Least-squares  No Half-normal Translog 
Kraft et al. (2002) Panel BCc (1995) Time-variant Half-normal 
Truncated  
Fourier-
flexible 
Hasan and Merton (2003) Panel Pooled (ASLd-MLE) Quazi time-variant Truncated  Translog  
Weill (2003) Cross-section ITSUR (MLE) Time-invariant Gamma Translog 
Fries and Taci (2005) Panel BC (1993, 1995) Time-variant Truncated Translog 
Bonin et al (2005) Panel Pooled (ASL-MLE) Quazi time-variant Half-normal Translog 
Rossi et al (2005) Panel BC (1995) Time-variant Truncated; 
Half-normal 
Fourier-
flexible 
Kasman (2005) Panel Pooled (ASL-MLE) Quazi time-variant Half-normal 
Exponential 
Truncated 
Translog 
Kasman and Yildirim (2006) Panel BC (1995) Time-variant Truncated  Fourier-
flexible 
Kosak and Zajc (2006) Panel BC (1992) Time-variant Truncated Translog 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) Panel  Pooled (ASL-MLE) Quazi time-variant Truncated Translog 
Staikouras et al (2008) Panel Pooled (ASL-MLE) Quazi time-variant Truncated Translog 
Mamatzakis et al. (2008) Panel Pooled (ASL-MLE) Quazi time-variant Half-normal Translog 
Kosak et al. (2009) Panel BC (1995) Time-variant Truncated Translog 
Kosak and Zoric (2011) Panel Pooled (ASL-MLE), 
Pitt and Lee(1981), 
BC (1995) and 
TREe(Greene, 2005) 
Quazi time-variant & 
time-variant 
(depends on the 
model 
Truncated; 
Half-normal 
Translog 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
Note: a) Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regressions technique; b) Maximum Likelihood Estimation; c) Battese and Coelli; d) 
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and e) True Random Effects Model  
 
 
The choice of functional form. The choice of the functional form is another important issue when 
employing the SFA. Although, there are theoretical advantages of Fourier Flexible (FF) over the 
translog functional form as discussed in Section 2.4, it is not always feasible to use FF because of 
the computational difficulties it brings and the far more parameters that need to be estimated. 
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The FF functional form requires larger data sets, which are not usually available for transition 
economies. Kraft et al. (2002) use both translog and FF functional form and argue that regardless 
of the time dimension of the inefficiency and the distributional assumption of the error term, the 
preferred functional form is the FF functional form as suggested by the Likelihood Ratio Test. 
Apart from this study, the FF functional form is used only in two other studies, Rossi et al. (2005) 
and Kasman and Yildirim (2006). The translog functional form is far more used in the studies of 
transition economies, for example, Mertens and Urga (2001), Hasan and Marton (2003), Weill 
(2003), Fries and Taci (2005), Bonin et al (2005), Kasman (2005), and Yildirim and Philippatos 
(2007). Table 3.2 summarises the method of investigation as well as the distributional 
assumptions and the functional forms used in the literature on transition economies. 
 
 
3.3.3 Definition of variables in SFA 
As discussed in Section 3.1 one of the aims of this chapter is to identify the variables of relevance 
in conducting the SFA in order to estimate cost efficiency in banking. To that end we recall Eq. 2.6 
and augment it by the additional vector of exogenous variables, the Zs that may influence the 
total costs and their structure in the production of the given output(s), as discussed in Section 
2.3.3. The Zs may also directly affect cost (in)efficiency rather than the frontier itself, but this issue 
is further discussed in Section 4.3.1. At this stage we are interested in the identification and 
definition of the variables required for efficiency estimation, hence for now we include Zs as a 
part of the frontier as follows: 
    
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑜 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑙𝑛𝑍𝑖(𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                     … (3.1)                                
where 𝐶𝑖𝑡  presents total costs, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑤𝑖𝑡 and 𝑍𝑖(𝑡) represents the outputs, input prices and the 
additional exogenous variables, respectively. This section discusses the importance of the data 
used and the variables of interest in the context of the banking sector. Coelli et al. (2005) stress 
that the quality and appropriateness of data used in the sophisticated techniques for estimating 
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efficiency are just as important as the techniques themselves. No matter how powerful a given 
statistical technique or mathematical tool, it cannot overcome problems that fundamentally 
reside in data themselves. In the context of cost efficiency measurement, as presented in Eq. 3.1, 
three categories of variables are important: (i) output quantities, 𝑦𝑖𝑡; (ii) prices of inputs, 𝑥𝑖𝑡  and 
(iii) the additional exogenous variables, 𝑍𝑖(𝑡). Choosing between various output indicators in the 
case of service industries may be particularly challenging. A good understanding of the industry 
under consideration is a first and foremost requirement and banking is a complex industry and as 
such it can be considered either as a production or an intermediation activity, but as discussed in 
Sections 2.5 and 2.7 we regarded it as the latter. Berger and Humphrey (1991) state that with this 
approach flow data of monetary units of loans and deposits are appropriate to be included in the 
analysis. However, since flow data are not usually available, they argue that flows are typically 
assumed to be proportional to the stock of the loans and deposits expressed in monetary units. 
This approach is widely taken in the literature since the data used is based on financial reports. 
 
In order to define the variables to be later used in the empirical investigation of cost efficiency in 
banking in SEECs (in Chapter 4), we again focus on the studies conducting the respective analysis 
in transition economies. As discussed in Section 3.1, data on transition economies is still limited 
(this is further discussed in Section 4.3.2), but the studies on developed economies are not of 
much use. Table 3.3 presents the definition of the variables used in the empirical investigation of 
cost efficiency in transition countries which treat the bank as an intermediary (see Appendix to 
Chapter 3, Section 3.1, Table A3.1 for complete table including the definition of the variables in 
studies for transition economies using the production approach as well). Other than the 
production parameters, in this table the Z variables (macroeconomic indicators, banking industry 
and bank-specific variables) used in the reviewed studies are also presented.  
 
 
By analysing Table 3.3, it seems that, given data availability, the choice and the definition of 
variables in estimating efficiency in the banking sector is already well established. The dependent 
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variable in the cost efficiency model is the total cost (Table 3.3, Column 2), comprised of total 
interest expenses, personnel expenses and other operating expenses. Total loans and other 
earning assets are the two outputs used (Table 3.3, Column 3). The input prices are presented in 
Column 4. The first input price, the price of borrowed funds is equal to total interest expenses 
divided by total deposits/borrowed funds. The second input price, the price of labour is 
represented as personnel expenses per employee. The price of physical capital is defined as the 
ratio of non-interest (operating) expenses, excluding personnel costs, to fixed assets.  
 
Most of the studies use the ratio of total costs to total assets and ratios of each output to total 
assets (Table 3.3). This way of defining the variables is in line with Berger and Mester (1997) who 
use the equity capital as denominator in the ratio. They argue that this normalization is to control 
for heteroscedasticity and for scale biases in estimation as well as convenient economic 
interpretation of the findings. Therefore, this thesis, in particular Chapter 4 also considers this 
approach and considers total costs and outputs in terms of total assets. As discussed above, the 
price of labour is personnel expenses per employee, but data on the number of employees across 
banks and time is very restricted in Bankscope (Section 4.3). Given that there is a significant 
portion of missing data on number of employees, the reviewed empirical studies for transition 
economies measure the labour price as a ratio of personnel expenses over total assets, instead of 
number of employees (Table 3.3, Column 4). Therefore, this definition of the labour price will also 
be employed in Chapter 4, following this well-established approach in this literature for transition 
economies.  
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Table 3.3 Summary of the variables used for cost efficiency estimation in the studies for transition economies employing the intermediation approach 
Author(s) Dependent variable Independent variables Environmental factors 
 Total costs (TC) Output(s) Input prices Individual bank’s 
characteristics 
Structure of the 
banking industry 
Country level variables 
Kosak and 
Zoric (2011) 
Σ of personnel, 
interest and other 
expenses 
Loans 
Securities 
OEAb 
Labour (personnel expenses/TA) 
Borrowed funds ( interest expenses/funding) 
Physical capital (noninterest expenses/FAd) 
Equity ratio 
Foreign ownership (dummy 
variable) 
EBRD Indexe , HHIf 
Number of banks 
Intermediation ratio 
Population density 
GDPPg , Financial 
deepening ratioh  
Kosak et al. 
(2009) 
Σ of personnel, 
interest and 
noninterest expenses 
Loans 
Securities 
OEA 
Labour (personnel expenses/TA) 
Borrowed funds ( interest expenses/funding) 
Physical capital (noninterest expenses/FA) 
Equity ratio 
Ownership status, ROA 
market share 
net interest margin 
EBRD Index, HHI  
number of banks 
intermediation ratio 
Population density, 
GDPP, Financial 
deepening ratio 
Mamatzakis 
et al. (2008) 
Σ of personnel, 
administrative, 
interest, fee and 
commission 
expenses/TAa 
Loans/TA 
OEA/TA 
Labour (personnel expenses/TA) 
Borrowed funds (total interest expenses/ total 
interest bearing borrowed funds) 
Fixed netputs: Equity/TA and FA/TA 
Ownership 
Type of institution 
Bank size  
Listed/non-listed banks 
NO NO 
Staikouras et 
al (2008) 
Σ of operating and 
financial cost/TA 
Loans/TA 
OEA/TA 
Price of non-financial inputs [operating (non-
interest) expenses/TA 
Price of funds (Interest paid on borrowed 
funds/total funds) 
In the first stage: 
Equity, Cash/TA  
In the second stage: 
Equity/TA, LLP*/Loans,   
Deposits/Total funds 
ROA, Bank size, TA  
Ownership status 
Deposits per km2  
HHI  
 
GDPP  
Population density 
 
Mertens and 
Urga (2001) 
Σ of variable costs, 
noninterest and 
administrative 
expenses/TA 
Inter-bank loans/TA 
Consumer loans/TA 
Othersc/TA 
Labour (total labour costs/TA) 
Deposits (interest expenses/deposits) 
Physical capital (Σ of furniture, premises and 
other administrative expenses/FA) 
Input variables: 
Bank capital, FA 
Bank-specific variable: 
NPLs**/total loans 
  
Notes: a stands for total assets; b denotes other earning assets; c is other investments (government and risky securities and investment in other enterprises); d denotes fixed assets;  e stands for 
EBRD Index of banking sector development; f represents Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; g denotes GDP per capita, h presents  financial deepening ratio, which is a ratio of the total banks’ on 
country level over GDP; * Loan Loss provisions; ** Non-performing loans 
Source: Author’s own compilation
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Finally, the last three columns in Table 3.3 present the Z variables, in particular macroeconomic 
indicators, banking industry and bank-specific variables included in the reviewed studies. As can 
be noticed, again there is considerable consensus among those studies that incorporates all the 
three categories of Z variables which adjust the cost frontier or enter the mean/the variance of 
the one-side error term, ui (this issue is further discussed in Section 4.4). The rationale for inclusion 
of the three categories of controlling variables can be found in the arguments of Berger (2007) 
and Greene (2008) as discussed in Section 2.5 and 2.3.3, respectively. In addition, the empirical 
results regarding these variables for some of the reviewed studies are presented in Table 3.4 
below. As suggested by Berger (2007), country-specific and industry-specific variables are 
included to adjust the frontier against which the (in)efficiency is measured relative to the 
macroeconomic and industry environment in which the bank operates, given that this thesis, in 
particular Chapter 4, focuses on eight transition countries. Furthermore, as suggested by Greene 
(2008), bank-specific variables are included to control for potential heterogeneity resulting from 
different output quality, as the omission of variables from the model which explain differences 
across banks may affect the efficiency estimates. 
 
Following the studies presented in Table 3.3 we identify four environmental variables to be 
included in the empirical analysis in Chapter 4: real GDP per capita, the inflation rate, demand 
density and population density. Some of these factors are expected to have a negative impact on 
the total costs, that is, they contribute to a decrease of the total costs and thus reduce the cost 
frontier, shifting it to the right. Such factors include the level of economic development, measured 
as real GDP per capita, which influences the demand and supply for deposits and loans and  is 
expected to be negatively related to total costs as a result of economies of scale. 
 
The reviewed empirical studies in this chapter considering transition economies, find an inverse 
relationship with GDP per capita/GDP growth and total costs (Fries and Taci, 2005; Kasman and 
Yildirim, 2007; Kosak et al., 2009; Kosak and Zoric, 2011; Kasman, 2005 and Yildirim and 
Philippatos, 2007), in other words the economic development contributes to total costs 
reduction. The inflation rate is closely related with the level of the interest rates. Additionally, 
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high inflation is expected to have a negative impact on financial development. It is assumed that 
in economies with high level of inflation bank costs increase because of increased costs in credit 
screening and risk management. This is consistent with the findings of Kasman (2005) and Kasman 
and Yildirim (2007).  
 
The density of demand, the total deposits of the banking sector divided by area in square 
kilometres, is also expected to be negatively associated with total cost, because where banks 
operate in an economic environment with a lower density of demand they may incur higher 
expenses to collect deposits and offer loans. The expected relationship is found in Kasman (2005) 
and Kasman and Yildirim (2007). Finally, the population density ratio of inhabitants per square 
kilometre is also expected to have inverse relationship with total costs, given the fact that in areas 
of low population numbers, the demand for banking services is limited with respect to the number 
of customers. However, the empirical results in the reviewed studies are mixed; the expected 
inverse relationship is found in the studies of Kasman (2005), Kasman and Yildirim (2007) and 
Staikouras et al. (2008), but the opposite of the theoretical prediction, a positive relationship 
between total costs and population density is found in Kosak et al. (2009) and Kosak and Zoric 
(2011).  Although the last two indicators seem to be similar, they represent different country 
specificities. The population density may serve as an indicator for the market size with respect to 
demand, which is fairly constant over a short period of time. Thus, in the countries with low 
population density, the banks by default face the problem being unable to exploit fully economies 
of scale. On the other hand, demand density is expected to reflect simultaneously people’s wealth 
and trust in the banking system (the latter being an important factor in the transition period, since 
people lost the faith in the banking system because of the systematic failures at the beginning of 
the transition).   
 
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 serve as an evidence for the complementarity of these two indicators. 
Figure 3.1 displays the averages of the both indicators for each of the eight countries under 
consideration in this thesis and Figure 3.2 maps the average increase of demand density across 
these countries. According to Figure 3.1 although Albania and Serbia are the countries (only 
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Slovenia is more populated than Serbia), they are substantially lagging in terms of demand density 
compared to Slovenia and Croatia, the two countries with the highest average demand density. 
The differences between the two counties with the lowest and highest average demand density 
is enormous. 
 
Figure 3.1 Population density and demand density across countries (average over time) 
Source: Author’s own calculation (based on data from National Banks and World Bank) 
In addition, Slovenia and Croatia are the two countries with lowest average increase in the 
demand density over time, whereas Montenegro has the highest average increase in the demand 
density (Figure 3.2). In a nutshell, inclusion of only the one of these indicators may adjust the 
frontier inadequately. Consequently, this can be a criticism of the transition papers which do not 
control for the two indicators simultaneously (only Staikouras et al., 2008 controls for both the 
characteristics, while the others either include one of them or none). 
 
Figure 3.2 Average increase of demand density across countries 
Source: Author’s own calculation (based on data from National Banks and World Bank) 
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The banking industry specific features are usually represented by two indicators: the 
intermediation ratio and concentration ratio. The intermediation ratio, measured as total loans 
to total deposits in the overall banking sector, captures the differences among the banking sectors 
in terms of their capacity to convert deposits into loans, which may be related to bank holdings 
of government securities leading to the crowding out of private borrowing by the public sector, 
or inadequate institutions to support lending to the private sector with the absence of effective 
secured transactions and bankruptcy laws (Fries and Taci, 2005). Therefore, the relationship of 
the intermediation ratio to total cost is expected to be negative. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) is a measure of concentration. There is still an ongoing debate on the relationship between 
concentration and the cost/profit. If higher concentration enables some banks to exhibit market 
power, total cost may increase because of negligence and inefficiency as suggested by the Hicks’s 
quiet-life hypothesis (1935) and Leibenstein’s X-efficiency theory (1966). On the other hand, if a 
higher concentration results from superior banks’ management and the exploitation of 
economies of scale and scope, then higher market concentration leads to lower costs (Dietsch 
and Lozano-Vivas 2000; Fries and Taci 2005; Lensink et al. 2008), consequently higher cost 
efficiency (Berger, 1995). This can implicitly provide supportive evidence for the efficiency-
structure hypothesis (Demsetz, 1973). Moreover, improved efficiency could also result if the 
market remains contestable, which depends on the ease that firms can enter the industry, given 
that the existing industry is now more concentrated and more efficient. The discussion above 
suggests that concentration ratio is closely related to both cost and (in)efficiency implying that 
the “position” of this indicator in the model is dubious. However, given that this is an aggregated 
indictor on a country level rather than an individual indicator, such as market share, it is 
considered as an industry-specific, rather than bank-specific feature in the empirical estimations 
in Chapter 4. 
 
Several bank-specific characteristics that might affect the total costs, but primarily (in)efficiency 
should be included in the empirical analysis (the position of these variables in further discussed 
in Sections 4.2 and 4.4). Berger and Mester (1997) argue the importance of considering the 
financial capital when analysing efficiency, primarily because a bank’s insolvency risk depends on 
its financial capital available to absorb portfolio risks and losses, thus it affects a bank’s costs and 
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profits. Moreover, they maintain that if a bank is a risk averse, it may hold a higher level of 
financial capital than maximizes profits or minimizes costs. Therefore, if financial capital is 
ignored, the efficiency estimates may be under/overestimated, despite the optimal behaviour of 
the bank conditional on its risk preferences.  
 
The transition economies have undergone substantial structural reforms during the last two 
decades as discussed in Section 1.4. Market liberalization has been a crucial element of those 
reforms, opening up the markets for foreign investments. In the banking sector this has resulted 
in a situation in which a significant share is owned and operated by foreign banks. Following 
theoretical underpinnings and empirical findings, the effect of ownership is dubious (discussed in 
the next subsection), hence it is relevant the empirical analysis in Chapter 4 to control for this 
element and investigate the ownership effect on costs/efficiency in SEECs, given that ownership 
restructuring has been one of the main reforms in the banking sector.  
 
From the theoretical point of view it is assumed that producers provide outputs with same quality 
(homogenous products). However, in practice this assumption usually does not hold, especially in 
the banking industry which is highly specialized in “customer-tailored” products and the presence 
of asymmetric information in the lender-borrower relationship. Therefore, there is a need for 
model adaptation with respect to product quality. For that purpose, a measure for output quality 
is introduced in the model. The first step towards taking into account this complication is to 
consider total net loans, which do not include impaired loans, but introduce loan loss reserves or 
non-performing loans as a proxy for the quality of the output as it is a usual practice in the 
empirical studies in transition economies (Table 3.3). Both items are part of the balance sheet 
statement and present a stock of loan loss reserves and non-performing loans. So far, the 
empirical studies for transition economies do not control for the level of loan impairment charges, 
which are a position in the income statement and present the flow of loan impairment charges 
for the particular year. Therefore, they have direct impact on the total costs which means on the 
(in)efficiency level as well. The level of loan impairment charges is expected to be procyclical (for 
instance at the outset of the financial crises in 2009, the level of loan impairment charges more 
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than doubled in many of the countries, especially in Slovenia, Croatia and Bulgaria, see Figure 
3.3), therefore their inclusion in the empirical analysis in Chapter 4.  
 
However, it should be noted that the use of loan impairment charges, as a measure of the loan 
quality, is not without problems. In particular, they appear in the income statement as charges 
for impaired loans in the current year, but they in fact reflect bad loans approved in past years as 
well as the current year; therefore they represent the quality of the loans over a longer period of 
time. Thus, from economic theory perspective, they represent accounting costs, rather than 
opportunity costs, but given that loans are a stock not a flow of loans, which also incorporates 
approved loans in the past, it is considered to be the best measure for quality from the data 
available (further discuss in Section 4.3).  
 
 
Figure 3.3 Loan impairment charges across countries and time (constant price as of 2005) 
Source: Author’s own calculations (based on Bankscope and other data collected by the author) 
 
Finally, given that in the last decade many of the transition economies became EU member states 
it is reasonable to control for EU accession to capture any heterogeneity across EU and Non-EU 
countries as well as through time. However, none of the reviewed empirical studies control for 
this, which could be considered as a shortcoming of these studies. It is expected that EU dummy 
will capture the effect of accessing EU, which means changes in the current 
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environment/regulations faced by the banks. Additionally, it is expected that EU accession will 
force the banks to lower their costs in order to stay in the market. Therefore, the empirical 
analysis in Chapter 4 will consider this issue as well.  
 
Briefly, the empirical analysis in Chapter 4 considers the three categories of z variables discussed 
above, and the choice of their inclusion in the empirical model relies on the common practice 
already established in this literature, as presented Table 3.3. However, as discussed above the 
empirical work in this study will employ a different measure for output quality compared to the 
recent studies and will control for EU membership.    
 
One-step versus two-step approach and the inclusion of the Zs. The aim of this section is twofold. 
First, it aims to present the trend in the reviewed studies regarding the treatment of the additional 
explanatory variables, that is whether they are an integral part of the empirical model (one-stage) 
or these possible determinants of efficiency (the Zs) are regressed on the estimated banks’ 
efficiency levels (the two-stage approach). This issue is theoretically discussed in Section 2.3.3. 
Second, it aims to summarize the empirical findings regarding the aforementioned explanatory 
variables. The rationale for inclusion of macro level variables is to enable comparison across 
countries and control for the differences in the economic development, but also because the 
macroeconomic environment is expected to affect banks’ efficiency. However, some of the other 
explanatory variables of banks’ efficiency considered in the models are primarily included on 
intuitive rather than theoretical grounds as presented in Section 3.3.3.  
 
 
 
Table 3.4 Summary of the reviewed studies with respect to the stages employed in the empirical analysis 
and the empirical results in terms of the Zs 
 One-stage Quasi Two-stage 
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 Fries&Taci 
(2005) 
Kasman&Yildirim 
(2006) 
Kosak et al. 
(2009) 
Kosak&Zoric 
(2011) 
Kasman 
(2005) 
Staikouras et al. 
(2008) 
Yildirim&Philippatos 
(2007) 
GDP per capita insignificant  positive negative positive insignificant  
GDP growth  negative   negative  Negative 
Income per capita  negative   positive   
Inflation  positive   positive   
money/GDP     positive   
Population density  negative  positive positive negative negative  
Density of demand  negative   negative   
Intermediation ratio negative negative Insignificant positive negative   
EBRD index Nonlinear  insignificant negative    
No. of banks   negative negative    
HHI  positive insignificant insignificant  positive  
CR3/5 insignificant      Positive 
Market share negative  negative     
Panzar-Rose H-statistics       Negative 
Financial development   negative positive positive    
Foreign ownership negative Insignificant negative insignificant Mixed  Negative 
Capital/TA negative    negative  Negative 
ROA    negative     
NIM    negative     
Nominal interest rate positive       
Non-loans assets/loans  positive       
NPL/loans positive       
LLP/Loans      Insignificant  
Cash/assets      positive  
Large banks       Negative 
Loans/assets        Negative 
LLR/TL       Negative 
Short-term/Total fund       Negative 
Off-balance sheet       Negative 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
Table 3.4 summarizes the empirical studies according to the number of stages in the procedure 
of estimation taking into consideration the treatment of the efficiency determinants. We divide 
them into three groups: one-stage, quasi and two-stage procedures. The one-stage procedure 
incorporates the macroeconomic/environmental variables, the banking industry variables and the 
individual bank’s characteristics in the empirical model for efficiency estimation likewise the 
production factors and the outputs as discussed in Section 2.3.2 and 2.3.3. In the two-stage 
procedure the efficiency determinants are regressed on the obtained cost efficiency levels in the 
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second stage, where the efficiency estimates are obtained in the first-stage after performing the 
SFA or any other method for estimation efficiency. Although some researchers discuss the 
problems of the two-stage efficiency estimation procedure (Section 2.3.3), such an approach is 
often used in the literature for the transition countries. The quasi group, classification created by 
the author, comprises of studies that include macroeconomic and bank-industry specific variables 
in the first stage when efficiency is estimated, while regress the individual bank’s characteristics 
on the efficiency estimates in the second stage. There is also another group of papers, not 
considered in the table, which estimate cost efficiency for different countries, but do not control 
for the differences in the economic and financial development. The lack of these variables could 
easily lead to biased efficiency estimates. Several studies such as Mamatzakis et al. (2008), Rossi 
et al. (2005), Yildirim and Philippatos (2007), Bonin et al. (2005) ignore this issue and estimate 
efficiency under common frontier with no control for differences in development, except some 
of them include country dummies. Studies that follow the one-stage approach are Fries and Taci 
(2005), Kasman and Yildirim (2006), Kosak et al. (2009), Kosak and Zoric (2011), whereas Yilidirim 
and Philippatos (2007) represent the two-stage group. 
 
 
3.3.4. Comparison of the efficiency estimates in the reviewed studies 
Table 3.5 presents a summary of the cost efficiency scores in the banking sector in majority of the 
transition economies. The results indicate differences in the efficiency level obtained from the 
various studies. Serbia and Montenegro which are subject to analysis only in one study; therefore 
there is no counterpart for comparing the efficiency results for these particular countries. 
However, the new EU member countries are subject to analysis in the majority of the studies 
reviewed in this section. For instance, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia are analysed in Fries and Taci (2005), Rossi et al. (2005), Kasman and Yildirim 
(2006), Yildirim and Philippatos (2007), Mamatzakis et al. (2008), Kosak and Zajc (2006), Kosak et 
al. (2009) and Kosak and Zajc (2011). Analysing the results, it is very difficult to reveal any pattern 
of behaviour with respect to the estimated cost efficiencies, although the results vary across 
studies. However, a substantial difference in the estimated efficiency scores is found in the results 
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of Mamatzakis et al. (2008) and Kosak et al. (2009). The difference in the estimated results per 
country is in range of 20 and 30 per cent (except for the case of Slovakia, where the difference of 
the average estimated efficiency score is 10). In addition, Kosak et al. (2009) estimate efficiency 
levels between 77 and 95 per cent, while Mamatzakis et al. (2008) gives the range as from 61 to 
69 per cent for the same set of countries in close to the same time span. In order to understand 
the grounds for such difference in the obtained result, both empirical studies have been 
thoroughly examined. Many details of the investigation are different and might be considered as 
potential reasons for the differences in the results. 
 
First, the studies make use of a different model: Mamatzakis et al. (2008) use maximum likelihood 
as originally proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) on a pooled data set, whereas Kosak et al. (2009) 
employ the Battese and Coelli (1995) model for panel data.  This indicates that the former is a 
time-invariant estimator, while the latter is a time-variant estimator. Mamatzakis et al. (2008) 
estimate efficiency in a one-step procedure using dummies for country, time, size and type of the 
bank, but ignore the additional variables, the Z(s). The Kosak et al. approach is also one-stage, but 
this study includes environmental variables and bank-specific characteristics.  Both studies use 
the translog functional form for the multiproduct model and apply the intermediation definition. 
In short, the aforementioned features of the two studies indicate that the primary reason for the 
substantial difference in the results is a consequence of the time-(in)variant estimator employed 
and possibly the inclusion of the Z(s) in the Kosak et al. (2009) study. 
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Table 3.5 Efficiency estimates by country and author(s) 
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Common 
frontier 
w/o 
country-
specific 
variables 
Common 
frontier 
with 
country-
specific 
variables 
Bulgaria    0.62(0.42)        0.67                                 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
           0.58                  
Czech    0.47(0.42) 0.47 – 0.64 0.79 (0.74-0.84) 0.73 – 0.80 0.74  0.59  0.80 0.61                       0.81                                  0.72-0.81             
Croatia  0.66  0.72(0.67)   0.77 – 0.84     0.63                                    
Cyprus           0.68    
Estonia    0.85(0.82) 0.78 – 0.80 0.83 (0.68-0.92) 0.70 – 0.76    0.65                    0.95                                 0.84-0.92           
Hungary   0.71 (0.62-
0.78) 
0.76(0.62)  0.71 – 0.79 0.79 (0.75-0.85) 0.73 – 0.80    0.69                      0.90                               0.74-0.84               
Kazakhstan    0.83(0.78)           
Latvia    0.76(0.75) 0.64 – 0.77 0.79 (0.70-0.89) 0.66 – 0.78    0.62               0.93     0.77-0.94                    
Lithuania    0.82(0.80) 0.75 – 0.79 0.79  (0.74-0.83) 0.60 – 0.74    0.66                   
0.94                             
0.81-0.93                  
Macedonia    0.60(0.47)   0.73 – 0.79     0.53                        
Malta           0.69    
Poland    0.74(0.66)  0.78 – 0.82 0.80 (0.73-0.85) 0.75 – 0.85 0.78 0.77 0.82 0.64               0.92                             0.81-0.87                 
Romania    0.55(0.47)  0.55 – 0.76  0.71 – 0.79     0.64                                  
Russia    0.70(0.46)    0.63 – 0.75        
Slovakia    0.78(0.76)  0.63 – 0.66  0.79 (0.75-0.83) 0.66– 0.80    0.67  0.77 0.73-0.83 
Slovenia    0.78(0.75)  0.87 – 0.92 0.80 (0.74-0.87) 0.74-0.84    0.69      0.91                           0.82-0.89               
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
           0.63   
Ukraine 0.67   0.73(0.59)           
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Note: Weill (2003) does not provide efficiency scores separately for Czech and Poland, thus not included in this table. This also applies for Bonin et al. (2005) 
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The two studies, Rossi et al. (2005) and Kasman and Yildirim (2006), deserve to be considered 
separately from the rest of the other transitional empirical studies. There are some of the features 
of the studies that are the alike are: the same time span, the same set of countries (except that 
Rossi et al. included Romania), the same database exploited for collecting the banks’ data and 
both studies use the Fourier-flexible functional form with three outputs. There are the differences 
in the methods of investigation, which certainly could be the explanation for the diversity in the 
efficiency scores in the empirical estimates. Having presented the grounds for feasible 
comparison of the two articles, the emphasis is directed towards the differences in the methods 
of investigation involved in the studies, which could be possibly considered as a source of diversity 
in the efficiency scores. What makes this comparison interesting is that both studies employ a 
time-varying panel estimator, but Rossi et al. use Battese and Coelli (1992) estimator, while 
Kasman and Yildirim use Battese and Coelli (1995). Although, both of them are time-varying 
estimators, the procedures applied differ, namely the former uses a two-step approach, whereas 
the latter a one-step. The choice of outputs in Rossi et al. is based on the modified approach, 
while Kasman and Yildirim use the value-added approach for the same purpose. Consequently, 
the analysis suggests that employing a time-variant efficiency estimator (which is considered as 
the main factor for variety in the results, see arguments in Section 2.3.2) in both studies was not 
enough to secure similar results. The discrepancies in the efficiency estimates arguably may be 
explained by the differences in the other issues regarding the methods of investigation, such as 
the definition of bank (intermediary or producer) and/or the stages in the estimation procedure 
(one-stage and two-stage). This further supports that any issue regarding the methods of 
investigation should be carefully approached.  
 
To sum up, the findings from the analysed set of papers, so far, are that there is diversity in the 
technique and the detailed application used between studies. The reasons for the differences in 
the obtained empirical estimates for efficiency are not fully established, but there is intuitive 
support for it relating to the type and the nature of the estimator and the number of stages in the 
process of empirical investigation. 
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3.3.5 The two most relevant studies 
This section aims to critically assess the two most relevant studies regarding our empirical 
investigation in Chapter 4 with respect to the set of countries and the methods of investigation. 
Staikouras et al. (2008) estimate cost efficiency for part of the SEECs, which are subject of our 
interest, whereas Kosak and Zoric (2011) analyse efficiency for the more advanced transition 
economies, using the same methods of investigation as we intend to use in Chapter 4, as discussed 
in Section 2.7.  
 
Staikouras et al. (2008). This study analyses cost efficiency in the banking sector of six South East 
European (SEE) countries (BIH, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro) over 
the period from 1998 to 2003. They use SF approach, incorporating firm-specific and country-
related variables. Features of the model specification are the translog functional form and the 
intermediation approach when choosing input prices and output(s). In line with the other studies, 
Bankscope is the main data source. The empirical findings reveal a generally low level of cost 
efficiency of 62 per cent average cost efficiency of all six countries, where the Macedonian 
banking sector is on average least cost efficient and the Bulgarian banking sector is the most 
efficient one. The authors explain the low efficiency scores as a consequence of both exogenous 
and endogenous factors. They argue that the most significant exogenous factors are the 
legislature and macroeconomic environment, whereas the skills of bank managers and the 
inappropriate system of corporate governance in SEECs banks are very prominent endogenous 
factors. However, the GDP per capita is not statistically significant in their study, indicating the 
country development does not influence the banks’ cost efficiency in these set of countries.  
 
Other factors that are found to have no impact on cost efficiency are output quality, risk 
preferences and population density. The results suggest that some of the factors are associated 
with cost efficiency. For example, the liquidity ratio and HHI are negatively associated with cost 
efficiency. The latter finding provides evidence in favour of the “quiet life” hypothesis which 
argues that the banks that enjoy market power are not under pressure to lower their costs.  
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Medium-sized banks are found to be slightly more cost efficient compared to the both small and 
large banks. The results suggest that the foreign banks and banks with dominant foreign 
ownership are the most cost efficient, while the government-owned banks are at the other far 
end of the spectrum. In order to boost the cost efficiency in the banking sector, a possible solution 
is the privatization of the government-owned banks and/or the entry of foreign banks.  
 
Another objective of the study is investigation of the determinants of lower/higher cost efficiency 
at a second stage. However, this seems to be superficial, especially because some of the variables 
are included in both the two stages. In particular, Staikouras et al. regress cost inefficiency values 
obtained from the SFA on a vector of explanatory variables, such as the loans to assets ratio and 
the ratio of bank deposits to total funds to capture the asset portfolio composition and funding 
mix. Specifically, in order to control for the financial capital ratio, the equity to assets ratio is 
included (already included in the first stage); as a proxy for default risk the loan loss provisions to 
loans is included; ROA is considered as a measure for profitability; the market share of each bank 
is used as a proxy for market power while to study the pattern of “learning by doing” they include 
the bank’s age and finally to control for the macroeconomic environment, the growth rate of GDP 
(GDP per capita included in the first stage) is introduced in the model. Both country and ownership 
dummies are also included in the two stages of the empirical analysis. The empirical results 
suggest absence of association between the cost efficiency and the variables describing the 
deposit mix, loan quality and profitability. A positive and significant relationship of cost efficiency 
is found with the GDP growth, the age of the bank and the asset portfolio composition, whereas 
a statistically negative relation is found with the equity ratio (supporting the “moral hazard” 
hypothesis) and the market share.  
 
 
The authors interpret the positive and significant age variable as a consistent with the “quiet life” 
hypothesis, arguing on page 495, that “at some stage, efficient management might become less 
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prominent and opt, instead, for a less proactive style, leading to a decrease in efficiency”. 
However, Hicks (1935) “quiet life” hypothesis draws special attention to the management of the 
companies with high market power not opting for profit maximization, since managers find their 
subjective costs for efficient resource allocation greater than the gains they get from it. Therefore, 
in our opinion the age variable cannot be necessarily be interpreted in the spirit of the “quiet life” 
hypothesis. Similarly, the estimated parameter of the market share variable is negative and 
statistically significant and this effect is interpreted by the authors, page 495, “banks with 
dominant share of domestic assets could facilitate more efficiently their operation and thus, 
register lower average total cost”. This is in line with the Demsetsz’s efficiency-concentration 
hypothesis. Given this, if the effect of HHI on cost efficiency is considered from the first stage of 
estimation there are contradictory results. The HHI is estimated to have a positive effect on the 
total costs, hence implicitly negative effect on cost efficiency, which suggests support of the 
“quiet life” hypothesis (market power-concentration hypothesis), whereas in the second stage of 
estimation, the estimated coefficient of market share supports the opposite, namely the 
efficiency-concentration hypothesis. The main criticism related to this study is the use of two-
stage approach, because its drawbacks as discussed in Section 2.3. Another important issue is the 
potential endogeneity, due to the causality between inefficiency and the market share variable 
according to the efficiency-structure hypothesis in the second stage, but this issue is not 
considered in this study. Finally, this study does not precisely reveal the estimation method, in 
particular which SF panel estimator is applied and it is not consistent in the presentation of the 
model equations, since the notation of the inefficiency error term is presented first as time-
variant and then as time-invariant.   
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Kosak and Zoric (2011). This paper presents a first attempt to investigate the significance of 
adequately accounting for (un)observed heterogeneity in estimating efficiency in the banking 
sector in the eight new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe and Baltic countries18 
(CEEB) covering the period from 1998 to 2007. They employ four different SFA methods to analyse 
the issue of (un)observed heterogeneity including the influence of controlling variables composed 
of environmental factors, either macroeconomic or bank level variables. The four models applied 
are: (i) the pooled frontier model estimated by ML method as initially proposed by Aigner, Lovell 
and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977); (ii) the Pitt and Lee (1981) model 
also estimated by ML procedure; (iii) the Battese and Coelli (1995) model where the inefficiency 
term is specified to depend on exogenous variables and (iv) the Greene (2005) true random-
effects model which deals with the unobserved heterogeneity. The first three models are 
estimated by the ML method, while the fourth model is estimated by simulated ML. 
 
All four models are specified with the translog functional form and use the intermediation 
approach for defining input prices and outputs of the cost function. Besides the basic variables, 
several country-specific and banks specific variables are included in the models (see Table 3.3 for 
details of the variables included). Kosak and Zoric (2011) make use of different sources to 
construct an unbalanced data set including Bankscope, central bank publications, IMF 
International Financial Statistics, EBRD Transition Reports, banks’ annual reports and their home 
web-pages. 
 
Their findings suggest no substantial differences in the efficiency estimates when the models are 
extended by the inclusion of environmental variables in the four models, although some of the 
environmental variables are significant. Moreover, the Spearman rank correlation is high and 
significant for the ranks of inefficiency scores obtained from the models 1, 2 and 4 with and 
without country-specific factors, suggesting a similar ranking pattern. They argue that this might 
                                                        
18Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia from Central and Eastern Europe; Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia 
from the Baltic countries. 
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be the case because of the similar level of development of the investigated countries. However, 
it should be noted that the rank correlation estimates tell different story when the four models 
are compared to each other with respect to efficiency ranking, which suggests that the model 
specification and the estimator chosen do to some extent matter. For example, while the ranks 
from the pooled model are highly correlated with the ranks obtained from the other models, the 
correlation between the efficiency ranking scores from the true random-effects model compared 
to the efficiency scores from the Pitt and Lee and the Batesse and Coelli models are quite low. 
 
The empirical findings of the additional possible efficiency determinants suggest diversity in the 
results, since the sign, magnitude and significance of the coefficients vary across the models. 
Looking at the estimated average country efficiency levels, the BC model estimates range from 73 
to 94 per cent, whereas the TRE model estimates range between 81 and 84 per cent. This big 
difference in the efficiency range it is likely to be due to the fact that TRE accounts for both 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity which enables separation of the latent heterogeneity 
from the inefficiency. Kosak and Zoric emphasize possible sources for unobserved heterogeneity 
among which differences in bank type, type of customers, location in relation to the customer 
density and competitors. Because of the similar efficiency level in the latter model, the authors 
argue for a “single” frontier for CEEB countries, in line with single EU market. 
 
While the authors, in the abstract, maintain that “different methods result in similar average cost 
efficiency levels, while the rankings depend on the econometric specification of the model-
probably partly attributed to different ability of the models to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity as proposed by Greene (2005)”, there are unequivocal differences in average 
efficiency estimates within countries with respect to the model employed. For instance, the 
average efficiency estimates for Latvia are in range of 77 to 94 per cent, for Lithuania between 81 
and 93 per cent (see Table 3.4), that is over 10 percentage points difference in the estimated 
efficiency. Moreover, there is a lack of discussion in this study regarding the diagnostics of the 
four different models employed and how they differ among each other. By shedding light on the 
model diagnostics and discussing their differences, the authors could accentuate possible 
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preferences between the models. Also, the model diagnostics are not revealed even when the 
models are estimated with and without inclusion of the environmental variables. Another issue, 
not considered in this study, is the change of the banks efficiency score ranking at the individual 
bank level. For example, there is no evidence provided whether the banks in the top/bottom 5 
per cent in the rank table are changed or whether the frontier bank remains the same across the 
four models.  
 
Furthermore, the authors acknowledge the difference in the specification of the BC model and 
TRE model, namely in the former model the environmental variables are included as factors that 
directly influence cost efficiency, while in the TRE model they are assumed to determine the cost 
frontier and because of that to have indirect influence on cost efficiency. However, this kind of 
provisional inclusion of the environmental variables could seriously affect the results, and 
therefore researchers should at least try to find, if any, theoretical ground to distinguish between 
the factors that directly affect the cost frontier and/or cost inefficiency. This might be one reason 
for the (in)significance of some of the variables in the BC model and TRE model. For instance, The 
EBRD index is found to be positive and significant in BC model, whereas it is negative and 
insignificant in TRE model. The effect of both number of banks and intermediation ratio are 
negative and significant in TRE model, while insignificant in BC model. 
 
The critical assessment of this study is extended also to the variables included in the models. First, 
the number of banks in each country is considered as a proxy of competition in the banking 
industry. Given that the number of population varies substantially from 1.3 million (in Estonia) to 
38.3 million (in Poland)19, it seems that the number of banks is misleading indicator for the 
competition in the banking sector. Instead, a more appropriate measure would be a relative 
measure such as banks per capita. In this case, our own calculations present different story. A 
simple hypothetical example is: if we take all the active banks as recorded in Bankscope (ignore 
                                                        
19 This data is obtained from World Bank Data and the figures represent average population in the countries in the period 
1998-2007, which is the time span used in this paper. 
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the banks with status dissolved, in liquidation and bankruptcy) and assume that all the banks 
operate throughout the period, in Estonia the number of banks is 8, while in Poland is 68, which 
in absolute values indicates higher competition in Poland. On the other hand, considering a 
relative measure of competition (banks per capita) we come to figures of approximately 6 banks 
per 1 million people in Estonia and about 2 banks per 1 million people in Poland, suggesting far 
greater competition in Estonia compared to Poland.  Second, throughout the paper there is no 
definition provided for the ownership variable, namely what is considered to be a foreign owned 
bank. 
 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION  
Empirical studies on estimation of efficiency in banking in SEECs have been conducted since the 
late 1990s. From then onwards many researchers have contributed in this literature. As a result, 
this chapter critically assessed the empirical studies on cost efficiency in banking conducted for 
the transition economies. Specifically, this literature review aimed to (i) identify the knowledge 
gap in the field of cost efficiency in banking with special reference to transition economies; (ii) 
identify the variables which should be included in the estimation of cost efficiency in banking, 
including the those reflecting observable differences across countries (and the banking industries) 
and across banks and (iii) following the discussion in Chapter 2, confirming our choice regarding 
the methods of investigation for the empirical analysis in Chapter 4. This chapter presents a bridge 
between Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. Specifically, while the former discusses the theoretical grounds 
for efficiency estimation, the latter is empirical estimation of the cost efficiency in the banking 
sector in SEECs. 
 
In order to provide a review consistent with the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2, this chapter 
replicated the same structure and topics as in Chapter 2. After reviewing the empirical studies on 
cost efficiency in the transition economies, the main findings, with respect to the aims of this 
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chapter, are summarized in this section. In terms of the possible knowledge gap, we found that 
the empirical contributions considering transition countries deal almost exclusively with the 
countries that recently joined EU; the exceptions were several studies that include Croatia in their 
set of countries (this country is now also an EU member) and Macedonia (in three studies only). 
Specifically, to our best knowledge, there is only one empirical study evaluating cost efficiency in 
the banking sector for the SEECs, that is BiH, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia-
Montenegro, conducted by Staikouras et al. (2008). Although, the EU member countries (Bulgaria, 
Croatia and Romania) are subject to analysis in the other empirical studies, most of the successors 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro as a separate countries and BiH) are not examined before 
this study, indicating the small amount of research on this region. Moreover, Albania is not 
included in any of the reviewed studies. In addition to this, the time span of investigation in the 
reviewed studies is largely in the period from 1993 to 2003. Hence, the estimation of cost 
efficiency for the selected SEECs countries considered in this thesis would close a gap in the 
applied literature for this field of studies.  
 
Next, the literature review facilitated the definition of the variables necessary for the estimation 
of the cost efficiency. In particular, we learnt that there is a consensus in the literature regarding 
the definition of the production factors and the outputs in the banking sector. Furthermore, this 
review provided list of explanatory variables, the so-called Zs, which present possible 
determinants either of the position of the frontier or the bank’s inefficiency. These variables are 
usually divided in three categories, that is macroeconomic, industry-specific and bank-specific 
variables. The knowledge of the definition of the variables will be further used in Chapter 4.    
 
In terms of the methods of investigation, the literature review did not provide much evidence to 
support the choice of a specific estimator. Although the choice of which SFA estimator is the key 
issue among the methods of investigation, there are not enough empirical studies which employ 
the theoretically preferred models, namely the time-varying RPMs (including the special case of 
the Greene’s true random effects model) as discussed in Chapter 2. In fact, to our best knowledge, 
only Kosak and Zoric (2011) estimate time-varying efficiency and control for unobserved 
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heterogeneity using, among the other models, the true random effects model proposed by 
Greene (2005). It is important to note that none of the empirical studies on efficiency in banking 
in transition economies makes use of RPMs. Based on this discussion we can identify a knowledge 
gap in the empirical literature on efficiency estimation. In particular, the estimation of efficiency 
in banking using RPMs will further contribute to this literature; hence these models will be 
employed in Chapter 4. Moreover, it was apparent that most of the studies estimating time-
varying efficiency were making use of the Battese and Coelli (1992, 1995) models. Hence, for 
comparative purposes this stream of models will also be used in Chapter 4.  
 
Finally, the findings from the empirical studies reviewed here suggested the diversity of the 
techniques and the detailed application used in these studies. Moreover, the estimated levels of 
banks’ efficiency are found to be different across these studies, but the reasons for the differences 
are not fully established. Arguably, this could have resulted from the type and the nature of the 
estimator and the number of stages in the process of empirical investigation. This is another issue 
which will be considered in Chapter 4. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters presented the theory of efficiency, methods of investigation with 
respect to cost efficiency (hereafter CE) (Chapter 2) and the empirical evidence on CE, mainly in 
transition economies (Chapter 3). Having reviewed these issues in detail, a solid theoretical and 
econometric basis is created on which the empirical investigation can be developed. The main 
aim of this chapter, thus, is the estimation of banks’ CE in SEECs for the period 2000-2012. In 
pursuing this aim, Farrell’s definition of economic efficiency (discussed in Chapter 2.2) is 
employed for the purpose of this empirical analysis, particularly since it encompasses both 
technical and allocative efficiency. Additionally, as discussed in Section 2.3.2, this chapter employs 
SFA in context of a panel data set and, based on the argument in Section 1.4.3 and Section 2.3.2, 
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estimates time-variant CE. Moreover, the empirical analysis in this chapter measures CE against a 
common frontier (based on Section 2.5), using a translog functional form (Section 2.4) and 
treating banks as intermediaries (Section 2.6).  
 
Chapter 3 presented an extensive literature review on efficiency estimation in the banking sector 
with special reference to transition economies which provided a basis for the methods of 
investigation, the choice of variables used and the identification of the knowledge gap. In 
addition, the review in Chapter 3 was a critical assessment of the examined studies, which 
identified the potential drawbacks in the current literature.  
 
Consequently, based on this review, this chapter aims to contribute to the empirical literature on 
banks’ CE, using different econometrics techniques some of which (for example the RPMs) have 
not yet been used for examining CE for transition economies. Moreover, the set of SEE countries 
covered in this empirical analysis (the six Western Balkan countries of Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, and two relatively new EU members, 
Bulgaria and Slovenia) have not been considered in any of the studies reviewed in Chapter 3. 
Additionally, the dataset used in this analysis is unique because although the basis for creation of 
our dataset is, as in most other studies, the Bankscope database, we have extensively 
supplemented the respective data by collecting data from reports published on the individual 
banks websites or national banking agencies because there is a significant amount of missing data 
for the countries under consideration in Bankscope. A further contribution to knowledge related 
to this analysis is the investigation of the implicit role of technical change on banks’ CE.  
 
This chapter is of importance not only because it attempts to fill a gap in the literature on cost 
efficiency estimation in the banking sectors in transition economies, but also because the 
predicted efficiency scores are used as a determinant of the market share in the banking sector 
in SEECs, the focus of the second part of this thesis (specifically, Chapter 6). 
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 specifies the baseline empirical model for 
the estimation of CE based on the discussions in Chapters 2 and 3. Section 4.3 discusses the data 
used in this empirical analysis, including the definition of the variables used and the data sources. 
Section 4.4 presents alternative model specifications associated with the positioning of the 
factors reflecting the observed differences across countries and banks (the Zs) based on the 
discussion in Section 3.3.3. Section 4.5 discusses the estimated CE of banks in SEECs, specifically 
across countries and time. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.  
 
4.2 THE MODEL  
This section aims to develop a model according to the economic theory of production, a process 
which considers the transformation of a bundle of inputs (factors of production) into outputs 
(products), explicitly taking into account that this transformation is not always fully efficient (as 
discussed in 2.2). The conventional approach to studying the economic theory of production, 
while allowing for inefficiency in the production process, is estimation by frontiers. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, there are many issues that need to be considered when developing a model for cost 
efficiency estimation in the banking industry. Hence, Section 4.2.1 presents the process of 
creating the baseline model. Given that there are various empirical models and possibilities for 
the estimation inefficiency (reviewed in Chapter 2.3.2), Section 4.2.2 focuses on the choice of 
models appropriate for this analysis. 
 
4.2.1 Model specification 
The focus of this section is on the stochastic frontier baseline model specification that is used later 
in the chapter, and further extended in Section 4.4. For that purpose, it is necessary to refer back 
to the issues discussed in Chapter 2. After considering the arguments regarding the advantages 
and disadvantages of greater flexibility of the functional forms (Section 2.4), this analysis employs 
the translog functional form. This form is deemed appropriate because there is a substantial loss 
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of degrees of freedom20 relative to the sample size if the alternative Fourier-flexible functional 
form was to be employed. Additionally, some of the variables used in our empirical investigation 
(as shown in section 4.3) are characterized by limited variability and, therefore the use of Fourier-
flexible functional form could potentially exacerbate the multicolinearity problem. Equation 4.1, 
represents the model for the estimation of CE with the above issues taken into consideration (that 
is, SFA with translog cost functional form).    
lnTC𝑖 = α0 + ∑ αrlnYri +
n
r=1
∑ βjlnPji +
m
j=1
1
2
∑ ∑ σrklnYrilnYki
n
k=1
n
r=1
+
1
2
∑ ∑ γjhlnPjilnPhi
m
h=1
+ ∑ ∑ δrjlnYrilnPji
m
j=1
n
r=1
m
j=1
+ νi + ui 
                           … (4.1) 
Where TC𝑖, Yr and Pj represent total costs, outputs quantity and input prices of a bank, 
respectively and α, β, σ, γ and δ are parameters to be estimated. These terms are defined in 
details in Table 4.1, Section 4.3. The “composed” error term, includes the traditional symmetric 
random noise component, νi  and a one-sided inefficiency component, 𝑢i (the properties of the 
“composed” error term were presented in Section 2.3.2). The bank is 𝑖, the number of outputs is 
𝑛 and 𝑚 is the number of inputs.21 
 
As discussed in Section 2.3.2 the cost frontier, or the cost function, requires the theoretical 
restrictions on the parameters to obtain homogeneity and symmetry. Applying the homogeneity 
restriction on the above function means that the sum of the coefficients of the input prices equals 
1. That is, 
∑ βj = 1
m
j ;    ∑ γjh = 0
m
j    𝑎𝑛𝑑   ∑ δrj = 0
m
j                                             … (4.2) 
                                                        
20 Calculation of the degrees of freedom is not straightforward and depends on factors determined within the empirical 
procedure, mainly by the researcher. At this stage they could not be calculated; however a small change in these factors 
could cause substantial increase in the parameters to be estimated, and it can easily reach over 100 parameters to be 
estimated. 
21 The time subscript denoting the panel model is not included at this stage for the sake of simplistic illustration of the model. 
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This restriction is imposed by normalization with respect to input prices. According to the Young’s 
theorem a symmetry restriction should be imposed, such that  
γjh = γhj   and   σrk = σkr                                                            … (4.3) 
After imposing these restrictions on Equation 4.1 and assuming a multiproduct translog frontier 
with two outputs and three input prices, the model specification becomes:22    
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑇𝐶
𝑃3
)
𝑖
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑌1𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛𝑌2𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃1
𝑃3
)
𝑖
+ 𝛽2𝑙𝑛 (
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)
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2
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+ 𝛾12𝑙𝑛 (
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+ 𝛿22𝑙𝑛𝑌2𝑖𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃2
𝑃3
)
𝑖
+ 𝜈𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖             … (4.4) 
 
Consequently, a departure point for the model specification is the common multiproduct translog 
function as presented in Equation 4.4. Panel data is at our disposal for the banking sectors under 
investigation, thus the estimation of CE is conducted by SF panel models because they: (i) have 
advantages over the cross–sectional models (Section 2.3.2) and (ii) offer many different 
possibilities in empirical investigation, due to the numerous SF panel data models adjusted for 
estimation of CE, as discussed in detail in Section 2.3.2. The choice of which panel data models to 
use is discussed in the next section. Also, given that our dataset covers eight countries, 
comparable CE estimates are necessary because they are used as an explanatory variable in 
Chapter 6. Hence, as suggested by Berger (2007) in Section 2.5, the common frontier is preferred 
over the country-specific frontier. However, applying the common frontier requires the inclusion 
of control variables to control for the differences in the economic environments and banking 
sectors of different countries. Second, according to Greene (2008) the efficiency distribution can 
be affected as a result of observed and unobserved heterogeneity (Section 2.3.3). This is partially 
related to the discussion of Berger (2007), but appears to be a broader issue because it includes 
the issue of output quality and the omission of variables from the model which explain observable 
differences across banks, which may affect the efficiency estimates. For example bank-specific 
                                                        
22 Again for the sake of brevity the time subscript is not included. 
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variables, such as the quality of the bank assets (loans) and the ownership structure (foreign or 
domestically owned bank), in addition to being control variables, also reflect the differences in 
the economic environments. To incorporate the arguments of Berger (2007) and Greene (2008), 
a vector of macroeconomic, banking industry and bank-specific variables are included in the 
model, Zit, based on the discussion in Section 3.3.3 and how these are best included in the model 
is discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.  The last issue in the specification of the empirical model is 
related to the treatment of the bank either as producer or intermediary (Section 2.6). According 
to the broad economic literature the origin of a bank is in its role of matching creditors with 
borrowers, that is acting as an intermediary. Although the bank activities have increased 
significantly over the past two decades in countries under consideration, the mediator role still 
remains its primary role (IMF, 2012).  
  
TIME DUMMIES OR TIME TREND. The inclusion of year dummies and/or time trend in the model 
is another issue that merits attention, especially because this has not been discussed in the 
empirical studies for transition economies (Chapter 3). The majority of papers do not include 
either year dummies or a time trend, or if they do they are not reported or commented on (Fries 
and Taci, 2005; Kraft et al., 2002; Rossi et al., 2005; Nikiel and Opiela, 2002; Kasman, 2005; Hasan 
and Marton, 2003). Some papers include year dummies (Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; 
Mamatzakis, 2008), while some other papers include a time trend (Kosak and Zoric, 2011; Kosak 
et al., 2009; Kasman and Yildirim, 2006; Staikouras, 2008). However, in these papers there is no 
discussion of the effect of the time trend and none of them incorporates the time trend into the 
translog model (this issue is explained in greater detail later in this section). In a nutshell, this 
discussion is largely marginalized by previous researchers dealing with banking sector in transition 
economies. 
 
In the standard panel models, year dummies are included to reduce the cross-sectional 
dependence, capturing heterogeneity as a result of important events that occur over the years 
covered in the dataset. On the other hand, a time trend is commonly used in the banking literature 
to measure the technical change, since due to data limitation there is no indicator or proxy for 
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measuring technological progress, such as the value of R&D or the average age of capital 
equipment, as used in other industries (Humphrey, 1993). In addition, Frame and White (2009) 
argue that the financial innovations in the banking sector are primarily encouraged by 
technological changes in telecommunications and data processing (using software and hardware 
for client credit scoring, risk management, automated clearing house, etc.) which are very difficult 
to include directly in an empirical model. There are number of new products and services 
introduced over the period of this investigation in the banking sector in transition economies, 
given that these countries lag behind the developed economies with respect to financial 
innovations, such as introduction of ATMs, debit/credit cards and on-line banking, which are 
quantifiable and feasible to be included in the model, but availability of such data is very limited.  
 
A time trend is the simplest and most commonly used measure in the empirical studies for 
modelling technical change. By formulation, it assumes and provides a smooth rate of technical 
change. This is considered as a limitation of this approach, because year-to-year variation in 
technical change may be inadequately depicted when this process is not constant or smoothly 
increasing or decreasing (Nelson, 1986). Humphrey (1993), in addition to time trend, uses another 
two approaches for the first time in the context of banking: an index approach (Caves, Christensen 
and Seanson, 1981; Baltagi and Griffin, 1988); and shifts in cross-section (Berger and Humphrey, 
1990), using a cost translog function. The index approach accommodates a non-smooth technical 
change, which allows year-to-year variations to be estimated more accurately, if present in the 
data.  The shifts in cross-section cost functions approach is a more general form than the index 
approach and allows for discontinuous year-to-year rates of technical change (Humphrey, 1993). 
 
The way in which the technical change is built into the model in all three approaches is now 
discussed. Using the time trend approach in the translog specification, technical change is 
introduced by including a continuous variable from 1 to T, (where T denotes the last year in the 
dataset) and cross-products of this variable with the outputs and input prices are included, in the 
same manner as for the production variables in the model. However, the papers that used a time 
trend for transition countries (referenced above), include only the 1 to T continuous variable and 
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not the cross-products with outputs and input prices. In the index approach, technical change is 
modelled by including year dummies (for all years) which act as intercepts as well as cross-
products of each year dummy with outputs and input prices. In the standard econometric analysis, 
year dummies are included to control for heterogeneity resulting from important events that 
occur over the years covered in the dataset. The index approach seems to assume that year 
dummies serve only as a proxy for technical change and are not capturing any other 
heterogeneity. It is likely that such assumption can be appropriate only for a stable period of time 
during which no significant events occur, which is not the case in SEECs as discussed in Section 
1.4. Lastly, in the shifts in cross-section approach, as well as the elements that are allowed to be 
affected by technical change in the previous two approaches, all parameters are allowed to vary 
over time by running cross-section regressions for each year. Using this approach, the advantages 
of panel data models are lost. Nevertheless, Humphrey (1993) finds that the last two approaches 
have greater flexibility as they provide better representation of the year-to-year variations of the 
technical change. He also adds that a time trend is not able to capture this disaggregated technical 
change but, if one is satisfied to consider the average technical change over the whole period 
under investigation, all the three models yield similar results. Furthermore, Esho and Sharpe 
(1995) argue that the index number approach is volatile, not suitable for small samples or in the 
context of multiproduct production, while the time trend approach provides estimates which are 
relatively stable and steadily evolve over time.  
 
The choice of the approach for analysing technical change in this thesis is constrained by the data 
at hand and the method of estimation employed. As discussed earlier in this section, the panel 
data models will be used which renders the third approach inapplicable. In addition, employing 
the shifts in the cross-section approach implies that the advantages of panel data models are lost. 
In particular using a panel model, the non-modelled differences between banks that are constant 
over time may be captured in the “composed” error term. The second approach requires inclusion 
of 45 additional parameters. The consequent loss of degrees of freedom from this approach is 
more than 50 per cent of the observations from the first three years in this study. More 
importantly, as discussed in the previous paragraph, the index approach considers the year 
dummies only as a proxy for technical change. Given that the empirical analysis includes eight 
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SEECs, during a period in which the transition process was progressing as discussed in Section 1.4 
and these countries still experience systematic reforms during this period, it is inappropriate to 
assume that the year dummies in this dataset will capture only technical change. Moreover, this 
analysis also covers the years of the last financial crisis (2008 and 2009), which makes the above 
assumption even more restrictive. Consequently, considering all of the above arguments, this 
empirical analysis employs the time trend approach. This approach, despite its lack of flexibility, 
still continues to be widely used in empirical research (see for instance, Greene, 2005b estimating 
CE for US banks using Cobb-Douglas functional form). As discussed above, the time trend 
approach has not been yet integrated in translog specification in transition countries. In terms of 
bank efficiency in transition economies, Kasman and Kasman (2006) are, to our knowledge, the 
only researchers who investigate the relationship between efficiency and technical change by 
employing a time trend, in their case, in a Fourier-flexible functional form. They find an increased 
rate of cost reduction resulting from technical change in CEE countries in the period 1995-2002. 
Although, no empirical research has been conducted considering this issue for SEECs yet, it is likely 
that  financial innovations spurred by technological changes in these countries have contributed 
to faster pace of efficiency changes in these countries’ banking sectors. Hence, this analysis of 
banks’ cost efficiency controls for the technical change in the SEE countries, which is a 
contribution to the current literature. 
  
Also, given the time period of our data, it is important to control for the effects of the financial 
crisis, as this is likely to have affected all banks in the region (and the omission could give rise to 
cross-sectional dependence). Hence, two year dummies for 2008 and 2009 are included in the 
model in addition to the time trend variables, so a “combined” effect of technical change and year 
dummies for two years is investigated. For the purpose of comparison of the estimation results 
with those of previous studies for transition economies, a version of the model will also be run 
with year dummies (𝐷𝑡) for each year instead of the time trend (𝑇).  
Based on Berger (2007) and Greene (2008), given the discussion above two models are proposed. 
Firstly, a simple model with just year dummies (𝐷𝑡) and a vector of additional explanatory 
variables (𝑍𝑖𝑡) is: 
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The second (and preferred) model, is an extended version of Equation 4.4 which includes a time 
trend  (𝑇) integrated into the translog framework, year dummies to control for the financial crisis 
and a vector of additional explanatory variables (𝑍𝑖𝑡) in line with the previous discussion:   
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In the above equations the subscript t is added to denote the time component in the panel data 
models; νit~𝑁[0, 𝜎𝑣
2] is the same for all the specifications, but uit is modelled differently, as 
discussed in the next section below and detailed in Section 4.4.  
 
4.2.2 The choice of time-varying panel models  
The choice of panel data models that are employed in the analysis is primarily driven by the aim 
of this chapter, that is estimating CE for each bank through time based on the discussion in Section 
1.4, which implies that a priori there are strong reasons for expecting time varying CE due to the 
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extensive reforms in the banking sectors in the respective countries for the period under 
consideration (2000-2012). Given this argument we need to employ time-varying panel models, 
otherwise we would have a mis-specified empirical model. More generally in the literature on 
bank efficiency, it is not usually expected that CE will change over very short periods of time, 
hence the time dimension of the panel data is important for the feasibility of estimating time-
varying CE. According to Greene (2011), an appropriate time span for analysis of time-variant CE 
is ten years as it is expected that this gives sufficient time for CE variation, though a time span of 
between five and ten years can sometimes also be considered as sufficient for such analysis. He 
further suggests that, by the same token, the characteristics of the unit of analysis are important 
in determining the necessary time span for estimating a time-variant CE. In addition to the 
previous discussion, in the banking sector in SEECs it is expected that the efficiency variations are 
likely to occur over shorter time-span because of competitive pressures, especially as a result of 
entry of foreign banks in these markets (Section 1.4). Moreover, as discussed in the previous 
section, Kasman and Kasman (2006) find an increased rate of cost reduction resulting from 
technical change in CEECs in the period 1995-2002. Although no empirical research has been 
conducted on this issue for SEECs yet, it is likely that there has been financial innovations spurred 
by technological changes in these countries as well, which contributed to faster pace of CE 
changes. Given the availability of data, we aim to cover the longest possible time span (more on 
this discussion in the following Section 4.3). 
 
Many researchers offer different model extensions and adjustments to allow for time-variant CE 
estimates (see Section 2.3.2). Recent empirical studies on CE in the banking sector in transition 
economies which consider time-varying CE, presented in Chapter 3, mainly employ the Battese 
and Coelli (1992, 1995) (hereafter BC) panel models. However, these papers, as discussed earlier, 
do not explain the specific reason for choosing these particular time-varying panel models, 
therefore the reason for the popularity of the use of BC models is not clear. Since no clear 
justification is found in favour of the BC models over other time-varying panel models, it is 
possible that their attractiveness has increased because of the ease of implementation after their 
incorporation into the STATA econometric software (no other SFA panel model estimators is 
available in STATA). Our analysis applies two panel data model estimators for time-varying CE, 
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that is BC (1992, 1995) and the Random Parameters Models (hereafter RPMs) [including the 
special case of the so-called “true random effects” model – Greene (2005), hereafter TRE] as 
discussed in Sections 2.3.2 and 2.7. The rationale for choosing these particular models is multifold. 
The well-known models of BC (1992, 1995) are primarily chosen because of their popularity 
among the researchers, and because these models allow for modelling the inefficiency 
component of the error term to be expressed as a function of explanatory variables, which are 
assumed to explicitly affect a bank’s inefficiency. Also estimating efficiency using BC models 
allows for comparison of the estimates with the ones obtained in other similar studies (Section 
3.3.4).  
 
However, the models of special interest in this thesis are the RPMs because of their specific way 
of: (i) accounting for heterogeneity as well as firm inefficiency, and (ii) allowing for random 
variation in the CE estimates across time as discussed in Section 2.3.2. These panel data models 
differ from the other SFA panel models, because of their unique approach to disentangling 
heterogeneity from inefficiency. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical study that employs 
RPMs for estimating efficiency for the banking sectors in transition economies.  
 
4.3 DATA 
The countries subject to analysis are eight SEECs: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. The rationale for choosing this group of 
countries is mainly their similar process of transition to a market economy (Section 1.4), their 
geographical position and their historic relations. Until 2012 (the end period of this analysis) only 
Bulgaria and Slovenia had become members of the European Union (EU). The other four successor 
states of the Former Yugoslavia (BiH, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) and Albania are still 
working on their political and economic reforms aiming at fulfilling the EU's accession criteria. 
This particular set of countries enables the empirical analysis to respond to several research 
questions such as: (i) measuring the CE of banks in each country; (ii) analysing the pattern of CE 
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across countries and through time; (iii) investigating the effect of technical change explicitly on 
the banks’ total costs and implicitly on their CE; (iv) whether the EU accession has accompanied 
improvements in CE; and (iv) analysing the effect of the last financial crisis explicitly on the banks’ 
total costs and implicitly on their CE. To our knowledge, none of the existing papers have analysed 
these questions in this particular set of countries. 
 
 
4.3.1 Definition of variables 
 Table 4.1 summarizes the description of the variables used in the empirical model, based on the 
discussion in Section 3.3.3 where details on the identification of the variables and their expected 
signs were discussed. For the sake of brevity the subscripts which denote panel data model (it) are 
omitted in the table. Descriptive statistics of the respective variables is presented in Appendix to 
Chapter 4, Section 4.1. 
 
As discussed in Section 3.3.3, the production parameters included in the model are the variables 
used in the other empirical studies for estimating cost efficiency for the transition economies. In 
particular, the dependent variable represents the total costs to total asset ratio, the two used 
outputs are total net loans and other earning assets (total earning assets less total loans) and the 
three input prices are the price of borrowed funds, the price of labour and the price of physical 
capital. 
 
 
 Table 4.1 Description of the variables used in the empirical analysis of cost efficiency 
Variables Description 
Dependent variable  
Total costs (LnTC) Natural logarithm of total cost (interest expenses, personnel expenses and 
other operating expenses) over total assets ratio 
  
Independent variables  
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Outputs (LnY)  
Loans (LnY1) Natural logarithm of total net loans over total assets ratio 
Other earning assets (LnY2) Natural logarithm of other earning assets (Loans and Advances to Banks, total 
securities and other earning assets) over total assets ratio 
Input prices (LnP)  
Price of borrowed funds (LnP1) Natural logarithm of total interest expenses over total deposits ratio 
Price of physical capital (LnP2) Natural logarithm of non-interest (operating) expenses to fixed assets ratio 
Price of labour (LnP3) Natural logarithm of personnel expenses divided over total assets ratio 
Time  
Year dummies (Di)  From 2000 to 2012, where 2000 is the base year, thus omitted to avoid perfect 
collinearity 
Time trend for technical change t=1,2, … , 13, where 1=2000 and 13=2012 
  
Environmental variables (Z)  
Country specific  
Level of economic development Natural logarithm of GDP per capita in constant 2005 prices (USD ’000) 
Density of demand Natural logarithm of total deposits of the banking sector per km2 ratio 
Inflation Inflation based on Consumer Price Index 
Population density Natural logarithm of the number of inhabitants per km2 
EU/Non-EU country Dummy variable 1 for the year before EU accession, 0 otherwise 
  
Industry specific  
Intermediation ratio Natural logarithm of total loans to total deposits in the banking sector ratio 
Measure for concentration Natural logarithm of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
  
Bank specific  
Capital Natural logarithm of total equity to total assets ratio 
Ownership structure Domestic (if the share of foreign owners is < or = to 20 per cent of a bank’s 
capital, the base category) 
Mixed (1=if the share of foreign owners is between 21 and 89 per cent, 
otherwise 0) and  
Foreign (1=if the share of foreign owners is = or >90 per cent, otherwise 0) 
Loan impairment charges Natural logarithm of loan impairment charges to total assets ratio 
Note: The value of the ratio for each variable is not multiplied by 100, i.e. it is a “pure” ratio and not a percentage. The 
subscripts i and t are excluded 
In addition to the discussion in Section 3.3.3 the three variables, ownership structure, loan 
impairment charges and EU dummy variable deserve further explanation. Specifically, regarding 
the ownership structure three categories of ownership considered include (i) domestic (<20 per 
cent of foreign ownership), (ii) mixed (from 21 to 89 per cent of foreign ownership) and (iii) foreign 
(>89 per cent of foreign ownership). This categorization of the ownership status is not based on a 
conventional definition for foreign ownership for two reasons. First, it is assumed that even a 
small stake of foreign ownership in the SEECs will affect the decision-making process and second, 
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as presented in Section 1.4.3 after 2000 the extensive inflow of foreign capital quickly resulted in 
banking sectors with predominantly foreign capital, often far above 50 per cent. In particular, by 
the end of 2012 in some of the banking sectors under consideration around 90 per cent of the 
capital is foreign owned. These categories, in addition, allow for distinguishing the impact among 
the “partially” and “completely” foreign owned banks on costs/efficiency.  
 
The loan impairment charges is a measure of the quality of loans only. Data on the indicator 
measuring the quality of other earning assets is either restricted or not available for majority of 
the banks, therefore, this is not included in the model. There is around 10 per cent of the total 
1667 observations where the other earning assets are higher than loans, and this is mainly 
because of the loans and advances given to other banks, which we assume are placements of high 
quality. The rest of the other earning assets such as trading securities, at-equity investments and 
other securities are substantially less than the amount of loans. Consequently, omitting to control 
for the quality of other earning assets is expected not to affect the findings. The position of the 
loan impairment charges in the income statement indicates their positive impact on the overall 
costs of the bank. However, their exclusion from total costs is twofold. First, they are not an input 
for providing a particular service by the banks and second they serve as a proxy for loan quality. 
Given this, loan impairment charges can be considered as an indicator that shapes the cost 
frontier, but also the level of loan impairment charges can directly affect a bank’s efficiency. 
Finally, European Union dummy has a value of 1 for the year before a country enters EU (for 
Slovenia is 2003, for Bulgaria is 2006 and for Croatia is 2012), since it is assumed that the banking 
sectors of the three countries have been harmonized with the banking sectors of the EU members 
and by that point in time already adopted the “conditions” under which these banking sectors 
operate. 
The Z is the vector of country-specific, industry-specific and bank-specific characteristics. The 
purpose of inclusion of the three categories of controlling variables is to incorporate the 
arguments of Berger (2007) and Greene (2008) as discussed in Section 4.2.1. As previously 
discussed in Section 2.3.3, a defined procedure related to the position of the Z(s), either as 
affecting the frontier or the level of efficiency does not exist, hence in the absence of firm 
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theoretical arguments, this is left to be a researcher call. Based on the discussion in Section 3.3.3 
some inferences regarding this issue can be made. In particular, country-specific and industry-
specific variables are included to adjust the frontier against which the inefficiency is measured 
relative to the macroeconomic and industry environment in which the bank operates, given that 
this empirical analysis encompasses eight transition countries (Berger, 2007).  
 
Furthermore, as suggested by Greene (2008), bank-specific variables are included to control for 
potential heterogeneity resulting from different output quality and omission of variables from the 
model which explain differences across banks and may affect the directly the efficiency estimates. 
However, some the positioning of the concentration ratio (the industry-specific variable) in the 
deterministic part of the model may be questioned, given that according to the discussion in 
Section 3.3.3, the concentration ratio is closely related to both cost and inefficiency implying that 
the “position” of this indicator in the model is unclear. Nevertheless, given that this is an 
aggregated indictor on a country level rather than an individual indicator, such as market share, 
which explicitly affects the inefficiency of that particular bank, it is reasonable to be expected that 
this industry-specific indicator would determine the cost frontier. Another example is the loan 
impairment charges, which as presented above given their position in the income statement, can 
be considered as an indicator that shapes the cost frontier, but it is expected that as a measure 
of quality, the level of loan impairment charges would primarily affect the bank’s inefficiency, 
rather than the frontier itself. Our personal belief is that this indicator, along with the other bank-
specific variables, mainly result from management decisions, hence it is more reasonable to be 
considered as a factor that directly affects inefficiency. As presented in the baseline model 
specifications in Equations 4.5 and 4.6, all of the Z(s) variables, including the bank-specific 
variables, are part of the deterministic part. In Section 6.4 the alternative model specifications are 
presented where these bank-specific variables enter 𝑢𝑖𝑡 and directly affect bank’s inefficiency.  
4.3.2 Data sources 
Three broad data sources are used for estimation of CE. The first source includes data for 
individual banks. This data is extracted from the Bankscope database, created by Bureau Van Dijk, 
on several occasions. When the data was first obtained in December 2009, it was in the form of 
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original financial statements put together by Bankscope. This data was not comparable across 
countries or years because of different accounting standards used (IFRS, IAS, Local GAAP). For 
many years, the Bankscope database used templates to present banks’ data which reflect the 
particular accounting systems of each of the countries for which it collects the data. However, in 
April 2010, Bureau Van Dijk announced a new “universal” representation of the banks’ data in 
order to put the accounting systems on same basis and to facilitate the empirical analyses across 
the entire set of banks. Thus, a second attempt at extracting data was made during May and June 
2010 directly from the Bankscope database, to use the advantage of collecting comparable bank 
data. However, the newly obtained data-set, though comparable, had the drawback that the time 
series data for most of the banks became shorter, possibly due to the difficulties in the process of 
data transformation. Given that the aim of the analysis is to estimate the time-variant cost 
efficiency for individual banks, a long time span of data is preferable. Although we reconsidered 
the use of Bankscope for years going back to 1995,  the data for these additional years was very 
restricted as most banks did not publish annual reports of this period on their websites. Also, the 
data for the years before 2000 are not available in Bankscope’s new “universal” format, but 
provided in individual bank’s financial statements format. Furthermore, the additional data is not 
available on Bankscope’s new platform. Therefore, the time span for the empirical investigation 
was chosen to be from 2000 to 2009, so that a period of ten years suggested by Greene (2011), 
and discussed in Section 4.2.2 is covered. Initial regressions were run for this period of time. 
 
However, before conducting the empirical analysis of determinants of market share in banking 
(Chapter 6), we decided to update the dataset and include the data for the period 2010-2012, and 
for the empirical analysis of this chapter to be conducted on this new dataset too. To that end the 
Bankscope data was once again accessed in January 2014 to extract data for the required period. 
For the last three years, the availability of data had substantially improved, hence there was little 
need to supplement the data from other sources to reduce the missing observations for these last 
three years as had been the case for the period 2000-2009. In what follows we discuss the process 
of data augmentation which was performed after the second attempt at accessing Bankscope 
data in 2010, given that Bankscope has not filled the gaps in data for the earlier years (at least as 
of January 2014). 
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For countries under consideration the Bankscope database has a large number of missing 
information on important variables for the period 2000-2009. A major shortcoming of most 
studies using this database is that the issue of missing variables is ignored. The missing 
observations may be random (“ignorable”) or non-random (“nonignorable”), where in the case of 
missing at random the “missingness” is not associated with the value of the variable itself, but it 
does (missing at random-MAR) or does not (missing completely at random-MCAR) depend on the 
values of the other variables in the dataset (Rubin, 1976). When the aforementioned assumptions 
for the pattern of missingness do not hold, then such missingness is referred as to “nonignorable”. 
In the case of ignorable missingness the parameters for the missing data-generating process are 
not related to those which are estimated in the complete model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
 
The most common assumption (often implicit) in the empirical literature is MAR, however this 
may be considered as too optimistic an assumption, given that information about the value of the 
variable that is missing is unknown. Schafer and Graham (2002, p.152) emphasize: “When 
missingness is beyond the researcher's control, its distribution is unknown and MAR is only an 
assumption. In general, there is no way to test whether MAR holds in a data set, except by 
obtaining follow-up data from nonrespondents or by imposing an unverifiable model." If data 
missingness is assumed to be MAR and the probability of missing data on any regressor does not 
depend on the values of dependent variable the commonly used method is listwise deletion – all 
observations with missing values on one or more variables in the dataset are deleted. However, 
the listwise deletion can significantly reduce the amount of available information and thus the 
efficiency of estimation in small samples when missingness occurs for a non-trivial proportion of 
regressors (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 928). 
 
Therefore, we decided to embark on finding the missing data from secondary sources to augment 
the Bankscope data. Additional data was collected from the annual reports of individual banks, as 
well as reports by other agencies which summarize data related to the banking sector for of 
individual countries (in the case of BiH for instance). During this process we have cross-checked 
the available data from Bankscope with those from secondary sources and no major 
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inconsistencies were observed. Accordingly, we decided to increase the sample size with the data 
from other sources that were not available in Bankscope in order to increase the 
representativeness and size of the dataset.   
 
Table 4.2 is an example of the data augmentation work. It summarizes the data augmentation 
process for BiH. The first column shows the name of the banks included in the study. The second 
column presents the missing variables and the relevant years for each bank in Bankscope. As 
discussed in Section 4.2, personnel expenses is a crucial variable in our models and their absence 
reduces the number of observations. As seen in the table, data on personnel expenses (PE in the 
Table) is very restricted in Bankscope, implying a substantial loss of observations. The third 
column presents the years for which data is extracted from the financial reports from the 
individual bank’s website, while the fourth column displays the years for which data is gathered 
from one of the banking agencies in BiH, depending on whether the bank is established in the 
Federation or in Republika Srpska. The last column displays the time span of data for the particular 
bank after augmenting the Bankscope data with data from the additional sources. A similar 
process was followed for other countries under consideration and much of the missing data was 
recovered.23 
 
 
Table 4.2 Data augmentation process for Bosnia and Herzegovina up to 2009 
Bank name Bankscope Official web page Banking Agency 
(FBiH) 
Final data  
(obs. added)* 
BOR Banka Sarajevo 2002-2004 (n/a PE for 2002-2004) 
2008-2009 
for 2009 only 2000-2001;  
2005-2007 
PE data 
2002-2004 
2000-2009 (8) 
Balkan Investment Bank 2004-2007 (n/a PE for 2007) Reports w/o notes 2001-2003;  
PE for 2007 
2001-2007 (4) 
Bobar Banka 2002-2004 (n/a PE for 2002-2004) 
2007-2009 
2005-2006 
PE for 2002-2004 
2000-2001 
 
2000-2009 (7) 
Bosna Bank International 2004-2009  2002-2003 2002-2009 (2) 
Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank B. Luka 2005-2009  2002-2004 2002-2009 (3) 
Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank Mostar1 2003-2009 (n/a PE for 2003)  2000-2002 2000-2009 (4) 
                                                        
23 For the sake of brevity, these notes and accompanying tables are not presented in the thesis but they are available if 
needed. 
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Intesa Sanpaolo Banka2 2003-2009 (n/a PE for 2003-2004) PE for 2003-2004 2000-2002 2000-2009 (5) 
IK Banka Zenica 2005-2009 (n/a PE for 2005-2006) PE for 2005-2006  2000-2004 2000-2009 (7) 
Investment Bank of FBiH3 2004-2007  2000-2003; 
2008-2009 
2000-2009 (6) 
Komercijalno-Investiciona 
Banka V. Kladusa 
2002-2009 (n/a PE for 2002-04, 
2007) 
No reports  2000-2001 
PE for 2002-04 
and 2007 
2000-2009 (7) 
NLB Razvojna Banka4 2003-2009 (n/a PE for the period) PE for 2006-2009 PE for 2003-2005 2003-2009 
(all) 
NLB Tuzlanska Banka 2001-2008 (n/a PE for 2001-2003) 2000 and 2009 
PE for 2001-2003 
 2000-2009 (5) 
Nova Banka Banja Luka 2001-2008 (n/a PE for 2001-2006) 2009; PE 2001-06  2001-2009 (7) 
Privredna Banka Sarajevo5 2002-2003 (n/a PE for the period) No reports 2000-2001; 
2007-2009 
PE for 2002- 2003 
2000-2003 
and 
2007-2009 
(all) 
ProCredit Bank 2002-2009 (n/a PE for 2002-2003) PE for 2003 PE data for 2002 2002-2009 (2) 
Raiffeisenbank6 2007-2008 2000-06 and 2009  2000-2009 (8) 
Sparkasse Bank7 2002-2009 (n/a PE for 2002-2003) PE for 2002-2003 2000-2001 2000-2009 (4) 
Turkish Ziraat Bank 2002-2009 (n/a PE for 2002-2003)  2000-2001 2000-2009 (4) 
UniCredit Bank8 2002-2009 (n/a PE for 2002-2003)  2000-2001; 
PE for 2002-03 
2000-2009 (4) 
UniCredit Bank Banja Luka9 2002-2009 (n/a PE for 2002-2003) No reports PE for 2002-2003 2002-2009 (2) 
Union Banka Sarajevo 2002-2009 (n/a PE for the period)  2000-2001; 
PE for 2002-09 
2000-2009 
(all) 
Vakufska Banka Sarajevo 2002-2009 (n/a PE for 2002-2004) 2001; PE for 2002-
04 
2000 2000-2009 (5) 
Volksbank Banja  2005-2009  2002-2003 2002-2009 (2) 
11 
Volksbank BiH 2002-2009 (n/a PE for 2002-2007)  2000-2001; 
PE for 2002-07 
2000-2009 (8) 
Notes: * - the figure in the brackets denotes the number of additional observations added to the sample as a result from the 
augmentation process; 1-Before 2001 Aurobanka; 2-Before 2003 UPI banka; 3-The special law regulates establishment and 
work of Development Bank of the FBiH Sarajevo, that has become a legal successor of Investment Bank of the FBiH Sarajevo 
since 01.07.2008; 4-Before 2006 is LHB banka; 5-The bank is under provisional administration for the period 2004-2006 and 
no data is available; 6-Up to January 2003 is Raiffeisenbank; 7-Sparkasse Bank Sarajevo, until July 2009, operated under the 
name ABS Bank Sarajevo; 8-From 2004 it is UniCredit Zagrebacka banka Mostar, after merging Zagrebacka banka Mostar and 
Univerzal banka Sarajevo. HVB Central Profit Bank Sarajevo was integrated into UniCredit Zagrebacka bank Mostar (the new 
name of the Bank is UniCredit Bank Mostar); 9-Since 1st June 2008 Nova Banjalučka Banka operates under the name of 
UniCredit Banka Banja Luka; 10-Before 2007 this bank was operating as Zepter Bank; 11-None of the sources provides enough 
disaggregated data (in the case of other operating expenses) for 2004, thus no data for that year.  
Source: Author’s own compilation 
The information on the aggregate data for the banking system for each country is extracted from 
the statistics databases and the quarterly and annual reports using the websites of each country’s 
National Bank. Country specific variables, such as development indicators for each country, are 
extracted from the World Development Indicators Database of the World Bank.  
 
Banks for which data is available for less than five years are excluded from the dataset, since it 
can be expected that it would take at least five years for a bank to improve its efficiency due to: 
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(i) the extensive transition reforms; (ii) the substantial inflow of foreign capital and the expertise 
that comes along with the new ownership; (iii) the learning by doing processes; and (iv) the rapid 
technical changes in SEECs’ banking industry in recent years. Our data set includes banking 
institutions listed by the National Banks of each country, namely commercial banks (131), 
investment banks (7), micro-finance institutions (6); cooperative banks (6); and savings banks (3). 
Additionally, to avoid survivorship bias, the sample consists of not only the currently active banks, 
but also banks that were active during part of the period under investigation but have gone 
bankrupt during the period. The banks which have been merged with other banks during the time 
span of investigation appear in the sample as the “old” banks prior to the merger and the “new” 
banks after the merger. In the case of takeovers, again the bank is included in the sample prior 
the takeover, and disappears from the database after the take-over. However, a bank that takes 
over another bank in the next period appears as same unit of analysis as prior to the takeover, 
but with increased financial position as a result of the takeover. Both mergers and takeovers are 
worth consideration in the empirical analysis. However, since banks from eight countries are 
included in the analysis for a period of time when the banking sectors is still in transition in terms 
of the ownership structure, it is not feasible to control for all those events. According to Rossi et 
al. (2005) the effects of consolidation process in the banking industry as well as international 
mergers and acquisitions is often manifested in the profit side rather than on the cost side. On 
the contrary, Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) argue that the primary motive for bank mergers is to 
improve performance and achieve cost synergies. Despite these arguments the majority of the 
banking studies for transition economies do not control for this trend in the industry (Mertens 
and Urga, 2001; Bonin et al., 2005; Kasman (2005); Kasman and Yildirim, 2006; Kosak and Zajc, 
2006; Staikouras et al., 2008; Kosak et al., 2009; Kosak and Zoric, 2011). Hasan and Marton (2003) 
and Fries and Taci (2005) are the only two studies that have considered mergers in their empirical 
analysis. The former introduces an acquisition/merger dummy variable in the second stage in 
which possible correlation between profit inefficiency and other relevant factors is investigated. 
The dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the bank has acquired/merged with another bank 
during the post-1991 period, otherwise 0. The latter empirical study includes the merger variable 
in the mean of the inefficiency term, but no definition of the variable is provided. They found a 
negative but insignificant relationship between bank mergers and inefficiency. This approach of 
including only one dummy variable for bank mergers for all of the banks is somewhat dubious, 
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because the effect of the merger in this case is expected to be the same for all banks, regardless 
of size and ownership. This might be a reason for the insignificant effect of the bank merger 
variable in the study of Fries and Taci (2005). As shown in Table 4.1, the empirical investigation 
uses the ratio of the outputs relative to total assets, which in a way cancels out the immediate 
substantial increase in the outputs as a result of a merger/acquisition/takeover. 
 
The dataset is an unbalanced panel with 1667 observations for 153 banks covering a period of 13 
years from 2000 till 2012, which on average presents about 11 years per bank. Table 4.3 provides 
a detailed overview across time of the number of banks operating in each country and the number 
of banks included in the sample. The data shows that there are considerable oscillations in the 
distribution of banks both across countries and over time. Moreover, this table displays the 
proportion of banks included in our sample across countries, which is an indicator for 
representativeness of the sample. Although, this indicator can be somewhat misleading, since it 
is only based on the number of banks, according to the total assets of the banking sectors, our 
data includes on average from 60 to 80 per cent of the total banking assets across countries and 
time. Given this argument, it is evident that the larger banks in all of the countries are included in 
the sample for all the years, since the share of total assets indicator is substantially higher than 
the number of banks indicator, on average and over time. In Table 4.3 it is noticeable that the 
representativeness of the sample increases substantially over time in all countries. 
 
Table 4.3 Number of banks included in the sample as a proportion of the total banks 
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 ALBANIA  BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA 
2000 10 4 40  55 14 25 
2001 13 6 46  48 18 38 
2002 13 8 62  40 23 58 
2003 15 9 60  37 24 65 
2004 16 10 63  33 22 67 
2005 17 9 53  33 23 70 
2006 17 8 47  32 23 72 
2007 16 9 56  32 24 75 
2008 16 9 56  30 23 77 
2009 16 8 50  30 23 77 
2010 16 9 56  29 21 72 
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2011 16 9 56  29 21 72 
2012 16 9 56  28 21 75 
 BULGARIA  CROATIA 
2000     44 18 41 
2001 35 7 20  43 19 44 
2002 34 14 41  46 24 52 
2003 35 19 54  41 27 66 
2004 35 22 63  37 27 73 
2005 34 24 71  34 28 82 
2006 32 24 75  33 28 85 
2007 29 23 79  33 28 85 
2008 30 23 77  34 28 82 
2009 30 23 77  34 27 79 
2010 30 21 70  33 25 76 
2011 31 21 68  32 25 78 
2012 31 20 65  31 25 81 
 MACEDONIA  SLOVENIA 
2000 22 8 36  28 13 46 
2001 21 9 43  24 16 67 
2002 21 9 43  22 16 73 
2003 21 9 43  22 17 77 
2004 21 12 57  22 17 77 
2005 20 12 60  25 17 68 
2006 19 13 68  25 17 68 
2007 18 13 72  27 17 63 
2008 18 13 72  24 17 71 
2009 18 13 72  25 17 68 
2010 
 
18 12 67  25 17 68 
2011 17 12 71  25 17 68 
2012 16 12 75  23 17 74 
 SERBIA  MONTENEGRO 
2002 50 8 16     
2003 47 18 38  10 5 50 
2004 43 25 58  10 6 60 
2005 40 26 65  10 9 90 
2006 37 28 76  10 9 90 
2007 35 28 80  11 9 82 
2008 34 28 82  11 9 82 
2009 34 28 82  11 9 82 
2010 
20 
33 28 85  11 7 64 
2011 33 27 82  11 8 73 
2012 32 25 78  11 8 73 
4.4 ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
As discussed previously, CE is estimated by using RPMs (with Greene’s TRE model being a special 
case) and BC (1992, 1995) models. The detailed model specifications estimated are explained in 
terms of the random parameters model. The departure point is the estimation of the baseline 
models, Eq. 4.5 (hereafter TRE1) and Eq. 4.6 (hereafter TRE1T) by the TRE model (with the 
constant term being the only random parameter). The baseline models, as well as the production 
factors, include all of the Z(s) (country, industry and bank characteristics) in the objective function 
(the cost frontier). 
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However, as discussed in Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.3, the bank-specific variables are more likely 
to have a direct impact on inefficiency, rather than to contribute in shaping the cost frontier and 
to affect the total costs. Fortunately, SFA allows for introduction of the observed heterogeneity 
(the Zs) in the variance parameters and in the mean of the underlying inefficiency. But, as 
previously discussed in Sections 2.3.3 and Section 4.3, there is no clearly defined theory that 
dictates how these variables should enter the model, hence we assume that the country and 
industry specific variables belong to the objective function (the frontier line), whereas the bank-
specific characteristics directly affect the bank’s efficiency and should enter in the mean of the 
underlying inefficiency and/or in the variance parameter. It should be noted that, in the case of 
RPMs (including the TRE model) heteroscedasticity in vit cannot be accommodated, since it is 
assumed that vit is constant. Moreover, the normal-truncated model (which allows for the 
explanatory variables to enter in the mean of the underlying inefficiency) at the same time with 
heteroscedasticity in uit (observed heterogeneity introduced in the variance parameter of uit) is 
not identified, that is it is impossible to obtain the parameter estimates (LIMDEP Manual, 2007, 
p. E33-92). Therefore, this empirical analysis considers the two different possibilities separately; 
first, placing the bank-specific variables in the mean of the underlying inefficiency and second in 
the variance parameter of uit. However, the TRE truncated-normal model with bank-specific 
variables in the mean of the underlying inefficiency appears to be unidentified with this dataset. 
Similar failure is found in an example given by Greene (LIMDEP Manual, 2007, p. E33-97, when 
using the RPMs). Consequently, we proceed with the second model, that is, with 
heteroscedasticity in uit (hereafter TRE2 for the model with year dummies and TRE2T for the 
model with time trend).  
 
The next model specification goes beyond the TRE model and considers some of the parameters 
of the regressors as random, in addition to the constant term (Section 2.3.2). Usually, in the 
econometric modelling the parameters are treated as constant across observations (the effect of 
any individual explanatory variable is the same for each observation). However, the existence of 
unobserved factors may indicate that the estimated parameters may vary across individuals. The 
random parameters model account for the influences of this unobserved heterogeneity. The 
rationale for such a modelling approach is grounded in the argument of Berger and Mester (1997) 
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who emphasise the lack of homogeneity in the quality of produced outputs. Given the high level 
of product differentiation in banking arising from, inter alia, various types of loans, repayment 
schedule, risk, level of information, controlling for quality is restricted. These differences are not 
fully captured by the available data (bank data on more disaggregated levels are usually not 
available for researchers, especially for transition countries). Consequently, the treatment of both 
outputs (total loans and other earning assets) as random parameters is supported by the 
argument put forth by Berger and Mester (1997). In addition, risk preferences are not 
quantifiable, but they are closely associated with the loan impairment charge. Moreover, a 
constant effect of loan impairment charges on inefficiency across individuals is questionable, 
since a marginal increase of loan impairment charges may have a lower negative effect on 
efficiency for more capitalized banks than for less capitalized ones or due to other factors that are 
not considered in the empirical models. Therefore, in the third model, the loan impairment 
charges, the total loans and the other earning assets are modelled as random parameters, 
whereas the bank-specific variables again enter the variance of uit (hereafter TRE3 for the model 
with year dummies and TRE3T for the model with time tend). 
 
The second tranche of models comprises the BC (1992, 1995) models. To allow for comparison 
between these strands of models, we keep the same model specifications as discussed in the 
previous paragraphs. First, the baseline model specifications as given in Eq. 4.5 (hereafter BC1) 
and Eq. 4.6 (hereafter BC1T) are estimated. As in the previous alternative model specifications, 
first the bank-specific characteristics are included in the mean of the underlying inefficiency 
(hereafter BC2 for the model with year dummies and BC2T for the model with time tend); and 
then in the variance parameter of uit, (hereafter BC3 for the model with year dummies and BC3T 
for the model with time tend) (Section 2.3.2). Although, unlike the RPMs, the BC models allow for 
the truncated-normal distribution with heteroscedasticity in uit simultaneously, this model is not 
estimated in order to have comparable specifications. 
 
All variables included in the models, except the inflation rate, the dummy variables and the time 
trend, are expressed in natural logarithms. The econometric software used for this analysis is 
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LIMDEP 9.0. The RPMs (excluding the true random effects model) are estimated by maximum 
simulated likelihood, whereas the rest of the models are estimated by maximum likelihood. The 
estimation of the RPM is extremely time-consuming even with the current computing power. In 
order to achieve a reasonable approximation to the true likelihood function, a large number of 
random draws is required. Train (2002) suggests the use of “intelligent” draws, such as Halton 
sequences, which can reduce the number of draws required by a factor of five or ten, with a 
corresponding reduction in the amount of time needed to fit the models. Greene (2005) suggests 
the use of several hundreds of Halton sequences. Our models are estimated with 500 Halton 
sequences.  
 
 4.5 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
As discussed in the previous section,  CE has been estimated using three BC models and three 
RPMs, two of which are the TRE models (in one of them all the variables including the technology 
parameters are included in the frontier, and in the other bank-specific variables enter the variance 
of the one-sided error term, representing inefficiency). In addition, all of these models are 
estimated twice, once with year dummies and once incorporating a time trend in the translog 
formulation along with year dummies for 2008 and 2009 to control for the last financial crisis. For 
a comprehensive analysis, the empirical findings are presented in four separate sections in the 
following order. Section 4.5.1 presents a comparison of the BC models and RPMs based on the 
diagnostic statistics obtained from each model, although it is important to note that  usually it is 
not feasible to perform various statistical tests between the models, because they are not nested 
(Goddard et al., 2014). Section 4.5.2 discusses the preferred set of models for the estimation of 
CE and identifies the preferred model within this group. The findings of the preferred model and 
the effect of technical change on banks’ total costs are presented in Section 4.5.3, while a 
discussion on the CE levels across countries and times is presented in Section 4.5.4. Finally, in 
Section 4.5.5 we compare the efficiency estimates from the preferred model with those of other 
studies reviewed in Chapter 3.  
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4.5.1 Comparison of the BC and RPMs models 
Based on Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.4, we identified six model specifications to be estimated 
using BC models and RPMs. This section provides a comparison between the BC models and the 
RPMs. Table 4.4, Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 present the estimated results from the BC and RPMs.  
Table 4.4 consists of the results of the estimation of six versions of BC models. Table 4.5 uses 
Pearson correlation coefficients to compare the efficiency estimates obtained from BC and RPM 
models. Table 4.6, which presents the results of the six RPMs, is given later in the following section 
(4.5.2), because the detailed consideration of these models is discussed at that point. 
 
Starting with the comparison of the BC models and RPMs, the first important indicator to be 
considered is the lambda coefficient, 𝜆=σu/σv (in the lower panel of Table 4.4 and also Table 4.6 
in Section 4.5.2), which is statistically significant in all of the models and suggests that banks are 
operating with some inefficiency in all cases where the test can be performed. Specifically, the 
standard error of lambda is given for all of the BC model specifications but only for the baseline 
model of the RPMs: this test is not produced by the estimation procedure for the other models. 
Greene (2004) argues that the bigger the lambda the greater is the inefficiency component of the 
model.  
Table 4.4 Empirical results from Battese and Coelli models 
 BC1 BC2 BC3 BC1T BC2T BC3T 
Constant -0.2744  0.2158  0.7231  0.1395  0.5072  0.8716*** 
Loans  0.1456*  0.2175**  0.2692  0.1504**  0.2221***  0.2604*** 
Other Earning Assets (OEA)  0.1638***  0.1917***  0.1941***  0.1661***  0.1975***  0.1895*** 
Price of borrowed funds (Interest)  0.0733***  0.1077***  0.0081  0.0210  0.0518*** -0.0557*** 
Price of physical capital (Capital)  0.0108  0.0159  0.1576***  0.0012  0.0044  0.1630*** 
Loans*OEA  0.0932***  0.1047***  0.0888**  0.0959***  0.1064***  0.0832*** 
½*Loans2  0.0394***  0.0550***  0.0514  0.0349***  0.0500***  0.0468*** 
½*OEA2  0.0035  0.0040  0.0013  0.0067***  0.0069***  0.0037** 
½*Price of borrowed funds2 -0.0041 -0.0110** -0.0746*** -0.0055 -0.0102** -0.0949*** 
½*Price of physical capital2  0.0166***  0.0129*** -0.0520***  0.0202***  0.0187*** -0.0376*** 
Interest*Capital  0.0388***  0.0374***  0.0842***  0.0290***  0.0261***  0.0741*** 
Loans*Interest -0.0061  0.0065  0.0039 -0.0203** -0.0109 -0.0037 
Loans*Capital -0.0132 -0.0267 -0.0440 -0.0187 -0.0304** -0.0463*** 
OEA*Interest -0.0174*** -0.0135* -0.0155 -0.0168*** -0.0116 -0.0066 
OEA*Capital -0.0332*** -0.0385*** -0.0369*** -0.0423*** -0.0482*** -0.0462*** 
Loan Impairment Charges -0.0341**  0.0001  1.1560 -0.0310**  0.0001  1.9434 
Equity -0.0808***  0.0001  2.1744 -0.0794***  0.0001  3.7256 
Foreign ownership -0.0296*  0.0001  0.1399 -0.0298*  0.0001  0.1088 
Mixed ownership  0.0545***  0.0001  0.5286  0.0520***  0.0001  0.8032 
Population density  0.2580**  0.2398***  0.1709  0.2293*  0.2207**  0.1480*** 
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Demand density -0.0048  0.0318  0.0842  0.0345  0.0574  0.0895*** 
Intermediation ratio  0.0230  0.0178  0.0219  0.0204  0.0124  0.0126 
GDP per capita -0.0576 -0.0937* -0.1501 -0.1011** -0.1202** -0.1589*** 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  0.0326  0.0336  0.0365  0.0355  0.0378  0.0402* 
Inflation  1.5441***  1.5414***  1.3647**  1.5482***  1.5453***  1.3571*** 
EU Membership -0.0561*** -0.0522*** -0.0400 -0.0836*** -0.0761*** -0.0528*** 
2001  0.0069  0.0112  0.0116    
2002  0.0393  0.0361  0.0195    
2003  0.0159  0.0066 -0.0177    
2004 -0.0260 -0.0429 -0.0820    
2005 -0.0890** -0.1064** -0.1229    
2006 -0.0901* -0.1210** -0.1490    
2007 -0.0493 -0.1019* -0.1481    
2008 -0.0785 -0.1324** -0.1751 -0.0299 -0.0398 -0.0323 
2009  0.0249 -0.0309 -0.1039  0.0614**  0.0545*  0.0332 
2010  0.0111 -0.0416 -0.1124    
2011 -0.0148 -0.0662 -0.1285    
2012  0.0046 -0.0486 -0.1113    
Time trend (TT)    -0.0338*** -0.0397*** -0.0478*** 
½*TT2     0.0060***  0.0064***  0.0060*** 
TT*Loans     0.0054  0.0049  0.0012 
TT*OEA     0.0053***  0.0050***  0.0028** 
TT*Interest     0.0113***  0.0124***  0.0144*** 
TT*Capital    -0.0029*** -0.0036*** -0.0038*** 
𝜆  1.8694***  1.5655***  3.8417***  1.9600***  1.6197***  8.8588*** 
σu  0.2833***  0.2634***  0.9575  0.2896***  0.2681  1.3047 
σv  0.1515  0.1683  0.2493  0.1478  0.1655  0.1473 
ETA  0.0100**  n/a  0.0087  0.0100**  n/a  0.0100** 
AIC -0.1797 -0.2527  0.0830 -0.1471 -0.2471  0.2915 
Log Likelihood  190.75  250.62 -27.14  159.58  241.92 -204.93 
Estimated cost efficiencies over the whole sample 
Mean  0.8091  0.8178  0.8258  0.8061  0.8157  0.8445 
SD  0.1037  0.1003  0.1082  0.1045  0.1012  0.1103 
Min  0.3603  0.3989  0.2857  0.3539  0.3928  0.3205 
Max   0.9936  0.9938  0.9884  0.9941  0.9942  0.9956 
Note: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance of variables at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
The original printouts related to the BC models are presented in Appendix to Chapter 4, Section 4.2. 
On average, the estimated lambdas in the RPM estimations are higher compared to the ones from 
the BC models (except BC3T), implying that estimations by RPMs result in higher inefficiency. 
Thus, there is evidence that inefficiency effects are an important factor when explaining cost 
differences for banks in SEECs.  
 
However, before going further with the analysis of the BC results, it is important to discuss a 
number of “signals” which appeared during the estimation of the different models, raising some 
concern. Specifically, the estimation of all BC models was accompanied by the error message 
“Error 805: Initial iterations cannot improve function”, indicating that the models had not 
converged to provide a normal exit from the iteration process (only one iteration was completed). 
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This suggests limited validity of the findings obtained from the BC models. Greene (LIMDEP 
Manual 2007, p. E33-53) has a warning note for the BC models, arguing that “good” results using 
these models can emerge only when the data is highly consistent with them. Extreme results may 
emerge if the dataset is not of high quality or these models are not appropriate for the given data. 
Consequently, this view and the warning from the estimations suggest that the estimates of these 
models should be considered with caution.  
 
The studies on transition economies reviewed in Chapter 3 which use these models, do not discuss 
the existence of such a problem, although they are all based on Bankscope data. It is not clear if 
the issue has been raised previously and ignored or that it is an outcome of our particular data, 
for instance the particular countries included or the augmentation of the Bankscope data. On the 
other hand, RPMs have not exhibited any problems during the estimation procedures. In 
particular, all the models converged and had a normal exit from the iteration process.  
 
A more detailed analysis of the results of the BC models, reveals other indicators which raise 
concern about the appropriateness of these models. In particular, referring to the lambda 
estimates in Table 4.4, although they are statistically significant most of the values are fairly low, 
except for model BC3T which gives a high value, and such variations may support the previous 
argument that this set of models does not fit this data well. The specific parameter ETA (not 
available for BC with heteroscedasticity), which determines whether inefficiencies are time 
varying or time invariant, is significant in three variants, suggesting that the CE is time-variant 
over the period of investigation. However, when the estimated CE resulting from the BC models 
was closely examined, it was noted that the variation in CE seems to be negligible, something 
which is supported by the ETA’s low value of 0.01. In other words, the efficiency estimates for 
majority of the banks are almost constant over time. This finding is against the a priori 
expectations based on the discussion in Section 1.4 that during the period of 2000-2012 the 
banking sector in these countries has undergone a major restructuring, in particular with respect 
to an influx of foreign capital, mergers, acquisitions and takeovers, financial innovations and 
technological changes which facilitate the customer-orientated approach to bank services (on-
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line banking, increasing the numbers of ATMs, etc.). All of these are expected to have positively 
affected banks’ CE during these years. 
 
Amongst the empirical studies reviewed in Chapter 3, Rossi et al. (2005) and Kosak and Zajc (2006) 
find ETA to be significant, with values of 0.05 and 0.1, respectively, which are much higher 
estimates compared to our ETA estimates of 0.01. Kosak and Zoric (2011) find ETA to be 
insignificant, while Fries and Taci (2005), Kraft et al. (2002), and Kasman and Yildirim (2006) do 
not present this coefficient. The reason why some studies do not present the results with respect 
to ETA or have different results for this indicator is unclear. This might be due to the model in use 
(as discussed earlier the BC with heteroscedasticity model does not provide an estimate of ETA) 
or simply it is not presented. Slovenia is the only country included in these studies and our sample; 
and CE estimates are generally lower in the studies which do not report the ETA indicator (see 
Table 4.9 in this Section 4.5.5).  
 
RPMs allow for random distribution of inefficiency over time in the formulation of the model, as 
opposed to BC models in which by construction inefficiency is a function of time (see Chapter 
2.3.2 for technical details) and the variation in the inefficiency estimates in the BC models 
depends on this restrictive formulation. In this thesis, the CE estimates from the BC models are 
almost time-invariant, which can be observed by the analysis of the individual estimates through 
time, although the ETA coefficient is significant as previously discussed. Greene (2008) presumes 
that time-invariant estimates substantially incorporate heterogeneity, have higher 𝜎𝑢 compared 
to the time-varying models, which indicates a high variation of efficiency across banks for the 
former and low variation in the efficiency across banks in the latter case. This view can be applied 
in this analysis, since the 𝜎𝑢 of the BC models is much higher than the 𝜎𝑢  of RPMs (Table 4.4 and 
Table 4.6 in Section 4.5.2, respectively), suggesting that heterogeneity and inefficiency are 
confounded in the BC models. Moreover, there is a substantial difference in the 𝜎𝑢  across the BC 
models, suggesting possible instability of the BC estimates with respect to CE variations across 
banks. For example, the striking 𝜎𝑢  value of 0.96 and 1.30 in the BC3 and BC3T models respectively 
are about five times higher than the 𝜎𝑢 values of the other BC models (Table 4.4). In any case the 
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failure of the BC models to converge and have a normal exit from the estimation procedure and 
the very high variation in the values of 𝜎𝑢  obtained from similar models, provides support for the 
view that this strand of models does not seem to fit our dataset. According to Greene (2011) the 
BC models are very close to time-invariant models, which do not control for latent heterogeneity, 
while RPMs by formulation account for this type of heterogeneity. Hence, it is expected the CE 
estimates from these models to differ due to the potential presence of heterogeneity in the 
estimated inefficiency scores. Greene’s position presents another supporting argument for RPMs 
over BC models in this analysis.  
 
Another issue that can be of particular use in the comparison of the two strands of models is the 
significance of the estimated coefficients of the bank-specific variables when they can directly 
influence inefficiency by considering them to be explanatory variables of ui (regardless of whether 
they enter in the mean of the underlying distribution or in the variance of ui). In particular, as 
presented in Table 4.4 all of these variables are statistically insignificant and those controlling for 
ownership do not have the a priori expected sign (that foreign ownership would increase the CE 
of banks) in BC2, BC2T, BC3 and BC3T. On the other hand, the bank-specific variables are highly 
significant with expected signs in all of the RPMs (Table 4.6, Section 4.5.2). Referring back to the 
other studies for transition economies, Fries and Taci (2005) and Kosak and Zoric (2011) find these 
variables significant (although these researchers have also used some different bank-specific 
variables). Kraft et al. (2002) do not present the results of the estimation; Rossi et al. (2005) do 
not employ such a model specification, whereas in Kasman and Yildirim (2006) the position of 
such variables is not clearly presented. Previous studies therefore provide some (limited) support 
for the significance of such variables and this discussion can be considered as an additional 
indicator that the BC models do not fit our dataset appropriately.  
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There is a lack of statistical grounds when choosing between different SF models. However, there 
are some indicators such as LR test for nested models and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)24 for 
non-nested models that can be used for this purpose. That the RPMs (including the special case 
true random-effects model) are preferred over the BC models is suggested by AIC, for all of the 
RPMs have a smaller AIC compared to BC models. Specifically, the AIC for BC models is in the 
range of 0.29 to -0.25 and for the RPMs the AIC is in the range of -0.54 to -1.19 (Table 4.4 and 
Table 4.6). It is evident, that even the “worst” performing RPM, according to AIC, is preferred over 
the “best” BC model. Moreover, 𝜎𝑣 in RPMs is about three times smaller than 𝜎𝑣 in the BC models. 
From this can be further surmised that there is a heterogeneity in this data set which has been 
moved out from the error, which contributes to a higher “purity” in the RPMs CE estimates, since 
𝜎𝑣 is one of the components in the Jondrow et al. (1982) error term decomposition formula (𝜀𝑖𝑡 =
𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡). Consequently, the CE estimates of the BC models may also reflect heterogeneity 
besides efficiency. This is in line with the earlier argument regarding the possible existence of 
heterogeneity in the CE estimates obtained from the arguably time-variant BC models (since ETA 
is significant, but the size is negligible).     
 
So far, the results of the two strands of models have been compared on statistical grounds. Briefly, 
the argument is in favour of RPMs. However, before selecting the preferred strand, a discussion 
over the individual estimates is provided in the context of their consistency across the two sets of 
models. The mean bank CE in SEECs is arguably similar across all models (BC and RPMs) and ranges 
from 80.6 to 87.5 per cent. However, in order to examine the efficiency distribution and the 
(dis)similarities of the individual efficiency estimates across banks obtained by different models, 
scatter diagrams of the individual estimates are presented for a simple visual comparison and 
Pearson correlation of the individual efficiency estimates are calculated to test for their 
correlation across different models.  
 
                                                        
24 The smaller the value of this information criterion the better is the model, given the variant of the formula for the AIC used 
in LIMDEP. 
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Even though conclusions about the model performance cannot be drawn on the grounds of 
scatter diagrams, they present a significant intuitive way for understanding the relationship 
between the different sets of estimates. The scatter diagram in Figure 4.1 presents the 
relationship between the sets of estimates produced by the BC models, where BC1 (all the 𝑍𝑖𝑡 
variables enter the frontier) is the base category for comparison. It can be noted that except for 
a few banks, all the other estimates are quite consistent regardless of the model specification and 
positioning of the  𝑍𝑖𝑡.  
 
Figure 4.1 Scatter plot of estimated individual efficiencies using Battese and Coelli models 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
In Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 the individual CE estimates of BC2T are compared with the estimated 
CE of TR2T and TR3T models, respectively. Since the estimated CE within the BC models are 
reasonably consistent as shown in Figure 4.1, BC2T is chosen as a representative from the BC 
models because bank-specific variables enter in the variance parameter of 𝑢𝑖𝑡, as in TR2T and 
TR3T. It is evident that both diagrams, Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 present a similar picture, 
indicating a lack of consistency of the BC estimates of CE and the “equivalent” RPM estimates. 
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Figure 4.2 Scatter plot of estimated individual efficiencies using true random effects model and “equivalent” Batesse 
and Coelli 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Scatter plot of estimated individual efficiencies using Random Parameters Model and “equivalent” Batesse 
and Coelli 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 give some insights into the relationship between RPM sets of CE 
estimates. In Figure 4.4, the base model against which the other models are compared is TR1T, 
whereas in Figure 4.5, TR2T is compared to TR3T. It can be noticed that the two sets of estimates 
in Figure 4.5 are more consistent than the ones in the Figure 4.4. The reason for the lower 
consistency of the estimates in Figure 4.4 is the choice of the base category against which the 
other two sets of estimates are compared. In particular, the base category is TR1T, where all the 
variables (including the bank-specific variables) are part of the objective function and contribute 
to shaping the frontier line. Consequently, the position of the bank-specific variables within the 
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framework of the model does matter and affects the efficiency estimates. On the contrary, as 
previously presented in Figure 4.2, this is not the case with the BC model estimates of CE when 
the position of bank-specific variable are changed from the objective function into the 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 
presumably because of the insignificant effect of these variables in those particular models (Table 
4.4). On the other hand, in Figure 4.5, although there is some consistency in the estimates, the 
relationship is far from fully consistent, presumably because of the treatment of some of the 
variables as random parameters (loans, other earning assets and loan impairment charges). 
  
Figure 4.4 Scatter plot of estimated individual efficiencies using Random Parameters Models 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Scatter plot of estimated individual efficiencies using true random effects model and random parameters 
model 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
To check the relationship between the different sets of estimates on statistical ground, Pearson 
correlation coefficient analysis is conducted (Table 4.5). All the correlation coefficients are 
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significant at all conventional levels of significance. Given the sample size of 1667 observations, 
even fairly low correlations are very often significant – as they are in Table 4.25 The correlation 
between BC and RPM models are presented in bold type. 
 
Table 4.5 Pearson’s correlation coefficient for Battese and Coelli models and Random Parameters models 
            |    TRE1      TRE2      TRE3     TRE1T     TRE2T    TRE3T   BC1     BC2      BC3      BC1T     BC2T    BC3T 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  TRE1 |   1.0000  
  TRE2 |   0.7146  1.0000  
  TRE3 |   0.7062  0.9130  1.0000  
TRE1T |   0.9893  0.7084  0.6997  1.0000  
TRE2T |   0.7153  0.9907  0.9199  0.7196  1.0000  
TRE3T |   0.7178  0.9196  0.9600  0.7150  0.9195  1.0000  
    BC1 |   0.1689  0.6362  0.6016  0.1674  0.6355  0.6049  1.0000  
    BC2 |   0.1487  0.6441  0.6105  0.1475  0.6416  0.6075  0.9678  1.0000 
    BC3 |   0.2181  0.6252  0.6218  0.2151  0.6254  0.6426  0.8897  0.8898  1.0000 
  BC1T |   0.1739  0.6358  0.6039  0.1724  0.6396  0.6112  0.9957  0.9623  0.8972  1.0000 
  BC2T |   0.1530  0.6459  0.6138  0.1518  0.6479  0.6148  0.9656  0.9954  0.8977  0.9688  1.0000 
  BC3T |   0.2148  0.6374  0.6070  0.2138  0.6461  0.6311  0.9148  0.9212  0.9701  0.9277  0.9346  1.0000 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
These correlation coefficients provide support for the above discussion. In particular, the 
correlation coefficients of the CE estimates from the BC models are very strong at about 0.90. 
However, there is a weak correlation between some of the BC and RPM sets of estimates and only 
moderate correlation between the rest (in Table 4.5 these correlation coefficients are bolded). 
The correlation coefficients of the estimates obtained from the RPMs models are moderate to 
very strong, ranging from 0.70 to 0.99. This is a supporting evidence for the argument regarding 
the consistent and less consistent sets of estimates within the RPMs, presumably due to the 
position of the bank-specific variables and the treatment of some variables as random 
parameters. 
So far, the two sets of models, BC and RPMs, have been compared on statistical grounds using 
the diagnostic statistics and other indicators provided by each model as well as regarding the 
                                                        
25 For brevity, the p-values are omitted in the Table 4.5, since all the coefficients are significant at all levels of significance.  
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consistency of the individual efficiency estimates across models. Briefly, to summarize the 
discussion over the preferred set of models, all the arguments presented above are in favour of 
estimation by RPMs. RPMs are preferred because: (i) they account for heterogeneity, which 
purifies the efficiency estimates; (ii) no problems were faced during the estimation procedure; 
(iii) by formulation RPMs allow for free variation of the individual efficiency estimates within one 
bank, whereas in the BC models the time-variant component of the estimates are conditioned on 
a particular function of time, which in this analysis although significant is negligible in magnitude, 
hence resulting in almost time-invariant CE estimates. Greene (2008) argues that the major 
reason for the inconsistency when comparing the sets of efficiency estimates is the assumption 
of time (in)variance. In this analysis, the efficiency estimates from the BC models are almost time-
invariant although by formulation they are time-variant models; (iv) the AIC provides support; and 
(v) the bank-specific variables are all insignificant in the BC models when they enter 𝑢𝑖𝑡, which is 
strongly against the a priori expectations. On the basis of these reasons,, we can now turn to a 
detailed analysis of the results of RPMs (the original printouts related to the six RPMs are 
presented in Appendix to Chapter 4, Section 4.3).  
 
 
4.5.2 Comparison of Random Parameters Models (RPMs) 
Several issues are considered in order to identify the “best” set of the CE estimates among the 
RPM set. The first issue is the decision for the choice of models either with year dummies (TRE1, 
TRE2 and TRE3) or the models with time trend and two year dummies (2008 and 2009) controlling 
for the financial crisis (TRE1T, TRE2T and TRE3T). The empirical results of the two types of models 
are presented in Table 4.6. The first three columns present the empirical findings for the models 
with year dummies (the year 2000 is the base category) and the last three columns present the 
estimates of the models with time trend. The models with a time trend have the almost the same 
values of AIC, hence this information criterion is not of much use in this case. When comparing 
the values of 𝜎𝑢 and 𝜎𝑣 across the models, it can be noticed that 𝜎𝑢(𝜎𝑣) is marginally lower 
(higher) in the models with time trend compared to the models with year dummies, however 𝜎𝑢 
is substantially the lowest in TRE3T (Table 4.6). This could be interpreted as taking a “little” 
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heterogeneity out of 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (Greene, 2004) and a support in favour of the models with time trend, 
especially TRE3T with the three random parameters (presented in bold type to be distinguished 
from the other parameters and they are discussed later in this section) in addition to the constant 
term and the bank-specific variables modelled to affect directly inefficiency. Since, there are no 
econometric testing procedures available, the above arguments can be considered as a support 
for the models with time trend and financial crisis year dummies over the models with year 
dummies, although the supportive evidence is quite marginal. 
 
Next, the analysis of the estimated parameters of the year dummies and time trend estimates 
along with its cross-products with the technology parameters may facilitate deciding between the 
two types of models (Table 4.6). The year dummies from 2004 to 2012 are all highly significant 
and negative in all models, except in TRE2 where the 2004 year dummy is insignificant. The results 
suggest a constant decrease of the total costs in banking through time. It can be noticed that the 
estimated magnitude of cost reductions over years depends on the model specifications; the 
position of 𝑍𝑖𝑡 and the treatment of the outputs and their quality as random parameters are found 
to have an effect on the year dummies coefficients. 
 
Considering the estimated coefficients associated with the time trend, the empirical results 
suggest that all the estimates, except one in each regression, are highly significant, indicating the 
presence of autonomous trend with respect to technical change. Moreover, the year 2008 and 
2009 dummies although positive are insignificant in these models, except the 2009 time dummy 
which is significant and positive in TRE1T. Given that the technical change is found to be a 
significant indicator of the banks’ total costs and the marginal support of the statistical 
diagnostics, the models with time trend seem to fit our data better. Hence, in what follows the 
focus is on the results obtained from the random parameters models with time trend (the last 
three columns in Table 4.6). 
Table 4.6 Estimation results from the Random Parameter Models  
TRE1 TRE2 TRE3 TRE1T TRE2T TRE3T 
Constant  0.0403 
(0.2290) 
-0.0881 
 (0.3287) 
-0.8925 
 (0.4289) 
 0.1998 
(0.2292) 
 0.0106 
(0.3190) 
 0.4566 
(0.3591) 
 147 
 
Loans  0.1651**  0.1947*** -0.0562 
(0.1426) 
 0.1703**  0.1558*** -0.0289 
(0.2592) 
Other Earning Assets (OEA)  0.1813***  0.2028***  0.0897 
(0.0780) 
 0.1604***  0.1824***  0.0931 
(0.0694) 
Price of borrowed funds (Interest)  0.1668***  0.2283***  0.1980***  0.1587***  0.2224***  0.2227*** 
Price of physical capital (Capital) -0.0188 -0.0158  0.2231*** -0.0096  0.0029  0.1718*** 
Loans*OEA  0.0804***  0.0546***  0.0093  0.0585***  0.0246  0.0053 
½*Loans2  0.0161  0.0176 -0.0370***  0.0252  0.0184 -0.0407*** 
½*OEA2  0.0064**  0.0040  0.0040**  0.0067**  0.0023  0.0061*** 
½*Price of borrowed funds2  0.0852***  0.0600***  0.0811***  0.0832***  0.0565***  0.0678*** 
½*Price of physical capital2  0.0421***  0.0227*** -0.0340***  0.0446***  0.0290*** -0.0231*** 
Interest*Capital  0.0011  0.0233***  0.0265*** -0.0012  0.0113***  0.0244*** 
Loans*Interest -0.0394*** -0.0139 -0.0123* -0.0382*** -0.0282** -0.0047 
Loans*Capital -0.0145 -0.0365*** -0.0124 -0.0074 -0.0136 -0.0146 
OEA*Interest  0.0129**  0.0307***  0.0212***  0.0101***  0.0323***  0.0411*** 
OEA*Capital -0.0362*** -0.0479*** -0.0248*** -0.0418*** -0.0504*** -0.0332*** 
Loan Impairment Charges  -0.0297**  0.1671***  0.3185 
(0.4136) 
-0.0241*  0.1693***  0.3447 
(0.3778) 
Equity -0.0392***  0.6120***  0.2667*** -0.0374***  0.6396***  0.3486*** 
Foreign ownership -0.0476*** -0.1153*** -0.0432 -0.0511*** -0.1055*** -0.2211*** 
Mixed ownership -0.0065 -0.4631*** -0.3882*** -0.0075 -0.4634*** -0.3695*** 
Population density  0.2315***  0.2182***  0.5797***  0.2472***  0.2497***  0.2504*** 
Demand density  0.0270  0.0231  0.0601***  0.0421*  0.0265  0.0787*** 
Intermediation ratio  0.1120***  0.0798***  0.2204***  0.1141***  0.0639***  0.1505*** 
GDP per capita -0.1064*** -0.0661** -0.2361*** -0.1377*** -0.0978*** -0.2105*** 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  0.0701***  0.0627***  0.0753***  0.0789***  0.0723***  0.0759*** 
Inflation  0.6839***  0.6081***  0.2912***  0.4715***  0.4966***  0.2119*** 
EU Membership -0.0270* -0.0100 -0.0097* -0.0418*** -0.0243** -0.0151** 
2001 -0.0046  0.0324  0.0163    
2002 -0.0112  0.0254 -0.0104    
2003 -0.0597* -0.0040 -0.0561***    
2004 -0.1059*** -0.0566** -0.1083***    
2005 -0.1489*** -0.0820*** -0.1343***    
2006 -0.1667*** -0.1002*** -0.1471***    
2007 -0.1416*** -0.0955*** -0.1592***    
2008 -0.1342*** -0.1012*** -0.1659***  0.0290  0.0077  0.0132 
2009 -0.0934** -0.0745** -0.1682***  0.0540**  0.0274  0.0131 
2010 -0.1143*** -0.0894** -0.1752***    
2011 -0.1301*** -0.1066*** -0.1856***    
2012 -0.1290*** -0.1103*** -0.1773***    
Time trend (TT)    -0.0584*** -0.0414*** -0.0458*** 
½*TT2     0.0076***  0.0044***  0.0052*** 
TT*Loans    -0.0095*** -0.0128***  0.0002 
TT*OEA     0.0038***  0.0009  0.0029*** 
TT*Interest     0.0024  0.0078***  0.0040*** 
TT*Capital    -0.0028*** -0.0037*** -0.0021*** 
𝜆  2.3990***  3.8804  5.2947  2.4112***  3.6776  4.0923 
σu  0.2217  0.2440  0.2469  0.2225  0.2417  0.1929 
σv  0.0924  0.0629  0.0466  0.0923  0.0657  0.0471 
AIC -0.5444 -0.6714 -1.1892 -0.5448 -0.6775 -1.1851 
Log Likelihood 494.74  600.59  1035.18  491.11  601.67  1027.81 
Estimated cost efficiencies over the whole sample 
Mean  0.8509  0.8555  0.8654  0.8502  0.8574  0.8745 
SD  0.0860  0.0704  0.0677  0.0865  0.0701  0.0670 
Minimum  0.3267  0.3876  0.3284  0.3237  0.3847  0.3248 
Maximum  0.9828  0.9942  0.9957  0.9821  0.9939  0.9957 
The estimates of the production technology coefficients give the direction of the effects mostly 
as expected, and are largely significant. Given that the translog functional form is used, the 
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interpretation of the technology parameters is complicated, because of the squared and cross-
product terms of the outputs, the inputs and the time trend. For example, at first glance, the 
coefficients of loans is negative in TRE3T (the last column in Table 4.6), raising some doubts for 
the appropriateness of the model, since the main output is insignificant and the coefficient on 
loans has the opposite sign to that expected. However, given that this is a random parameter its 
interpretation is not straightforward (more on this issue later in this section), especially given the 
effect of this output is also demonstrated in several cross products with the other output, the two 
input prices, the time trend and itself, as it is required by the translog specification; all of these 
cross products coefficients except one are statistically significant at all conventional levels. On the 
other hand, the price of physical capital is significantly positive as expected only in TRE3T (all of 
the cross-products are highly significant except one).  
 
As already acknowledged the coefficients of the technology parameters are of second-order 
importance, therefore for brevity detailed interpretation is not presented, especially because 
their interpretation is complex. Furthermore, complexity in interpretation of the results is also 
common for the coefficients of the random parameters (loan impairment charges, loans and 
other earning assets). As argued by Greene (2005b) the standard errors cannot be used 
straightforwardly to assess the significance of the estimated parameters, as it is a usual practice 
in the econometric analysis. The reason for this is that there is no unique “parameter” to assess 
when the parameters are randomly distributed across the units of analysis. In particular, Greene 
(2005b) emphasizes that the structural parameters provide the moments of distribution, not the 
asymptotic mean and the variance of a sampling distribution. For example, for the loan 
impairment charges, the unconditional normal distribution of 𝑍𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖  across banks is estimated to 
have a mean of 0.3447 and a standard deviation of 0.3778, as given in Table 4.6 (the last column). 
According to Greene’s argument in this case it is very likely that any realization of the process 
generating ZLICi will produce both positive and negative values, suggesting that LIC would have a 
positive effect on inefficiency for some banks, whilst negative for others. In addition, as previously 
argued, because of the translog functional form in use, the generating process of α1i and α2i is 
complex, since the effect is “spread” among the cross products as well (see Equation 4.6 for 
details). Therefore, the standard deviations are presented in the parentheses in Table 4.6 for the 
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random parameters and the “stars” which indicate the statistical significance of the parameters 
are not presented, since as discussed it is not a proper indicator for significance.  
 
Figure 4.6, Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 below present plots mapping the mean and the standard 
deviations for each of the 153 banks for the loans, other earning assets and the loan impairment 
charges respectively, in order to display variations in the individually estimated parameters. As 
noted, the conditional means (the dots in the centipede plot) are not actually estimates of α1i, α2i 
and ZLICi, but are draw from a conditional distribution instead. The spikes in Figure 4.6, Figure 4.7 
and Figure 4.8 represent estimates of a range of the density that should capture a large portion 
of the mass of the distribution. In particular, the estimated conditional mean plus/minus two 
conditional standard deviations will capture at least 95 per cent of any but the most pathological 
distribution (LIMDEP, 2007). Hence, subject to couple caveats (Greene, 2008 and LIMDEP, 2007), 
the lines in the three figures below do present confidence intervals for α1i, α2i and ZLICi, 
respectively.   
 
 
Figure 4.6 95% Confidence Intervals for Bank Specific Coefficients on Loans 
 Source: Author’s own calculation 
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Figure 4.7 95% Confidence Intervals for Bank Specific Coefficients on Other Earning Assets 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8 95% Confidence Intervals for Bank Specific Coefficients on Loan Impairment Charges 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
Considering the three figures above, there are considerable amount of variation across banks in 
both means and standard deviations, especially in loans and loan impairment charges as 
expected. This indicates that the random parameter “treatment” of these three variables may be 
justified. Moreover, comparing the three models with time trend among each other using the AIC 
(Table 4.6), again there is a supportive evidence in favour of this model over the other two models 
(TRE1T: -0.55; TRE2T: -0.68 and TRE3T: -1.2). In addition, both 𝜎𝑢 and 𝜎𝑣 are lowest in this model 
compared to the other two (Table 4.6), suggesting that heterogeneity is reduced the most in this 
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particular model (TRE3T). Therefore, since all the arguments support the random parameter 
model with time trend and the two year dummies, where loans, other earning assets and loan 
impairment charges are considered as random parameters and the bank-specific variables enter 
the variance of the inefficiency component, this is the model which results are discussed in detail 
and the one chosen for Chapter 6, when the CE estimates are considered as a determinant of 
bank’s market share.  
 
 
4.5.3 Interpretation of the Preferred Random Parameters Model (TRE3T) 
Although the choice of the “preferred” model was made above, given that this was made on 
marginal grounds, all RPM models are referred to in the discussion of the detailed results that 
follows in this section. GDP per capita coefficient has a negative sign as expected and it is 
significant at the one per cent level of significance. This implies that the higher levels of GDP per 
capita are associated with increase in cost efficiency gains. Inflation, as expected has a positive 
impact on costs and is also significant at the one per cent level of significance, suggesting that in 
an inflationary environment firms experience a loss in cost efficiency. The dummy variable 
controlling for EU accession, as expected, has an inverse relationship with the total costs and it is 
statistically significant. Banks operating in the EU common market are expected to face greater 
competition, which in turn is expected to bring about gains in cost efficiency. Population density 
and demand density coefficients have a positive impact on the total costs and are highly 
significant at 1 per cent level of significance. However, the coefficient signs of the two parameters 
are the opposite of the a priori expected signs, as it is assumed that banks operating in markets 
with a higher density of demand and in higher population density areas would face lower costs as 
there is higher probability of having more clients for whom they will execute various services 
(collecting deposits and approving loans) which leads to decrease in the costs per service. 
However, as explained by Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), if banks compete by opening more 
branches for strategic reasons, this may create excessive bank operating costs, hence higher total 
costs. Similarly, contrary to expectations, the level of intermediation has a positive and significant 
effect on total costs.  
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The HHI is estimated to have a positive effect and is significant at the one per cent level of 
significance, providing evidence in favour of the Hicksian quiet life hypothesis. Additionally, this 
finding suggests that the higher concentration is at least partly a result of market power, since 
higher concentration is associated with higher costs (Leibenstein, 1966). If the assumption is that 
big banks in one banking industry most probably behave in line with the Hicksian quiet life 
hypothesis, then this is further supported by the effect of a bank’s equity. In particular equity is 
found to be positively and significantly associated with banks’ inefficiency, because in TRE3 and 
TRE3T equity enters the variance parameter of uit. However, in TRE1 and TRE1T (where equity is 
a part of the goal function), its coefficient is negative and significant, suggesting an inverse 
relationship with total costs, meaning that banks with higher equity have lower costs. Therefore, 
the findings with respect to equity are inconclusive. 
 
As expected, given the know-how introduced in the banking sector in SEECs with the entry of 
foreign capital, the coefficient on the ownership variable indicated that mixed and foreign banks 
are more efficient relative to domestic banks. In particular, the coefficients of both variables 
(foreign and mixed), are negative, as expected, in all of the RPMs specification. Moreover, both 
coefficients are significant in most specifications, including the preferred TRE3T model (where 
they are highly significant).  
 
A striking finding is the effect of the loan impairment charges on total costs/inefficiency. In the 
case of the preferred model, TRE3T as explained earlier in this section, the interpretation is not 
straightforward, because the effect of loan impairment charges on inefficiency is estimated 
individually for each bank in the sample and, as presented in Figure 4.8, there is an evident 
variation of this effect among banks. The effect of loan impairment charges is negative and 
significant at 10 per cent level of significance when they are included in the goal function, TRE1T 
(the effects is on total costs), indicating that higher level of loan impairment charges would 
decrease total costs, which is the opposite of the expectations. However, this variable is positively 
associated with banks’ inefficiency (statistically significant at 1 per cent level of significance) in 
the formulations when loan impairment charges enter the variance of 𝑢𝑖  (TRE2T), which is in line 
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with the expected effect. Briefly, these findings support the important role of loan impairment 
changes regarding the banks’ CE.  
 
Table 4.7 presents the average technical change and its component across countries and time for 
the preferred random parameter model (TRE3T). The first column presents the average technical 
change, which is calculated using the equation above the table. The average technical change can 
be decomposed in three types of technical change: (i) radial (neutral) technical change; (ii) 
disembodied (nonneutral) technical change and (iii) scale augmenting technical change (Ashton, 
1998). The radial technical change accounts for reductions in total costs holding the marginal 
substitution between factors constant, which is an equivalent of Hick’s neutral technical change. 
Since, this type of technical change is −(𝜌
𝑇
+ 𝜌
𝑇𝑇
𝑇), it quantifies the shifting of the cost frontier 
towards the origin (Table 4.7 column 3). The scale augmenting technical change reflects the 
changes in the sensitivity of total cost to variations in the efficient scale of production, namely the 
technical change linked to changes in scale of banks within sample. It is calculated as 
−(𝜃1𝑇𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜃2𝑇𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐸𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ), hence If the coefficient is positive for all i, the scale of production 
which minimizes average cost for a given output mix is increasing over time (Table 4.7 column 4). 
The disembodied technical change shows the change in the efficiency or quality of the factor 
inputs in the production process. It is −(𝜗1𝑇𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜗2𝑇𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) and explains the sensitivity 
of total cost to variations in unit input prices (Table 4.7 column 5). Hence, if this coefficient is 
positive the share of input i in total cost is decreasing over time. This would represent a shift 
towards the cost frontier or homogenization within the sample. 
 
Overall, significant average technical change is observed as shown in the last column of Table 4.6, 
because all the coefficients related to the time trend (including the cross products of time trend 
with the outputs, input prices and itself) are statistically significant, except the cross product of 
time trend and loans. All the countries in the sample exhibit certain levels of technical progress 
per annum ranging from 1.4 per cent (Bulgaria) to 2.2 per cent (BiH) (Table 4.7 column 2), while 
the overall effect in SEECs over the period 2000-2012 is 1.8 per cent.  
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Table 4.7 Average estimates of technical change for banks in SEE across countries and time (2000-2012) 
−(𝜌𝑇 + 𝜌𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝜃1𝑇𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜃2𝑇𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐸𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜗1𝑇𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜗2𝑇𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) 
Country Technical Radial Scale 
Augmenting 
Disembodied 
Albania 0.0165 0.0093 0.0030 0.0043 
BiH 0.0223 0.0093 0.0063 0.0067 
Bulgaria 0.0140 0.0041 0.0046 0.0053 
Croatia 0.0185 0.0093 0.0044 0.0048 
Macedonia 0.0196 0.0093 0.0050 0.0053 
Montenegro 0.0130 -0.0011 0.0074 0.0067 
Serbia 0.0174 0.0041 0.0066 0.0067 
Slovenia 0.0168 0.0093 0.0036 0.0038      
Year 
    
2000 0.0477 0.0406 0.0034 0.0037 
2001 0.0433 0.0354 0.0035 0.0044 
2002 0.0392 0.0301 0.0036 0.0055 
2003 0.0348 0.0249 0.0039 0.0059 
2004 0.0304 0.0197 0.0044 0.0063 
2005 0.0255 0.0145 0.0046 0.0064 
2006 0.0202 0.0093 0.0048 0.0061 
2007 0.0148 0.0041 0.0053 0.0054 
2008 0.0095 -0.0011 0.0062 0.0045 
2009 0.0045 -0.0064 0.0058 0.0050 
2010 -0.0003 -0.0116 0.0058 0.0055 
2011 -0.0052 -0.0168 0.0060 0.0055 
2012 -0.0098 -0.0220 0.0063 0.0058 
     
Overall SEECs (2000-2012) 0.0178 0.0076 0.0049 0.0054 
Note: Coefficients are presented using reverse sign (“-“ in front of the equation), so that a positive technical change 
is interpreted as a factor that contributes in lowering the total costs.  
Appendix to Chapter 4, Section 4.4, in details, presents the technical change and its component across countries 
and time for the random parameter model (TRE3T) 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
The spread of this range across countries is not wide, suggesting similar technological progress. 
An interesting finding is the effect of technical change analysed through time. Specifically, as 
shown in Table 4.7 in the bottom panel, the effect of technical change is positive in the period 
2000-2009, but the positive effect of technical change on cost reductions diminishes through 
time. In other words, this effect is 4.8 per cent in 2000 with decreasing trend in the following 
years to reach only 0.5 per cent in 2009. From then onwards (2010-2012) the technical progress 
has a negative, but negligible effect in 2010 (0.3 per cent) and this negative effect increases in the 
 155 
 
last two years when in 2012 it becomes 1 per cent. Hence, in the last three years of the analysis 
the lack of technical progress leads to increase of the total costs of the banks in SEECs. The reason 
for the negative effect of technical change on total costs (increase in total costs), as presented in 
Table 4.7 bottom panel, is the calculated negative effect of the radial technical change, which 
quantifies the shifting of the cost frontier to the origin. Moreover, radial technical change is the 
dominant component of the overall technical change. However, given that scale augmenting and 
disembodied technical change are always positive, although their effect is small, these indicate a 
steady “catching up” to the average state of technology (Ashton, 1998). 
 
4.5.4 Cost efficiency in the banking sector in SEECs 
This subsection discusses the cost efficiency estimates for the banks in the eight SEECs during 
2000-2012 on the sample of 153 banks. Prior to the presentation of the empirical results it is 
important to note that CE estimates as a part of the error term are not estimated along with their 
standard errors (more on this issue see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000 and Greene, 2008). As a 
result, we cannot test whether any difference in CE across countries and through time is 
statistically significant. This of course presents a caveat of this type of empirical analysis.  
 
Table 4.8 presents the estimated cost efficiencies of the banks across SEEC countries and time 
obtained from TRE3T, while Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 present the average cost efficiency across 
countries and time, respectively.26 The average estimated banks’ cost efficiency in SEECs for the 
observed period is 87.5 per cent, in particular the average banks’ cost efficiency across countries 
ranges from 81.5 to 90 per cent. It is a striking finding that the average banks’ cost efficiency in 
SEECs is the highest at the beginning of the investigated period, 2000, at 88.8 per cent while the 
lowest average efficiency is at the final year of analysis, 2012, at 86.2 per cent. In general, the 
findings suggest that there is a deviation from the full efficient level (100 per cent) 
                                                        
26 The estimated cost efficiencies from the other TRE models are presented in Appendix to Chapter 4, Section 4.3. 
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Table 4.8 Cost efficiency estimates across country and time based on TRE3T model (in %) 
Country/Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Avg 
Albania 84.4 80.3 83.2 84.3 86.4 88.8 89.3 89.3 88.7 89.1 89.6 89.9 90.6 87.2 
BiH 87.5 86.8 87.1 87.6 90.1 89.9 90.1 89.8 89.9 89.8 88.9 88.9 86.8 88.7 
Bulgaria 
 
86.9 85.8 87.1 88.4 88.2 87.4 88.4 87.9 87.0 87.0 87.1 86.9 87.3 
Croatia 90.1 88.8 88.0 89.0 88.7 88.9 89.2 89.1 89.3 89.0 89.0 89.1 88.9 89.0 
Macedonia 89.6 87.3 85.7 88.8 89.8 89.7 90.1 88.9 88.3 88.7 88.1 88.9 88.7 88.7 
Montenegro 
   
86.4 86.3 86.6 87.6 88.7 88.3 86.2 87.3 88.3 88.5 87.4 
Serbia 
  
83.2 82.9 78.8 82.8 84.2 85.9 88.0 80.2 78.2 76.3 75.4 81.5 
Slovenia 89.3 87.2 88.2 88.9 91.0 91.0 90.7 90.5 88.9 91.2 91.5 90.4 90.6 90.0 
Average 88.8 86.9 86.6 87.1 87.2 88.0 88.3 88.7 88.7 87.2 86.7 86.4 86.2 87.5 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
The Slovenian banking sector is the most cost efficient with an average of 90 per cent, while the 
Serbian banking sector is the least cost efficient with an average of 81.5 per cent.  The banking 
sectors of Croatia, Macedonia and BiH are characterized by a similar cost efficiency of around 89 
per cent, while the banking sectors of Montenegro, Bulgaria and Albania are by two percentage 
points less efficient. Although there is a gap for improvement of the banks’ CE in SEECs of between 
10 and 18.5 per cent, it seems that the banking sectors in SEECs are highly competitive. 
  
 
Figure 4.9 Average cost efficiency across countries based on TRE3T (in %) 
70.0 75.0 80.0 85.0 90.0 95.0 100.0
Slovenia
Croatia
Macedonia
BiH
Montenegro
Bulgaria
Albania
Serbia
Slovenia Croatia Macedonia BiH Montenegro Bulgaria Albania Serbia
Efficiency 90.0 89.0 88.7 88.7 87.4 87.3 87.2 81.5
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   Source: Author’s own calculations 
Figure 4.10 presents the trend of CE in the banking sectors in SEECs for the period 2000-2012. It 
can be noticed that the countries, except Serbia and Albania (the latter only in the early period), 
do not exhibit noticeable differences in their CE and, as mentioned above, we cannot discuss 
whether these differences are statistically significant, given that the standard errors are not 
available. The banking sector of Slovenia remains the most cost efficient, although it is 
characterized by slight decreases in CE prior to the EU accession until the financial crisis in 2008 
(2004:91% and 2008:89%), as well as during 2011-2012 which has been a turbulent period for the 
this banking sector. 
 
 
Figure 4.10 Cost efficiency in the banking sector in SEECs through time based on TRE3T 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
The highest improvement in terms of banks’ CE is found in the banking sector of Albania, whose 
banks’ CE has been improving continuously from 2001 until the financial crisis (overall in this 
period by 11 per cent).  After the financial crisis, the positive trend of banks’ CE in Albania again 
reappears. This substantial improvement arguably may be due to the regained confidence in the 
banking sector, after the systemic failure of this banking sector as a result of the Ponzi schemes 
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in 1997. The Serbian banking sector has a decreasing trend in terms of CE until 2004, followed by 
a trend of substantial improvement in CE until the financial crisis, since when CE is considerably 
decreased (2008: 88% and 2012: 75.7%). The banking sector of Croatia, BiH Bulgaria, Macedonia 
and Montenegro demonstrates a constant level of banks’ CE during the whole period 2000-2012, 
even for the period of the financial crisis, which indicates that this banking sector has remained 
to some extent immune on the crisis with respect to CE.  
 
 
4.5.5 Comparison of cost efficiency results with other studies 
Table 4.9 presents the estimates of the average bank CE in transition economies obtained from 
the studies reviewed in Chapter 3. As it can be noticed, none of these studies analyse CE for 
Albania, while BiH, Serbia and Montenegro are considered in one study only, where Serbia and 
Montenegro are analysed as a single country. By the same token, Macedonia and Bulgaria are 
rarely included in the empirical studies on efficiency in banking in transition economies.  
 
The estimates of the average CE of banks in SEECs obtained from our empirical analysis and those 
the reviewed studies are presented in Table 4.9 for the purpose of comparison. The higher figures 
for our study could be due to the following two reasons. First, the period of analysis covers a later 
stage of transition (2000-2012) and an evolution (improvement) in CE may be expected. Second, 
there are the differences in the methods of investigation, as explained earlier in this chapter and 
shown in the table. In particular, the use of RPMs in the context of SFA control for the unobserved 
heterogeneity across the banks, which was not the case in the reviewed studies, where 
heterogeneity and inefficiency were largely confounded, and treated as “inefficiency”. Almost all 
of the reviewed studies in Table 4.9 use the BC models (1992, 1995) in their empirical analysis, 
which exhibited many problems when applied to our dataset. Only, Kosak and Zoric (2011) use 
the true random effects model by Greene (2005b) but they incorrectly introduce the time trend 
in their analysis. However, their results for Slovenia of 87 per cent of cost efficiency in the banking 
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sector are similar with our CE estimates for Slovenia of 86 per cent and 89 per cent according to 
TRE1T and TRE2T, respectively. 
Table 4.9 Average cost efficiency (%) in the banking sector in transition economies and the methods of investigation in 
selected studies 
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Bulgaria  62     67                                  85-87 
BiH       58                   85-89 
Croatia 66 72   77-84  63                                     86-89 
Macedonia  60   73-79  53                         86-89 
Slovenia  78  87 – 92 74-87 74-84 69  84 91                           82-89                  86-90 
 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
      63    80-82S 
85-87M 
Methods of investigation (all the studies use the intermediation approach and estimate cost efficiency)  
Period of 
analysis 
’94-
00 
’94-
’01 
’95-02 ’95-02 ’93-00 ’98-
03 
’98-
03 
’96-
03 
’96-
00 
’98-07 ‘00-12 
Type of analysis Pane
l 
Panel Panel Panel Panel Poole
d 
Poole
d 
 Pan
el 
Panel Panel 
Estimator BC ВС ВС ВС ВС / / BC ВС ВС, TRE RPM 
Functional form FF Т FF Т FF Т Т T Т Т T 
Note: S stands for Serbia, while M for Montenegro, because in our study the two countries are examined separately;  ВС 
stands for Bаttese and Coelli models; TRE denotes true random effects model; RPM denotes Random Parameter Model; FF 
stands for Fourier-Flexible functional form and Т stands for translog functional form. 
 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter empirically investigated the cost efficiency in the banking sector in eight SEECs 
(Albania, BiH, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) in the period 2000-
2012 using a sample of 153 banks. The methods of investigation applied in this chapter resulted 
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from the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2 and the empirical evidence in the literature reviewed 
in Chapter 3. In particular, cost efficiency is estimated using the SFA, specifically the Random 
Parameters Models, including the special case of the true random effects model by Greene (2005), 
because of their superior characteristics as discussed in Chapter 2, that is they allow for estimation 
of time-varying CE and control for latent heterogeneity. However, as presented in Chapter 3, 
Battese and Coelli (1992, 1995) are the most widely used models in the studies of cost efficiency 
in banking in transition economies. Therefore, this strand of models was estimated in our 
empirical analysis as well, mainly for purpose of comparison. However, while estimating the 
Battese and Coelli models we encountered certain “signals” which raised some concerns 
regarding the validity of these models. Moreover, the limited statistical inferences available for 
the BC models provided an additional reason for preferring the RPMs over the BC models. The 
preferred model among the family of RPMs was the model where the macroeconomic and 
industry-specific variables influence the frontier while the bank-specific variables affect the bank’s 
inefficiency. Regarding other issues related to the methods of investigation, and based on the 
discussion in chapters 2 and 3, the estimated model had a translog functional form, the estimation 
was conducted under common frontier, and the bank was considered to be an intermediary.  
 
The main findings can be summarized as follows. The banking sector of Slovenia is the most 
efficient with average CE of 90 per cent, while the banking sector of Serbia is the least efficient 
with average CE of almost 81 pe rcent. The Croatian, Macedonian and BiH banking sectors have 
average CE of almost 89 per cent, while the Albanian, Bulgarian and Montenegrin banking sectors 
have average efficiency of almost 87.5 per cent. During the period of analysis (2000-2012), the 
banking sectors in SEECs experience improvements in their CE but the differences in the CE of 
these countries are not high. The exception is the Serbian banking sector which has not managed 
to catch up with the CE of other countries. The highest improvement in CE is found in the banking 
sector of Albania and the highest decline in Serbia. The individual estimates of CE for each bank 
across time are used in the empirical analysis in Chapter 6. 
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In terms of technical change, the empirical results suggested that all the countries in the sample 
exhibited significant levels of technical progress during 2000-2012, which lowered the total costs 
of banks. The technological progress was found to be similar in all the countries under 
consideration. Specifically, in SEECs over the period 2000-2012, the overall effect of technical 
change in reducing total costs was 1.8 per cent per annum. An interesting finding is the effect of 
technical change analysed through time. Specifically, the effect of technical change is positive in 
the period 2000-2009, but the positive effect of technical change on cost reductions diminishes 
through time.  
 
Considering the research question regarding the impact of ownership, EU accession and the last 
financial crisis on the cost efficiency of banks in SEECs, our empirical findings suggested that 
ownership structure and the EU membership do matter, while the last financial crisis does not. 
Specifically, mixed and foreign banks were found to be more cost efficient than the domestic 
banks, which is consistent with the expectations that the entry of foreign capital would contribute 
to enhancing the positive impact of the introduction of new technologies, know-how expertise, 
new financial products, and managerial and organizational skills and techniques. Moreover, the 
EU member countries have a lower total costs compared to the other analysed countries. This is 
expected, since the banks operating in the single EU market face severe competition, which forces 
them to be more cost efficient in order to survive and grow (the Slovenian banking sector being a 
good example).  
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5.1 INTRODUCTION  
The traditional industrial organization literature argues that market structure affects firms’ 
conduct which in turn influences their performance. To date a vast number of theoretical and 
empirical studies have investigated the effect of market structure on competition and 
performance in the banking sector from different perspectives but, to our knowledge, only a few 
studies have investigated the determinants of “market structure”.27  
                                                        
27 We have searched the extensive Google Scholar and EconLit, the American Economic Association’s electronic bibliography, 
for studies related to determinants of bank’s market share, and found only a few studies which explicitly analyse market 
share. These will be discussed in Section 5.3. 
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The importance of market structure in banking is evidenced by numerous theoretical and 
empirical studies which analyse the effect of market structure at macro and micro level variables. 
For example, economic theory provides contrasting predictions about the effect of banking sector 
concentration on the well-being of the economy as a whole, namely the “concentration-stability” 
and “concentration-fragility” hypotheses.28 At the microeconomic level, market structure and 
competition may affect a bank’s access to finance which in turn influences firm performance and 
development (Pagano, 1993; Petersen and Rajan, 1995;  Cetorelli and Peretto, 2000; Guzman, 
2000; Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2003; Beck et al., 2004).  
 
According to the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm (Mason, 1939 and Bain, 1951 
and 1956), higher concentration in the banking industry leads to higher market power which 
results in a lower credit supply and a higher cost, thus restricting the firm’s growth. Some 
empirical studies provide evidence in favour of this paradigm, namely that concentration is 
associated with higher interest rates and/or credit rationing, which results in less new firm 
creation (Hannan, 1991; Jayaratne and Wolken, 1999; Boot and Thakor, 2000; Guzman, 2000; 
Ongena and Smith, 2001; Black and Strahan, 2002; Scott and Dunkelberg, 2005 and Elsas, 2005). 
 
                                                        
28 The former view argues that a more concentrated banking structure leads to greater bank stability because of better 
diversification (Allen and Gale, 2004) and because of higher profits resulting from economies of scale (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine, 2001) serve as a buffer against adverse shocks, hence in more concentrated banking sectors the incentive for 
excessive risk taking is reduced (Hellman et al., 2000). According to the “charter value hypothesis” (Keeley, 1990; Demsetz 
et al, 1996) banks behave in a risk-averse manner in order to keep their competitive advantage as their charter value 
increases (when banks can earn monopoly rents) by holding more capital in order to preserve it. In this case, therefore, 
higher concentration prevents excessive risk taking which implies a more stable banking system (Boyd and De Nicoló, 2006; 
Carletti and Hartmann, 2003). On the other hand, the “concentration-fragility” view maintains that more concentrated 
banking systems are more prone to fragility and systemic distress (Beck et al., 2006), because banks exert market power 
through higher interest rates, which may lead to higher levels of non-performing loans resulting from the enhanced risk-
taking behaviour of borrowers (Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005). Tabak (2012) argues that the “competition-risk” trade-off 
disappears only when banks solve the optimal contracting problem arising from the multiple principal-agent relationships - 
banks are agents to their depositors and, at the same time, the principal to their borrowers. Additionally, banks in highly 
concentrated banking systems are “too big to fail”, hence in times of potential failure they are heavily subsidised which, in 
turn, increases the incentive for excessive risk-taking (Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Mishkin, 1999). More on the concentration-
stability and concentration-fragility controversy can be found in the comprehensive theoretical and empirical reviews by 
Beck (2008), Carletti (2008) and Carletti et al. (2002). 
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On the other hand, information asymmetries and agency costs which lead to adverse selection, 
moral hazard and hold-up problems, lead to a positive or nonlinear relation between market 
power and access to loans for opaque borrowers (Petersen and Rajan, 1995 and Zarutskie, 2003). 
Furthermore, Cetorelli and Peretto (2000) develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of capital 
accumulation where credit is intermediated by banks operating in a Cournot-type oligopoly, and 
demonstrate that concentration has both positive and negative consequences for firms’ access to 
finance. In particular, higher concentration in banking shrinks the amount of loanable funds; 
however, the borrowers screening incentives are higher, leading to efficient lending. On this basis 
Beck et al. (2004) argue that, compared to perfect competition or monopoly, oligopoly is the 
optimal market structure in banking.  
 
The market structure in banking may also affect the banks’ performance (profitability) due to 
market power (SCP Paradigm) or higher efficiency (Demsetz, 1973 and 1974). There are empirical 
studies in banking that support the SCP paradigm (Gilbert, 1984; Berger and Hannan, 1989; 
Molyneux and Thornton, 1992; Athanasoglou, 2006; and Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007), and 
there are also studies that do not support this paradigm (i.e., they do not find a significant 
relationship between industry concentration and bank profitability (Maudos, 1998; Naceur, 2003 
and Staikouras and Wood, 2003).  
 
Demsetz’s (1973, 1974) work challenges the concentration-collusion-profitability view and argue 
that the superior efficiency of large firms, rather than market power, explains the positive relation 
between profitability and concentration. In the context of banking, Demsetz’s efficient structure 
theory (as opposed to the SCP paradigm) postulates that due to the cost advantages of the larger 
banks (economies of scale and/or scope) loan interest rates are lower and deposit rates are higher 
(Van Hoose, 2010). As with SCP, there are empirical studies that support the efficient-structure 
hypothesis in banking (Smirlock, 1985; Goldberg and Rai, 1996; Punt and Van Rooij, 2001). Evanoff 
and Fortier (1988) and Berger and Hannah (1993) find empirical evidence suggesting that the two 
views are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. 
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The importance of market structure and its implications at macro and micro levels discussed 
above, does not hide the fact that there is little empirical evidence on the determinants of market 
structure in banking. This chapter, therefore, aims to identify the potential determinants of 
market structure in banking by drawing on several related strands of theory as discussed in 
Section 5.2. Given that the focus of this thesis is the banking industry only, the use of standard 
measures of the structure of industries (market concentration measures such as HHI and CRn) are 
not appropriate, given the limited number of countries included in our analysis (a total eight). 
However, even with higher number of countries the imperfections of these indices weaken the 
analysis. Evanoff and Fortier (1988), considering CR3, emphasize that the arbitrariness of taking 
three firms and the implicit assumption of the equal impact of these largest firms on performance, 
something which in turn may lead to inaccurate policy implications. Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011) 
emphasize that HHI does not distinguish between large and small countries. Beck et al. (2008) 
argue that HHI and CR3 are rough indicators which do not incorporate bank ownership, treating 
domestic and foreign banks the same. Berger et al. (2004) emphasize that recent studies find a 
different competitive effect for large and small banks, but the empirical studies still make use of 
such concentration measures as indicators of market structure. Given that these indices are 
primarily based on individuals’ market shares, higher market shares, ceteris paribus, suggests a 
more concentrated and less competitive market though this has to be treated with caution as the 
degree of competition, or concentration, in a market depends not just on the market share of one 
or a few large firms, but also on the share of remaining firms. 
 
Given the arguments above this thesis uses “market share” (hereafter MS) as an indicator of the 
degree of competition in the banking sector. Additionally, while banks may be able to influence 
their MS, but they do not decide on market structure individually. According to Aghion and Stein 
(2008), MS is an essential target for many firms, especially if the firm’s manager cares about the 
current stock price, and banks often assess their performance relative to each other on this basis 
(Berger and Bouwman, 2013). A bank’s MS arguably reflects its competitive position (Berger and 
Bouwman, 2013), its market power (Relative Market Power Hypothesis; Shepherd 1986; Berger, 
1995) and efficiency (Demsetz, 1973; Smirlock, 1985; Boone, 2000, 2004). By investigating 
determinants of a bank’s MS, we may examine possible systemic variations in determinants across 
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different bank size-classes, which is not possible when aggregated concentration indicators are 
used and banks exhibit different risk-taking behaviour.  
 
From a policy point of view, the examination of the determinants of MS enables the regulators to 
gain and improve their knowledge of the overall market structure in banking. Berger and 
Bouwman (2013) argue that although the battle for MS is a zero-sum game, it matters to 
regulators because it affects banks’ behaviour. Consequently, they will be able to influence 
particular determinants in order to regulate concentration and influence the behaviour of banks 
in the desired direction. This issue is further developed in Chapter 7. 
 
In order to develop the conceptual framework for the determinants of MS in banking we use the 
few existing empirical studies as the point of departure in Section 5.2. Following the review of 
these studies, the conceptual framework of this part of the thesis, highlighting a range of potential 
determinants of MS, is developed in Section 5.3 using an eclectic approach for identification of 
the determinants because the theory on this subject is underdeveloped. To this end, we identify 
two broad categories, the “inside” and “outside” determinants of MS with the former referring 
to factors under the control of a bank and the latter to factors beyond the direct control of the 
bank, in particular regulatory and supervisory. The aim of this section is to facilitate the 
formulation of a model to investigate the determinants of a bank’s market share  which will be 
estimated in Chapter 6. Finally, conclusions will be presented in Section 5.4.  
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5.2 REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES INVESTIGATING MARKET 
SHARE 
This section offers a critical review of three major studies that have explicitly focused on a bank’s 
MS (Gonzalez, 2009; Berger and Bouwman, 2013; and Stiroh and Strahan, 2003). Although the 
aim of the latter two studies are different from ours, their use of MS as the indicator of market 
structure serves as the basis for developing the conceptual framework of this study. The model 
estimated in Chapter 6 builds on and extends the work of Gonzalez (2009) which, to our best 
knowledge, is the only study investigating determinants of MS in banking in a similar manner to 
this thesis; hence the literature review starts with this study.   
  
a. Gonzalez (2009). This study investigates the determinants of market structure by using both 
MS and concentration indices, but it is only the former that is considered here. It examines how 
the bank’s efficiency and political economy variables (regulation29, quality of institutional 
development and macroeconomic variables) influence the market structure in banking in 69 
countries, covering more than 2,500 banks over the 1996–2002 period. He considers efficiency as 
the only factor which can be influenced by a bank and its managers (what we will refer to as the 
“inside bank determinant” of MS. While in our study this is also one of the main variables of 
interest, particularly given a significant part of this thesis is devoted to the estimation of banks’ 
efficiency, we also aim to investigate whether there are other potential “inside” bank 
determinants of MS. However, similar to Gonzalez, we aim to go beyond “inside” bank 
determinants by analysing the effect of regulation and macroeconomic environment on a bank’s 
MS.  
 
Gonzales estimates banks’ efficiency scores using the non-parametric approach of Data 
Envelopment Analysis and country-specific frontiers against which an individual bank’s efficiency 
                                                        
29 This includes indices reflecting the ease of entry into banking, the existence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme, moral 
hazard, official supervisory power and the presence of private monitoring, 
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is measured. He emphasizes that “rather than compare efficiencies across banks in different 
countries, we analyze differences in levels of efficiency between banks in the same country, and 
consider whether the influence of efficiency differences on the structure of a national market 
varies across countries, depending on legal and institutional frameworks (p. 741).” To being with, 
as already discussed in Section 2.5, efficiency estimates using a country-specific frontier cannot 
reflect which country has more efficient banks, instead the only possible comparison is in which 
countries the banks operate at an efficiency level closer to the best-practice bank within that 
country. However, given that he uses panel data models for his empirical analysis, it requires 
efficiency estimates obtained under a common frontier, so that efficiency estimates which are 
comparable across countries are used in the analysis (as argued by Berger, 2007 and further 
discussed in Section 2.5, and also applied in Chapter 4). Consequently, it is likely that the efficiency 
scores included in the analysis are problematic. 
 
In order to conduct the empirical analysis he uses a static model estimated by two-stage least 
squares random-effects estimator (EC2SLS) to account for: (i) the presence of unobserved bank-
specific effects, (ii) the potential simultaneity between banks’ efficiency and market structure 
(market concentration and MS), and (iii) the potential endogeneity of the political economy 
variables. To control for endogeneity the author employs the instrumental variable method. For 
example, as an instrument for banks’ efficiency the number of observations in each country is 
included in the analysis, because of the finding of Zhang and Bartels (1998) that efficiency levels 
estimated using DEA are negatively related to sample size. For political economy variables the 
author uses the instruments proposed by Barth et al. (2004) which include: the legal origin 
(English, French, German, Scandinavian, and Socialist legal systems), latitudinal distance from the 
equator, and religious composition (percentage of population in each country that is Roman 
Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, or other). However, the theoretical justification for the instruments 
is unclear and moreover he does not provide any diagnostic evidence of the strength of these 
instruments, which is a major weakness given the possible problems that can arise with weak 
instrumentation (Wooldridge, 2009 pp. 514-516).    
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The empirical findings of Gonzalez (2009) are in line with the efficiency-structure hypothesis 
discussed in Section 5.1, that is, a bank’s efficiency is found to be a statistically significant 
determinant in both the market concentration and the MS equations. His empirical findings for 
the political economy variables suggest: (i) higher barriers to entry and a better-quality legal 
environment increase both market concentration and MS; (ii) greater private and official 
supervision favour lower market concentration and a smaller MS; (iii) restrictions on activities of 
banks and the presence of explicit deposit insurance have an ambiguous effect because the 
estimated effects are not consistent in the market concentration and MS equations. 
 
Besides the analysis of the main effect of political economy variable on concentration and MS, 
Gonzalez (2009) also examines the effect of the political economy variables via bank’s efficiency 
(using interaction terms, one at a time, between the bank’s efficiency and each of the political 
economy variables). The inclusion of single interaction terms is widely used in the empirical 
literature especially when regressors are highly correlated, as Gonzalez explains. However, the 
correlation matrix presented in his study does not suggest that the individual variables are highly 
correlated, and the interaction terms are not included in the correlation matrix. Hence his 
rationale for “one at a time” inclusion of interaction terms is problematic. Indeed even if the 
variables are highly correlated, excluding a relevant variable is not appropriate as it can lead to 
specification bias (Wooldridge, 2009 p. 93). The empirical findings of these alternative empirical 
models with the interaction terms30, give a negative and statistically significant coefficients on the 
interaction terms in the case of stricter entry restrictions and the presence of explicit deposit 
insurance, which do not support the efficiency hypothesis, but positive and significant coefficients 
of the interaction terms for greater private monitoring and a better-quality institutional 
environment, which are consistent with the EFS hypothesis. These, together with the findings of 
the direct effects discussed above, imply that the effects of regulation on MS may be explained 
by factors other than those related to banks’ efficiency.   
                                                        
30 The interpretation of the effects of the interaction terms is as follows: a positive (negative) coefficient on an interaction 
term suggests an increased (decreased)  effect of efficiency on market share depending on the size of the political economy 
variable is in place (i.e.=1). 
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In summary, Gonzalez (2009) presents a solid foundation to build on in answering the research 
question related to the determinants of market structure in banking in SEECs. However, we aim 
to develop both theoretical and empirical dimensions of this paper. First, Gonzalez (2009) relies 
on the market structure–performance relationship and the efficiency hypothesis, while we use 
the efficiency hypothesis to recognize the potential simultaneity between market share and 
efficiency. We aim to go beyond these traditional views by elaborating the theoretical 
underpinnings of the new measure for competition proposed by Boone (2000, 2008a, 2008b), 
which is further discussed in Section 5.3.1. Second, as argued by Gonzalez, his analysis with 
respect to regulation is a purely empirical exercise but this chapter aims to derive testable 
hypotheses in this regard using studies analysing the effect of regulation on banks’ performance 
and risk-taking. Given that Gonzalez’s empirical findings suggest that the effect of regulation on 
market structure is for reasons other than bank’s efficiency, the possibility of other bank-specific 
characteristics being potential factors through which regulation may affect competitiveness in 
banking should be explored. Third, following from the previous arguments, Section 3 of this 
chapter examines whether other “inside” bank characteristics such as quality, risk-taking, capital 
and ownership structure are important variables to be considered. Finally, from empirical 
perspective Gonzalez assumes a bank’s MS to be of a static nature, an arguably unrealistic and 
restrictive assumption, especially for SEECs given the discussion in Section 1.4 of the extensive 
changes taking place during the transition period in these countries. This issue is further 
addressed in Chapter 6.  
 
b. Berger and Bouwman (2013). Recently, Berger and Bouwman (2013) examine the effects of 
bank capital on two dimensions of bank performance (the probability of survival and changes in 
market share) during normal times and also during different types of financial crises for  the US 
banking sector (using sub-samples according to size) covering the period 1984-2010. The rationale 
for this empirical analysis is in the divergent views in the literature on the effects of capital on a 
bank’s performance, the size of these effects, and the relevance of different types of crises 
(banking crises and market crises) and normal times. Given that the focus of this part of the thesis 
is on the determinants of a bank’s MS, this review is concerned only with the effects of capital on 
a bank’s MS, or its competitive position as described by the authors.  
 172 
 
 
The hypothesis tested in this study is that capital enhances a bank’s MS during crises and normal 
times. In order to test this hypothesis they regress the percentage change in MS on the bank’s 
average pre-crisis capital ratio interacted with separate dummies31 for banking crisis (initiated in 
the banking sector), market crisis (initiated in the financial markets, excluding the banking sector) 
and normal times, and a set of control variables (proxies for risk and opacity, size and safety net 
protection, ownership, organizational structure and strategy, competition, and location). An 
important issue to note is that profitability is excluded from the MS equation as compared to 
survival equation (Gonzalez, too, does not include profitability even though his theoretical 
framework is the market structure-performance literature). Their empirical strategy is to examine 
the effect of a bank’s pre-crisis capital on its performance during a crisis. The rationale for this is 
twofold: (i) the crisis is unpredictable, and (ii) such an approach allows for the mitigation of the 
potential simultaneity between MS and capital, since lagged capital and current MS are less likely 
to be jointly determined (alternative models using instrumental variables are also investigated in 
this study).  
 
Berger and Bouwman (2013) define their dependent variable as the percentage change in a bank’s 
MS, the bank’s average MS during a crisis minus its average MS over the eight quarters before the 
crisis, normalized by its average pre crisis MS and multiplied by one hundred.32 To estimate the 
empirical model they use ordinary least squares (OLS), with robust standard errors (clustered by 
bank) to control for heteroskedasticity as well as possible correlation between observations of 
the same bank in different years.33 They split the sample into small, medium and large banks and 
estimate the models for each of the three defined groups. 
In general, the empirical findings of Berger and Bouwman suggest that capital enables banks to 
improve the percentage change in their MS and the effects are argued to be economically 
                                                        
31 Capital variable is not included in the model given that three interaction dummies (one for each “period”) are included in 
the model. Their main approach pools the data to treat banking crises, market crises and normal times as a separate group. 
32 Given that in the period under investigation the authors have identified two periods of banking crises, three periods of 
market crises and two normal time periods, each bank has a maximum of seven observations. 
33 The regressions also include individual crisis and normal time dummies, which act as time fixed effects.  
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reasonable, with the effect being strongest for small banks. The findings could be summarized as 
follows: (i) higher capital facilitates small banks to improve their MS at all times (banking crises, 
market crises, and normal times) and (ii) higher capital supports medium and large banks to 
enhance their market shares only during banking crises. They explain the economic rationale 
behind the strongest effect of capital being on the MS of small banks in the following way. A 
bank’s depositors are most concerned with the stability of the bank and higher level of capital 
deals with their concern since during crises it is the main defence against failure. Hence, to be a 
small bank with higher capital ratio during crises is a signal of stability and a competitive 
advantage over the lower-capitalized banks, which in turn leads to customers migrating from 
lower capitalized banks to higher capitalized banks, enhancing the MS of the latter. Furthermore, 
Berger and Bouwman find that capital is essential for the survival of small banks. Their literature 
review provides the evidence that small banks are mainly involved in relationship lending where 
long-term bank–borrower relationships are essential for value creation.  
 
The threefold relevance of this study for our research are: (i) the capital ratio should be 
considered as an “inside” bank determinant of MS; (ii) capital is considered to be endogenous, as 
a bank’s MS could affect its capitalisation choice; and (iii) there is a systemic variation in the effect 
of the capital ratio on MS by size of the bank in both normal times and times of crisis. These issues 
are considered in Section 6.2 where the empirical model is developed. 
 
c. Stiroh and Strahan (2003). These authors focus on the post-deregulation period in the US in 
the 1980s and observing the increased correlation between the above average performers and 
MS gains in banking industry, they assess the effect of increased competition on the dynamics of 
the US banking sector for the period 1976-1994. The deregulation in the US refers to removing 
the regulations controlling interstate banking and interstate branching in the US. This study does 
not examine the effect of specific regulations on MS which is of interest in this thesis. However, 
given the rarity of studies on a bank’s MS, this study serves to present that (de)regulation has 
“side effects” on MS allocation among banks. These authors investigate the relationship between 
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a bank’s performance34 and its MS in the subsequent year (as the dependent variable). They find 
that the relationship strengthens significantly after deregulation (specifically of branching and 
interstate banking) as competitive reallocation effects mean that assets are transferred to better 
performers. They conclude that the earlier regulation of U.S. banks blunted the market 
mechanism and hindered the competitive process, thus suggesting that regulation does affect the 
allocation of MS among banks. Their results also indicate that relative profitability did not have a 
significant effect on MS in the period of regulation. They argue that banks' relative performance 
is more strongly linked to MS gains (in the subsequent year) in the deregulated environment, 
whereas during the period of regulation, such dynamics are dampened.  
 
The authors also examine the effect of the deregulation in concentrated and less concentrated 
markets using the HHI.35 It is expected that regulation enables some banks to be very large and 
exert greater market power, hence deregulation is expected to matter more in highly 
concentrated markets. The findings suggest a significant larger increase in the performance-MS 
relationship in concentrated markets compared to less concentrated markets, which is a priori 
expected. In addition, they investigate the performance-MS relationship by dividing the sample 
to "small" and "large" banks and find that although the relationship gets stronger for both large 
and small banks, the effect is much larger for large banks compared to small banks.  
 
According to Stiroh and Strahan such result may not be only due to the deregulation, but also to 
cost advantages of large banks, thus highlighting the importance of efficiency for MS (further 
discussed in Section 5.3.1). They explain that in a static model the relationship between MS and 
performance reflects basic characteristics of the production technology (economies of scale and 
scope or market power) where size is primarily taken as exogenous. But their results indicate a 
                                                        
34 Normalized return on equity (Bank’s ROE minus the mean ROE for all banks in the same state and year, divided by the 
standard deviation of ROE for those banks ) in the baseline model  and two other performance measures for robustness 
checks: dummy variable for lagged ROE above median (Dummy variable equals 1 for banks with lagged ROE above the median 
of their peers, otherwise 0) and dummy variable to distinguish banks with below median costs (Dummy variable equals 1 for 
banks with below-median costs (the ratio of non-interest expenses to total operating income). 
35 A dummy variable for HHI>1800 
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dynamic explanation where increased size is the result of successful performance as better 
performing firms grow at the expense of their weaker competitors. In addition, their findings 
suggest that a bank’s performance is a “better” predictor of future MS after more than five years 
after deregulation, suggesting that an adjustment period is needed in order for the dynamics of 
competition to affect market outcomes, that is MS. This finding implies that it is reasonable to 
consider market share as dynamic, which casts doubt on the use of a static models (for example 
that of Gonzalez, 2009).  
   
The relevance of this study to our study is threefold. First, this study provides evidence that 
(de)regulation affects the competitiveness of the banking sector and supports the view that 
regulation is an “outside” bank determinant. Hence it could be considered as a departure point 
for developing the conceptual framework in terms of regulation and supervision in banking. 
Second, the effect of (de)regulation varies across different bank size-classes. Finally, unlike 
Gonzalez (2009), this study supports the view at MS should be modelled dynamically.  
 
5.3. DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF MARKET 
SHARE 
Given that, to the best of our knowledge, there is a lack of theoretical and empirical studies on 
the determinants of a bank’s MS (also confirmed by Barth et al., 2006 and Gonzalez, 2009), the 
aim of this section is to develop a framework which draws on various strands of economic 
literature and to introduce potential “inside”- and “outside”-bank determinants of MS by looking 
at various theoretical and empirical studies, which will provide a basis for our empirical model. 
The “outside” bank determinants (regulation and supervision) are even less investigated than 
“inside” bank determinants, because the main concern of the literature on regulation in banking 
is securing safe and sound banking sector with special reference to the consequences of risk-
taking on financial stability. The effect of regulation on the MS has not been studied yet.  Hence, 
the aim is to produce intuitive predictions of the effect of potential determinants on a bank’s MS 
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and to provide the basis for further investigation of this topic.  The result will serve as the basis 
for the empirical model in Chapter 6.2.  
 
5.3.1 Market share and efficiency (The Boone Indicator) 
Boone (2000, 2008a, 2008b) uses the argument that higher concentration does not necessarily 
imply less competition and proposes a new measure of competition. The empirical literature 
usually interprets higher measures of concentration (higher HHI or CRn) as reduced levels of 
competition. However, Boone demonstrates that a rise in competition does not necessarily lower 
the HHI (it is not a monotonic function of competition), hence a change in HHI can be a misleading 
indicator of competition. Given this, he aims to answer two questions: (i) is there a variable which 
is a monotonic function of competition?; and (ii) if so, can this variable be used to measure 
competition empirically? 
 
In this framework, competition intensifies when: (i) the number of firms increases as the 
exogenous entry cost decreases; (ii) the interaction between firms is more aggressive (decrease 
in conjectural variation36, products become closer substitutes and there is a switch from Cournot 
to Bertrand type competition); and (iii) (marginal) costs are reduced. In addition, when firms want 
to increase competition (as a strategy) or face increased competition (new entry for example) 
firms with high levels of X-inefficiency could fairly easily cut some of the “excess fat”. However, 
under increased competition, all firms may be forced to become more efficient (even if they do 
not have much fat). Boone claims that a monotonic indicator for competition is based on relative 
(variable) profit differences37. The intuition behind this indicator is that higher levels of efficiency 
                                                        
36 Firms’ conjectural variation is their expectations about the reaction of other firms to an increase in quantity (Bresnahan, 
1989 p. 1026). The lower this parameter is, “the more softly a firm expects its opponents to react to a rise in its output level. 
Hence the more aggressively (in the sense of higher output levels) the firm will behave (Boone, 2000 p. 9). 
37 This relative profit differences as originally defined by Boone (2008) is: [P(n’’)-P(n)]/[ [P(n’)-P(n)] where P denotes the level 
of profit of firm n (for the purpose of this presentation three firms are considered) and firms differ in their efficiency level, 
that is n’’>n’>n. “More precisely, in any model where a rise in competition reallocates output from less efficient to more 
efficient firms it is the case that more intense competition raises [P(n’’)-P(n)]/[ [P(n’)-P(n)]. Since this output reallocation effect 
is a general feature of more intense competition, relative profit differences is a robust measure of competition from a 
theoretical point of view (p. 1246).” 
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are mapped with higher relative profits and an inefficient firm is penalized by earning lower 
relative profits. This indicator reveals two effects of competition, the reallocation effect and the 
selection effect. The reallocation effect is that the relative (not the absolute) profits of the 
efficient firm (associated with lower marginal costs) increase compared to an inefficient firm as 
competition increases. For instance, if intensified competition leads to a reduction in profits, the 
reduction will be greater for the inefficient firm compared to the efficient firm. Hence, the market 
mechanism maps the cost differences among firms into profit differences. These effects are 
higher in more competitive markets than in less competitive markets. In other words, when 
competition increases, the output is reallocated from inefficient to efficient firms (which implies 
an increase in market share of an efficient firm given a fixed market size), since efficient firms can 
compete more aggressively due to cost advantages. In addition, if higher competition reduces 
(raises) firms’ output levels, the fall (rise) in output is bigger (smaller) for less efficient firms. The 
two effects together reflect the selection effect of competition, which differentiates between 
“good” and “bad” firms due to cost advantages. When competition increases, the selection effect 
may result in “bad” firms exiting the market. 
 
Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011) are the first to apply the Boone approach to measure competition 
in the loan markets in five major EU countries (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain) as 
well as, for comparison, in the UK, the US and Japan in the period 1994-2004, using market share 
as the dependent variable instead of relative profits. Hence, we use their model as the starting 
point of our theoretical framework and extend it as presented below. As these authors argue, the 
theoretical underpinnings of the Boone indicator is the efficiency hypothesis, as this hypothesis 
assigns higher relative profits to higher efficiency and not to monopoly power (Demsetz, 1973). 
On the basis of Boone’s work and following the empirical model of Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011), 
therefore, we argue that a bank’s MS depends on its efficiency.  
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5.3.2 Market share and quality (Endogenous Sunk Cost Theory)  
Next, based on the endogenous sunk cost theory (Sutton, 1991), we focus on relaxing two 
important assumptions of the Boone model: (i) homogenous bank products and (ii) exogenous 
entry costs. Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011) assume that banks’ products are similar over time, 
because all banks are forced to follow the innovative banks in order to remain competitive. 
However, the assumption that banks will follow those who innovate and carry out investment in 
quality is not plausible according to the endogenous sunk theory (Sutton, 1991, 2007). These 
investments (in quality, R&D and advertising) are primarily undertaken to increase entry barriers 
and to discourage new entrants, hence enabling the incumbent banks to gain higher market 
shares as market size increases. Furthermore, these investments provide products of higher 
quality which in turn enable banks to lure some of the customers of other banks. This theory 
produces the opposite result to Boone’s argument that competition reduces if exogenous entry 
barriers are increased, because if entry barriers are increased due to endogenously determined 
sunk costs, competition does not necessarily soften, but the form of rivalry is changed from full 
price competition to price and non-price competition. Hence, it is important that investments in 
quality are included in the model, because they can contribute to gaining MS.  
 
Sutton (1991, 2007) analyse the nature of entry barriers (exogenous or endogenous) and their 
effect on concentration levels. His work is based on the SCP paradigm, but with two important 
points of difference. The first point relates to difficulties arising from the chain of causation. The 
original SCP paradigm has been heavily criticized both by empirical researchers and game-theory 
scholars in the last couple of decades, especially in terms of its one-way causation. SCP did not 
take into consideration impact of the firms’ conduct and performance on market structure. 
However, treating the firm’s conduct only as a link between market structure and performance is 
challenged by the NEIO scholars. Both the game-theoretic literature and various empirical studies 
challenge this aspect of the SCP paradigm, emphasizing the possibility of a reverse link from 
conduct or performance to structure (Bresnahan, 1989; Panzar and Rosse, 1977). Sutton tackles 
this problem by looking to a reformulation of the basic theoretical model.  
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The second difference lies in Sutton’s treatment of “barriers to entry”. Bain (1956) considers entry 
barriers which are related to the presence of scale economies as exogenous (this assumption is 
used also in the study of the Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011) discussed in the previous section). In 
the environment with exogenous entry (sunk) costs, as the size of the market grows (for instance, 
with growth in income or population), the incumbent firms are expected to expand in order to 
reach the minimum efficient scale. In addition, profits are also expected to increase, which will 
encourage new entrants to the market, if they can earn higher profits (higher than entry costs in 
equilibrium). Consequently, as the market size increases, the number of firms in the market 
increases and this in turn is expected to decrease each firm’s market share and ultimately to 
reduce concentration. However, Sutton (1991) argues that industries with low levels of 
economies of scale (for example the soft drinks industry), have high levels of concentration. 
Hence, he suggests the presence of other “entry barriers” (such as advertising and R&D spending) 
which are endogenously determined as an outcome of the firm’s choice prior to each period 
rather than exogenously given. Consequently, Sutton emphasizes that it is necessary to model 
levels of entry barriers as being determined jointly with the level of concentration as a part of an 
equilibrium outcome. This is a fundamental outcome of the modern game-theoretic literature. 
The treatment of entry barriers may be the reason why apparently high profits could be consistent 
with the absence of “explicit” entry barriers, or why high measured profit levels do not seem to 
stimulate new entry in certain industries.  
 
These endogenous barriers are related to the increase in entry costs which could be in a form of 
investment in quality, R&D, advertising, etc. (for details see Sutton, 1991). This indicates that firms 
do not compete only on price, but also with other factors. Consequently, in order to “strengthen” 
these factors and to become more competitive, they may invest in quality to improve their 
products. The investment in quality will additionally increase the fixed entry cost. The term 
“endogenous” sunk costs refers to how the level of investment is determined in the firm’s decision 
making process. Such investment has two effects: (i) it increases the fixed cost and possibly the 
marginal costs of production, since production of higher quality products may require higher cost 
and (ii) it retains the existing customers and attracts new customers. These two effects raise the 
entry barriers and discourage new entrants more than it would with exogenous sunk costs. 
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Furthermore, as the market size grows, the incumbents have an incentive to compete with each 
other in order to capture a part of the “new” market (MS may increase or remain unchanged) by 
investing further in quality. Hence, the entry costs continuously increase and further discourage 
new firms from entering the market. Consequently, the ultimate outcome is that although the 
market size grows, market concentration (which we interpret as market shares of leading firms) 
will not necessarily decrease – something which is opposite of the outcome of the exogenous 
sunk costs theory.   
 
The theoretical underpinnings of Sutton’s theory suggest that this theory is applicable to 
industries where, in addition to price competition, non-price competition is important (Carlson 
and Mitchener, 2006). As Van Hoose (2010) argues, the banking industry is an industry in which 
non-price competition is important. The aim of non-price competition is to persuade the 
customers that a bank’s products and services are of high quality and either retain them or attract 
them from other banks. Such non-price competition in banking includes the branch network, 
number of ATMs, walk-in or drive-in services, advertising, number of employees per branch and 
more recently the availability of internet banking. However, because data on such variables, 
except for the number of branches, is unavailable for SEECs, this literature review is restricted 
only to the impact of branches on banking competition.   
 
Hasan and Smith (1997) find that the number of branches may independently explain at least as 
much of profitability as the more traditional variables used in the extant literature. Calem and 
Nakamura’s (1998) results suggest higher competition and a decline in market power in U.S. 
banking due to an expansion in the branch network. Examining the effect of U.S. banking 
deregulation of the 1990s on branch banking, Dick (2006) finds that competition between banks 
relies on a significant expansion in the number of branches. This non-price competition, along 
with changes in regulation, increases the operating costs of banks significantly, but also boosts 
the earned revenues. Hirtle (2007) empirically investigates the impact of an increasing branch 
network on a set of indicators of bank performance in the U.S. His findings suggest that there is 
profit pressure on banks with a medium size branch network. In addition he finds a small amount 
 181 
 
of support for the impact of branch network size on the overall firm performance, possibly due to 
the optimization of the branch size network resulting from an increase in non-branch activities. 
The effect of branches is also prominent in studies on European banking. Cerasi et al. (2002) 
emphasize that a branch network was an essential strategic component and affects MS during 
the 1990s in Europe. Likewise, Kim and Vale (2001) point out that branching was important in 
Norwegian banking sector in the 1990s, with a positive effect on a bank’s MS but not on the 
overall market size.  
  
Higher branch density is expected to bring the services and products closer to the customers. If a 
bank has a branch in a neighbourhood, it is expected that local people and local companies will 
use the services in that branch, instead of going to another area for the same services. Thus, 
higher branch density is expected to increase the exposure of the bank and provide more 
convenient services to the customers. Often, the customers are served by the same employees in 
the branch, which may lead to higher confidence and satisfaction of the customer, since it is 
expected that employees will learn more about the customers in their branch and provide them 
a more personal service. In addition, by serving almost same customers frequently, it is expected 
that employees will obtain more information about the customers, which in turn may decrease 
information asymmetry, especially in the process of customer screening before, for example, 
granting a loan. Dick (2002), in a demand deposit study, finds evidence that branches are an 
important factor in a customer’s choice of a bank. In another study, Dick (2007) emphasizes that 
banks open branches because they expect to shift the demand and therefore attracting new 
customers. Branches present mainly sunk costs, since building a branch costs approximately $1 
million (Radecki et al., 1996). Only a small portion of this amount is used for equipment, which is 
expected to be sold easily or used to replace elsewhere.  
 
Branches may also be considered also as a proxy for advertising (Dick, 2002 and Dick, 2007). She 
outlines that banks attempt to attract customers by their branches with stylish merchandising 
and customer service as well as by being more visible by, e.g., putting a clock outside the branch. 
Due to limited availability of advertising data there is a lack of studies using actual advertising 
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expenses and their effect on a bank’s performance, although the study of Örs (2003) is a rare 
exception.  He analyses the role of advertising in commercial banking in the 2001–2002 period 
and finds supportive evidence of advertising increasing bank profitability and emphasizes that 
non-price competition through advertising is a vital factor in the banking industry. In a nutshell, 
so far two potential inside bank determinants of MS are identified, that is efficiency and 
investments in quality, such as branch offices. 
 
5.3.3 Market share and risk taking  
In this section we aim to relate a bank’s risk-taking behaviour to possible effects on its MS. It is 
important to note that to our knowledge there are neither theoretical nor empirical studies that 
explicitly analyse the effect of risk-taking on banks’ MS. Earlier studies usually consider the effect 
of MS on risk-taking as exogenous, but the most recent studies recognize potential endogeneity 
in the relationship between MS and the risk-taking. That such causation can exist is shown by 
Allen and Gale (2004) who demonstrate that banks may engage in excessive risk-taking because 
they expect a convex profit function in market share and bank size, since banks with a larger MS 
may exploit market power and increase profitability. Additionally, the same outcome may be 
expected in terms of profit and banks’ size if larger banks have lower average costs due to 
economies of scale. Keeton (1999) explains that some authors maintain that banks reduce the 
loan price and ease credit standards to expand due to increased competition for loan customers 
and his findings suggest a two-way relation between loan growth and loan losses for the US. 
Recently, Foos et al. (2010) empirically examine the two way causation between loan growth and 
loan losses (in the context of this thesis, the former could be considered as action to maintain or 
increase a bank’s MS and the latter as a realization of risk-taking) Specifically, their main research 
question is whether banks can grow without becoming riskier (the effect of past loan growth on 
current loan losses), but they subsequently examine if there is an intertemporal two-way linkage 
between loan growth and loan losses. The second possible relationship is supported by their 
argument that banks with high loan losses may be forced to reduce their loan growth because of 
shareholders’ intervention, reputation, accounting policies, risk of bank runs, banking regulation, 
etc. Consequently, they estimate a modified two-equation vector autoregressive model (VAR) 
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with changes in current loan losses and excessive loan growth as endogenous variables. Their VAR 
results support the two-way linkage between loan growth and loan losses, in particular the 
findings indicate that loan growth leads to higher loan losses and loan losses are associated with 
a decrease in loan growth. It is important that this study considers that both of the two 
relationships are realized with time lag, which emphasizes the importance of the realization of 
the undertaken project including the risk.  
 
The excessive risk-taking behaviour in banking is usually explained by the risk-shifting paradigm. 
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) analyse this paradigm in both the deposit and the loan markets and 
allow for competition in both markets. They build their model on the study by Allen and Gale 
(2000) who consider only the deposit market.38 When the loan market is ignored, risk-taking 
behaviour is only related to banks; however, once the loan market is included in the analysis, the 
risk-taking depends on the borrowers’ investments and activities financed by bank loans as well, 
which are determined by loan prices (risk is increasing in loan rates) and other terms of the loan 
contract. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) show that in an environment with moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems, the loan market effects more than offset the deposit market effects and that 
increased concentration leads to higher bank risk (the concentration-fragility view). This paper 
also demonstrates that there exists a fundamental risk-incentive mechanism causing banks to 
become more risky as their markets become more concentrated. This mechanism exists on the 
asset side of the balance sheet and is not modelled in the widely cited studies that focus on 
deposit market competition. Ceteris paribus, as competition declines, banks earn more rents in 
their loan markets by charging higher loan rates. By themselves, higher loan rates would imply 
(weakly) higher bankruptcy risk for bank borrowers. This effect is further reinforced by moral 
hazard on the part of borrowers who, when confronted with higher interest costs, increase their 
own risk of failure. 
                                                        
38 In the modified model which includes the existence of a loan market, banks face two additional problems to be solved: 
the portfolio problem (asset allocation, bonds and other trading securities for which prices and return distributions are given 
and there is no private information for banks); and the optimal contracting problem (banks allocate assets in loans besides 
other assets with borrowers’ actions being unobservable or observable only at a cost, which leads to private information for 
banks). 
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Following Boyd and De Nicolo that the risk-incentive mechanism and its effects are higher in the 
loan market relative to the deposit market, we further explain the effect of risk-taking on MS 
primarily using the loan market. The analysis is as follows: if a bank wants to increase its market 
share in order to enhance its profit later on, it implies that it should attract more borrowers and 
in doing this the bank lends to more risky customers. In order to demonstrate the role of risk-
taking in the loan market, several strands of literature are consulted: (i) probability of failure in 
banking (Buchinsky and Yosha, 1995); (ii) prospect theory (Kahneman and Trevsky, 1979) and (iii) 
lending standards and screening (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006 and Ruckes, 2004).  
 
 
Probability of Failure/Survival. Buchinsky and Yosha (1995) develop a dynamic model in which, 
in the absence of deposit insurance, the probability of failure of a bank is determined 
endogenously as a function of observable characteristics and bank-level policy variables (deposit 
interest rates, dividend payouts and risky investments) and, in the process, shed light on the effect 
of market discipline in identifying “bad” banks. The bank considers the effect of their optimal 
policy on the probability of failure, which affects its ability to collect deposits (necessary for 
undertaking projects). The optimal policy, as defined by Buchinsky and Yosha, is a result of the 
dynamic stochastic program solved for each bank in each period given an elastic supply of 
deposits. Hence, for every possible bank size there is an optimal policy which determines the 
probability of failure, which is taken into consideration by the depositors when they supply funds, 
which explains the existence of endogeneity in their model. The state of the dynamic programme 
in period t is characterized by: (i) a bank’s size in period t (the monetary value of the portfolio) 
and (ii) the realized gross returns on investments undertaken in period t-1 in securities (where 
the return on market portfolio is equal for each bank) and risky projects (the returns to the 
idiosyncratic investments in projects). As argued by the authors, at the end of each period, “the 
size of the bank (conditional on survival) is determined by its initial size, the policy it chooses, and 
the realization of the returns from the risky investments” (p. 8). In the construction of their model 
they emphasize that the size of the bank is mainly determined by the actual returns on a bank’s 
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idiosyncratic investments in projects. In other words, the riskiness of the bank is entirely due to 
its activities on the asset side (the deposit supply is not stochastic: no liquidity shocks), where 
risky investments comprise of loans to new businesses, funding of R&D ventures, or the extension 
of mortgages where (gross) ex-post realizations differ, while the return on market portfolio of 
securities is the same for each bank. 
 
Buchinsky and Yosha (1995) employ a simulation procedure to examine the effect of bank size 
(they use equity to proxy for bank size), the riskiness of investments and reserve requirements on 
the bank’s optimal policy and probability of bankruptcy (determined endogenously within the 
system, as discussed earlier). Their focus is on the evolution of banks over time due to the 
idiosyncratic risk faced by banks as a result of their risky investments. In the first period of 
simulation banks (a total of 30) are identical in size and are allowed to select their optimal policies 
(they all choose the same optimal policy). However, from the next period they begin to differ both 
in size and the choice of optimal policies due to the different outcome of their undertaken 
projects. The study then examines the number of banks which survive and the size distribution of 
these banks over thirty periods of the simulation. Their results suggest that the shape of the size 
distribution becomes almost stationary and is skewed to the left with a small number of large 
banks. The main finding of the base case simulation is that the probability of survival becomes 
positively associated with a bank’s size. Buchinsky and Yosha originally argue that small banks 
have three optional scenarios: (i) to raise no deposits at all and invest their capital in riskless 
securities, so the probability of survival is almost guaranteed, but they remain small; (ii) to offer 
a lower deposit interest rate and collect less deposit funds and invest those funds in projects with 
lower risk and by that increase their probability of survival; or (iii) to offer high deposit interest 
rates, which leads to higher risk premiums in order to collect more deposits, reflecting that some 
small banks want to “escape from poverty”. In accordance with the simulation results, small banks 
choose the third option, implying that very small banks are involved in gambling activities by 
investing a large portion of their funds in risky projects. The incentives for small banks to adopt 
such a risky strategy are explained by their aim to become larger in the medium or long run 
although such strategies increase the probability of bankruptcy in the short run. Briefly, the higher 
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the risk the higher the returns and thus growth in MS, if the undertaken projects are successfully 
completed. 
 
 
Prospect Theory. The rationale for considering this theory is to further elaborate whether 
(excessive) risk-taking may be considered as a potential “inside” bank determinant of market 
share. Kahneman and Trevsky (1979) developed the prospect theory (behavioural decision theory 
under risk) as a critique of the well-established and commonly used expected utility theory for 
decision making under risk which assumes risk-averse individuals. They show that individuals 
typically make choices that are not in accordance with the expected utility theory when they face 
risky prospects. Individuals underweight merely probable outcomes compared to certain 
outcomes (the certainty effect), which implies risk-averse individuals in the case of gains and risk-
seeking in the case of losses (the reflection effect). Additionally, individuals exhibit inconsistent 
preferences when the same choice is presented in different forms (the isolation effect). In 
prospect theory the choice decision relies on the value function (S-shaped), which is determined 
by two elements: a reference point (target or benchmark) for a choice decision (the asset’s value) 
and the changes in the preferences (the certainty and reflection effects) in the domain 
above/below the reference point (gains and losses). In particular, the function that describes the 
risk-taking behaviour of a decision maker of a below target return (benchmark or aspirational 
level) is commonly convex and steeper than the function that describes the domain of risk-averse 
individuals with above target returns, which is generally convex. The S-shaped function is steepest 
at the reference point, hence it the function is centred at the reference point (Figure 5.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Hypothetical value function 
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Source: Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
 
Having briefly presented the underpinnings of the prospect theory, we now discuss two rare 
studies on its application in the banking industry (Johnson, 1994 and Godlewski, 2007). Johnson 
(1994), motivated by the perception of increased riskiness of the banking industry in the US during 
the 1980s, tests the validity of the prospect theory over the period 1970 to 1989. Godlewski 
(2007) examines the validity of the prospect theory in the banking sectors in South East Asia and 
Latin America in the period 1996 to 2001. The testable hypothesis derived from Kahneman and 
Trevsky (1979) in terms of the risk-return relationship is positive for banks with above target 
returns and negative for banks with below target returns. As argued by Johnson (1994) riskier 
projects may provide a decision maker a better chance of achieving the desired target than less 
risky projects. Both studies employ profitability ratios (ROA and ROE) and the equity ratio as 
measures of return against which the target is determined. The target value is the median value 
of these measures in the industry. As a measure of risk both studies employ the so-called 
Fishburn’s “redefined risk”  as the integral of a function that is based on distance below target 
outcome (Johnson, 1994). These studies provide supportive evidence for the prospect theory. In 
particular, the findings suggest that banks performing below targeted performance behave as risk 
seekers, whereas the banks operating above targeted performance are risk-averse.  
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Given the findings above, the risk-taking behaviour of banks may affect their performance (ROA 
and ROE), but also affects their MS. Johnson (1994) explains that in order to increase its 
profitability on a longer time horizon, a bank can extend its loan portfolio through lending to high 
risk borrowers, the immediate effect being an increase in MS. For this category of loans the bank 
sets a higher interest rate as a compensation for the higher risk, which in turn leads to higher 
interest income per dollar invested and finally to higher profits, if the outcome is positive. This 
implies that the MS of the bank could be enhanced by undertaking higher risk. For a bank below 
its targeted MS (if the target is now a certain level of MS, instead of profitability), this may enable 
it to narrow the gap between its actual MS and targeted MS. However, the outcome of such 
activities is risky and the bank’s MS may deteriorate further if the outcome is default on the risky 
loans. Indeed it may even lead to exit from the market. However, banks operating above their 
targeted MS may not be willing to apply such strategy. 
 
Lending Standards and Screening. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) in their theoretical paper 
examine how the distribution of information regarding the borrowers in the loan markets is 
related to banks’ strategic behaviour in determining lending standards, lending volume, and the 
aggregate allocation of credit. They present a model of a loan market where banks have private 
information regarding the quality of some, but not all, of the borrowers. For the “unknown” 
borrowers they may ask for collateral in order to differentiate between “good” and “bad” 
borrowers, or they may choose to approve loans without it. The screening of loan applicants is 
useful for reducing the asymmetric information in the loan market which leads to an adverse 
selection problem across banks and between banks and borrowers.  Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 
show that in equilibrium banks will choose to screen the applicants more (less) if the proportion 
of unknown borrowers is low (high). The intuition behind this result is as follows: an unknown 
borrower who applies for a loan for a new project could be one of two types: (i) a first time 
applicant (ii) a borrower who has been already rejected by other banks. In a scenario, when the 
proportion of unknown borrowers and new projects in the market increases, each bank begins to 
receive an increased number of loan applications. Without screening banks are not capable of 
distinguishing between these two types of borrowers. However, when the proportion of new 
borrowers in the market significantly increases, the number of loan applications to each bank 
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increases as well, hence banks find it more profitable in such circumstances to screen less (given 
that screening involves costs and those costs increase significantly when the proportion of 
unknown borrowers is becoming high), that is “to reduce collateral requirements in an effort to 
undercut their competitors and increase their market share (p. 2512).” Although Dell’Ariccia and 
Marquez primarily examine the effect of lending booms and lending standards on financial 
instability, they acknowledge that risk-taking may be a policy for some of the banks in order to 
increase their market share at least in the short run, whereas their long-run market share depends 
on the success of the granted loans. Given the above arguments that lending booms may result 
in higher riskiness and financial instability, undertaking higher risk may result in some banks 
gaining market share, suggesting a possible causality between the level of loans and risk-taking.  
 
The variation in the lending standards and price competition among banks over different stages 
of the business cycle has also been examined by Ruckes (2004). He demonstrates that credit 
standards vary counter-cyclically, and banks screen less and use more lenient credit standards in 
expansion periods. This is the result of banks’ rational decisions (not because they care less but 
because in periods of expansion the average quality of borrowers is higher, hence the probability 
of default is much lower) which enables profit maximization given intensified price competition. 
The rationale for intensified price competition is the increased willingness of all banks to grant a 
loan because the average quality of borrowers is high.  
 
In periods of recession the average quality of borrowers is lower, hence in order to distinguish 
between borrowers, banks need more accurate information to forecast if it profitable to give 
loans to borrower. However, given that screening is costly and the low probability of a positive 
borrower assessment, conditional on the low average quality of borrowers, the marginal benefit 
from screening is small. Hence, Ruckes shows that, as in the expansion period, in recession also 
the optimal level of screening is superficial, but with the result that in recession banks resist 
lending. Once the share of good borrowers starts to increase above a certain benchmark level, 
the level of screening is intensified. The author further explains that in recession, price 
competition is lessened and the lending standards become stricter, because banks become 
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reluctant to lend. Moreover, the gross profits in recession are lower than in expansion, given the 
decrease in the amount of lending, but the granted loans considered individually are more 
profitable in recession than in expansion because of the higher risk in the expansion period. Given 
the results from the Ruckes’s model and the underpinnings of the prospect theory, during the 
recession period, the most risk loving banks, which may especially be those that are performing 
under their target MS, may increase their MS (at least in the short run) if they grant more loans.  
 
Given the discussion above a definitive expectation of the direction of the relationship between 
risk taking and market share is not fully clear. However, it can be expected that in the short run 
taking higher risks will contribute to expansion of the loan portfolio of a bank, hence the bank to 
gain in MS. However, this would be sustainable on long run only if the undertaken risky projects 
are successfully realized.   
 
5.3.4 Market share and capital  
In this section we go beyond the study of Berger and Bouwman (2013) who empirically investigate 
the effect of capital on a bank’s market share discussed in Section 5.2. Predictions of the 
relationship between capital and MS differ across different theories. Some studies suggest that 
banks with higher capital have a higher MS, because these banks are more competitive and have 
a competitive advantage (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Allen and Gale, 2004; Boot and Marinc, 
2008, Allen et al., 2011; Mehran and Thakor, 2011; Berger and Bouwman, 2013). Additionally, 
there is empirical evidence suggesting that better-capitalized banks may compete more 
effectively for deposits and loans (Calomiris and Powell, 2001; Calomiris and Mason, 2003; 
Calomiris and Wilson, 2004; Kim, Kristiansen, and Vale, 2005) and hence an increase in MS could 
be expected.  On the other hand, some authors argue that in the case of highly-leveraged firms in 
the non-financial sectors, this positive relationship does not hold since such firms will be more 
aggressive in their market activities and strategies, resulting in a negative relationship between 
capital and market share. For example, in the banking sector, Stiroh and Strahan (2003) find that 
the equity to asset ratio has a negative impact on MS. They interpret this as the equity to asset 
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ratio possibly picking up a size effect, since the large banks are inclined to be more leveraged. 
However, since the econometric model used in their analysis includes fixed effects, the authors 
provide a further explanation, namely that the equity to asset ratio may also control for the 
differences in the operational strategies across banks because aggressive banks tend to have both 
higher leverage and to expand more rapidly. Given the above arguments the effect of capital on 
MS is unclear.  
 
 
5.3.5 Market share and regulation: “Outside” determinants 
In his comprehensive review of SCP studies in banking, Gilbert (1984) argues that one of the 
serious drawbacks in those studies was the omission of the direct inclusion of regulation. Hence, 
the effects of changes in regulation on the market structure-performance relationship cannot be 
determined from these early studies. That regulation blunts the market mechanism and hinders 
the competitive process is evidenced by Stiroh and Strahan (2003), as discussed in Section 5.2. 
They find that a bank's relative performance and its subsequent MS growth strengthens 
significantly after deregulation as competitive reallocation effects lead to the transfer of assets to 
better performers (for example, more efficient) and a possible increase in concentration, unless 
the deregulation encourages new entry. In terms of regulation, this may imply that countries with 
stricter regulations (mainly to secure financial stability) could have a less concentrated banking 
sector not because of increased competition (Boone, 2000, 2008), but because regulation may 
serve as a protector of weak banks (Lyons and Zhu, 2012). However, if regulation restricts new 
banks from entering the market, then regulation may lead to more concentrated market. Hence, 
at first glance it seems that regulation in general and different types of regulation in particular 
may work in two directions, to contribute to more or less concentrated market. 
 
However, to our best knowledge there is no coherent theoretical framework elaborating the 
effect of regulation on the competitive position of banks. Only Gonzalez (2009) examines this 
issue and acknowledges that his study is an empirical exercise as he does not provide any 
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theoretical background for the effect of regulation on banks’ MS. Recently, Lyons and Zhu (2012)39 
following the theoretical framework of Sutton (1991) empirically examine the relationship 
between competition, regulation and market structure (concentration) across European banks in 
the period 1997-2009. As with Gonzalez (2009), this study lacks a theoretical basis and does not 
discuss the expected effects of these regulatory and supervisory practices. Lyons and Zhu find 
that activity restrictions negatively affect concentration, while conglomerate restrictions are 
found to increase concentration. In addition, the authors examine the effect of entry restrictions, 
capital regulation and official supervision on concentration in banking, but these factors are found 
to be insignificant. They consider these results to be rather surprising, especially for the latter 
two, given that capital regulation and supervision have been revised and become stricter in the 
aftermath of last financial crisis. In terms of entry restrictions the insignificant results may be due 
to the lack of variation in this variable, or because entry requirements are offset by the incentives 
for entry.   
 
The discussion above establishes a rationale for further investigation of regulation and 
supervision practices in terms of their effect on a bank’s MS, hence in what follows we try to 
provide intuitive predictions regarding the effect of regulation on MS, hence prepare grounds for 
a better empirical investigation in Chapter 6. Before discussing the effect of regulation in banking 
in detail, we should highlight an important issue related to what we call the country-level effect 
and the bank-level effect of regulation on competitiveness in banking. This results from the fact 
that when one bank gains in MS, other bank(s) must lose a portion of their MS because the sum 
of all MSs equals to one. Hence, given that regulation is determined on a country level, it is not 
possible to observe a positive or negative effect of regulation on all individual bank’s MS, since 
not all banks in one country can increase/decrease at the same time, unless the regulation 
encourages exit or entry. Consequently, the effect can be considered at the aggregate banking 
industry level as analogous to concentration and we name this as the country-level effect. In other 
words, this effect is whether the regulation is to favour a market with a few banks with a large 
                                                        
39 This study is not included in the Section 5.2: Review of empirical studies investigating MS, because this study considers 
market concentration; however it is relevant in this section. 
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MS or a large number of banks with a small MS, i.e. a less/more concentrated market. On the 
other hand, it is reasonable to expect that regulation policies may affect an individual bank’s MS 
through transmission channels such as individual bank specificities, for example a bank’s 
performance (efficiency as in Gonzalez, 2009; and relative profitability as in Stiroh and Strahan, 
2003), risk taking behaviour, size (for instance, as explained later in this section, big banks may 
influence regulators according to the interest group theory), etc. Given that in such case the effect 
of regulation on a bank’s MS is through other factors (in the empirical model this would be 
interactions between regulation and the factors just mentioned above) we name this as the bank-
level effect. These are elaborated below.   
   
Although regulatory practices are mainly determined at the national level (such as activities 
restrictions and existence of explicit deposit insurance schemes), there is also a trend of 
establishing international regulatory practices such as Basel II40. This thesis focuses on both 
national and international regulatory and supervisory practices. However, the effects of these 
practices are difficult to establish clearly because there are several possible outcomes as 
suggested in the literature.  
Consideration of the “capture” theory is relevant for understanding the potential reverse 
causality between regulation and MS. Specifically, from the standpoint of the “capture” theory, 
supervision and regulation may benefit larger banks by facilitating their expansion at the cost of 
medium and small banks because they can have more influence on the government policy and, 
hence, a positive association should be expected for big banks. These arguments raise the 
possibility that regulatory and supervisory processes may be endogenous. This point applies to all 
aspects discussed in the rest of this subsection. 
CAPITAL REGULATION. Capital regulation is the main focus of government intervention and also 
of the Basel II Accord. Since capital serves as a buffer against potential losses and bank failures 
                                                        
40 Basel II is the successor of Basel I, however the last financial crisis urgently requested changes in regulation, hence in 2010-
11 new comprehensive set of reform measures are proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which 
implementation is expected 2013-2015. Hence, given that the period of analysis on this thesis is up to 2012, Basel II is 
considered when discussing the regulatory and supervisory practices. 
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and protects investors in the case of failure (Barth et al. 2004), its positive effect on a safe and 
sound banking system is quite clear (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). Berger and Bouwman (2013) 
argue that deposit insurance may mediate the effect of capital on MS, because deposit insurance 
increases the competition for deposits and the capital is essential for collecting uninsured 
deposits and subordinated debt. Kendall (1992) argues that indeed there may be increased risk-
taking behaviour by individual banks occasionally, but this does not mean a riskier banking sector. 
The results of Barth et al. (2004a) suggest that more stringent capital requirements contribute to 
less non-performing loans, but it is not robustly associated with banking crises, bank development 
and efficiency when controlling for other supervisory–regulatory policies. Fernandez and 
Gonzalez (2005) provide results similar to Barth et al. (2004a). On the contrary, Koehn and 
Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988), Besanko and Kanatas (1996), and Blum (1999) 
emphasize that capital requirement may encourage risk-taking behaviour. Hence, given the above 
studies, capital regulation can be expected to affect risk-taking behaviour, which in turn can affect 
the size of the bank’s loan portfolio.  
 
Boot and Marinc (2006) present a set of theoretical models to assess how capital regulation 
interacts with the degree of competitiveness of the banking industry conditional on the level of 
screening which affect the profitability and riskiness of their lending operations (we assume 
higher screening reflects prudent bank behaviour). They distinguish two types of banks, “good” 
and “bad”, where the “good” banks invest more in monitoring technologies, hence could be 
considered as less risky banks. Part of their findings can be summarized: (i) higher capital 
requirements enhance the screening incentives of both types of banks, because a higher level of 
capital requires means more risk is internalized and (ii) higher capital requirements always 
decrease the value of a bad bank, but enhances the value of a good bank when the competition 
is fierce enough and the banking industry is of significantly low quality. Since (i) seems to be clear, 
the (ii) is elaborated using two effects of capital regulation as explained by Boot and Marinc. In 
particular, their first effect results from the imposed higher cost on each bank since capital is more 
expensive than deposits, hence ceteris paribus, the value of each bank is reduced. Their second 
effect results from the deposit insurance subsidy. Specifically, the competitiveness of the low 
quality banks is strengthened due to the deposit insurance subsidy, but this is now reduced by 
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the capital regulation, which enables good banks capture higher rents. Good banks can reduce 
the MS of the bad banks when the capital requirements are quite high, the competition is high 
and there are enough bad banks. On the other hand, they also show that high capital 
requirements may encourage entry due to the diminished competitive position of the lower 
quality banks compared to the high(er) quality banks.  
 
These arguments provide ambiguous predictions in terms of the bank-level effect of capital 
requirements through risk-taking behaviour on MS, in particular if capital requirements are an 
incentive/disincentive for riskier investments, in line with the discussion in Section 5.3.3, it may 
improve/reduce the MS of those banks which opt for higher risk loans, at least in the short run. 
Beatty and Gron (2001) find that capital requirements are important for low-capital banks, 
because such banks are legally forced to always hold a certain threshold of capital for covering 
potential losses. According to this it may be expected that the effect of capital requirements 
systemically vary over different size-classes in terms of the competitive position of banks (MS), 
especially because big banks are able to better diversify and lower the overall riskiness of their 
undertaken projects than small banks. In terms of the country-level effect, in a country with 
stringent capital requirements a lower concentration in banking could be expected given that 
capital requirements act as a “brake” on lending activities. Specifically, instead of investing the 
capital in profitable projects, banks are obliged to hold “aside” a certain portion of their capital.   
 
OFFICIAL SUPERVISORY PROCESS. The supervisory review process is the second pillar in Basel II. 
Given the prevalence of market imperfections in financial markets, official supervision is 
necessary to overcome them. Supervision becomes more important in countries with deposit 
insurance schemes, since banks have an incentive to engage in excessive risk-taking behaviour.  
Ogura (2006) emphasizes that more competitive banking systems require more stringent 
supervision because credit standards tend to be loosened either because of the lower duration of 
the customer-bank relationship or as a result of competition in the industry (as shown by Ruckes, 
2004 and Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Section 5.3.3). Therefore, during prosperous economic 
years, the number of approved loans increases rapidly, resulting in a lending boom which raises 
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the need for closer supervision in order to restrict potential excessive risk taking. Additionally, 
Allen and Gale (2004) point out that the erosion of profits by long-term competition forces create 
an incentive for profit-seeking banks to invest in riskier assets, again requiring higher supervision 
to prevent excessive risk-taking. Barth et al. (2006) find that official supervisory power has a 
negative influence on bank development (using a country-level indicator: ratio of the banks’ loans 
to private sector and GDP) which is line with Boot and Thakor (1993), Shleifer and Vishny (1998) 
and Djankov et al. (2002). However, they argue that this finding should be treated with caution 
because in a multivariate analysis this effect becomes insignificant, arguably due to the high 
correlation of official supervision with the other regulatory and supervisory practices. Gonzalez 
(2009) reports that greater private and official supervision reduces market concentration and a 
bank’s MS. He finds that the negative influence of official supervisory power on market structure 
is interconnected with other factors than efficiency, indicating that the MS of more efficient banks 
are not negatively affected by official supervision.  
 
Taking into consideration the above arguments and empirical findings, a number of intuitive 
predictions on the effect of official supervision on bank’s competitive position can be put forward. 
First, clear-cut predictions in terms of the direct effect of the supervision cannot be established. 
However, if we add an assumption that big and complex banking institutions are difficult to 
monitor, it is reasonable to expect a negative association between supervision and MS at the 
country level, in other words supervision may promote a banking sector without (some) banks 
becoming “too big” to effectively monitor.  Second, risk-taking and the size of a bank can be 
considered as the most relevant channels for analysing the bank-level effect of supervision on 
MS. If supervision is imposed to control the risk-taking behaviour of banks, then stricter 
supervision is expected to have a negative effect on the MS of banks which would otherwise be 
willing to embark on more risky lending in order to improve their MS, at least in the short run.  
PRIVATE MARKET MONITORING. The private market monitoring is part of the third pillar in Basel 
II. In essence this will “encourage market discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements 
which will allow market participants to assess key pieces of information on the scope of 
application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment procedures, and hence the capital adequacy 
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of the institution” (BIS, 2006 p.226). Very few studies have considered the effects of private 
monitoring in banking.  
 
Van Hoose (2010) argues that private monitoring might help regulators in differentiating “bad 
banks” from “good banks” and force them to act appropriately in cases of possible failures. 
Similarly, Levine (2005) points out that private monitoring would improve a private bank’s 
corporate governance thus will boost its functioning which may provide the potential for 
increased MS for “good banks”. Van Hoose (2010) emphasizes that larger banks may comply with 
the process of information disclosure more easily and at less cost compared to smaller banks - 
and this is a negative outcome of market discipline. Furthermore, Duarte et al. (2008) maintain 
that private monitoring increases the bank’s costs due to making additional informational 
disclosures and maintaining investor relations departments, which may have a negative impact 
on efficiency (Pasiouras et al., 2009). In the presence of economies of scale, this cost may be 
proportionately less for big banks than for small banks, thus it can be expected that the MS of 
small banks may be reduced.  
 
Barth et al. (2006) explain that private monitoring is preferred because politicians and regulators 
would be forced to react promptly and accordingly regarding the market signals, instead of acting 
according to their own group and political interests, especially in countries with underdeveloped 
capital markets, accounting standards and legal systems (the case in SEECs as discussed in Section 
1.4). Caprio and Honohan (2004) consider low-income countries with this regard and emphasize 
that these countries may be better off if they rely on market discipline despite the poor disclosure, 
accounting and legal system because: (i) market participants would be motivated to monitor, 
because even if the country has deposit insurance, it may not be appropriately provided because 
of the fiscal uncertainties of bank runs; (ii) the tendency for a large presence of foreign banks 
makes information disclosure more available; and (iii) a less complex banking environment. These 
arguments imply that private monitoring in SEECs may offset the selective positive effect of 
official supervision, especially for the big and influential banks, if regulators and supervisor act in 
line with the capture theory.  
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Barth et al. (2006) find a positive effect of private monitoring on bank development and 
emphasize the role of the third pillar, which prior to Basel II has been neglected. Barth et al. 
(2004), Levine (2005) and Delis et al. (2011) report that private monitoring has a positive impact 
on a bank’s performance. Gonzalez (2009) finds that greater private supervision reduces market 
concentration and MS, similar to official supervision. However, his further findings support the 
expectation that private monitoring is a necessary condition for well-functioning markets, which 
in turn boosts efficiency and contributes to gains in MS (a significantly positive coefficient of the 
interaction term efficiency and private monitoring). Gonzalez explains that the negative 
association between MS and private monitoring as resulting from factors other than efficiency. 
From the discussion above, it is possible that one factor giving the negative effect on MS is the 
restriction of higher risk taken undertaken to enhance a bank’s MS. This is a reasonable 
prediction, given that a significant portion of lending activities are financed by deposits of the 
customers, hence private monitoring is expected to reward banks with prudent behaviour and 
transparent disclosure practices and punish banks with opposite working practices. However, the 
country-level effect of private monitoring is not clear, as there are arguments which indicate both 
negative and positive effect of private monitoring on the average bank’s MS.   
 
RESTRICTIONS ON BANKS’ ACTIVITIES. Another aspect of banking regulation is the range of 
activities that may be undertaken by banks (this regulation policy is country specific and is not 
part of the Basel pillars). In addition to the traditional banking activities other types of activities 
include securities, insurance and real estate. There is a debate on whether or not such restrictions 
should be imposed on banks. It has been argued that these restrictions would (i) help avoid 
conflicts of interest between different activities (Edwards, 1979 and Saunders, 1994); (ii) reduce 
the opportunities for riskier behaviour (Boyd et al., 1998); (iii) result in fewer big and complex 
financial institutions for monitoring; and (iv) limit the “too big to fail” phenomenon (Barth et al. 
2004; Leaven and Levin, 2005). Moreover, Lyons and Zhu (2012) maintain that activity restrictions 
are expected to be associated with less concentrated markets, because banks do not have access 
to risky markets including securities, insurance and real estate, hence are less likely to 
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substantially grow in MS. These arguments imply that activity restrictions hinder the expansion 
of a bank’s MS and lead to a less concentrated banking sector (the country-level effect).  
  
However, as Barth et al. (2006) have argued, there are reasonable theoretical grounds for 
permitting banks to engage in a broad range of activities since these may promote sound, stable 
and even more efficient banks. For example, involvement in different activities may allow the 
exploitation of economies of scale and scope (Classens and Klingebiel, 1999; Barth et al. 2000; 
Haubrich and Santos, 2005), which may facilitate the increase in the MS of the more efficient 
banks (although some banks may sacrifice efficiency and profits at least in the short run in order 
to expand MS). Moreover, having the opportunity to operate in different markets facilitates risk 
and income diversification which may enhance the stability, performance and the concentration 
in the banking sector, if such new opportunities result in remaining banks become even larger 
(the country-level effect). This is consistent with Gonzalez (2009) who finds that activity 
restrictions lead to increase in market concentration (Section5.3). 
 
In terms of the bank-level effect, the engagement in new opportunities (projects and activities) 
and their transformation into MS of some banks depends on the ability of individual banks to 
penetrate these new markets and their willingness to extend the current product-mix. Hence, it 
is reasonable to expect that big banks and banks willing to undertake additional risk, which comes 
with the new unknown market, would benefit if there are no or fewer activity restrictions. On the 
other hand, Bonfim and Kim (2012) argue that banks may have a tendency to act like a herd 
(engaging in similar risk-taking and management strategies) and this increases the risk of failure 
if they believe that a bail out will take place in a case of severe financial distress (Acharya and 
Yorulmazer, 2007; and Brown and Dinc, 2011). Beck et al. (2013) argue that in more competitive 
environments herding behaviour may motivate banks to engage in more risky activities, hence 
the bank-level effect of activity restrictions on MS could be transmitted through the risk-taking 
behaviour of the individual bank. They refer to activity restrictions as a possibility that encourages 
herding behaviour and leads to negative outcomes. The rationale for herding behaviour is found 
in the limitation of banks’ endeavour in new markets, when the core business is highly 
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competitive. Consequently, due to activity restrictions some banks (some of them are leaders and 
some followers) can opt for herding behaviour increasing the risk taking of the respective banks 
in the lending market and it may also increase the overall risk taking of banks. Given that big banks 
are more likely to better diversify their portfolios in the existing markets, even in the case of 
herding they have a higher probability of success and growth in size, not only in the short run, but 
in the long run as well.  
 
Barth et al. (2004) and Beck et al. (2006) find that restrictions on bank activities lead to a negative 
effect on bank performance and stability. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) indicate a positive and 
significant relationship between net interest margins and restrictions on activities. This finding 
suggests that activity restrictions may affect MS positively if banks with a higher net interest 
margin have a predisposition to expand, because they can decrease the margin (and remain 
profitable) in order to reduce their rivals’ MSs.  
 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES. The arguments in favour of an explicit deposit scheme are that 
it protects the banking system and small customers from bank failures (Barth et al., 2004).  
However, others have argued that deposit insurance may decrease the level of monitoring by 
depositors (Barth et al., 2004a) and lead the banks to opt for higher risk since they can collect 
deposits without being obliged to pay a premium if something goes wrong and they also face 
failure (Merton, 1977; Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Bhattacharya et al., 1998; Hendrickson 
and Nichols, 2001; Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002). 
 
Barth et al. (2004a) find a positive and robust relationship between deposit insurance generosity 
and probability of a crisis, but they maintain that the effect of deposit insurance depends on other 
factors such as bank-specific and/or other regulatory and supervisory practices. Some of these 
other factors are related to additional regulation policies and supervision processes which are 
expected to mitigate the moral hazard problem and hence affect the allocation of MS across 
banks. For example, prudent official supervision and enhanced private monitoring may decrease 
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the extent and consequences of moral hazard discussed above. Risk-based deposit insurance 
premiums may be also considered as potential mechanism against moral hazard (Van Hoose, 
2010). Moreover, some theories argue that deposit insurance strengthens deposit competition 
(Matutes and Vives, 1996; Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010). As Berger and Bouwman (2012, pp. 8-9) 
originally argued “In such a setting, capital would still be of importance, however, especially for 
raising uninsured deposits and subordinated debt, both of which may affect the bank’s MS.” 
 
Gonzalez (2009) finds that deposit insurance schemes increase the average MS in the banking 
sector (the country-level effect). His results also indicate that deposit insurance reduces the 
validity of the efficiency-structure theory and the positive effect of deposit insurance on MS is for 
other reasons than those related to the efficiency hypothesis. Given that the purpose of 
regulation in banking is to ensure prudent behaviour amongst banks, it is reasonable to consider 
risk-taking as one of those other reasons for a positive effect of deposit insurance on a bank’s MS, 
as discussed throughout this section. In fact, Boot and Marinc (2006)41 show that “deposit 
insurance effectively subsidizes low quality banks relative to high(er) quality banks. This makes 
low quality banks more competitive than they would otherwise have been, and makes it more 
difficult for good banks to gain market share at their expense, (p. 2).” The low quality banks 
potentially undertake more risk (underinvest in monitoring of the borrowers) and, according to 
Boot and Marinc in the presence of a deposit insurance scheme it is expected that banks prone 
to risk-taking may increase their MS through expanding lending and deposits at least in the short 
run. In addition, the phenomenon of “too big to fail” allows big banks a favourable position and 
they may further increase their MS much easier than the smaller banks by undertaking riskier 
projects in the presence of deposit insurance. Eventually, the county-level effect of deposit 
insurance on MS can be expected to be positive (average MS in the sector is higher), while the 
bank-level effect on MS would depend on the size of the bank and its risk-taking behaviour.  On 
the other hand, the long run effect depends on the realization of the undertaken projects 
(Buchinsky and Yosha, 1995).  
                                                        
41 This study has been already presented in the section for the capital regulation. 
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The problem of moral hazard arising from a deposit insurance scheme may be mitigated if the 
regulators create a set of rules which limit the risk-taking behaviour of banks, which restricts the 
lenient lending and the MS expansion. Such measures can regulate: (i) who is the major 
contributor for deposit insurance; (ii) whether banks are charged risk-based deposit fees; and (iii) 
what proportion of deposits is insured by the scheme. Such measures could alleviate the moral 
hazard problem but may also limit the expansion of banks’ MS, since is it is expected that banks 
would avoid excessive risk-taking.    
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
The market structure in banking can have important implications for financial stability, firms’ 
performance and growth, the well-being of the households and the banks’ performance. The main 
purpose of this chapter is to identify the potential determinants of a bank’s market share- which 
may also be considered as factors determining a bank’s competitive position. However, as 
highlighted throughout this chapter, there are only a very limited number of theoretical and 
empirical studies analysing this topic and a comprehensive theoretical framework is still 
underdeveloped. Deriving a conceptual framework which reflects the potential determinants of 
a bank’s market share presents a challenging task and requires an eclectic approach deriving from 
various strands of literature presented in Section 5.3. Recognizing that banking is a regulated 
industry, the range of determinants includes bank-specific factors (those under control of the 
management, or the “inside” bank determinants) and regulatory and supervisory practices (which 
are the control of the management, or the “outside” bank determinants).   
 
The starting point for this theoretical discussion, and the empirical analysis in the next Chapter, is 
the study by Gonzalez (2009) which to our knowledge is the first empirical attempt investigating 
cost efficiency and regulation as determinants of MS. However, based on a detailed critical review 
of this study, it became clear that a number of important additional issues have to be taken in to 
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account. First, his empirical study considers only one “inside” bank determinant, cost efficiency. 
In this chapter we go beyond this and identify other possible “inside” bank determinants, such as 
investments in quality, risk-taking behaviour and capital. Moreover, the inclusion of regulation in 
the study of Gonzalez is on ad hoc basis; hence we make an effort to develop theoretical 
predictions, at least intuitively, of the effect of regulation and supervision on a bank’s competitive 
position. To this end, a “step by step” strategy and an eclectic approach are employed to identify 
a comprehensive set of determinants of a bank’s MS (Section 5.4). In particular, various strands 
of economic literature tackling market structure from different perspectives are discussed. These 
include the literature on measuring competition (the Boone indicator), endogenous sunk cost 
theory, the literature on the role of capital in banking and the probability of survival in banking, 
prospect theory, and the literature on lending standards and screening. 
 
Second, Gonzalez estimates bank’s efficiency by a non-parametric approach, DEA, with a country-
specific frontier, and then uses these estimates as a determinant of market structure in a cross-
country panel study. However, as discussed in Section 5.2, the use of a country-specific frontier 
cannot provide efficiency estimates comparable between countries. Hence, we apply a 
parametric approach, Stochastic Frontier Analysis, using the Random Parameters Models in the 
context of a common frontier, in order to obtain comparable, time-varying efficiency estimates 
across countries (Chapter 4) and use these in the empirical estimation of market share in Chapter 
6. Third, Gonzalez assumes that market structure and a bank’s market share are of a static nature, 
an unrealistic and restrictive assumption. As supported by Stiroh and Strahan (2003), a bank’s 
competitive position is a dynamic process, in other words the current level of bank’s market share 
depends on past competitive levels as well as current factors (explored further in Chapter 6.2), 
which in turn requires use of a dynamic panel model (Section 6.4). Finally, although Gonzalez 
(2009) investigates determinants of market structure in 65 countries, his data set includes only 
two out of eight countries under consideration in this thesis, Croatia and Slovenia. The other six, 
Albania, BiH, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, are not included in his study. 
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After reviewing a broad range of literature, the following factors were identified as the “inside” 
bank determinants of market share: the level of efficiency, investments in quality (non-price 
competition), risk-taking behaviour and the capital ratio. The “outside” bank determinants 
identified include restrictions on activities of banks, the existence of explicit deposit insurance 
schemes, the level of capital requirements, the strength or effectiveness of official supervision 
and market discipline (the three pillars of the Basel II Accord). The identification of “outside” bank 
determinants and the potential testable hypotheses proved even more challenging than that of 
“inside” bank determinants. In particular, given that the sum of market shares of all banks has to 
add up to one, any regulatory policy cannot positively or negatively affect all banks. The analysis 
of the effect of regulation on MS at country level is analogous to the study of market 
concentration. Hence, our theoretical discussion focuses on both country level and bank-level 
effect of regulation on market share. The impact of any regulatory policy on an individual bank’s 
MS depends on a bank’s characteristics. It is known that the purpose of regulation in banking is 
to secure safe and sound banking system by influencing the incentives and behaviour of bank 
managers. In addition to efficiency, which was considered by Gonzalez (2009), risk-taking and the 
size of banks may be the channel for transmission of the effects of regulatory measures on an 
individual bank’s MS.  
 
An important issue that characterises the identified determinants is their potential endogeneity 
due to reverse causality with a bank’s market share as discussed in Section 5.4, an issue that will 
be further considered in Chapter 6. The outcome of this chapter is a conceptual framework, which 
overcomes the identified limitations of Gonzalez (2009), that can be used as the basis for 
developing an empirical model to investigate the determinants of a bank’s MS in selected SEECs 
in the period 2002-2012. This empirical analysis is presented in the next chapter.  
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter 5, this thesis presents an attempt to identify the potential determinants 
of a bank’s market share (which serves as a proxy for competitive position of the bank, thus the 
two terms are used interchangeably) by conducting an empirical investigation using a model 
developed by reviewing and extending different strands of the literature and a few already 
existing studies in the field. Therefore the aim is to provide initial empirical evidence that may lay 
the basis for further theoretical and empirical research on the determinants of MS in banking. As 
argued in Chapter 5, this area of investigation has policy relevance, given the importance of the 
banking industry for the economy and the fact that it has always been a regulated industry, with 
some aspects of regulation being directly concerned with MS concentration.  
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Therefore, this chapter aims to empirically investigate what determines a bank’s MS. For that end, 
the “derived” theoretical framework in Chapter 5 regarding the possible determinants of a bank’s 
MS is used as a ground for this empirical analysis. Specifically, this chapter considers two broad 
groups of variables (the “inside” bank and “outside” bank factors) discussed in Chapter 5. 
Furthermore, in line with the theoretical framework, as discussed in Chapter 5, additional testable 
hypotheses are defined which are related to the possibility of systematic variation across different 
risk-taking behaviour and size-classes of banks in terms of the effect of various determinants. 
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 6.2 presents the baseline empirical model. 
Section 6.3 discusses the data employed in this analysis, and the research methodology used for 
this investigation is the subject of discussion in Section 6.4. The empirical findings of the baseline 
model are elaborated in Section 6.5, followed by the empirical findings from the alternative model 
specifications which check for possible systematic variation across different risk-taking behaviour 
and size-classes of banks. In addition, this section includes a robustness check of the empirical 
results using different specifications of efficiency and risk. Finally, Section 6.6 provides a summary 
of the findings and conclusion.  
 
6.2 MODEL SPECIFICATION: THE BASELINE MODEL 
This section develops an empirical model of the potential determinants of a bank’s MS, drawing 
on the theoretical underpinnings and the literature review presented in Chapter 5. As discussed 
there, the potential determinants of MS are divided in two broad groups: “inside” and “outside”. 
The “inside” bank determinants are those which are under a bank’s control and decision, whereas 
the “outside” determinants are those beyond its control, that is factors determined by the 
regulatory and supervisory bodies in the country. At any given time a bank can actively improve 
its MS only by improving its “inside bank” determinants as the “outside bank” determinants are 
established for each country and, as discussed later in Section 6.3, they are pre-determined. The 
possibility that banks can affect these practices and influence regulators in the process of creating 
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the regulation and supervision framework is excluded. In addition to the aforementioned groups 
of factors, there is another factor that is likely to play a role in determining a bank’s competitive 
position, that is, the behaviour of the rivals. Although, it is difficult to account for competitors’ 
actions, we endeavour to partially capture them as presented later in this section. It is important 
to note that the baseline model examines the country-level effect of regulation, while in Section 
6.5 the alternative models are focused on the bank-level effect of regulation on MS. 
 
6.2.1 “Inside” bank determinants  
The “inside bank” determinants consist of the past MS of the bank (the lagged dependent 
variable) as well as other factors in the current period. According to the standard microeconomic 
theory in order for a firm to increase its MS, it needs to increase its size (its capital – its fixed 
assets) and to do so it needs to invest – but there is a delay in getting to the desired level because 
of costs of adjustment. The past level of MS gives the basis from which the bank needs to adjust 
its current level; hence the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable is necessary. Given the 
specificities of the banking industry, where collected deposits are as important as the capital for 
a further potential increase of the MS, as well as the cost of deposits (the interest rate), there are 
other costs associated with the expansion of deposits which result from asymmetric information 
and/or information sharing, switching costs and first mover advantage. It is expected that these 
kinds of costs are reflected in the partial adjustment process captured by the lagged dependent 
variable. For example, Kim et al. (2003, pp.51-52) find that: “On average, 23.0% of the customer’s 
added value is attributed to the lock-in phenomenon generated by switching costs. As much as 
35% of the average bank’s market share is due to its established bank–borrower relationship (on 
average 13.5 years).” Furthermore, as discussed in Section 1.4, the banking industry in the 
countries under consideration have undergone substantial restructuring after the post-socialism 
era, which was a slow and long process characterised by various government interventions and 
imperfections in order for banks to accommodate to the new rules applied by the free market 
economy. The substantial inflow of foreign capital into this industry contributed to an 
asymmetrical distribution of knowledge and experience between banks about the functioning of 
the market economy and the required steps to remain active and/or to expand in the new 
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environment, which can be considered as additional costs of adjustment. These arguments 
support the dynamic nature of a bank’s MS [as well supported by Stiroh and Strahan (2003) as 
discussed in Section 5.2], which presents a development from the static model as specified by 
Gonzalez (2009) discussed in Section 5.2. 
 
As discussed in Section 5.3, the “inside” bank determinants include efficiency, capital42, risk 
(probability of default) and quality/advertising. The following discussion presents the choice of 
variables for the empirical analysis. As a measure for efficiency this thesis uses the cost efficiency 
of the bank. As discussed in Section 2.2 and 2.3.2 a bank’s cost efficiency is defined as the ratio of 
the expenditures of the most cost-efficient bank (the minimum cost attainable in a given 
environment, accounting for random shocks) to observed total cost of any other bank. Thus, cost 
efficiency has a range of 0 to 1, where the further the bank is from 1 and closer to zero, the less 
efficient it is. It is expected that at least one bank has a score of 1 (produces at the lowest feasible 
cost level, that is no further reduction in the costs could maintain the same output level), 
representing the best-practice bank against which the other banks are compared with respect to 
cost efficiency. This definition is a relative measure of cost efficiency, hence it takes into account 
the behaviour of the most successful rival in the industry in terms of efficiency. It is important to 
note that in the empirical analysis of this chapter, for the sake of ease interpretation, we use cost 
efficiency multiplied by 100, that is a percentage, rather than as a ratio from 0 to 1. The cost 
efficiencies of the banks were estimated in Chapter 4 by conducting a SFA using a random 
parameters model (where loan impairment charges, loans and other earning assets were treated 
as random, that is the effect of each of these variables on total costs, hence implicitly on cost 
efficiency, is unique for each bank, given the presence of heterogeneity in these variables). An 
important property of these estimates is their variation across time within a bank on a yearly 
basis, which in turn is expected to provide more information about the effect of cost efficiency on 
                                                        
42 As in Berger and Bouwman (2013) capital and capital ratio are used as synonyms, hence the both terms are interchangeably 
used throughout this chapter. In particular, in the theoretical discussion the term “capital” is used, while in the empirical 
analysis the term “capital ratio” is used, as it is widely used in the empirical literature to control for the size of banks and 
potential heteroscedasticity.  
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MS. As discussed in Section 5.3.1, cost efficiency is expected to be positively associated with a 
bank’s MS 
 
Another possible “inside” bank determinant is the effect of non-pricing/strategic competition on 
the competitive position of the bank. In the absence of other data representing this kind of 
competition, branch density (number of branches per 10,000km2) is used as an indicator of non-
pricing behaviour. This variable may serve as a proxy for quality (the endogenous sunk cost 
theory) and/or as a mean for advertising in banking as discussed in 5.3.2. A priori, branch density 
is expected to have a positive effect on a bank’s competitive position, particularly because in the 
selected SEECs for the period of this study non-pricing competition was not a well-established 
mechanism, hence high initial yields from such form of competition may be expected.  
 
The next potential “inside” determinant of a bank’s MS is the capital, as discussed in Section 5.3.4. 
To investigate the effect of capital on the MS, this analysis considers the ratio of a bank’s capital 
relative to its total assets. An appropriate indicator for capital is the risk adjusted capital (Tier 1 
or Tier 2), since it represents more accurately the level of capital at the disposal of a bank in the 
case of losses, for example due to loan default. However, due to limited data on risks associated 
with each element of the bank’s capital, the unadjusted capital ratio is employed. The theoretical 
literature that analyses the role of a bank’s capital from different aspects (banking sector stability, 
optimal capital structure, franchise value of the bank) usually makes use of the terms “holding 
more capital” and “more capitalized banks” but rarely there is a defined benchmark against which 
this comparison is made. In some cases this benchmark may be the rate of capital requirements 
imposed by the regulators, but in most cases this is not explicit. 
 
Accordingly, to capture “the more” issue, this empirical analysis defines the capital ratio relative 
to the median capital ratio (instead of mean to avoid the effect of the outliers) in each country 
for each year. In particular, a bank’s capital ratio is defined as the difference between the bank’s 
capital and the median banks’ capital in each country in each year, hence the variable is negative 
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(positive) if the bank’s capital is below (above) the median bank’s capital. Moreover, such 
definition of the capital ratio variable captures the rivals’ behaviour in terms of capitalization. The 
literature suggests that being a more capitalized bank is associated with greater stability (more 
capital to be used as a “buffer” against losses) and higher MS (Section 5.2 and 5.3.3). However, a 
reverse relationship could be argued as well, if banks competing for MS are more aggressive hence 
highly leveraged, because holding more capital may imply less investments.  
 
Section 5.3.3 presents the theoretical underpinnings along with empirical evidence on the 
relevance of including risk-taking as a potential determinant of MS. It is important to note that 
the database at our disposal does not provide any information regarding the ex-ante riskiness of 
individual investments and their ex-post realization; hence it does not allow a detailed empirical 
investigation regarding the effect of risk-taking on MS. The second best alternative is the Z-score, 
which captures the aggregate risk of insolvency, also known as the probability of default. This 
index is widely used in the literature as a measure of risk undertaken by a bank (Beck et al., 2013; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Houston et al., 2010; Giordana and Schumacher, 2012; De 
Nicolo, 2000; De Nicolo et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2009; Wolff and Papanikolaou, 2010). The Z-
score measures the distance from insolvency (Roy, 1952) and is calculated as 
𝑍𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+(𝐸 𝐴)⁄ 𝑖,𝑡
𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖,𝑡
         …. (6.1) 
where ROA is return on assets, E/A denotes the equity to asset ratio, σ(ROA) is the standard 
deviation of return on assets, i denotes the cross-section dimension (bank) and t stands for time. 
Boyd and Runkle (1993) interpret the Z-score as a number of standard deviations by which returns 
on assets need to fall from the mean to eradicate the bank’s equity. A higher Z-score implies a 
lower probability of default, providing a more appealing measure of soundness compared to 
simple leverage measures. 
In a similar vein as with capital, the literature with respect to risk-taking in banking is concerned 
with “the more” issue, but once again there is no clearly defined benchmark against which the 
undertaken risk of a bank is measured in order to become a “more” risk-taker. In this study the 
bank’s Z-score index is defined as the difference between the Z-score of that bank and the median 
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Z-score in country i and time t. Accordingly, such definition of the Z-score accounts for the 
competitors’ behaviour in term of risk-taking. If the estimated coefficient is negative it suggests 
that the higher the bank’s solvency the lower the bank’s MS, which implies that more-risk taking 
is associated with a higher MS. In terms of the expected sign of risk-taking, as discussed in Section 
5.4.3, there are theoretical predictions and evidence that under some circumstances a positive 
relationship between risk-taking and MS is feasible, but in the medium and long run this effect 
mainly depends on the success (realization) of the undertaken projects and the bank’s size. Hence, 
the general expectation with respect to the effect of risk-taking is ambiguous rather than positive.   
 
Finally, ownership structure in banking is widely argued to affect a bank’s performance in 
transition countries (Section 1.4 and Section 4.5). The relationship between market share and 
ownership structure can be considered as effected by different management goals. Aghion and 
Stein (2008) argue: “If the firm’s manager cares about the current stock price, she will favor the 
growth strategy when the market pays more attention to growth numbers. Conversely, it can be 
rational for the market to weight growth measures more heavily when it is known that the firm is 
following a growth strategy (p. 1025).” If we assume that due to the higher expertise associated 
with foreign capital, the management of foreign-owned banks are more aware for the 
preferences of the investors compared to the management of the domestic-owned banks, then 
it is reasonable to expect that foreign banks aspire for a higher market share (a better competitive 
position). It is important that this empirical analysis does not follow the traditional definition for 
foreign bank, namely when more than 50 per cent of the capital is foreign. Instead, we include a 
dummy where 1 stands for banks with over 90 per cent foreign owned capital, and 0 otherwise, 
because we aim to investigate whether almost “fully” owned foreign banks have a higher market 
share compared to foreign banks with a substantial share of domestic capital and domestic banks. 
This definition of the ownership variable is used when estimating bank’s cost efficiency in Chapter 
4, where further discussion of this variable definition is provided (Section 4.3). The ownership 
variable can change over time which captures the ownership restructuring of the bank. It is 
expected that “fully” foreign owned bank will have a higher market share. 
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6.2.2 “Outside” bank determinants  
The “outside” bank determinants can be divided in two groups of factors. The first group 
represents the macroeconomic environment in which banks operate, while the second group 
represent the regulatory and supervisory practices in the country, usually imposed by the 
respective central banks. Theoretical underpinnings and evidence with respect to the possible 
effect of regulation on MS are discussed in Section 5.3.5. So far, as discussed in Section 5.2, 
Gonzalez (2009) is the only author who investigates the effect of regulation and supervision on a 
bank’s MS and as he acknowledges his study is an empirical exercise without explicit theoretical 
grounds of the effect of regulation and supervision on MS, given that theories on this issue are 
still not developed. However, despite our effort to analyse the theory of banking regulation to 
derive testable hypotheses for the effect of different regulatory practices on a bank’s MS, it is 
important to note that this study does not provide a theoretical model in this regard (see Chapter 
5). Therefore, for part of the regulatory practices there is no clear cut expectation of the effect on 
a bank’s MS. 
 
The macroeconomic environment is represented by GDP per capita, population density and EU 
membership. GDP per capita is included to control for the differences in the levels of economic 
development across countries and over time. Population density is to control for the differences 
in the market size across countries and over time. A dummy variable for EU membership is 
included to distinguish between EU and non-EU countries, because EU countries compete in the 
single market.  
 
The second group of “outside” determinants is of a special interest in this analysis given that 
banking is a significantly regulated industry. For that purpose the empirical model includes indices 
representing the regulatory and supervisory practices in the SEECs under investigation (the 
theoretical underpinnings for considering regulation and supervision as potential determinants 
of a bank’s MS is discussed in Section 5.3.5). In what follows in this section, we present only the 
indices employed in the empirical analysis; their detailed creation is presented in the following 
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Section 6.3 and the Appendix to Chapter 6, Section 6.1. For convenience we divide these 
indicators in three groups: (i) regulatory framework; (ii) supervisory framework and (iii) activity 
restrictions which can be related to bank herding (the last group is based on Beck et al., 2013).   
 
Regulatory framework (Capital Requirements and Mitigation of Moral Hazard). This group of 
country-specific indicators represent regulatory measures that would prevent banks from risky 
behaviour when their charter value is eroded. They include capital requirements and factors that 
mitigate moral hazard due to deposit insurance. As discussed in Section 5.3.5, the reviewed 
literature gives ambiguous predictions for the effect of capital regulation on a bank’s competitive 
position. In particular, a country with stringent capital requirements could be expected to have a 
less concentrated banking sector, that is banks with a lower MS on average, because capital 
requirements could be considered as a “brake” on lending activities, since instead of investing the 
capital in profitable projects, banks are obliged to put “aside” a certain portion of their capital. To 
empirically examine the country-level effect of capital regulation the Capital Regulatory Index is 
included in the model, which exhibits whether explicit (even risk-based) requirements exist 
regarding the amount and source of capital that banks are supposed to hold.  
 
Another issue is to investigate the effect of deposit insurance schemes on the competitive 
position of a bank. Beck et al. (2013) use deposit insurance coverage to investigate the stability-
competition relationship. However, due to lack of such data for the SEECs, it is not possible to 
directly control for the effect of deposit insurance on MS, where too generous deposit insurance 
schemes may enhance a bank’s incentives for risk-taking in more competitive markets, as 
discussed in Section 5.4.5. In order to control for the prevention of moral hazard and excessive 
risk-taking due to introduction of insurance deposit schemes and to investigate the effect of such 
actions on a bank’s competitive position, the Mitigating Moral Hazard Index is included in the 
model. The country-level effect of moral hazard mitigation is not clear, because these factors are 
supposed to provide fair, transparent and risk-tolerant competitive environment.  
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Supervisory framework (Official Supervision and Private Monitoring). More effective 
supervision is expected to limit the risk taking behaviour of a bank, which in turn can lessen the 
influence of competition on risk taking (Section 5.3.5). In this analysis the Official Supervisory 
Power Index is included to examine the effect of official supervision on a bank’s competitive 
position. According to the discussion in Section 5.3.5 the expected country-level effect on bank’s 
MS is not clear and straightforward, but a negative country-level effect could be expected if 
supervisors have difficulties in monitoring big and complex banking institutions.  
 
Banking supervision may be supplemented by private (market) monitoring which serves the same 
purpose, as discussed in Section 5.4.5. Barth et al. (2006) advocate that many economists consider 
the private monitoring more reliable than the official supervision. That private monitoring is 
becoming an important aspect of banking regulation and maintaining the market discipline is why 
it has been introduced as a third pillar in Basel II; it was not a part of Basel I. However, the effect 
of the private monitoring is not clear cut in the literature; hence there is no clear priori 
expectation with respect to the sign. As discussed in Section 5.4.5, based on the arguments in 
Section 5.1, firms face problems with access to finance in highly concentrated markets, while 
households feel less likely to be credit constrained in areas where banks have greater market 
power (Bergstresser, 2005). This leads to opposite predictions of the customer preferences 
regarding the concentration in banking, hence the country-level effect is ambiguous. To examine 
the effect of private monitoring on a bank’s competitive position, this empirical analysis includes 
the Private Monitoring Index. This index aims to capture the ability of the private market forces 
to affect a bank’s behaviour.    
Activity Restrictions. This group of “outside” bank determinants is motivated by Beck et al. (2013), 
but includes different variables from their study as discussed below. The country-level effect of 
activity restrictions is ambiguous. Specifically, these restrictions can be negatively associated with 
the concentration in banking, because by limiting the activities and markets, banks’ growths are 
restricted, while on the other hand concentration may increase if some banks grow and become 
to dominate the current market. The Activity Restrictions index included in this empirical analysis 
measures the degree to which banks are allowed/prohibited from engaging in the business of 
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securities (underwriting, brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry), 
insurance (underwriting and selling) and real estate (investment, development and 
management); hence the degree to which banks are allowed to diversify away from traditional 
banking activities.  
 
Given the above discussion the baseline model specification considers the inside-bank 
determinants and the outside-bank determinants, where for the latter we consider the country-
level effect of regulatory and supervisory practices. The model is:  
 
MSit=f(MSit-1, IBDit, OBDct)         … (6.2) 
Where MSit stands for the market share of bank i in time t, IBDit denotes a range of inside 
determinants for bank i in time t; OBDct represents a range of outside bank determinants for 
country c in time t. However as it is discussed in Section 6.3, data on regulation and supervision 
indicators are available only for two periods in time, since the survey used for creation of these 
indices is not conducted on yearly basis. Description of the variables included in the model is 
presented in Table 6.1.  
 
6.3 DATA 
As in Chapter 4, this empirical analysis investigates the determinants of a bank’s MS in eight 
selected SEECs (Albania, BiH, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia). 
The period covered is 2002-2012 this is slightly different than in Chapter 4 where the analysed 
period was 2000-2012; more on this issue later in this section. For the purpose of this empirical 
analysis several data sources are exploited to obtain the required data. Hence, this section 
presents a comprehensive overview of the datasets employed as well as their descriptive 
statistics. We first focus on the related sources for bank-specific variables and then we discuss the 
data sources for the country-specific variables (regulation and supervision practices and 
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macroeconomic environment). The exception is the main variable of interest, the cost efficiency, 
which is not collected from secondary data sources but estimated using Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis and Random Parameters Models (in Chapter 4). 
 
The rest of the bank-specific variables of interest to this thesis are calculated using data obtained 
initially from Bankscope. However, as it is discussed in Section 4.3.2, the Bankscope database has 
substantial missing data for the countries under investigation in this thesis. In order to increase 
the representativeness of the dataset and to reduce the problem of missing data, the Bankscope 
data is supplemented by data from individual financial bank’s reports available on their websites, 
as in the case of the cost efficiency estimation (details on the data augmentation process has 
already been discussed in Section 4.3.2). Especially relevant for this particular empirical analysis 
is the extension of the data regarding the number of bank’s branches, because Bankscope 
provides very limited information on this variable, which is one of the main variables of interest. 
Specifically, the number of observations available from Bankscope with respect to the number of 
branches is 489, but in the final dataset after consulting the financial reports of each bank 
individually, this number is increased to 1912, which can be considered an important addition to 
our analysis.  
 
 
Table 6.1 Description of variables used for estimation of the model in STATA 12 
Variables and their abbreviation Description 
Dependent variable  
Market Share (LMSA) Natural logarithm of percentage share of a bank’s total assets relative to the total assets 
in the industry. 
  
Independent variables  
Inside Banks (IBV)  
Efficiency (LEFF) Natural logarithm of percentage efficiency estimates obtained using SFA and RPMs 
(Table 4.6: column TRE3T) 
Branch density (BDEN10) Number of branches per 10,000 km2 
Risk (DZS) Relative Z-Score index calculated as the difference between each bank’s Z-score and the 
median Z-score in the corresponding country and year.  
Z-score is calculated as a ratio of: the sum of return on assets and capital ratio over the 
standard deviation of return on assets 
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Capital (DEQ) Relative capital ratio calculated as the difference between each bank’s capital ratio and 
the median capital ratio in the corresponding country and year.  
Total capital ratio is calculated as total capital over total assets  
Foreign Ownership (FOREIGN9) A dummy for foreign ownership, taking the value of 1 when the share of foreign owners 
is over 90% of a bank’s equity, 0 otherwise 
  
Outside Bank (OBV)  
Regulation and Supervision  
Capital Regulation* (CRINDEX) Index which may take values from 0 to 10, where higher values indicate greater capital 
stringency 
Moral Hazard Mitigation* 
(MORALH) 
Index which may take values from 0 to 3, where higher values indicate greater mitigation 
of moral hazard 
Official Supervisory Power* 
(OSPOWER) 
Index which may take values from 0 to 12, where higher values indicate greater 
supervisory power 
Private Monitoring* (PMINDEX) Index which may take values from 0 to 11, where higher values indicate more private 
monitoring 
Activity Restrictiveness* (OAR) Index which may take values from 0 to 12, where higher values indicate greater activities 
restrictiveness  
Macroeconomic Environment  
Population density (LPOP) Natural logarithm of inhabitants per km2 
EU/Non-EU country (EU) Dummy variable 1 for the year before EU accession, 0 otherwise 
Economic development (LGDPC) Natural logarithm of GDP per capita in constant 2005prices 
Source: The author 
Note: * See the text below and Appendix to Chapter 6, Section 6.1 for the calculation of these indices 
 
A further drawback of the Bankscope dataset is the lack of accuracy and consistency in the 
representation of the number of branches. During the process of data augmentation it was 
realized that the figures on branches do not always reflect a unique definition of a bank’s 
branches, instead in many occasions they only represented major branch units, while in others 
they include also other representative offices, outlets, etc. in addition. Such inconsistent data can 
easily lead to misleading empirical findings. In order to correct for this inconsistency, we use a 
broad definition of branch, namely all network units a bank utilizes to serve its customers are 
defined as a branch. However, despite the effort to correct the inconsistency, the problem is not 
completely solved, given that not all banks report the number of all different network units, for 
example outlets.  
 
Turning to the data required for the “outside” bank determinants two data sources are used. For 
the purpose of the environmental variables (GDP per capita and population density) the World 
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Bank Database is used and there is no issue with this data that requires additional discussion. 
However, for this empirical analysis the data for regulatory and supervisory practices requires 
more explanation, given that in the creation of these variables we make use of the special surveys 
sponsored by the World Bank, designed and implemented by a group of researchers (Barth, 
Caprio and Levine 2001, 2004, 2008). This particular survey was conducted in several waves in 
2001, 2003 and 2007. The original survey (Survey 1) as of 2001 is conducted in 117 countries in 
the period 1998 and 2000. In 2003 the first update of the survey is conducted (Survey 2) in 152 
countries, which reflects the regulatory situation in 2001-2002, while the Survey 3 is conducted 
in 2007 covering 142 countries (Barth et al., 2006, 2008). For the purpose of this analysis we make 
use of the Survey 2 and Survey 3, mainly because the questions in these two surveys differ from 
Survey 1, hence a comparable indices with respect to regulatory and supervisory practices in each 
country cannot be created that include the earlier survey. Moreover, if the length of the time 
component of the panel was important for estimation of time-varying cost efficiency (Section 
4.2.2), this is not the case for dynamic panel models using GMM (Section 6.4), in other words 
dynamic panel models are designed for short T (time series dimension) and wide N (cross-section 
dimension). Additionally, in the first two years of the dataset (2000 and 2001) the number of 
banks included in the analysis for some of the countries is small. Accordingly, considering these 
arguments the time span covered in this analysis is from 2002 to 2012, the years 2000 and 2001 
are excluded.  
 
Survey 2 and Survey 3 are used for creation of the indices which reflect the regulatory and 
supervisory practices in each country for the periods 2002-2007 and 2008-2012, respectively. The 
rationale for such split of the time span is to avoid the problem of potential simultaneity bias in 
the relationship between regulators/supervisors and banks’ managers, given the contrasting 
views of grabbing or helping hand of the government, as discussed in Section 5.4.5. Specifically, 
given that Survey 2 reflects the regulation in each country in the period 2001-2002, we use the 
indices created from this survey from 2002, because the accounting data as used for this analysis 
reflects the bank’s position as of the end of year 2002. Survey 3 is conducted in 2007, hence the 
indices created from this survey are used from 2008 until 2012. Another option to control for 
endogeneity is to use instrumental variables in line with Gonzalez (2009) who uses a number of 
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instruments for the observed values of the variables reflecting the regulation and supervision 
practices. In particular, he follows Barth et al. (2004) and uses the following instruments: legal 
origin dummy variables (English, French, German, Scandinavian, and Socialist), latitudinal distance 
from the equator, and religious composition dummy variables (the percentage of population in 
each country that is Roman Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, or other). The study of Gonzalez 
investigates market structure determinants on a sample of 69 countries, hence this choice of 
instruments could be considered as reasonable, because the sample is comprised of countries 
worldwide. However, our analysis includes selected SEECs which are neighbouring countries, thus 
the differences in the latitudinal distance from the equator are negligible and moreover they 
share very similar characteristics in terms of legal origin and religion. Consequently, Barth’s 
instruments are inappropriate for our analysis. As discussed in the next section for the purpose 
of this analysis we employ dynamic panel model estimated by General Methods of Moments 
(GMM) technique which allows lagged values of the variable itself and/or its lagged differences 
to be used as instruments. Nevertheless, such instrumentalization is problematic for these 
variables, given their limited variation across years. Therefore, it seems that our approach is the 
most appropriate to control for potential causality bias, that is one year lagged indices.  
 
It is important to note that Albania, Serbia and Montenegro are included in the Survey 2, but not 
in Survey 3. In addition, Serbia and Montenegro are considered together as one country in Survey 
2, because at that time Montenegro was not an independent country. Hence, the same indices 
are used for both countries. Given that Albania, Serbia and Montenegro are only included in the 
Survey 2, these countries are included only for the period 2002-2007.  
 
The regulation and supervision indices are created following Barth et al. (2006). In what follows, 
we present the generation of only two indices while in Appendix to Chapter 6, Section 6.1 the 
generation of other indices is presented. For the purpose of demonstration we choose the index 
for Overall Activity Restrictions and the index for Factors Mitigating Moral Hazard. The rationale 
for choosing these two indices is the difference in the offered answers for the questions included 
in the corresponding index. In particular, the former index is based on multiple choice questions, 
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where only one answer can be chosen and each choice has a different score value (from 1 to 4). 
On the other hand, the latter index is based on YES/NO questions (as majority of the other 
indices), where the answer has a value 1 for YES and 0 for NO. However, one of the questions 
included in this index is a multiple choice question, with one answer to be chosen as presented 
below. The value of the index is a simple sum of the answer values from each question, which 
gives an equal weight of all questions included in the corresponding index. 
 
The Overall Activity Restrictions Index is consisted of three questions regarding the regulation 
banks to be involved in activities related to securities, insurance and real estate market (as 
originally defined in the Survey, Barth et al., 2006):  
 Securities: What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in 
securities activities (the ability of banks to engage in the business of securities 
underwriting, brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry)? 
 Insurance: What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in 
insurance activities (the ability of banks to engage in insurance underwriting and selling)? 
 Real Estate: What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in real 
estate activities (the ability of banks to engage in real estate investment, development, 
and management)? 
There are four identical answers (as originally defined in the Survey, Barth et al., 2006) offered to 
the three questions such as: 
 Unrestricted (a full range of activities in the given category can be conducted directly in 
the bank). This answer has a value of 1. 
 Permitted (a full range of activities can be conducted, but all or some must be conducted 
in subsidiaries). This answer has a value of 2. 
 Restricted (less than a full range of activities can be conducted in the bank or subsidiaries). 
This answer has a value of 3. 
 Prohibited (the activity cannot be conducted in either the bank or subsidiaries). This 
answer has a value of 4. 
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Given the values of each answer by summing them up (only one answer chosen) the index range 
can vary from 3 to 12. The higher the index value, the higher the restrictions for non-banking 
activities. 
 
The index for Moral Hazard Mitigation includes three questions related to the possible measures 
that can be undertaken in order to reduce banks’ activities which lead to moral hazard problems. 
The existence of such measures is reflected by the following questions, as originally defined in the 
Survey of Barth et al. (2006) are: 
1. Is explicit deposit insurance protection system funded by (check one): the government, 
the banks, or both? The value is 1 if the answer is “banks”, otherwise 0 
2. Do deposit insurance fees charged to banks vary based on some assessment of risk? The 
value is 1 if YES, 0 if NO 
3. Is there formal coinsurance, that is, are depositors explicitly insured for less than 100% of 
their deposits? The value is 1 if YES, 0 if NO 
 
Likewise, the previous index each answer values are summed up to obtain the country index 
value. Hence, the value of this index may vary from 0 to 3. The higher the index, the more activities 
are undertaken for mitigating moral hazard. 
 
As presented the creation of indices is fairly straightforward and there is no need for further 
elaboration. However, the regulatory and supervisory indices are not without problems in terms 
of statistical and theoretical perspectives. As presented earlier the creation of the indices is based 
on simple summing up of the answer values for the questions included in each index, which in 
turn complicates the interpretation of the estimated coefficients. In particular, given the method 
of creating these indices sheds light on their type of data and interpretation, because these 
indices neither represent continuous data nor ordinal data. In other words, while the 
interpretation of the continuous regressors is almost straightforward, it is not the case for the 
ordinal data, because the difference between the assigned values within each index is not 
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measurable and may not be consistent, although the assigned values provide additional 
information of the rank order for the assigned values. For example, if we recall the index for 
activity restrictiveness the offered answers for each question are: 1=unrestricted; 2=permitted; 
3=restricted and 4=prohibited, which raises the question of whether the difference between 
“unrestricted” to “permitted” is really the same as the difference between “permitted” to 
“restricted”. This issue is transmitted to the indices themselves; hence a traditional interpretation 
(one unit increase in the corresponding index) is inappropriate. There are two possible 
approaches in order this problem to be overcome. The first approach is to investigate the effect 
of each regulation and supervision measure/policy separately as binary variables (yes/no with 
arbitrary labels 0 and 1). However, the rationale for excluding this approach is fourfold: (i) the aim 
of this thesis is to investigate the effect of the three Basel II pillars (capital regulation, supervision 
and market discipline) and the effect of some regulation strategic policies such as activity 
restrictions and measures that allow for mitigation of moral hazard on competitiveness in banking 
sector, rather than investigating each policy individually; (ii) there is no explicitly defined theory 
for the effect of the major regulation and supervision concepts on competitive position, hence 
less expected is that the theory provides any guidelines for individual regulation policies;  (iii) 
given the size of the data it is not feasible to include a binary variable for each regulation and 
supervisory policy as defined in the Survey; (iv) there is a very high correlation between the 
responses which reflect the individual regulation policies. The second approach includes 
modification in the interpretation, in other words, only the sign (positive or negative) of the 
estimated coefficients of the indices to be interpreted, while the size of those coefficients to be 
ignored (Section 6.5). 
Another relevant issue to be discussed related to the interpretation of the estimated effects with 
respect to the regulatory and supervisory practices is the “level of aggregation” against which 
these effects are interpreted. As discussed in Section 5.3.5 and Section 6.2, and also in Berger and 
Bouwman (2013), the battle for market share is a zero-sum game (one bank may gain market 
share at the cost of other bank, hence the sum of all shares equals to 1), hence it cannot be 
expected that on average, ceteris paribus, change in regulation can contribute to the increase 
(decrease) of each bank’s MS (it should be noted that although for banks in the market at a 
particular time it is not a zero sum game if there is exit from and entry into the industry; some 
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exit and entry did occur in the countries investigated as show in Table 6.3). As discussed in Section 
5.3.5 and Section 6.2 the effect of regulation on a bank’s MS is expected to depend on “inside” 
bank specificities, which suggest that the differential impact of regulation on a particular bank’s 
MS depends on bank specific determinants. Hence, we distinguish between country-level and 
bank-level effects of regulation on a bank’s MS. The country-level effect is interpreted as to 
whether a particular regulation leads to a lower or higher concentration, that is, a banking sector 
where, on average, individual banks have lower or higher MS, respectively. The bank-level effect, 
as discussed in Section 5.3.5, is captured by inclusion of interaction terms of regulatory and 
supervisory practices, and bank-specific variables and in this context the effect is interpreted as 
giving variation in the effect at bank level.  
 
However, given the size of the cross-sectional dimension of our dataset, the possible simultaneity 
between “inside” bank’s factors and the MS in addition to the GMM dynamic model estimation 
procedure (Section 6.4), it is not possible to include all interaction terms between each regulatory 
and supervisory practices and each “inside” bank determinants at the same time. The reason is 
the significant loss of degrees of freedom and the problem of providing sufficient instruments for 
all the endogenous variables (since all the interacted terms include endogenous variables, hence 
instruments need to be used for their estimation as discussed in Section 6.4). Consequently, we 
consider two transmission channels of regulation on MS, size of the bank and risk-taking, which 
are presented in Section 6.5.2 as alternative models, in addition in the baseline model 
specification which examines the country-level effect of regulation. It is important to note that 
besides the challenges from theoretical and empirical perspectives this thesis aims to provide 
empirical findings for first time in terms of the impact of regulation and supervision on 
competitive position in banking and to lay ground for further theoretical and empirical studies in 
this area. Table 6.2 presents the calculated indices for the regulatory and supervisory practices 
across countries based on the Survey 2 and Survey 3 and they signal variations across countries 
and surveys.  
 
Table 6.2 Indices for regulatory and supervisory practices across countries and surveys 
 224 
 
  
Overall 
Activities 
Restrictiveness 
Capital 
Regulatory 
Index 
Official 
Supervisory 
Power 
Private 
Monitoring 
Index 
Factors 
Mitigating Moral 
Hazard 
Su
rv
e
y 
3
 
Country 
     
BiH 8 7 12 4 1 
Bulgaria 7 7 11 6 1 
Croatia 6 5 10 6 1 
Macedonia 6 4 12 6 0 
Slovenia 8 7 13 7 1 
Su
rv
e
y 
2
 
Country 
     
Albania 6 5 12 5 0 
BiH 8 6 14 6 2 
Bulgaria 7 8 11 6 1 
Croatia 6 5 12 7 2 
Macedonia 6 4 12 5 1 
Serbia & 
Montenegro 
6 7 5.5 6 2 
Slovenia 8 10 12 7 2 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Barth et al. (2006) 
The values of the indices indicate that regulation and supervision are subject to changes over 
short period of time, except OAR, which indicate that regulators aim to adopt and adjust the new 
international regulations (for example Basel 2 and Basel 3, since in the period when these surveys 
are conducted, the countries under investigation has not yet fully adopted these practices). Table 
6.3 presents the number of banks across countries through time included in the empirical analysis. 
 
 
 
Table 6.3 Number of banks included in the dataset across counties and years 
Year/Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Albania 8 9 10 9 8 9      53 
BiH 23 24 22 23 23 24 23 23 21 21 21 248 
Bulgaria 14 19 22 24 24 23 23 23 21 21 20 234 
Croatia 24 27 27 28 28 28 28 27 25 25 25 292 
Macedonia 9 9 12 12 13 13 13 13 12 12 11 129 
Montenegro  5 6 9 9 9      38 
Serbia 7 18 25 26 28 28      132 
Slovenia 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 186 
Total            1912 
Source: Author’s calculation based on various publications by the national banks of the countries under consideration 
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Table 6.4 presents descriptive statistics of the data used for estimation of the baseline model.43 
Table 6.4 Descriptive statistics of the variables used in estimation of the baseline model 
Variable 
(based on 1069 observations) 
Mean  Min Max 
Market Share as a % of Assets 2.41 0.04 49.06 
Lagged Market Share  2.32 0.04 54.06 
    
“Inside” bank determinants    
Cost efficiency (%) 88.32 40.17 99.58 
Branch density per 10,000km2 9.85 0.09 84.41 
Z-Score (relative to industry median)a 6.79 -32.03 544.64 
Capital Ratio (relative to industry median)a 2.46 -20.06 70.31 
Foreign capital (>90%)  0 1 
    
“Outside” bank determinants    
Macroeconomic environment    
Population density (population on km2) 80.75 45.70 118.27 
GDP per capita (in $) 5,721.58 2,314.62 20,702.30 
EU membership  0 1 
Regulation and Supervision    
Activity Restriction Index 6.87 6 8 
Official Supervisory Power 11.14 5.5 14 
Capital Regulatory Index 6.36 4 10 
Mitigating Moral Hazard   1.30 0 2 
Private Monitoring Index  5.97 4 7 
 Note: a) the values of the median z-score across countries and time are presented in Appendix to Chapter 6, Section 
6.2.1.  
6.4. METHODOLOGY  
This section aims to identify a suitable estimator for the specified model in Section 6.2 (Eq. 6.2) 
given that the dataset is a panel. As a departing point we consider the specificities embraced in 
the model developed in Section 6.2 (Eq. 6.2). The inside bank determinants raise serious 
econometric issues due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable (market share) and 
potential endogeneity due to simultaneity between market share and inside bank determinants 
                                                        
43 These descriptive statistics are calculated after the estimation of the baseline model, i.e. using the command “estat 
summarize” after estimating the model with xtabond2. However, given that many of the variables are expressed in natural 
logarithm, in Table 6.4 the values are converted in original values in order to be easily readable. Appendix to Chapter 6, 
Section 6.2.2 presents the unique descriptive statistics corresponding to the estimated model. 
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and bank-specific heterogeneity. In addition, part of the variables of interest (the outside bank 
determinants) are mainly time-invariant indices (see Section 6.3), hence the choice of a panel 
model is also based on ability of the model to allow for estimation of coefficients of time-invariant 
variables. Hence, the focus is turned on dynamic panel models. 
 
Dynamic panel models induce serious complications in terms of estimation, since the basic 
assumptions of the linear regression are violated. In particular, given that the dependent variable 
is a function of the unobserved individual specific effect, it follows that the lagged dependent 
variable is as well function of the same unobserved individual specific effect. Therefore, the 
lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term (Baltagi, 2005, p.147). However, the 
random-effects model assumes that the independent variables are independent of the error term 
(Baltagi, 2005, p. 17), thus the GLS estimator is biased (Baltagi, 2005, p.148). In a similar vein, the 
fixed-effect model estimated by OLS is biased and inconsistent, although this model does not 
assume that independent variables are independent from the unobservable individual specific 
effect, even if the remainder disturbances are not serially correlated (more details on these 
Baltagi, 2005, p. 147). Consequently, dynamic panel models cannot be accurately estimated by 
conventional panel econometric techniques.  
 
The current knowledge regarding the estimation of dynamic panel models suggests a use of 
approach introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) which relies on 
General Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator. Prior to the discussion of this approach, which 
requires large cross-section (N) and short-time series (T), we briefly present the GMM estimator. 
GMM “refers to a class of estimators which are constructed from exploiting the sample moment 
counterparts of population moment conditions (some-times known as orthogonality conditions) 
of the data generating model”, (Hansen, 2007, p. 1). GMM estimator embraces other familiar 
estimators, including least squares (linear and nonlinear), instrumental variables, and maximum 
likelihood, (Greene, 2002, p. 540) and “permits the disturbances implicitly used in the 
orthogonality conditions to be both conditionally heteroskedastic and serially correlated” 
(Hansen, 1982 p. 1030). 
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In the presence of endogenous variables in the model, the covariance between the error term 
and (some of) the independent variables differs from zero, 𝐶𝑜𝑣[𝜀𝑖, 𝒙𝑖 ≠ 0], the estimates of the 
coefficients of interest are likely to be biased and inconsistent. A remedy for this problem is found 
in the instrumental variables, a vector of variables, wi, such that wi is uncorrelated 𝜀𝑖, but 
correlated with the endogenous variables, a set of orthogonality conditions 𝐸[𝒘𝑖𝜀𝑖|𝒙𝑖] (Greene, 
2002, p. 545). Given that the number of instruments is not limited, implies that there may be 
more than one set of moments which can be employed for estimating the parameters. Exactly 
this feature gives preference to GMM in estimation of the dynamic panel models.   
 
The orthogonality conditions that exist between the lagged values of the dependent variable and 
the disturbances can produce additional instruments in dynamic panel data model (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991). This seminal idea initiated a development of two types of dynamic estimators– a 
difference GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and a system GMM estimator (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
Consider a simple autoregressive model without independent variables: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,      𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁;      𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇; |𝛽 < 1|     … (6.3) 
where 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡, 𝜇𝑖~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎𝜇
2) denotes unobservable time-invariant individual specific 
effect and 𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) stands for time variant disturbance; 𝜇𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖𝑡  are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with  each other and among each other. In this model 𝐶𝑜𝑣[𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 ≠ 0] because 
𝜇𝑖 and 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 are correlated. Consistent estimate of 𝛽 can be obtained if the time-invariant specific 
effects are eliminated. This problem is solved by differencing the model: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛽(𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2) + (𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑣𝑖𝑡−1)      … (6.4) 
However, endogeneity is still a problem, since the differenced lagged dependent variable and 
disturbance are correlated because 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1and 𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 are correlated (Greene, 2012; p.537). However, 
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this can be overcome by employing the lagged difference 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−3 or lagged levels 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 and 
𝑦𝑖𝑡−3 as instruments for 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2, when T=3. Accordingly, the number of valid instruments 
increases for each forward period, hence for period T, the number of valid instruments would be 
(𝑦𝑖1, 𝑦𝑖2, … , 𝑦𝑖𝑇−2), (Baltagi, 2005, p. 149). However, the strength of the instruments is of 
importance in parameter estimation and it is expected that strength will diminish the further back 
in time the instrument is from.  
 
Blundell and Bond (1998) show that in case of dependent variable with random walk, 𝛽 → 1  and 
as 
𝜎𝜇
2
𝜎𝑣2
⁄  increases the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference estimator performs poorly as first-
differenced instruments become weak (Baltagi, 2005, Pugh, 2008; Roodman, 2009a). Blundell and 
Bond show that in the presence of a random walk, the “system” GMM estimator (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) is considerably more efficient than the difference GMM. 
The “system” GMM is an extension of the difference GMM and embraces two equations, original 
level equation in addition to the difference equation.  System GMM employs lagged differences 
of yit as instruments for equations in levels, in addition to lagged levels of yit as instruments for 
equations in first differences.44 The rationale for inclusion of the levels equation in the model is 
found in the argument of Roodman (2009a, p. 114): “For random walk–like variables, past 
changes may indeed be more predictive of current levels than past levels are of current changes 
so that the new instruments are more relevant.” The “system” estimator unlike the difference 
estimator has the ability to estimate time-invariant variables. Given that some of the variables of 
interest in our empirical analysis are time-invariant (Section 6.3), system GMM is preferred over 
difference GMM.  
 
However, the “system” GMM is not free of drawbacks. The most known and emphasized 
problems are: the “too many instruments” and the assumption of the “steady state”. Both the 
Sargan and Hansen tests are used to test the validity of the instruments, but the Sargan test 
                                                        
44 Consequently, the dataset is now compiled with twice the observations, each observation for the levels equation and the 
differenced equation. 
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requires errors to be homoskedastic (which is rarely the case) and Hansen is robust to 
heteroskedasticity, hence Hansen is the preferred test for testing the validity of the instruments 
(Roodman, 2005b). Roodman emphasizes that the conventional levels of 5 and 10 per cent used 
to reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity could not be considered as an acceptable 
threshold for instrument validity. Instead, he proposes a p-value of 0.25 as possible threshold for 
rejection of the null hypothesis. However, the Hansen test (as well as the Sargan test) is weakened 
by too many instruments and may mean that it is unable to reject the null hypothesis of 
instrument validity.  In this case the p-value estimated is close to 1. However, the literature does 
not provide clear “guidance” in terms of the optimal number of instruments. It is required that 
the number of instruments should at least be smaller than the number of groups (cross-sectional 
units) used in estimation. Regarding the “steady-state” assumption, Mangan et al. (2005) argue 
that two conditions are necessary for this condition to hold: (i) the absolute value of the estimated 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable must be less than 1 in order the process to be 
convergent and (ii) the convergence process must be independent from the unobservable time-
invariant individual specific effects, otherwise changes in the dependent variable would not 
depend on the error term. 
 
One-step and two-step procedures can be employed to estimate the GMM estimators. In the one-
step procedure the GMM estimator assumes that the variance of the errors is homoscedastic in 
the weighting matrix, an arbitrary assumption. The two-step procedure provides a robust 
estimator as in the second step the residuals from the first step are used to construct a proxy for 
the optimal weighting matrix which is then embodied in the feasible GMM estimator, which is 
robust to the modelled patterns of heteroskedasticity and cross-correlation (Roodman, 2009a, p. 
9). A drawback of the two-step procedure is the downward bias of the standard errors in the case 
of large number of instruments; however Windmeijer (2005) proposes corrections for the two-
step standard errors. These corrected standard errors as proposed by Windmeijer are superior to 
the cluster-robust one-step standard errors (Roodman, 2009a, p. 12). Consequently, this 
empirical analysis uses the two-step system GMM and the standard error correction procedure 
by Windmeijer (2005). 
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Another issue related to the treatment of standard errors also deserves discussion. Specifically, 
the bank efficiency variable (one of the “inside” bank determinants as discussed in Section 6.2.1) 
presents the estimated level of each bank’s cost efficiency. Cost efficiency was estimated for each 
bank and each year as presented in Chapter 4, and these estimates are used as an independent 
variable in the model in this chapter. According to basic econometrics, it is expected that these 
cost efficiency estimates include an error element, which is reflected in the standard errors of 
that estimate. As a result, when an estimated variable is introduced as an independent variable 
in the empirical model (as in our case), it may be expected that an appropriate adjustment may 
become necessary to take account of the error involved in its earlier estimation. Such a procedure 
should be applied regardless of whether the estimates used in the second stage (in our case in 
the empirical analysis of this chapter) are estimates of a dependent variable or error term in the 
first stage. In our case the cost efficiency estimates are derived from the composed error term, 
which implies that the standard errors of the estimated cost efficiency variable obtained in the 
next section should be adjusted. However, it is important to note that the cost efficiency 
estimates obtained in Chapter 4 do not provide a variance for the individual efficiency estimates 
(this is considered as a limitation of the SFA), hence there is nothing that can be used for 
correction. Alternatively, the problem can be viewed as measurement error, for which the 
standard econometric approach is to use IV estimation. However, we are not aware of any 
adjustment that provides a treatment for this problem in GMM estimation, nor is it clear how a 
separate model for the measurement error can be developed that could be used to construct an 
external IV.45 Thus, given the lack of an appropriate procedure, no adjustment is made for this 
problem in the analysis that follows.  
 
The inclusion of lagged dependent variable introduces a different interpretation of the equation 
Greene (2012, p. 536). In a static model the set of independent variables denotes the full set of 
information which produce the observed dependent variable. When the lagged dependent 
variable is included in the model it implies that the entire history of the independent variables is 
                                                        
45 I am indebted to Professor William Greene for explaining these points to me in emails dated the 17th of July 2012 and 
31st of March 2015. 
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now included in the model, hence any measured influence of the independent variables is 
conditioned on this history. Accordingly, the estimated effect of the independent variables 
embodies the effect of new information, which presents the so-called short-run effect. On the 
other hand, the long-run effect is obtained as a product of the estimated coefficient (for all 
independent variables except the lagged dependent variable) and the long-run multiplier 1 1 − 𝛽⁄   
(where β is the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable), (Greene, 2002, p.568).46  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.5 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This section discusses the empirical findings obtained from the baseline model (Eq. 6.2) and from 
the alternative models which examine whether the determinants differently affect, in terms of 
sign and magnitude, the market share of the big banks and the other banks. According to the 
theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 5 followed by the discussion of specification of the 
baseline empirical model in Section 6.2 and the methodology in Section 6.4, the following form 
of the model is specified: 
 
𝐿𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛼𝐿𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜷 + 𝒁𝒊𝒕𝜸 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡      … (6.5) 
                                                        
46 The standard error and the corresponding t-statistic for the long-run effects are calculated using the delta-method 
(Greene, 2002, p. 569). The validity of the long-run coefficient is conditioned on the stability of the system (no structural 
breaks over time). 
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where 𝐿𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 stands for the banks’ competitive position (the natural logarithm of the bank’s 
market share based on total assets) for bank i in time t, X and Z include “inside” and “outside” 
bank determinants, respectively as defined in Section 6.2, while 𝑣𝑖 denotes time-invariant 
unobservable individual specific effect and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 stands for the remainder disturbance. 
The full specification of the baseline model, with the constituent variables in X and Z, is: 
𝐿𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛼𝐿𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑁10𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑍𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁9𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐸𝑈𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾4𝑂𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾5𝑂𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑊𝐸𝑅𝑖(𝑡) +
𝛾6𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾7𝑀𝑂𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐻𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾8𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖(𝑡) + 𝜃1𝐷𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡    … (6.6) 
 
The full names of the variables included in equation 6.6 are presented in Table 6.1. Given that 
some of the variables are characterized by limited variation over time we use (t) to distinguish 
these variables from the continuous variables. In order to control for cross-sectional dependence 
the model includes time dummies (𝐷𝑡  from 2003 to 2012, where 2002 is excluded to avoid perfect 
multicolinearity). Such dependence is likely to occur due to universal time-shocks which in turn 
affect all units of analysis (Roodman, 2009a). 
 
STATA 12 econometric software is used to estimate these models. The lagged dependent variable 
and all “inside” bank determinants (cost efficiency, branch density, relative capital ratio and 
relative risk) are treated as endogenous (Section 5.5). The decision regarding the “rank” and 
“depth” of instruments, that is the specified combination of lags used as instruments  is made in 
accordance to the principle that all necessary model diagnostics are satisfied. When several 
alternative sets of instruments give satisfactory diagnostics the choice of final results is made on 
two grounds: (i) smaller number of instruments exploited and (ii) the estimates make more 
economic sense. Given that the dataset available for this empirical analysis is unbalanced all the 
models are estimated using the forward orthogonal deviations transform instead of first 
differencing, as this preserves sample size in panels with gaps (STATA 12 Manual). To keep the 
focus on the variables of interest, the results on the year dummy variables are presented only for 
the baseline model in section on the diagnostics of models. The original estimation printouts for 
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all estimated models along with the syntax for each of them are enclosed in the respective 
appendices. 
 
 
6.5.1 Baseline model 
The diagnostics of the model are given in Table 6.5 along with the estimated coefficients of the 
year dummies (the original printouts related to the baseline model are presented in Appendix to 
Chapter 6, Section 6.3). One of the most important issues in the dynamic panel estimation 
technique is the choice of instruments, given that the technique exploits instruments are derived 
within the system (Section 6.3). As discussed in Section 6.4 “too many instruments” can lead to 
reduced power of the instrument validity test (Sargan/Hansen). The baseline model is estimated 
by using 36 instruments comparing to the number of groups 148 and total of 1069 observations 
(Table 6.5). Thus the number of groups is four times higher than the employed number of 
instruments (Roodman’s, 2007 minimally arbitrary rule of thumb is that the former should be at 
least equal to the latter). The p-value of the Hansen test in the baseline model is 0.68 (Table 6.5) 
suggesting that the employed instruments are valid. 
Table 6.5 Diagnostic Statistics of the baseline model 
Test Statistics p value Hypothesis 
Serial correlation 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
 
0.000 
0.555 
  
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
H0: no second-order autocorrelation in the 
error term of the first-differenced equation 
Instrument validity 
Hansen test 
 
0.680 
 
 H0: the overidentifying restrictions are valid 
Steady state assumption 
Difference-in-Hansen 
 
0.846 
 
H0: Instruments for levels equation are valid 
Cross-sectional dependence 
Sarafidis test: Difference-in-Hansen 
Market Share collapse lag(3 3) 
 
 
0.526 
 
H0: Instruments on lagged dependent 
variable is valid 
   
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:   
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Source: The author 
 
The Arellano-Bond test checks for autocorrelation of first and second order, hence it is also known 
as the m1/m2 test. The null hypothesis of this test is that there is no second-order autocorrelation 
in the error term of the first-differenced equation. In particular, it is expected that first differences 
of errors are serially correlated, but there should be no second-order serial correlation. If these 
conditions are satisfied then second and higher lags of potentially endogenous variables are valid 
instruments. The p-value of 0.000 for the first-order autocorrelation means the null hypothesis of 
no autocorrelation of first order is rejected while the p-value of 0.555 for no second-order of serial 
correlation indicates there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation of second order in differences of errors (Table 6.5). 
 
Next important check is related to the assumption of steady-state, hence the difference-in-
Hansen test for levels equation is used. This test suggests that there is insufficient evidence to 
Efficiency: collapse lag(2 2) 0.827 H0: Instruments are valid 
Branch density: collapse lag(2 2) 0.307 H0: Instruments are valid 
Z-Score relative to industry median in year t: collapse (4 .) 0.385 H0: Instruments are valid 
Capital ratio relative to industry median in year t: collapse (2 2) 0.393 H0: Instruments are valid 
Wald test for joint significance of the independent variables 0.000 H0:Coefficients are jointly equal to zero 
 
Time dummies/coefficient/(Std. error)/(p-value)   
Year 2004 0.0145 (0.0217) 0.503  
Year 2005 0.0018 (0.0261) 0.946  
Year 2006 -0.0360 (0.0281) 0.201  
Year 2007 -0.0591 (0.0316) 0.061  
Year 2008 -0.1483 (0.0737) 0.044  
Year 2009 -0.1721 (0.0746) 0.021  
Year 2010 -0.1484 (0.0725) 0.041  
Year 2011 -0.1766 (0.0714) 0.013  
Year 2012 -0.1886 (0.0713) 0.008  
Observations  1,069    
Number of id 148    
No. of Instruments 36    
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reject the null hypothesis of valid instruments for levels indicating that the assumption of steady-
state holds, which in turn gives support to the system estimator over the difference estimator. 
The majority of the individual year dummies (from 2007 to 2012) are significant and they are also 
jointly significant at all conventional levels, suggesting universal time-related shocks. Given that 
the analysis covers the period of the last financial crisis it is expected that the banking sectors in 
all of the countries under investigation are affected by this universal shock in part of the period 
under investigation. However, Sarafidis et al. (2009, p.2) argue that cross-sectional dependence 
may still be present although year dummies are included in the model and for that they propose 
additional testing procedure which is related to the validity of the instruments used for the lagged 
dependent variable. The difference-in-Hansen test statistic for the over-identifying restrictions 
after excluding the instruments on the lagged dependent variable suggests insufficient evidence 
to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments on lagged dependent variable are valid, thus no 
evidence is found that there may be cross-section dependence in the error term.  
 
The econometrics literature shows that OLS estimation biases upwards the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable, whereas the fixed effects estimation of this coefficient gives a 
downward bias (Roodman, 2009a). Consequently, the estimated coefficient of the lagged 
dependent by a true dynamic estimator is expected to be within the range of the estimates 
obtained by fixed effects (the lowest bound) and OLS (the highest bound). As presented in Table 
6.6 the obtained coefficient of the lagged dependent variable lies between the estimated 
coefficient with OLS and fixed effects method (Appendix to Chapter 6, Section 6.3). The test for 
joint significance of the independent variables included in the model suggests that the variables 
have jointly explanatory power. Thus overall the diagnostic statistics suggest that the baseline 
model is well specified.  
 
Table 6.6 Comparison of coefficients on lagged dependent variable obtained with OLS, dynamic panel system GMM and 
fixed effects estimation techniques for baseline specification 
Model Coefficient Std.Error Probability 
Fixed Effects 0.667 0.020 0.000 
System GMM 0.864 0.041 0.000 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 0.954 0.006 0.000 
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 Source: The Author 
 
In the baseline model specification in Table 6.7, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable 
(market share) is positive and highly significant supporting the hypothesis of dynamics in the 
competitive position of a bank, that is there is a presence of partial adjustment in a bank’s market 
share towards their desired position. A one per cent increase in the lagged dependent variable 
leads to a 0.87 per cent increase in the current market share. This implies that the value of past 
determinants has strong persistence and their effects are important for the bank’s competitive 
position in the current period as discussed in Section 6.2.  
 
The inside bank determinants are considered first. Cost efficiency, which is the initial concern in 
this thesis, is insignificant, although the coefficient is positive as expected. The finding that market 
share is not determined by cost efficiency allows for an alternative interpretation, related to the 
debate of efficiency versus market power hypothesis (Section 5.3.2), that banks may gain market 
share due to market power, however, as discussed in Section 6.2 the model specification as such 
does not directly investigate this issue.  It is possible that neither efficiency nor market power are 
important determinants of a bank’s market share in SEECs, but other factors such as non-pricing 
behaviour (quality), risk-taking, the level of capitalization or regulation and supervision are the 
principal determinants of a bank’s market share, and these are discussed in what follows. 
Table 6.7 Determinants of the bank’s competitive position (natural logarithm of market share) in SEECs 2002-12 
(baseline model specification) 
Dependent Variable Short run Long run 
Natural logarithm of Market Share (Assets)   
Lagged dependent variable  0.865*** - 
 (0.0406)  
“Inside” bank determinants   
Cost efficiency (natural log.) 0.3038    2.2552 
 (0.5470) (4.0894) 
Branch density per 10,000km2 0.0182** 0.1350** 
 (0.0073) (0.0609) 
Z-Score (relative to industry median) -0.0015*** -0.0108** 
 (0.0005) (0.0054) 
Capital Ratio (relative to industry median) -0.0092*** -0.0684** 
 (0.0029) (0.0280) 
Foreign capital (>90%) 0.0315 0.2336 
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 (0.0628) (0.4256) 
“Outside” bank determinants   
Macroeconomic environment   
Population density (natural log.) 0.0758 0.5625 
 (0.0929) (0.7442) 
GDP per capita (natural log.) -0.0626 -0.4643 
 (0.0507) (0.3966) 
EU membership 0.0419    0.3112 
 (0.0353) (0.2589) 
Regulation and Supervision   
Activity Restriction Index 0.0952** 0.7066** 
 (0.0430) (0.3104) 
Official Supervisory Power -0.0252** -0.1866** 
 (0.0121) (0.0829) 
Capital Regulatory Index -0.0378** -0.2805** 
 (0.0149) (0.1148) 
Mitigating Moral Hazard  -0.0270 -0.2001 
 (0.0567) (0.3871) 
Private Monitoring Index -0.0342* -0.2536 
 (0.0195) (0.1819) 
Constant term -0.9782 - 
 (2.3756)  
Note: The values in brackets are the corrected robust standard errors (Windmeeijer’s). All models include year dummies. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance of variables at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.   
The relationship between market share and investments in the quality of services (branch density) 
is positive and statistically significant (5%). An increase in investment in quality by one branch 
office per 10,000km2 leads to increase in the bank’s market share of 1.8 per cent in the short run 
and 13.5 per cent in the long run, suggesting that non-price competition is important determinant 
of a bank’s competitive position in SEECs. Accordingly, this finding gives support to Sutton’s 
endogenous sunk cost theory (Section 5.3.2), that market concentration may not be reduced as 
the market increases in size, given that quality investments positively affect market share and 
incumbent banks not only sustain their market share, but such investments contribute to 
strengthening the market position by expanding the market share. The estimated high effect of 
branch density suggests that in the SEECs customers still value the access to “bricks-and-mortar” 
branch offices, despite technological progress and innovations (e-banking, the proliferation of 
automatic teller machines-ATMs and the increasing reliance on centralized call centres) that 
might have been expected to reduce the need of easy accessible branch offices. An alternative 
interpretation of the positively significant effect of branch network is that advertising (in line with 
Sutton it is one way for investments in quality) in banking as well may be important for the 
enhancement of the competitive position in banking. 
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In terms of risk as a determinant of bank’s market share, the empirical findings suggest that a one 
standard deviation (Z-score is expressed in standard deviations by definition) increase in the Z-
score of a bank above the median is associated with a drop in the market share of 0.15 percent in 
the short run and one percent in long run (results are significant at 1 and 5 per cent  respectively). 
Consequently, there is evidence that more risk-taking relative to the industry median facilitates a 
bank’s market share expansion. This finding is consistent with Ruckes (2004) and Dell’Ariccia and 
Marquez (2006) (Section 5.3.3) who show that banks may reduce collateral requirements (which 
is considered as undertaking more risk) in an effort to undercut their competitors and increase 
their market share. Additionally, microeconomic evidence from large international banks suggest 
that loan growth is an important driver of risk (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Foos et al., 2010; 
Keeton, 1999), but given the simultaneity in this relationship, our results further suggest that in 
order to expand the loan portfolio (and by that the market share) may involve more risk-taking. 
Moreover, this finding may be in line with prospect theory, since riskier projects may provide a 
decision maker a better chance of achieving the desired target than less risky projects, however, 
this thesis does not directly test the validity of the prospect theory. 
 
More capitalized banks relative to the median in the industry in the same country in year t are 
estimated to be associated with a decline in the market share, that is a decline in the bank’s 
market share of 0.9 per cent in the short-run and 6.8 per cent in the long run if the bank’s capital 
ratio is increased by one percentage point above the median capital ratio. This finding is 
consistent with the argument that overcapitalized banks lose market share, because the 
possessed capital is not used for undertaking new investments. According to Berger and Mester 
(1997) the level of capitalization may as well reflect the risk preference, with risk-averse banks 
holding more capital, which additionally supports the importance of risk-taking behaviour as a 
determinant for bank’s market share. However, the correlation between the capital ratio and the 
Z-score is moderate at 0.36. It is possible that overcapitalization is partially due to the bank being 
forced to hold “buffer” capital (especially after the last financial crisis and the introduction of 
Basel III) based on the riskiness level of currently “active” projects. On the other hand, Berger and 
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Bouwman (2013) find it puzzling in their empirical results that banks with higher capital ratios are 
likely to lose market share after market crises, in normal times. Finally, the effect of ownership 
structure on a bank’s market position is insignificant. 
 
According to the empirical findings “outside” bank determinants play an important role in the 
distribution of the market share across banks. Here, the model gives results at a country-level. In 
terms of the impact of activity restrictions, the empirical results suggest a positive and significant 
country-level effect, that is a higher average MS and this finding is consistent with Gonzalez 
(2009), whilst the theoretical expectations are ambiguous. Greater official supervisory power and 
private monitoring (the former significant at 5 per cent, but the latter only significant at 10 per 
cent and insignificant in the long run) are associated with a smaller bank’s MS on average, as a 
priori expected. Considering the effect of capital regulation, the results are consistent with the a 
priori expectations, with more stringent (risk-based) capital regulation leading to a reduction in a 
bank’s MS on average, that is a less concentrated banking sector. For the undertaken actions for 
mitigating moral hazard, although the sign is also in line with the theory, i.e. associated with 
smaller average MS, but the results are statistically insignificant. Similarly, macroeconomic 
development, EU membership and the market size are not significant, although the estimated 
coefficients are in line with the expectations. 
 
6.5.2 Alternative Model Specifications and Further Empirical Findings 
This section goes beyond the baseline model specification examines the country-level effect and 
specifies alternative models which allow for the estimation of possible bank-level effects of 
regulation as discussed in Section 5.3.5. Gonzalez (2009) empirically examines the bank-level 
effects of regulatory and supervisory practices using the cost efficiency of banks (Section 5.2), but 
as he emphasizes other channels (bank-specific factors) apart from efficiency may be useful for 
explaining the effect of regulation on an individual bank’s MS. As discussed in 5.3.5 the bank-level 
effect of regulation on bank’s MS could be different for the big banks compared to the rest of the 
banks in the sector. Additionally, the main purpose for imposing regulation is to secure safe and 
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sound banking system (Section 5.3.5), which usually refers to the interaction of regulation, risk 
taking and financial stability, hence risk-taking is considered as another channel for examining the 
effect of regulation on bank-level MS. 
 
Is there systematic variation in determinants across different size-classes? 
The following empirical analysis focuses on possible variations in the effects of determinants of 
market share of the big banks and that of all the other banks in the industry (medium and small). 
The rationale for this investigation is found in the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 5. 
In terms of cost efficiency, for example, the empirical findings of Berger and Humphrey (1994) 
regarding scale economies suggest that (i) large and small banks are less scale efficient than 
medium banks; (ii) measured scale economies are relatively small, and only small banks are likely 
to gain scale efficiency by growing; and (iii) growing in size beyond the one of the largest banks 
will not contribute to higher scale economies. This implies that the effect of cost efficiency on 
market share may vary systematically across different size-classes. In addition, it is argued that 
cost structure and efficiency may be seriously affected by an extensive branch network, since 
branches are considered to be expensive channel for delivering retail financial services, especially 
deposit-based services (Hirtle, 2007).  
 
Turning to the endogenous sunk cost theory (Section 5.3.2) the incumbent banks endogenously 
determine the level of quality investments (branch density) in order to increase the entry cost for 
the potential entrants and secure their competitive position on the market - to absorb the share 
of the “new” market. The level of such investment presumably depends on the performance and 
the competitive position of the bank. Hence, it is expected that big banks may benefit more than 
the other banks from these investments in terms of maintaining or even expanding their market 
shares. Another underpinning for conducting this analysis is the study of Berger and Bowman 
(2013) (Section 5.2), who find a different effect of capital ratios across different groups of banks 
in terms of size. Therefore, this hypothesis is tested as a part of this further investigation. In the 
context of risk, as discussed in Section 5.3.3, specifically Buchinsky and Yosha (1995) find that 
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small banks, especially those that have nearly failed, are prone to undertake riskier investments, 
because by doing that they increasing the probability of “hitting the jackpot” and remaining in the 
market- they have almost nothing to lose. Prospect theory (Section 5.3.3) additionally gives 
support for excessive risk-taking when the bank performs under the targeted objective, in this 
context the targeted market share. On the other hand, big banks may undertake individual 
projects with higher risk, given their ability to better diversify. Consequently, the a priori 
expectation regarding the effect of risk-taking on market share of big banks and that of the other 
banks is not clear. 
 
Regulation and supervision may also differently affect the competitive position with the size of 
the bank. As discussed in Section 5.3.5, given that theory on the effect of regulation on market 
share is not developed, the arguments for possible systematic variations in the effects of 
regulation across size-classes can be supported by the role of government, given the opposing 
public and private interest views. For the purpose of this study, the theory of interest groups is 
relevant, because this theory argues that regulatory bodies are captured by the interest of the big 
and powerful banks usually using politicians as intermediaries for achieving their interests. If the 
proposition holds that interest groups determine regulation direction, then the choice of 
regulation will depend of the power of the interest groups through time, meaning that the change 
of power among groups (government and banks) will dictate regulation choices. Given the 
arguments above, it seems relevant to examine for possible systematic variations in the effect of 
regulation on market share across different size-classes, that is the bank-level effect of regulation 
on the competitive position of different sizes of bank.  
 
Next, we briefly discuss the expected effect of regulation across different bank size-classes, based 
on the framework for analysis discussed in Section 5.3.5: 
Capital regulation. Capital requirements can be expected to be more detrimental to the 
competitive position of smaller banks, because big banks have more possibilities for funding than 
smaller banks. 
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Mitigating moral hazard. It is reasonable to expect that factors mitigating moral hazard would 
restrict the small banks from expanding on the basis of higher risk activities (Buchinsky and Yosha, 
1995). 
Official supervision. In line with the “capture” theory, supervision may facilitate the expansion of 
the big banks at the cost of the medium and small banks, hence a positive association is expected 
between supervision and the MS of big banks.  
Private monitoring. Private monitoring may be expected to enhance the MS of big banks simply 
because these banks have already established units for relations with investors which provide 
various information on regular basis for the activities of the bank. Such work practices bring the 
customers closer to the bank and creates a positive impression for the public. 
Activity restrictions. To analyse the bank-level effect of activity restrictions on bank’s MS, activity 
restrictions in this study are considered as an incentive for herding, where herding reflects the 
covariation of banks’ behaviour. In case of herding if the assumption that big banks are the leaders 
and the rest of the banks are followers holds then we could expect that big banks have a 
predisposition towards success and to further grow in size, at least in the short run. 
 
For the purpose of this additional analysis big banks are considered the four biggest banks in each 
country. Due to a limited number of banks (although majority of the banks in each countries are 
included in the data set) and the considered estimation technique which requires large N, it is not 
feasible to divide the dataset in two sub-sets, big banks and all others and conduct the proposed 
analysis. Therefore, the second best is inclusion of interaction terms of the considered 
determinants and a dummy variable denoting 1 for the biggest four banks in each country (C4), 
otherwise 0. The strategy regarding these additional model specifications is as follows: the first 
model, in addition to the baseline model, includes interaction terms with C4 for all the “inside” 
bank determinants, except ownership; the second, in addition to the baseline model, includes 
interaction terms with C4 for all the regulatory and supervisory practices. 
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The full model specification of the alternative models is: 
𝐿𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛼𝐿𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶4𝑖 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑁10𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶4 ∗
𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑁10𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑍𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶4𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑍𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶4𝑖 ∗ 𝛽8𝐷𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁9𝑖𝑡 +
𝛾1𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐸𝑈𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾4𝑂𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾5𝑂𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑊𝐸𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾6𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖(𝑡) +
𝛾7𝑀𝑂𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐻𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾8𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖(𝑡) + 𝜃1𝐷𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                 
    … (6.7)           
𝐿𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛼𝐿𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑁10𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑍𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁9𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐸𝑈𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾4𝑂𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾5𝐶4𝑖 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) +
𝛾6𝑂𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑊𝐸𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾7𝐶4𝑖 ∗ 𝑂𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑊𝐸𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾8𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾9𝐶4𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖(𝑡) +
𝛾10𝑀𝑂𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐻𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾11𝐶4𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑂𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐻𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾12𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾13𝐶4𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖(𝑡) +
𝜃1𝐷𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡      … (6.8) 
 
The estimation technique is the same used for estimating the baseline model (the original 
printouts regarding these models are presented in Appendix to Chapter 6, Section 6.4). As in the 
previous section, the diagnostics of the models are initially discussed. There is not sufficient 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis of the validity of overidentifying restrictions and the p-
values of Hansen test in the two models are above the most conservative threshold of 0.25 (Table 
6.8). In all estimations the null hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation was rejected and there 
is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no second order autocorrelation in 
differences of residuals.  
 
Table 6.8 Diagnostic statistics for the alternative model specifications 
Models/Tests 
Dependent Variable 
(LMSA) 
C4*”Inside” 
Bank 
Determinants 
 
C4*Regulatory 
and 
Supervisory 
Indices 
Test Statistics   
Observations 1,068 1,069 
Number of id 148 148 
No. of Instruments 68 41 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 
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AR(2) 0.469 0.554 
Hansen Test 0.782 0.710 
   Source: The Author 
Additionally, the number of instruments is relatively low in comparison to number of groups of 
cross-sectional observations. As a starting point when estimating these additional models the 
same structure of instruments is employed as in the baseline model. However, when necessary 
in order to satisfy the required diagnostic statistics, slight changes in the instruments are made. 
The number of instruments is considerably higher when estimating the Eq. 6.7 compared to Eq. 
6.8 because in the former model the endogenous variables are doubled (all bank-specific 
variables, except ownership structure are treated as endogenous as discussed in Section 5.5). The 
difference-in-Hansen test for levels supports the choice of the system over the difference 
estimator. In all specifications, the coefficient on lagged dependent variable is lower than the one 
obtained with OLS but higher than the one from fixed effects estimation (Appendix to Chapter 6, 
Section 6.4). Finally, the Wald test for joint explanatory power of coefficients rejects the null that 
all coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 
Table 6.9 Determinants of the bank’s competitive position (natural logarithm of market share) in SEECs 2002-12 
(baseline and alternative model specifications) 
VARIABLES/ 
Models  
Baseline 
model 
C4*”Inside” 
Bank 
Determinants 
C4*Regulatory and 
Supervisory Indices 
Lagged dependent variable 0.865*** 0.889*** 0.827*** 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.051) 
Cost efficiency 0.304 0.667 0.327 
 (0.547) (0.641) (0.586) 
Cost efficiency*C4  -2.427**  
  (1.039)  
Branch density 0.018** 0.018** 0.017** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
Branch density*C4  -0.005  
  (0.009)  
Z-Score (solvency) -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Z-Score*C4  0.004  
  (0.003)  
Capital Ratio -0.009*** -0.006* -0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Capital Ratio*C4  -0.019**  
  (0.008)  
Activity Restriction  0.095** 0.080** 0.112** 
 (0.043) (0.040) (0.045) 
Activity Restriction*C4    -0.084 
   (0.079) 
Official Supervisory Power -0.025** -0.024** -0.027** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
 245 
 
Official Supervision*C4   0.006 
   (0.022) 
Capital Regulation Index -0.038** -0.026 -0.026 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) 
Capital Regulation*C4   -0.035 
   (0.032) 
Mitigating Moral Hazard -0.027 -0.039 -0.071 
 (0.057) (0.039) (0.050) 
Mitigating Moral Hazard*C4   0.080 
   (0.066) 
Private Monitoring Index -0.034* -0.032 -0.021 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) 
Private Monitoring Index*C4   -0.017 
   (0.056) 
Foreign capital (>90%) 0.032 0.023 0.072* 
 (0.063) (0.035) (0.042) 
Population density 0.076 0.157* 0.062 
 (0.093) (0.095) (0.098) 
GDP per capita -0.063 -0.053 -0.061 
 (0.051) (0.039) (0.047) 
EU Membership 0.042 0.033 0.049 
 (0.035) (0.030) (0.036) 
C4  10.79** 0.739 
  (4.635) (0.698) 
Constant -0.978 -3.041 -1.209 
 (2.376) (2.812) (2.549) 
 Note: The values in brackets are the corrected robust standard errors (Windmeeijer’s).  
 ***, ** and * denote statistical significance of variables at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.   
 All models include year dummies. 
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In the last two columns of Table 6.9 the results from the alternative models (Eq. 6.7 and Eq. 6.8) 
are presented, while the second column presents the results from the baseline model (Eq. 6.6 and 
Table 6.7) for comparison purposes. The results from the three models are consistent in terms of 
sign, size and significance of the estimated coefficients, which in turn suggest that the results from 
the baseline model are robust (checks for robustness are further discussed in Section 6.5.3). 
Detailed interpretation of the results from the alternative models is not provided, given that the 
main interest is to examine possible systematic variation across different bank size-classes. 
 
The first step is to learn whether there is a significant difference among the C4 banks and all the 
other banks in terms of the effect of “inside” and “outside” determinants on their market share. 
This is indicated by the significance of the interaction terms as provided in Table 6.9. According 
to the findings in Table 6.9 there is systematic variation across different bank size-classes only for 
cost efficiency and relative capital ratio, in other words these two “inside” bank determinants are 
found to affect the market share differently of the C4 banks compared to the other banks. The 
empirical findings suggest no statistical difference in the effects of regulation and supervision on 
competitive position of big banks and the other banks.  
 
Where there is statistical significance of the interaction term, the overall impact on MS of these 
variables for the C4 banks is considered. A test for joint significance (lincom test in STATA) of the 
two variables is conducted, given that the coefficient of the interaction term presented in Table 
6.9 reflects the additional effect of the particular variable on the market share of the C4 banks 
over the one estimated for the corresponding variable (the base effect). The results of the test for 
joint significance are presented in Table 6.10 and the original printouts can be found in Appendix 
to Chapter 6, Section 6.4.  
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Table 6.10 The effect of selected variables on the market share of the biggest four banks  
The effect on market share of selected variables for the biggest 
four banks (C4) and its significance (lincom test in STATA) 
C4*“Inside” Bank 
Determinants 
C4*Regulatory and 
Supervisory Indices 
Efficiency+ Efficiency*C4=0 -1.760** 
(0.870) 
 
Capital ratio+Capital ratio*C4=0 
 
-0.0251*** 
0.0072 
 
Source: The author 
 
Unexpected finding is related to cost efficiency, which is found to be significantly and negatively 
associated with the market size for the C4 banks. Specifically, an increase of 1 per cent in cost 
efficiency reduces the market share of the C4 banks by 1.76 per cent (0.67-2.43 from Table 6.9). 
Hence, this result suggests that cost efficiency is detrimental in terms of the competitive position 
of the C4 banks, which is opposite of the theoretical underpinnings (Boone, 2000, 2004).  
 
Turning to the holding excess capital (over the median capital of the industry), the results suggest 
a higher negative effect on MS of the C4 banks compared to the other banks, with a decline of 2.5 
per cent if they increase their capital ratio by one percentage point above the median capital ratio 
in the same country in year t. These findings are not consistent with Berger and Bouwman (2013), 
who find that large banks with a higher capital ratio improve their market share during banking 
crises and they are able to maintain the improved MS after such crises. However, this finding is 
consistent with the arguments in Section 5.3.4 that bigger banks are more leveraged and hold less 
capital while expanding their lending.  
 
Is there systematic variation in regulatory and supervisory practices across 
different risk-taking behaviour (the bank-level effect)? 
As discussed in 5.3.5 the main purpose for imposing regulation is to secure safe and sound banking 
system. Moreover, given that the main concern of the economic literature on banking regulation 
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is the interaction of regulation, risk taking and financial stability, the channel that is considered in 
this thesis for examining the effect of regulation is risk-taking.  
 
Next, we briefly discuss the expected interaction effect of risk-taking and regulation on banks, 
based on the framework for analysis discussed in Section 5.3.4 and Section 5.3.5:  
Capital regulation. Increased capital requirements could be considered as either an incentive or 
disincentive for riskier investments and it may increase/decrease, at least in the short run, the 
market share of those banks which opt for higher risk. 
Mitigating moral hazard. Given that these measures aim to restrict the risk-taking of banks which 
arise due to a deposit insurance scheme, the bank-level effect is expected to be negatively 
associated with the competitive position of high-risk banks.  
Official supervision. A negative bank-level effect of supervision is expected for banks which opt 
for risk-taking behaviour in order gain market share, at least in the short run.  
Private monitoring. It is expected that  more risky banks will have to reduce their lending by a 
greater amount than less risky banks, giving a negative bank-level interaction effect, especially 
because a significant portion of the lending activities are financed by deposits of the customers 
(as discussed on Section 5.3.5).  
Activity restrictions. As discussed in Section 5.3.5 due to activity restrictions most banks may opt 
for herding behaviour (with leaders and followers), which in turn may increase the risk taking of 
some banks (the followers, presumably the small banks, given that big banks have more 
opportunities to diversify), hence some of them may gain MS based on risk-taking at least in the 
short run, where the long run outcome depends on the realization of the undertaken projects. 
 
In order to conduct this empirical analysis, the baseline model (Eq. 6.6) is augmented by the 
interaction terms between each regulatory and supervisory practice and the Z-score relative to 
the industry median (Eq. 6.9). The full model specification is: 
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𝐿𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛼𝐿𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑁10𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑍𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁9𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐸𝑈𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾4𝑂𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾5𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) +
𝛾6𝑂𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑊𝐸𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾7𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑊𝐸𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾8𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾9𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖(𝑡) +
𝛾10𝑀𝑂𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐻𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾11𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑂𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐻𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾12𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾13𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖(𝑡) +
𝜃1𝐷𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡     
 … (6.9) 
The estimation technique is the same used for estimating the previous models in this chapter. 
Initially, the diagnostics of the models are briefly discussed (Table 6.11) and these are satisfactory 
(the original printouts related to this model are presented in Appendix to Chapter 6, Section 6.5). 
There is not sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis for validity of overidentifying 
restrictions. In all estimations the null hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation was rejected 
and there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no second order autocorrelation 
in differences of residuals.  
Table 6.11 Diagnostic statistics for the alternative model specification 
Models/Tests 
Dependent Variable 
(LMSA) 
RISK*Regulatory 
and Supervisory 
Indices 
Test Statistics  
Observations 1,069 
Number of id 148 
No. of Instruments 60 
AR(1) 0.001 
AR(2) 0.475 
Hansen Test 0.720 
    Source: The Author 
The number of instruments is relatively low in comparison to number of groups of cross-sectional 
observations. As with the previous model specifications, we tried to keep the same structure of 
the instruments, to avoid results manipulation due to the choice of instruments. The number of 
instruments is considerably higher compared to the baseline model (Eq. 6.6) because all the 
interaction terms are treated as endogenous. The difference-in-Hansen test for levels supports 
the choice of the system estimator over difference one. In all specifications, the coefficient on 
lagged dependent variable is lower than the one obtained with OLS but higher than the one from 
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fixed effects estimation (Appendix to Chapter 6, Section 6.5). Finally the Wald test for joint 
explanatory power of coefficients rejects the null that all coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 
 
In the last column of Table 6.12 the results from the alternative model (Eq. 6.9) are presented, 
while the second column presents the results from the baseline model (Eq. 6.6 and Table 6.7) for 
comparison purposes. The results from both models are consistent in terms of sign, size and 
significance of the estimated coefficients and again the results of the baseline model are found to 
be robust. Detailed interpretation of the results from the alternative models is not provided, given 
that the main interest is to examine possible systematic variation across different risk-taking 
behaviour. The empirical findings indicate that there is a systematic variation in the effect of 
regulatory and supervisory practices across different risk-taking behaviour. Specifically, except for 
the private monitoring, all the other regulatory and supervisory practices are found to vary in 
their affect the MS of banks depending on risk-taking behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.12 Determinants of the bank’s competitive position (natural logarithm of market share) in SEECs 2002-12 
(baseline and alternative model specification) 
VARIABLES/ 
Models  
Baseline 
model 
Z-score*Regulatory 
and Supervisory 
Indices 
Lagged dependent variable (LN) 0.865*** 0.876*** 
 (0.041) (0.038) 
Cost efficiency (LN) 0.304 0.145 
 (0.547) (0.636) 
Branch density 0.018** 0.019*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Z-Score (solvency) -0.002*** 0.025 
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 (0.001) (0.020) 
Capital Ratio -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Activity Restriction  0.095** 0.057 
 (0.043) (0.062) 
Activity Restriction*Z-score   0.004* 
  (0.002) 
Official Supervisory Power -0.025** -0.009 
 (0.012) (0.019) 
Official Supervision*Z-score  -0.003*** 
  (0.001) 
Capital Regulation Index -0.038** -0.028 
 (0.015) (0.024) 
Capital Regulation*Z-score  -0.003** 
  (0.001) 
Mitigating Moral Hazard -0.027 -0.014 
 (0.057) (0.051) 
Mitigating Moral Hazard*Z-score  0.008** 
  (0.004) 
Private Monitoring Index -0.034* -0.041** 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
Private Monitoring Index*Z-score  -0.002 
  (0.002) 
Foreign capital (>90%) 0.032 0.069 
 (0.063) (0.043) 
Population density 0.076 0.153 
 (0.093) (0.203) 
GDP per capita -0.063 -0.058 
 (0.051) (0.052) 
EU Membership 0.042 0.048 
 (0.035) (0.030) 
Constant -0.978 -0.650 
 (2.376) (2.748) 
Note: The values in brackets are the corrected robust standard errors (Windmeeijer’s).  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance of variables at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.   
All models include year dummies. 
 
In order to interpret the empirical results in this regard, the marginal effects are estimated for Z-
score (dzs) and each of the following practices, activity restrictions (oar), factors mitigating moral 
hazard (moralh), official supervision (ospower) and capital regulation (crindex) and the estimates 
are presented in Figure 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4, respectively.47  
                                                        
47 The estimation of the marginal effects are presented in Appendix to Chapter 6, Section 6.4.  
 252 
 
 
   
Figure 6.1 Marginal effects of activity restrictions and Z-score 
 
We found that less risky banks (higher z-score) gain in MS with activity restrictions. As the level of 
OAR becomes higher this gain becomes slightly higher and significant at all levels (Figure 6.1). 
Similarly, the less risky banks are found to gain in MS with activities for mitigation of moral hazard 
(Figure 6.2). As the level of MORALH becomes higher this gain becomes higher, with the effect 
significant at the 10 per cent level.  
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Figure 6.2 Marginal effects of mitigating moral hazard and Z-score 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Marginal effects of official supervision and z-score 
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The empirical findings suggest that the less risky banks are found to experience a decline in their 
MS as official supervision increases, which again indicates that official supervision does not 
contribute in preventing the banks undertaking higher risk from further growing in relative size 
(Figure 6.3). Similarly, the less risky banks are associated with a lower MS with increase is the 
capital regulation, indicating that higher capital regulation is detrimental for the “good” banks 
(Figure 6.4). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Marginal effects of capital regulation and z-score 
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6.5.3 CHECK FOR ROBUSTNESS 
This section presents further alternative model specifications which serve as a check for 
robustness by considering alternative specifications of important variables, namely those for cost 
efficiency and risk. The original specification includes cost efficiency as estimated by Random 
Parameters Models, whereas in this robustness check two different cost efficiency measures are 
employed. In particular, efficiency estimates obtained from the “true” random-effects model of 
Greene and time trend (Section 4.5.1, Table 4.6, the model named ETR2T) and efficiency 
estimates obtained from the Battese and Coelli model with time trend where the bank-specific 
variables enter in the underlying mean of the inefficiency component (Section 4.5.1, Table 4.4, 
the model named EBC2T). Employing cost efficiency obtained from different empirical models and 
econometric techniques, would not only be a check for robustness for the empirical findings of 
this particular analysis, but would also provide indications of possible serious distortions of the 
results due to misspecification and inadequate techniques when estimating cost efficiency. In 
addition, a specification is included that uses a different measure of risk-taking instead of Z-score 
index employing the ratio of loan impairment charges and the net loans.  
 
Table 6.13 presents the results of these specifications in column 2, 3 and 4 respectively, and the 
results from the baseline specification (Eq. 6.6) are presented in the first column for comparison. 
The diagnostic statistics of the three new models are satisfactory (Appendix to Chapter 6, Section 
6.6). In terms of the specifications with different cost efficiency estimates (columns 2 and 3), the 
empirical results are fully consistent compared to those obtained from the baseline model. Most 
of the estimated coefficients have the same sign, similar size and statistical significance when 
compared with the coefficients from the baseline model (column 1). The only exceptions are the 
coefficients of the capital regulatory index and private monitoring index which are insignificant 
when EBC2T is included as a measure for efficiency, although the size of the coefficients is almost 
the same compared to the other two models (column 1 and column 2). 
 
Table 6.13 Determinants of the bank’s competitive position (natural logarithm of market share) in SEECs 2002-12 
(baseline and alternative model specifications) 
VARIABLES/Model Baseline 
Model 
Efficiency:  
(Ln) ETR2T  
Efficiency:  
(Ln) EBC2T 
Risk-taking:  
LIC/Loans 
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 Dependent: Market Share (Assets)   (1) (2) (3) 
Lagged dependent variable 0.865*** 0.864*** 0.870*** 0.845*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.045) 
“Inside” bank determinants     
Cost efficiency (ETR3T) 0.304     0.080 
 (0.547)   (0.638) 
Cost efficiency (ETR2T)  0.138   
  (0.527)   
Cost efficiency (EBC2T)   0.260  
   (1.368)  
Z-Score (relative to industry mean) -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001**  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
DLICL (relative to industry mean)    0.002 
    (0.003) 
Branch density per 10,000km2 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 0.017** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) 
Capital Ratio (relative to industry mean) -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Foreign capital (>90%) 0.032 0.035 0.027 0.071 
 (0.063) (0.064) (0.095) (0.045) 
“Outside” bank determinants     
Macroeconomic environment     
Population density 0.076 0.073 0.097 0.102 
 (0.093) (0.092) (0.123) (0.084) 
GDP per capita -0.063 -0.057 -0.058 -0.091** 
 (0.051) (0.050) (0.084) (0.045) 
EU membership 0.042    0.041 0.038 0.062** 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.041) (0.031) 
Regulation and Supervision     
Activity Restriction Index 0.095** 0.101** 0.098** 0.087** 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.050) (0.044) 
Official Supervisory Power -0.025** -0.026** -0.027* -0.024* 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) 
Capital Regulatory Index -0.038** -0.040*** -0.038 -0.036** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.017) 
Mitigating Moral Hazard  -0.027 -0.030 -0.029 -0.043 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.0610) (0.050) 
Private Monitoring Index -0.034* -0.034* -0.033 -0.021 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.021) 
Constant -0.978 -0.278 -0.896 0.108 
 (2.376) (2.294) (5.855) (2.735) 
Observations 1,069 1,069 1,069 1,070 
Number of id 148 148 148 148 
No. of Instruments 36 36 36 37 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.555 0.511 0.531 0.565 
Hansen Test 0.680 0.633 0.677 0.398 
Note: The values in brackets are the corrected robust standard errors (Windmeeijer’s). All models include year dummies. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance of variables at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.   
 
In the case when LIC are used as a measure for risk-taking instead of Z–score, the empirical results 
again give support for the robustness of the results obtained from the baseline model 
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specification, given that the majority of the coefficients have the same sign, size and significance 
as those obtained from the baseline model. However, the risk-taking measure (LIC) although it is 
found to be positively associated with the bank’s market share, the higher the risk the higher the 
market share, it is not significant, while in the baseline model Z-score is significant. In addition, in 
the revised specification the effect of GDP per capita estimated to be considerably larger and 
significant (5 per cent). Specifically, the findings of this model suggest that more developed 
countries are characterized by banks with a lower market share. The final difference is with the 
EU membership dummy which is significant in this model. It suggests that being a bank in an EU 
member country favours a higher market share compared to being in a non-EU country. However, 
given that the last two discussed variables are not of main interest in this analysis, we do not 
consider this as a signal for major inconsistency in the results. In a nutshell, the performed check 
for robustness indicates that the empirical results produced in this analysis are robust. 
 
Another possible approach to check the robustness of the results often used in studies is 
estimation of the baseline model on a reduced sample cleaned from outliers using winsorizing or 
a trimming procedure. In the former case the outliers are not excluded, but they are transformed, 
in particular after specifying a certain threshold (percentile) of the data which is considered as 
outliers, then the values of all data below (above) that percentile are transformed to the lowest 
(highest) value of that percentile. In the latter case, the threshold percentile of the data 
considered to be outliers are completely excluded from the dataset. However, given the 
specificities of this analysis, it is inappropriate to undertake these common procedures to perform 
a robustness check. For instance, if such procedures are performed on the dependent variable 
(market share) it means that the largest banks, which are the major players in every banking 
sector, would be excluded from the dataset, thus we could expect misleading results. In the case 
of risk-taking (independent variable) such data cleaning may also produce misleading results if 
the riskiest banks are excluded, given that the domino effect is present in banking. Therefore, 
such approach for checking the robustness of the results is not appropriate here and is not carried 
out. 
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6.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter empirically investigated the potential determinants of a bank’s competitive position 
(market share) in eight selected SEECs for the period 2002-2012, based on the theoretical 
framework discussed in Chapter 5. Two broad categories of potential determinants were 
considered, in particular factors under control of the bank’s managers (“inside” bank 
determinants) and factors beyond their control (“outside” bank determinants). The bank’s 
competitive position was treated as a dynamic process; hence a dynamic panel model was 
specified and estimated by the two-step General Methods of Moments.  
 
The empirical findings supported the hypothesis of the dynamic nature of a bank’s MS. In addition 
the results provided support for some of the “inside” bank determinants and regulatory and 
supervisory practices effecting MS, but not the macroeconomic environment. Initially, the 
evidence did not support the view that one of the main variables of interest, cost efficiency, was 
a determinant of the bank’s competitive position. Furthermore, increased risk-taking was found 
to affect a bank’s competitive position, which could be a detrimental for the stability of the 
banking system in the long run if banks undertake excessive risk in order to achieve a strategic 
target to enhancing their competitive position. Likewise, banks holding higher capital (compared 
to the median) had a lower market share, arguably due to underinvesting which hinders market 
share expansion. Non-price competition reflected in investments in quality, in particular the 
number of branches, was also found to be an important for determining a bank’s competitive 
position. 
 
Besides the bank-specific factors, regulation and supervision affect the MS of the bank, which 
could be considered as a “side-effect”, since their main role is to a secure safe and sound banking 
sector. As discussed in Section 6.5 the effect of regulation is analysed from two aspects, the 
country-level and bank-level. First, the analysis of the country-level effect of regulation on MS is 
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analogous to the study of market concentration. Second, the bank-level effect of any regulatory 
policy on an individual bank’s MS depends on a bank’s. Initially, we provide a summary of the 
empirical findings of the country-level analysis. Higher activity restrictions resulted in more 
concentrated banking sectors. On the other hand, the findings suggested the more stringent 
capital requirements are the less concentrated the banking market. Similarly, turning to the 
supervision, official and private, the empirical results suggest that higher supervision and 
monitoring negatively affect the concentration in banking. 
 
The bank-level effect of regulation and supervision on a bank’s MS was investigated in a separate 
empirical model, using the risk-taking determinant as a channel through which regulation effect 
is transmitted to a bank’s MS. We found that less risky banks gain in MS when the level of activity 
restrictions are higher and when more action is undertaken to mitigate moral hazard. The 
empirical findings suggested that the less risky banks are found to experience a decline in their 
MS in the case of greater official supervision, which again indicates that official supervision does 
not contribute in preventing the banks undertaking higher risk from further growing in relative 
size. Similarly, the less risky banks are associated with a lower MS the more stringent is the capital 
regulation, indicating that higher capital regulation may be detrimental for the “good” banks. 
 
Also we investigated whether there is a variation in determinants across different size-classes 
(this analysis again investigated the bank-level effect of regulation on a bank’s MS). The empirical 
findings suggested variation in the effect of cost efficiency and the relative capital ratio across 
different bank size-classes. In particular, an increase in cost efficiency negatively affects the 
market share of the four biggest banks, which is not the case for the other banks. In terms of 
relative capital ratio, holding of more capital has higher negative effect on the market share of 
the four biggest banks, while for the other banks the estimated negative effect is lower. 
Regulatory and supervisory practices are not found to have different effect on different bank size-
classes.  
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In a nutshell, the empirical results indicated several important findings. First, a bank’s competitive 
position is a dynamic process. Second, a bank’s MS is not a result of higher cost efficiency; 
arguably market power could potentially be a determinant of MS, but this was not investigated in 
this thesis. Third, relatively high (above the country’s median at a particular year) risk-taking and 
capital, and non-price competition are significant “inside” bank determinants. Fourth, regulatory 
and supervisory practices (activity restrictions, capital regulation, official supervision and private 
monitoring) were also important factors for the degree of concentration in the banking sector. 
Fifth, variation in regulatory and supervisory practices across different risk-taking behaviour was 
found for activity restrictions, official supervision, capital regulation and factors for mitigating 
moral hazard. Sixth, variation was found for cost efficiency and the relative capital ratio, while 
regulation was not found to have different effect on different bank size-classes. Finally, the 
performed checks for robustness of the results with different variable specifications did not 
suggest any inconsistency.  
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the 1990s South East European Countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) embarked on the process of transition from 
centrally planned economies towards free market economies. Their financial sectors, dominated 
by banks (as capital markets are still underdeveloped), play a crucial role in macroeconomic 
stability and development, and have undergone extensive reforms and restructuring in terms of 
size, ownership structure, technological progress and regulatory framework during this period. It 
has been a period of intense competition in the sector mainly due to the substantial inflow of 
foreign capital, which in turn has changed the structure of the industry in most transition 
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economies. These changes have been associated with the reallocation of market share (MS) 
across banks and changes in the competitive position of banks. During the period of analysis all 
SEECs aspired to join the EU, but only Slovenia and Bulgaria became EU member states, with the 
rest still striving to fulfil the required conditions of accession (Croatia joined the EU in July 2013). 
Joining the single EU market involves more severe competition in the banking industry, hence 
their survival depends on their ability to compete; and this is initially influenced by their cost 
efficiency.  Given the aspiration of SEECs to join the EU and the importance of the banking sector 
for their development, the main focus of this thesis is twofold: the estimation of banks’ cost 
efficiency and the identification and empirical analysis of determinants of the banks’ competitive 
position (based on their market shares). 
 
In terms of cost efficiency in banking in SEECs several interrelated specific questions are 
investigated. What is the most appropriate method for investigation of cost efficiency? What is 
the level of cost efficiency of banks in the SEECs and has there been any improvement in the cost 
efficiencies in these countries over time? Is there any technological progress that reduces the 
total costs of banks, hence improving their efficiency? What is the role of ownership structure, 
the EU accession and the last financial crisis on the cost efficiency of banks in SEECs?  
 
The analysis of potential determinants of banks’ MS in SEECs also provides answers to several 
interrelated specific research questions. Does cost efficiency matter for banks’ MS in SEECs? Are 
there other potential determinants of banks’ MS, in particular factors which are under the control 
of banks’ managers (quality investments, risk-taking behaviour and capital) and beyond the 
control of banks’ managers (regulation and supervision)?  Is there a systematic variation in 
determinants of MS across different bank size-classes? Is there a systematic variation in the effect 
of regulatory and supervisory practices across different risk-taking behaviour on banks’ MS? 
 
This chapter summarises the results of the investigation of the research questions related to the 
two focal points of the thesis, formulates policy recommendations for enhancing cost efficiency 
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in banking in SEECs and provides a basis for better understanding of what determines market 
structure in banking in SEECs, specially the competitiveness of a bank reflected in its market share. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 summarises the main findings of the thesis. The 
contributions to knowledge of this thesis are presented in Section 7.3. Policy recommendations 
are developed in Section 7.4. The limitations of the thesis are identified in Section 7.5. Finally, 
Section 7.6 provides suggestions for further research. 
 
7.2 MAIN FINDINGS 
Given that this thesis focuses on two main research questions, as discussed above, initially the 
main findings with respect to cost efficiency of banks in SEECs are presented, followed by the 
findings associated to the determinants of banks’ competitive position (market share, MS). 
Although, the investigation of the two main research issues implies that this thesis is comprised 
of two parts, they are closely related. In particular, cost efficiency is identified as a potential 
determinant of banks’ MS, hence the cost efficiency estimates are used in the empirical 
investigation of the determinants of banks’ MS.   
 
7.2.1 Cost efficiency of banks in SEECs 
The concept of efficiency is well established in the economic literature, and among several 
definitions for this concept, this thesis uses the one proposed by Farrell (1957). In particular, he 
considers that a producer is inefficient either by producing less than the maximum output 
obtainable from a given bundle of inputs (technically inefficient) or by not employing the best mix 
of inputs given their prices and marginal productivities (allocatively inefficient). Although this 
concept is theoretically established, efficiency itself is not observable, in other words it is not a 
simple reflection of any of the data usually recorded by banks or other firms, but instead efficiency 
levels are empirically estimated. 
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The literature on the estimation of efficiency in the banking sector begins in the late 1980s. There 
were a remarkably large number of studies conducted for the U.S. banks compared to the 
developed European countries’ banking sectors, particularly in the early stages. The first paper to 
examine the banks’ efficiency in transition economies dates back to 1998 by Kraft and Tirtiroglu. 
From then onwards, the literature on transition economies has been expanding, but it is still 
limited, especially for SEECs (Chapter 3). This was the main motivation for analysing banks’ cost 
efficiency and, for the same token the thesis contributes to a better understanding of banks’ cost 
efficiency in SEECs which is also reflected in the ability of banks to compete. 
  
To estimate banks’ cost efficiency in SEECs we presented a critical review of the literature on 
efficiency estimation and the various approaches with regard to this issue (Chapter 2). We argued 
that Stochastic Frontier Analysis (Section 2.3.1) was the appropriate method for the estimation of 
banks’ cost efficiency. Given the substantial reforms in SEECs since the beginning of the transition 
process, it was important that we estimated time-varying efficiency, because changes in efficiency 
were expected to happen at a fast pace. However, one issue that was neglected for a long time 
was the problem of potential heterogeneity due to observed and unobserved differences across 
countries and banks (Section 2.3.3). Given that efficiency estimates are derived from the error 
term of the regression analysis, it implies that efficiency and heterogeneity have been 
confounded. The remedy for the observed heterogeneity usually used in the empirical studies 
was the introduction of adequate control variables in addition to the production technology 
parameters. These account for the differences that both are under control and beyond the control 
of the banks’ managers, where the former group included bank-specific variables, while the latter 
included environmental and industry-specific variables. Greene (2005a, 2005b) proposes a set of 
models able to control for the unobserved heterogeneity, in particular, the Random Parameters 
Model (including the so-called true random effects model where the only random parameter is 
the constant term) (Section 2.3.2). Consequently, this set of models was considered for cost 
efficiency estimation in this thesis. However, given the popularity of the Battese and Coelli (1992, 
1995) models as discussed in Section 3.3, these models were also estimated, primarily for 
comparative purposes.  
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The average estimated banks’ cost efficiency in SEECs for the observed period is 87.5 per cent, 
with a range by country of 81.5 to 90 per cent (Section 4.5.4). The Slovenian banking sector is the 
most cost efficient with an average of 90 per cent in the period of analysis, while the Serbian 
banking sector is the least cost efficient with an average of 81.5 per cent.  The banking sectors in 
Croatia, Macedonia and BiH are characterized by a similar average cost efficiency of around 89 
per cent, while the banking sectors in Montenegro, Bulgaria and Albania are by two percentage 
points less efficient. The largest improvement in terms of banks’ CE is found in the banking sector 
of Albania, where the positive trend has been briefly interrupted only during the years of financial 
crisis. Although there is a gap or room for improvement of the banks’ CE in SEECs of between 10 
and 18.5 per cent, it seems that the banking sectors in these countries are highly efficient. The 
average banks’ cost efficiency in SEECs is the highest at the beginning of the investigated period, 
2000, at 88.8 per cent, while the lowest average efficiency is at the final year of analysis, 2012, at 
86.2 per cent. The recent financial crisis has had a slight negative impact on the efficiency levels 
of banks in all SEECs and this effect is the highest in the EU member states (Slovenia and Bulgaria), 
which is to be expected because the recession was more severe in the EU than in SEECs.  
 
Given that there are other studies which analyse some of the countries included in this study, we 
used this opportunity to compare the CE of those studies, reviewed in Chapter 3 and Section 4.5.5, 
with the CE obtained in this thesis (Section 4.5.4). It can be noted that our CE estimates are 
generally higher than the CE from the reviewed studies. This can arguably be because of: firstly a 
different period of time is investigated, as we consider the later stage of transition (2000-2012) 
which includes the recent financial crisis and the evolution in CE could be expected; secondly, 
and, possibly more importantly, the use of different panel models. Specifically, the majority of the 
reviewed studies rely on BC models, which although provide time-variant CE estimates, do not 
control for unobserved heterogeneity, whereas our preferred models, RPMs, do.  Only, Kosak & 
Zoric (2011) use the true random effects model by Greene (2005b) and their result for cost 
efficiency in the banking sector in Slovenia of 87 per cent is similar to our CE estimates for Slovenia 
of 86-89 per cent obtained from the three RPMs considered in this thesis.  
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In terms of technical change, the empirical results suggest an average effect for all SEECs of a 1.8 
per cent decrease in total cost due to technical change during 2000–2012 (Section 4.5.3). This 
technical progress ranges from 1.4 per cent (Bulgaria) to 2.2 per cent (BiH), which suggests fairly 
similar technological progress across this group of countries. It is interesting to find that in the 
2000-2009 period there is a cost reduction due to technical change but this effect decreases 
during these years. 
 
7.2.2 Determinants of bank’s market share in SEECs 
After an extensive search of the literature we found that the theoretical basis for the 
determinants of market share (MS) is underdeveloped. Therefore, we applied a “step by step” 
strategy and an eclectic approach to identify the potential determinants of MS (Chapter 5). 
Recognizing that banking is a regulated industry, the considered determinants included bank-
specific factors (those under control of the management, or the “inside” bank determinants, 
Section 5.3.1, 5.3.2 and 5.3.3) and regulatory and supervisory practices (beyond the control of the 
management, or the “outside” bank determinants, Section 5.3.4). The starting point for 
developing the theoretical discussion and the empirical analysis was Gonzalez (2009) which, to 
our knowledge, was the first empirical attempt investigating cost efficiency and regulation as 
determinants of MS. We built on his framework by identifying other potential determinants in 
addition to cost efficiency. In particular, a number of strands of economic literature, which treat 
market structure from different perspectives, were considered and discussed. First, the literature 
on measuring competition (the Boone indicator, Section 5.3.1) was discussed to further support 
the view of cost efficiency as a determinant of banks’ MS. Second, the endogenous sunk cost 
theory (Sutton, 1991, 2000) was useful as it establishes that investment in quality, in particular a 
branch network, is relevant for the banking industry, and that it could be considered as a 
determinant of banks’ competitive position (Section 5.3.2). Third, Berger and Bouwman (2013) 
directed our attention to the effect of bank total capital on MS. Their study along with other 
studies (Section 5.3.4) suggested that capital should be considered as another determinant of 
banks’ MS. Finally, given that risk-taking behaviour plays a key role in banking stability, we aimed 
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to understand if it could also affect the banks’ MS. To that end we reviewed several arguments 
which associate risk taking and banks’ MS, in particular the probability of survival in banking, 
prospect theory, and the literature on lending standards and screening (Section 5.3.3). Briefly, 
cost efficiency, investments in quality, capital and risk-taking behaviour are identified as potential 
“inside” bank determinants. 
 
In addition, similar to Gonzalez (2009), we considered the potential impact of regulation and 
supervision in banking on banks’ MS. However, given that regulation and supervision in banking 
is primarily introduced to secure prudent behaviour by banks, which is necessary for financial 
stability, the literature on the relationship between regulation and banks’ MS is generally scarce. 
Arguably this is the reason why the study by Gonzalez was conducted on an ad hoc basis in terms 
of the effect of regulation and supervision on banks’ MS. Therefore, we made an effort to develop 
some theoretical predictions, at least intuitively, of the effect of regulation and supervision on a 
bank’s competitive position and market structure (Section 5.3.5). The identified “outside” bank 
determinants included restrictions on activities of banks, the existence of an explicit deposit 
insurance schemes (developed at national level), the level of capital requirements, the strength 
of official supervision and market discipline (the three pillars of the Basel II Accord). 
 
The identification of “outside” bank determinants and the potential testable hypotheses proved 
even more challenging than that of “inside” bank determinants (Section 5.3.5). In particular, given 
that banks are competing for market share a change in any regulatory policy may not positively 
or negatively affect all banks. Hence, our theoretical discussion focused on both country-level and 
bank-level effect of regulation on MS. The country-level effect is analogous to the study of market 
concentration; in other words, the country-level effect is whether the effect of regulation is to 
favour a market with a few banks with a large MS or a large number of banks with smaller MS, 
that is a less/more concentrated market. The bank-level effect of any regulatory policy on an 
individual bank’s MS is expected to depend on a bank’s characteristics. It is known that the 
purpose of regulation in banking is to secure safe and sound banking system by influencing the 
incentives and behaviour of bank managers. In addition to efficiency, which was considered by 
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Gonzalez (2009), risk-taking and the size of banks were also considered to be potential channels 
for the transmission of the effects of regulatory measures on an individual bank’s MS.  
 
Another important issue which resulted from the process of developing the framework for 
analysis is the potential endogeneity due to reverse causality between the identified 
determinants and banks’ MS. In summary, the outcome of Chapter 5 was a framework for analysis 
and a model for the determinants of banks’ MS. 
 
The empirical analysis of the determinants of banks’ MS was the subject of analysis in Chapter 6. 
Gonzalez’s static model was extended to a dynamic model. To assume that bank’s MS is static, is 
an unrealistic and restrictive assumption because, as Kim et al. (2003, pp. 51-52) have pointed 
out, “as much as 35% of the average bank’s market share is due to its established bank–borrower 
relationship (on average 13.5 years).” Therefore, we allowed the banks’ MS to be dynamic by 
including the lagged value of the bank’s MS in the empirical model- and the system GMM dynamic 
panel technique was found to be the most appropriate for this empirical analysis (Chapter 6.4). 
The empirical results supported the hypothesis of a dynamic relationship. This implies that the 
past value of a determinant has persistence and impacts on the bank’s competitive position in the 
current period. In terms of the “inside” bank determinants, interesting findings emerged from the 
empirical analysis. In particular, cost efficiency, which was the initial concern of this thesis and for 
which theoretical underpinnings suggested a positive association with banks’ MS, was found not 
to be a significant determinant of banks’ MS in SEECs (Section 6.5.1). This finding allows for an 
alternative interpretation, that banks may gain MS by exercising their market power instead of 
improving their efficiency. However, our empirical analysis did not directly investigate this issue. 
 
The empirical findings supported other factors, such as non-price competition (quality), risk-
taking, the level of capitalization or regulation and supervision to be important and significant 
determinants of a bank’s MS (Section 6.5.1). Specifically, the results suggested a positive and 
significant effect of investments in the quality of services (branch density) which implies that that 
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non-price competition is an important determinant of a bank’s competitive position in SEECs, 
providing support for Sutton’s endogenous sunk cost theory. In addition this finding suggests that, 
in the SEECs, customers still value the access to “bricks-and-mortar” branch offices, despite 
technological progress and innovations (e-banking, the proliferation of automatic teller machines-
ATMs, and the increasing reliance on centralized call centres) that might have been expected to 
reduce the need for easily accessible branch offices. An alternative interpretation of the positive 
and significant effect of branch network on a bank’s MS is that the additional advertising achieved 
by branching may be important for the enhancement of the competitive position of a bank.   
 
In terms of risk taking as a determinant of bank’s MS, we found that excessive risk-taking 
facilitates a bank’s MS expansion. This is consistent with the reviewed literature on lending 
standards that argued banks may reduce collateral requirements (i.e., undertake more risk) in an 
effort to undercut their competitors and increase their MS (Section 5.3.3). Moreover, the 
relevance of risk taking as a determinant of banks’ MS is arguably in line with the prospect theory 
in which riskier projects may provide a decision maker a better chance of achieving the desired 
target than less risky projects, especially if they operate under a defined target. In essence, 
according to the prospect theory the individual underweights merely probable outcomes 
compared to certain outcomes, which implies an individual is risk-averse  in the case of gains and 
risk-seeking in the case of losses (the reflection effect) (Section 5.3.3). However, this thesis did 
not directly test the validity of prospect theory. More capitalized banks were found to be 
associated with a decline in the MS and this finding is consistent with the argument that 
overcapitalized banks lose MS because they do not use their capital to undertake new 
investments. In addition, this is consistent with Berger and Bouwman (2013) who found it puzzling 
that banks with higher capital ratios are likely to lose MS after market crises and in normal times. 
Finally, ownership structure was not found to be a determinant of a bank’s competitive position.  
 
According to the empirical findings “outside” bank determinants play an important role in the 
distribution of the MS across banks at a country level. Activity restrictions were found to positively 
affect the average MS in banking and this is in line with Gonzalez’s (2009) findings. Greater official 
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supervisory power and private monitoring were found to reduce the average MS as expected and 
this is again consistent with the findings of Gonzalez (2009). Considering the effect of capital 
regulation, the results are consistent with the a priori expectation that a more stringent (risk-
based) capital regulation leads to a reduction in the market concentration. Actions undertaken to 
mitigate moral hazard were found not to have a significant effect on the concentration level in 
banking (the average MS of banks). Similarly, macroeconomic development, EU membership and 
the market size were found not to be of significance in determination of a bank’s competitive 
position (Section 6.5.1).  
 
We also investigated whether there was a systematic variation across different size-classes of 
banks which allowed for the estimation of bank-level effects of regulation on market share, using 
the size of the bank, in particular the four largest banks, as a transmission channel of the effect of 
regulation on a bank’s MS (Section 6.5.2). According to the findings there is a systematic variation 
across different bank size-classes only for cost efficiency and excess capital; in other words, these 
two “inside” bank determinants were found to affect the market share of the four largest banks 
differently compared to the other banks. An unexpected finding was related to cost efficiency, 
which was found to have a negative effect on the competitive position of the four largest banks 
in the market and this is the opposite of the theoretical expectation (Boone, 2000, 2004). In terms 
of holding excess capital the results suggested a higher negative effect on the MS of the four 
biggest banks compared to the other banks. These findings are not consistent with Berger and 
Bouwman (2013), because they find that large banks with a higher capital ratio improve their 
market share during banking crises and they are able to maintain their improved market share 
after such crises. However, such a finding is consistent with the arguments that bigger banks are 
more leveraged and hold less capital, while expanding their lending (Section 5.3.4). In terms of 
regulation and supervision, the empirical findings suggest no statistical difference in the effects 
of regulation and supervision on competitive position of big banks and the other banks, which 
contrary to capture theory.  
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Finally, we investigated whether there was a systematic variation in regulatory and supervisory 
practices across different risk-taking behaviour of banks, in other words we investigated the bank-
level effect of regulation and supervision transmitted through the banks’ risk-taking behaviour 
(Section 6.5.2). The empirical findings suggested that the less risky banks are associated with a 
lower market share the more stringent is the capital regulation, indicating that higher capital 
regulation is detrimental for the “good” banks. Similarly, the less risky banks are found to 
experience a decline in their MS in the case of greater official supervision, which again indicates 
that official supervision does not contribute in preventing the banks undertaking higher risk from 
further growing in relative size. On the other hand, we found that less risky banks gain in MS when 
the level of activity restrictions is higher and when more action is undertaken to mitigate moral 
hazard.  
 
7.3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
7.3.1 Cost efficiency of banks in SEECs 
The empirical analysis of cost efficiency has made several contributions to knowledge of banks’ 
cost efficiency in transition economies, in particular SEECs. So far, the empirical contributions on 
cost efficiency focusing on transition countries have dealt almost exclusively with the countries 
that recently joined the EU (including Slovenia and Bulgaria) and to the best of our knowledge, 
there is only one empirical study evaluating cost efficiency in the banking sector for the SEECs 
conducted by Staikouras et al. (2008) (Section 3.3.5). Although Croatia has been the subject of 
analysis in the studies focusing on the more advanced transition economies (the new EU member 
states), and Macedonia and Bulgaria have been rarely included in any empirical study to date, the 
other successor states of former Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro and BiH) and Albania have not 
been examined at all before this study (Chapter 3). Consequently, our study contributes originally 
by investigating the cost efficiency of banks for a unique set of countries which have not been the 
subject of analysis previously.  
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Moreover, the dataset collated for the empirical analysis of this study presents an additional 
contribution to knowledge (Section 4.3). Specifically, as the database Bankscope has a lot of 
missing information on certain important variables for the countries of interest in the period 
2000-2009, we endeavoured to find the missing data from other sources such as the Annual 
Reports of individual banks and the Central Banks’ and other agencies’ reports to augment the 
Bankscope data. During this process we have also cross-checked the Bankscope data with those 
from other sources and any major inconsistencies were resolved. As a result, we increased the 
sample size with the data from other sources that were not available in Bankscope, making it a 
unique dataset, larger and more representative than what has been used in this literature before. 
 
Another contribution to knowledge of this thesis is related to the method employed in the 
estimation of cost efficiency.  We use Random Parameters Models (including the true random 
effects model introduced by Greene, 2005b where the only random parameter is the constant 
term) in the context of Stochastic Frontier Analysis. We identified only one other application in 
the literature (Section 3.3.5), that of Kosak and Zoric (2011), but they employ only the Greene’s 
true random effects model. However we argue that this study also contains a flaw in model 
specification - an inappropriate way of including time trend in a translog functional form. The 
advantage of RPMs models is not only their ability to control for the unobserved heterogeneity 
which is usually confounded with the efficiency itself, but they also allow for control of cross-
sectional heterogeneity in the parameters of the cost function. Hence, it is reasonable to expect 
that cost efficiency estimates obtained from these models would be higher compared to the 
estimates obtained from the commonly used models such as Battese and Coelli (1992, 1995) 
because, by using the former models, the part of the unobserved heterogeneity would be 
disentangled from the error term component representing the efficiency estimate (Section 2.3.3). 
This could be arguably considered as a reason for the higher efficiency estimates obtained in our 
study compared to results from other studies. Therefore, another contribution of the thesis to 
the current literature is the finding that before this study banks’ cost efficiency was possibly 
underestimated. 
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Given the wide use of Battese and Coelli (1992, 1995) models among other SFA researchers we 
also estimated cost efficiency using these models for comparative purposes. However, we 
encountered problems during the estimation procedure (the iteration of the likelihood function 
could not converge properly), implying that this set of models does not adequately fit our dataset 
which is larger and more representative that other datasets used in previous studies – something 
which had already been highlighted as a possibility by Greene (2011). However, none of the 
studies reviewed in Chapter 3 acknowledge such problem. Thus, our findings with respect to 
Battese and Coelli models may be considered as a sign of possible publication bias, hence a 
contribution to knowledge.  
 
Finally, our empirical study on cost efficiency presents a first attempt to investigate the effect of 
technical change on banks’ total costs and implicitly on banks’ efficiency in SEECs. Moreover, so 
far none of the empirical studies on cost efficiency in transition economies investigated the effect 
of joining the EU or the effect of the last financial crisis on cost efficiency. 
 
7.3.2 Determinants of bank’s market share in SEECs 
The analysis in this thesis has several contributions to the existing theoretical and empirical 
knowledge on determinants of banks’ MS. First and foremost, by studying the potential 
determinants of banks’ MS, we learnt that neither the theoretical nor the empirical literature on 
this topic is comprehensively developed. Therefore, we applied a “step by step” strategy and an 
eclectic approach to identify the potential determinants of MS (Chapter 5). In order to develop 
the framework for the empirical analysis various strands of economic literature dealing with 
market structure from different perspectives were considered and discussed. These included the 
literature on measuring competition (the Boone indicator) and the endogenous sunk cost theory, 
the literature on the role of capital and the probability of survival in banking, prospect theory, and 
the literature on lending standards and screening. We made an effort to develop theoretical 
predictions, at least intuitively, of the effect of regulation and supervision on a bank’s competitive 
position and market structure. Hence, the framework for analysis of the determinants of a bank’s 
 275 
 
MS in Chapter 5 presents a contribution to knowledge, because it lays the basis for further 
development of this topic. 
 
The contribution to knowledge is also reflected in the empirical analysis of determinants of banks’ 
MS, in particular the extensions of Gonzalez (2009), which is the only study examining 
determinants of banks’ MS from similar perspective. First, his empirical study considers only one 
“inside” bank determinant, while we went beyond that and identified the potential impact of 
investment in quality, risk-taking behaviour and capital on a bank’s MS. Second, Gonzalez 
estimates a bank’s efficiency by a non-parametric approach, DEA, using a country-specific 
frontier; however the use of a country-specific frontier cannot provide efficiency estimates 
comparable between countries. Hence, we applied a parametric approach, SFA, and Random 
Parameters Models in the context of a common frontier and used comparable efficiency estimates 
across countries in the empirical analysis. Third, Gonzalez assumes the market structure and a 
bank’s market share to have a static relationship. However our empirical findings supported the 
prediction that market share is of a dynamic nature. Finally, although Gonzalez (2009) investigates 
determinants of market structure in 65 countries, his data set includes only two out of eight 
countries subject to analysis in this study, Croatia and Slovenia. Albania, BiH, Bulgaria, Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia were not included in his study. Hence, this is the first empirical attempt 
for identification of the determinants of a bank’s competitive position in SEECs. 
7.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Prior to the discussion on possible policy implications deriving from this thesis, it is important to 
note that this research was not initially motivated by the needs of policy makers, but by a desire 
to understand the determinants of efficiency and market share in banking. However, during the 
process of conducting this research relevant policy implications emerged, which are discussed in 
Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2.  
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7.4.1 Policy implications of the cost efficiency of banks in SEECs 
Berger and Humphrey (1997, p. 21) asserted that research on the efficiency of financial institution 
was to improve managerial performance and to inform government policy usually determined by 
the central banks. In general, cost efficiency analysis could be used as a guideline by managers to 
improve their performance. In particular, the significant time trend used to control for technical 
change in the empirical analysis may be the result of technological progress. If this is the case then 
managers are likely to improve their cost efficiency due to technological progress which could be 
in the form of R&D which could result in new products and services similar to ATMs, debit/credit 
cards and on-line banking which have been introduced since recently in SEECs; or financial 
innovations primarily encouraged by technological changes in telecommunications and data 
processing (using software and hardware for client credit scoring, risk management, automated 
clearing house, etc.).  
 
Another issue which seems to be of relevance for achieving higher cost efficiency levels and 
depends on the manager’s decision is product differentiation and the choice of a suitable product-
mix (the assortment of products and services that bank offers to their customers). This argument 
is supported by the results from the Random Parameters Models used for estimation of cost 
efficiency (Section 4.5.2, Section 4.5.3 and Section 4.5.4). In particular, the estimated effects of 
these two outputs on the total costs were found to substantially vary across banks, suggesting 
that the structure of loans and other earning assets are of relevance with respect to bank’s total 
costs, hence its efficiency. However, given the data limitations with respect to disaggregated data 
(further discussed in Section 7.5) this research was constrained to use only broad definition of 
outputs, therefore we cannot provide any recommendation which product-mix could improve a 
bank’s efficiency. Finally, managers of banks with higher capital at their disposal need to be aware 
that although it may serve to signal higher stability, it is found to have a detrimental effect on cost 
efficiency which probably could be due to the high cost of ownership equity and/or high 
opportunity cost of holding “idle” capital.   
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This study provides some useful findings for government policy, in particular for competition 
policy and for the central banks which are in charge of setting the rules for regulation and 
supervision in banking. It is important for these institutions to learn that the banking sectors in 
SEECs could be considered as highly competitive with cost efficiency about 90 per cent, except for 
the Serbian banking sector with cost efficiency as of about 80 per cent (Section 4.5.4). Moreover, 
efficiency in banking was found to depend on the environmental conditions. In other words, 
stable and expansionary macroeconomic environments are beneficial for banks’ cost efficiency. 
In addition, we found that being an EU member state is associated with a more cost efficient 
banking sector (Section 4.5.3). Hence, it is useful to be learnt that banking cost efficiency possibly 
could be another benefit of joining the single EU market.  
 
Finally, in terms of the competition policy, we found that the more concentrated market structure 
in SEECs is associated with higher total costs, hence lower average cost efficiency (Section 4.5.3). 
In addition to this and contrary to the theoretical predictions, we found that cost efficiency is not 
a significant determinant of MS in SEECs (Section 6.5.1). These findings arguably imply that the 
SCP paradigm, in particular the market power hypothesis, may to some extent explain the market 
structure in the banking sector in SEECs. Therefore, this may be considered as a call for revising 
the competition policies in these countries, if they exist, and to regulate the concentration level 
of the banking sector. 
 
7.3.2 Policy implications of determinants of market share in SEECs 
The analysis of determinants of banks’ MS also provided relevant information for managers and 
governmental institutions. For managers it is useful to learn what determines the bank’s 
competitive position, hence what they needed to change if interested in enhancing this. It was a 
somewhat surprising finding that being a more cost efficient bank is not necessarily the way to 
improve their competitive position (Section 6.5.1). Moreover, big banks were found to lose MS if 
they improve their cost efficiency (Section 6.5.2) and this suggests that the managers may prefer 
an increase in costs which would lower cost efficiency if the higher costs were in the form of 
higher interest paid or additional services provided (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Consequently, 
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the competitive position of a bank depends on factors beyond costs, implying that managers 
should seriously consider non-price competition as a way of enhancing the bank’s competitive 
position (Section 6.5.1). One sort of non-price competition that could be used as a strategy to 
increase the bank’s MS is expansion of the branch network. Another strategy that can be used by 
mangers is undertaking higher risks, however this strategy could be detrimental to the bank’s 
stability in the long run. Holding more capital seems to negatively affect the competitive position, 
hence managers need to invest the excess capital at their disposal (above the requirement levels) 
in order to gain market share.  
    
The findings from this part of the thesis seem to be of much relevance to for the regulatory and 
supervisory practices defined by the central banks, especially because more risk-taking was found 
to be a significant determinant of MS (Section 6.5.1). Moreover, the effects of regulatory and 
supervisory practices on MS were found to differ according to the risk taking of banks (Section 
6.5.2). Given our findings, central banks need to impose higher activity restrictions and introduce 
more activities preventing moral hazard in order to allow less risky banks to enhance their MS. 
On the other hand, more stringent capital regulation and greater official supervision were found 
to have a negative impact on the competitive position of the more solvent banks, hence these 
restrictions need to be relaxed. 
 
7.5 LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
Although this thesis has made several contributions to the existing body of knowledge on cost 
efficiency and determinants of market share in banking, we encountered several constraints in 
the course of this research which may be considered as potential limitations of this thesis. Most 
of these limitations have resulted from the lack of data and its quality (Section 4.3). First, the 
definition of the outputs in banking sector could not be defined precisely because the 
disaggregated data for loans made by banks in SEECs (such as loans to other banks, companies 
and households) is not available (Section 4.3). Hence the outputs in banking had to be defined 
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broadly, although we believe the use of Random Parameters Models and treating the bank’s 
outputs as random parameters was a remedy against potential misspecification (Section 4.4). 
Second, the data for the years before 2000 is very limited (Section 4.3). Therefore, it was not 
possible to make any comparison between the two stages of transition (early and late) for SEECs. 
Although this did not affect our findings for the period under consideration, it certainly limited 
the scope of our research.  
Third, another data-related problem was availability of appropriate indicators on the nature of 
regulation and supervision in the banking sector (Section 6.3). In particular, for regulatory and 
supervisory practices we used the special surveys sponsored by the World Bank, designed and 
implemented by a group of researchers (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2001, 2004, 2008). This 
particular survey was conducted in several waves in 2001, 2003 and 2007, which means that we 
did not have the data on a yearly basis for these variables. Moreover, given that the Survey 
conducted in 2001 was not comparable with the next surveys, we had to exclude the years 2000 
and 2001 from the empirical analysis on the determinants of a bank’s MS. Furthermore, Albania, 
Serbia and Montenegro were included in Survey 2 (2003) but not in Survey 3 (2007). Therefore, 
in the analysis of the determinants of MS covers these countries only for the period 2002-2007 
(and not the entire period). In addition, Serbia and Montenegro were considered together as one 
country in Survey 2. Hence, the same indices are used for both countries. As we used system the 
GMM dynamic panel technique (Section 6.4), which does not requires large time dimension for a 
panel dataset, we believe the shorter time dimension did not affect our empirical results. 
However, because of the limited and irregular data on regulatory and supervisory practices 
(Section 6.3) it was not able to control for the effect of regulation and supervision on cost 
efficiency, given that the estimation of time-varying efficiency requires a long data series (Section 
4.2.2). Hence, in this case efficiency estimation could be affected. However given the use of 
models that control for unobserved heterogeneity we have adjusted for this lack of data as much 
as possible so that cost efficiency estimates are not significantly affected. Next, there is a problem 
of measuring the ex-ante risk of a project and the corresponding realization. As the most widely 
used variable in the literature is the Z-score and it represents a solvency and distance to default 
(Section 6.2.1), but there was no better variable available to us to proxy risk. However, we had to 
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use this as a time invariant variable in order to include Albania, Serbia and Montenegro in the 
analysis. 
  
Fourth, another potential limitation was the possible endogeneity which may result from the 
causality between cost efficiency and bank-specific variables, such as loan impairment charges 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). However, there have not been any developments yet in terms of 
SFA models that could account and control for endogeneity (Greene, 2011). Finally, the 
framework for analysis of the potential determinants of bank’s MS is intuitive than theoretical; 
hence it only represents a step in the development of theory in this area.   
 
 
7.6 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Research does not only provide answers to specific research questions, it also raises new 
challenges and areas for research. As one of the first quantitative analyses of cost efficiency in 
banking in SEECs and of the determinants of MS in banking, we address several research questions 
worth considering for future research and to fill the gaps in this literature. These research 
questions, along with the limitations discussed in the previous section, are presented in what 
follows. 
7.6.1 Cost efficiency of banks in SEECs 
The current literature on efficiency demonstrated that banks are less than fully efficient and there 
is a room for improvements (Section 3.3.4 and 4.5.4). Nevertheless, although some initial 
attempts have been undertaken in terms of the significance of the estimated efficiency levels, still 
procedures for testing the significance of these estimates are underdeveloped (Section 4.5.X). 
Hence, it is important that future research is focused on developing this issue. SFA imposes 
functional forms that restrict the shape of the frontier and specifying more globally flexible 
functional forms, such as Fourier-Flexible functional form, would allow the shape of the frontier 
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to be more freely determined (Section 2.4). Such a specification of the frontier may allow the data 
to provide more accurate efficiency estimates. However, this is conditioned on the data at the 
researcher’s disposal. Other limitations with respect to the methods of estimation efficiency that 
deserve attention for future research is developing approaches that would allow the choice 
among the various models to be based on more clearly determined process.  
 
In terms of the steps needed to build on and extend this study there are several important issues 
that deserve attention though the realization of which mainly depends on data availability. First, 
it would be of interest to investigate the effect of regulation and supervision on banks’ efficiency. 
Second, it would be useful, especially for banks’ managers, to learn the effect of investments in 
quality, such as a branch network on banks’ cost efficiency. Third, it would be beneficial to 
investigate the effect of the organizational structure of the bank on cost efficiency, which could 
provide evidence on whether any restructuring could enhance cost efficiency. Finally, given the 
increased process of consolidation in SEECs, the analysis of the effect of bank consolidation on 
profit and cost efficiency would be a related empirical analysis to go on the agenda of researchers 
(similar work has already been undertaken for other countries).48  
  
7.6.2 Determinants of bank’s market share in SEECs 
Our analysis of the determinants of a bank’s MS, which to some extent present a pioneering work 
in this field, hence it opens many questions that deserve further consideration and present an 
opportunity for future research. First and foremost, our framework for analysis of the 
determinants helped in deriving testable hypotheses, but it is intuitive and eclectic (Section 5.1). 
However, it lays the basis for developing a comprehensive theoretical framework which could 
provide further testable hypotheses for empirical research.  
  
                                                        
48 For example, Montgomery et al. (2015) explore the impact of bank mergers on profit and efficiency in Japanese banks. 
 282 
 
Next, it would be useful to work on a definition of a more representative variable indicating the 
riskiness of projects. Moreover, an interesting issue that arose during this research was “the 
more” risk and capital, which is commonly used in the theoretical literature. However, this 
concept is not discussed in terms of applied empirical research, namely how we are supposed to 
measure “the more” in this context. This thesis provided empirical evidence for the potential 
determinants of a bank’s MS (Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2), however this research could be extended 
form various perspectives. One of them is to investigate whether there is a particular capital 
threshold above which the effect of holding more capital is negatively associated with a bank’s 
MS. Such investigation could also apply for the risk-taking behaviour. Next, we can examine 
whether changes in regulation (Basel I, Basel II and Basel III) differently affect a bank’s competitive 
position. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1 
1.1 EXTENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF FINANCIAL LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS IN SEECs 
Table A1.1 Extent and effectiveness of financial laws and regulations in SEECs, 1998 
Country Extensiveness Effectiveness 
Albania 2+ 2 
BiH 3 2 
Bulgaria 4 4- 
Croatia 3 3 
Macedonia 3 3- 
Slovenia 4 3 
 
Explanation of the scores as proposed by EBRD in Transition Report (1998): 
Extensiveness:  
Score 2: Legal rules governing banking and securities are somewhat limited in scope. Although 
regulations in banking have been amended to accord with core principles, at least one important 
area of regulation remains deficient – for example, capital adequacy, use of international 
accounting standards, use of consolidated comprehensive supervision; 
Score 3: Legislation for banking and securities activities is reasonably comprehensive but would 
benefit from further refinement in some areas. Banking regulations generally conform to the 
Basle Committee’s Core Principles, although regulations concerning bank insolvency and deposit 
protection may not have been adopted; 
Score 4: Comprehensive regulation exists with respect to banking and securities activities that 
conforms generally to minimum international standards. But refinement is still needed in at least 
one important aspect of either banking or securities regulation. For example, many countries in 
this category still need to enact rules concerning money laundering (including “know your 
customer” provisions), or bank insolvency. Legislation concerning shareholder depositories and 
registries is either non-existent or is in its early stages of implementation. 
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The effectiveness of legal rules on banking: 
Score 1: Legal rules governing financial institutions and markets are usually very unclear and often 
contradictory. The regulatory support of the laws is rudimentary. Supervisory mechanisms are 
either non-existent or poor. There are no meaningful procedures in place to make financial laws 
and regulations fully operational;  
Score 2: Legal rules are somewhat unclear and sometimes contradictory. Supervision of banking 
and securities activities exists on an ad hoc basis. But there are few, if any, meaningful procedures 
in place to enforce the law. There may be a lack of adequately trained staff in either banking or 
capital markets regulatory authorities. 
Score 3: Although legal rules governing banking and securities activities are reasonably clear, 
regulatory and supervisory support of the law may be inconsistent so as to create a degree of 
uncertainty. Although the regulator may have engaged in corrective actions against failing banks 
and securities markets practices, enforcement problems still exist. 
Score 4: Legal rules governing banking and securities activities are readily ascertainable. Banking 
laws are generally well supported administratively and judicially, particularly regarding the 
efficient functioning of enforcement measures against failing institutions and illegal market 
practices. For example, the regulator has taken corrective action to liquidate failing banks. 
Enforcement actions against individuals and securities intermediaries are evident, but could still 
benefit from more systematic and rigorous enforcement. Courts have the authority to review 
enforcement decisions or other corrective actions for banks and/or securities firms. 
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1.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL II AND BASEL III 
Table A1.2 Implementation of Basel II 
Country Elements49 Status50 Year51 Remark 
Albania SA 1 2012 (a) In the framework of cooperation with the Bank of Italy, 
a comprehensive revision of the Regulation “On capital 
adequacy ratio” was made in view of approximation with 
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC. This regulation 
has been partially revised several times during 2011, while 
the project for its comprehensive revision is now finalised 
by the working group and it is foreseen to be approved 
(after consultation with banking industry) in 
September 2012. 
(b) The Supervisory Review Process - Pillar 2. According to 
the provisions of regulation “On capital adequacy ratio” it 
is contemplated that the inspectors of the Bank of Albania, 
when they deem it is appropriate, may ask any bank at any 
time for an adequacy ratio higher than the minimum ratio 
(there are some cases when the Bank of Albania imposed 
a higher level of CAR i.e. 12.5% to banks). In addition, 
qualitative elements of Pillar 2 have been taken into 
consideration during situations of potential stress in the 
banking system, while a high demand for withdrawal of 
deposits has also been taken into account. Such elements 
include disallowing banks to distribute their dividend, 
meetings with bank administrators for risk assessment and 
establishment of the necessary capital to cover the risk 
that may stem from unexpected situations. Actually, Bank 
of Albania is working on the ICAAP under the technical 
assistance of Bank of Italy. 
(c) Market discipline/public disclosure (Pillar 3). The 
regulation “On minimum requirements of disclosing 
information from banks and foreign bank branches” 
 FIRB 1 NA 
 AIRB 1 NA 
 BIA 1 2012 
 TSA 1 2012 
 AMA 1 NA 
 P2 1 2013 
 P3 4 2013-14 
                                                        
49 The following abbreviations are used in the table: Pillar 1 – Credit risk: SA = Standardised approach, FIRB = Foundation 
internal ratings-based approach, AIRB = Advanced internal ratings-based approach); Pillar 1 – Operational risk: BIA = Basic 
indicator approach, TSA = Standardised/alternative standardised approach, AMA = Advanced measurement approaches; P2 
= Pillar 2; P3 = Pillar 3. Relevant references can be found in the Questionnaire in Annex 2.   
50 Status indicators are as follows: 1 = Draft regulation not published, 2 = Draft regulation published, 3 = Final rule published, 
4 = Final rule in force, NA = Not applicable 
51 This column denotes the year in which the draft or final rule was or is expected to be published or when the final rule was 
or will be in force. NA means that the jurisdiction is not planning to implement this component or is planning to implement 
the component but does not know the year in which it will be implemented. If you use this please carry it to the other 
Sections 
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(approved by decision no.60, dated 29.08.08 of the 
Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania) sets out the 
minimum requirements, the methods and time lines 
associated with the information that needs to be 
published in the periodic reports of banks and foreign 
bank branches. According to this Regulation, banks should 
publish periodic reports which contain information in 
accordance with the main six categories defined by the 
Basel Committee and EU directive 2006/48/EC (Chapter 5, 
Annex XII) i.e. financial performance and their activities, 
risk profile, practices and strategies in risk management, 
CAR ratio, quality of loan portfolio, accounting policies, 
etc. This regulation is partly in alignment with the above 
mentioned EU directive. This regulation in force dealing 
with Pillar 3 is foreseen to be revised during 2013-2014. 
BiH SA 1 2016 The Revised Strategy was adopted in February in 2013 
with the aim of complying with the CRD directive. The 
drafting of by-laws within Pillar 1 (credit, operational and 
market risk), which refers to the basic and standardised 
approaches, is expected to be finalised in draft form by 
the end of this year or in the first quarter of 2014. The 
plan is to start with a simpler approach to the advanced 
approaches. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is preparing for 
a Quantitative Impact Study in order to determine the 
impact of changes in the regulatory framework – i.e. the 
segment for calculating the capital requirements for the 
standardised approach for credit risk including credit risk 
mitigation to the level of capital adequacy in BiH. 
 FIRB 1 2016 
 AIRB 1 2016 
 BIA 4 2009 
 TSA 1 2016 
 AMA 1 2016 
 P2 1 2016 
 P3 1 2016 
Croatia SA 4 NA  
 FIRB 4 NA  
 AIRB 4 NA  
 BIA 4 NA  
 TSA 4   
 AMA 4   
 P2 4   
 P3 4   
Macedonia SA 4 2012 Pillar II implementation has started in 2008, with the 
development of a new methodology for risk-based 
supervision and a new regulation for risk management. 
The regulation entered into force in 2009. In addition, in 
2012 amendments were made to strengthen the ICAAP 
requirements.  
 FIRB 1 2014 
 AIRB 1 2014 
 BIA 4 2012 
 TSA 4 2012 
 AMA 1 2014 
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 P2 4 2009 
 P3 4 2007 
Montenegro SA 4 2008 The Pillar II requirements of Basel II were incorporated 
into the Capital Adequacy Decision enacted in July 2011 
and applied as of January 1, 2012. The introductuin of 
ICAAP and SREP enabled the supervisory authority to 
ensure that banks have sufficient capital to support all 
material risks to which they are exposed in their 
operations. The first ICAAP reports from banks were 
submitted to the supervisory authority in the first half of 
2012. The Pilar III of Basel II was implemented through the 
Decision on public disclosure. The new Decision 
encouraged market discipline by introducing a set of 
disclosure requirements that will inform market 
participants on the financial statements of the bank, its 
strategies and policies, own funds, capital adequacy, 
information on the credit risk exposure, counterparty risk, 
operational risk etc.  
 FIRB 1 NA 
 AIRB 1 NA 
 BIA 4 2008 
 TSA 4 2008 
 AMA 1 NA 
 P2 4 2012 
 P3 4 2012 
Serbia SA 4 2012 All provisions of Basel II are enacted and in force, with the 
exception of provisions governing securitisation, because 
currently there is no legal basis for securitisation in Serbia 
and banks do not securitisation exposures in their 
portfolio. 
 FIRB 4 2012 
 AIRB 4 2012 
 BIA 4 2012 
 TSA 4 2012 
 AMA 4 2012 
 P2 4 2012 
 P3 4 2012 
Source: Bank for International Settlement (BIS), Financial Stability Institute Survey Basel II, 2.5 and III 
Implementation (2012) 
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Table A1.3 Implementation of Basel III 
Country Elements Status Year Remark 
Albania Liq 1 NA (a) During 2011, The Bank of Albania 
conducted an impact study, regarding Basel III 
liquidity indicators, with participation of all 
banks. Currently there are no plans for 
including these indicators as part of our 
regulatory framework. 
(b) Bank of Albania is now in the process of 
comprehensive revision of the guideline in 
force on Regulatory Capital that is foreseen to 
be concluded within 2012 
 Def cap 1 2012 
 Risk cov 1 NA 
 Conserv 1 NA 
 C-cycl 1 NA 
 LR 1 NA 
BiH Liq 1 2016  
 Def cap 1 2016  
 Risk cov 1 2016  
 Conserv 1 2016  
 C-cycl 1 2016  
 LR 1 2016  
Croatia Liq 1 01/07/2013 Croatia will implement Basel III rules with the 
implementation of the CRR/CRD4 EU 
regulatory package. New rules will enter into 
force on the date of accession of the Republic 
of Croatia to the European Union, which is 
expected to be 1 July 2013. 
 Def cap 1 01/07/2013 
 Risk cov 1 01/07/2013 
 Conserv 1 01/07/2013 
 C-cycl 1 01/07/2013 
 LR 1 01/07/2013 
Macedonia Liq 3 2009 There is a partial implementation of the 
liquidity standards and the definition of 
capital. In 2009, the National Bank of the 
Republic of Macedonia (NBRM) has issued 
liquidity risk regulation requiring banks to 
maintain two liquidity ratios for assets and 
liabilities maturing in the following 30, i.e. 
180 days. Both ratios are similar to the LCR 
defined in Basel III and are adjusted to the 
features of the Macedonian banking system. 
Regarding the definition of capital, due to the 
more conservative approach of the current 
capital adequacy framework, banks were not 
able to use innovative instruments as part of 
their own funds. As a result, in the 
Macedonian capital adequacy methodology, 
there is no difference between the definition 
of core tier 1 and tier 1. In addition to this, 
with the latest changes of this methodology 
from 2012, there are further enhancements 
of the definition of capital, in line with Basel 
III requirements. However, the new 
methodology does not provide for an 
 Def cap 3 2007 & 
2012 
 Risk cov 1 2013+ 
 Conserv 1 2013+ 
 C-cycl 1 2013+ 
 LR 1 2013+ 
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adequate treatment of some of the 
deductible items. 
 
Montenegro Liq 1 2013  
 Def cap 1 2013  
 Risk cov 1 2013  
 Conserv 1 2013  
 C-cycl 1 2013  
 LR 1 2013  
Serbia Liq 1 To be 
defined 
National Bank of Serbia is currently analyzing 
the most suitable manner and timetable for 
Basel III implementation in Serbia, and is set 
to formalize a Strategy for implementation of 
Basel III during year 2012. The Strategy will 
cover all relevant issues of theNew set of 
standards and will put forward timetable for 
adoption of particular requirements 
regarding capital and liquidity standards, 
which will follow EU process for Basel III 
implementation. On the side note, some 
elements of Basel III have already been 
introduced by the regulation based on Basel II 
standards, such as: a) exclusion of Tier 3 
capital from the total regulatory capital; and 
b) introduction of capital conservation buffer 
which effectively disallows banks with CAR of 
below 14.5% (or banks that would fall below 
CAR of 14.5% if dividends were to be paid) to 
pay out dividends. 
 Def cap 1 To be 
defined 
 Risk cov 1 To be 
defined 
 Conserv 4 To be 
defined 
 C-cycl 1 To be 
defined 
 LR 1 To be 
defined 
Source: Bank for International Settlement (BIS), Financial Stability Institute Survey Basel II, 2.5 and III 
Implementation (2012) 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
3.1 SUMMARY OF VARIABLES USED FOR ESTIMATION OF COST EFFICIENCY EMPLOYED IN OTHER 
STUDIES  
Table A3.1 Summary of the variables used for cost efficiency estimation in the studies for transition economies  
Author(s) 
D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
 Dependent variable Independent variables Environmental factors 
Output(s) Input prices Individual bank’s 
characteristics 
Structure of 
the banking 
industry 
Country level 
variables 
Mertnes and 
Urga 2001 
In
te
rm
e
d
ia
ti
o
n
  Total costs (Σ of variable costs, expenses 
for bank’s premises, furniture and 
equipment, and other administrative 
expenses) 
 
Inter-bank loans Consumer 
loans Other investment 
(government and risky 
securities and investment in 
other enterprises 
 
Labour (personnel 
expenses/period avg.TA) 
Deposits (total interest 
expenses/total deposits) 
Capital (expenses for FA 
other AE/average FA (used 
for scale efficiency estimation 
only) 
 
input variables: bank capital; fixed assets;  
bank-specific variable: non-performing loans/total volume 
of loans 
 
Kraft et al. 
(2002) 
P
ro
d
u
ct
i
o
n
 Total costs Loans to enterprises Loans to 
households Deposits to 
enterprises Deposits to 
households 
Capital cost ratio               
Labour cost ratio              
Funding cost ratio 
Ownership status (ui)  
Fixed netputs: Total Assets. Total Equity 
Hasan and 
Merton (2003) 
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 Total costs (interest and noninterest 
expenses) 
Total loans 
Total investments (other 
earning assets) 
Noninterest or fee-related 
income  Total interest bearing 
borrowed funds 
price of borrowed funds 
(total interest expense/total 
borrowed funds) 
price of labour (noninterest 
expenses/number of 
employees) 
 
Netput variables: Equity capital, loan loss provision/total 
loan 
 
In the second stage: 
Liquid asset (cash and securities/TA); Short-term loan/TA; 
Total assests; 
Financial investment/TA; Loans to customers/TA; Customer 
short-term deposit/TA; Equity/TA; Age in business; Opening 
hours (average hours); Asset owned by foreign banks/TA; 
Acquisition dummy variable;  
Foreign ownership dummy variables (0.01–25%, 25.01–50%, 
50.01–75%, 
and 75.01–100%) 
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Weill (2003) 
In
te
rm
e
d
ia
ti
o n
 Total costs (sum of personnel exoenses, 
interest paid and other non-interest 
expenses) 
Loans 
Other earning assets 
Labour (personnel 
expenses/TA)                
Borrowed funds (Interest 
paid/Total funding)        
Physical capital (Other non-
interest expenses/FA) 
Equity; Country dummy 
In the second stage: Ownership dummy variable; 
Loans/investment assets; Deposits/TA; Total assets 
 
Fries and Taci 
(2005) 
In
te
rm
e
d
ia
ti
o
n
 f
o
r 
co
st
s;
 V
al
u
e 
ad
d
ed
 f
o
r 
o
u
tp
u
ts
 Total costs (sum of interest expenses and 
general operating expenses. 
Loans to customers 
Deposits 
 Non-loan assets/TA; Non-performing loans/Total loans; 
Equity/TA; Ownership status; Bank capitalization; Dummy 
variable for different accounting standards; Other earning 
assets/TA; Deposit market share; ROA; ROE. 
CR5; Share of majority foreign-owned banks in total banking 
system assets; Intermediation % (loans/deposits); EBRD 
ordinal index of banking sector reform; Average ratio of 
capital to assets of the banking sector; GDP per capita; 
Nominal market interest rate; Density of deposits  
Bonin et al 
(2005) 
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 Total costs (sum of interest and non-
interest costs) 
Total deposits              Total 
loans    
Total liquid assets and 
investments Liquid assets  
Price of capital (non-interest 
expenses/TA)                          
Price of funds (interest 
expenses/total deposits 
Ownership status   
Rossi et al 
M
o
d
if
ie
d
 
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 Total costs (operating expenses) Loans (performing and 
nonperforming) with 
customers 
Deposits with customers 
Other earning assets 
Labour (Staff expenses/TA) 
Capital (operative-capital 
expenses /adjusted FA) 
Deposits (interest expenses 
/customer deposits) 
In the second stage: 
LLP/total loans; Equity/TA; Loan/TA; Market share; CR5; 
Ownership (% of foreign assets) 
 
Kasman (2005) 
in
te
rm
e
d
ia
ti
o
n
  Total loans 
OEA 
Labour (personnel 
expenses/TA) 
Capital (other operating 
costs/FA) 
Borrowed funds (total 
interest expenses/total 
funding? 
In the second stage: 
ROA; Total costs/Total assets; Equity/Total assets; Total 
loans/TA; 
Total deposits/TA; lnTA; non-interest income/total income; 
financial investments/total assets; ownership status 
(dummy) 
Density population; Income per capita; Density of demand; 
Capital ratio; Intermediation ratio; Money/GDP; GDP 
growth; Inflation 
Telephone lines per 100km2 
Kasman and 
Yildirim (2006) 
V
al
u
e 
ad
d
e
d
 
ap
p
ro
ac
h
 
total costs (interest expensesþnoninterest 
expenses) 
Total loans 
total deposits OEA 
(investment securities)  
Price of labour and physical 
capital (operating costs/TA) 
Price of funds (total interest 
expenses/total deposits and 
other purchased funds 
Density ; of population, Income per capita; Density of 
Demand; 
Capital ratio; HHI; Intermediation ratio; Inflation; M2 to 
GDP;  
GDP growth; LnTA; Market capitalisation (%of GDP) 
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Yildirim and 
Philippatos 
(2007) 
M
o
d
if
ie
d
 v
al
u
e 
ad
d
ed
 Total costs (sum of interest expenses, 
personnel expenses and other operating 
expenses) 
Loans (Net loans) 
Investments (securities, equity 
investments and other 
investments) 
Deposits (demand, savings and 
time-deposits) 
Price of labour (personnel 
expnses/TA) 
Price of borrowed funds 
(interest expenses/customer 
and short-term funding and 
other funding) 
Price of physical capital 
(other operating 
expenses/FA) 
Equity 
In the second stage: 
Ln TA 
Shareholders’ 
equity/TA 
Loans/ta 
Llp/gross loans 
Customer and short-
term funding/total 
funding 
Interbank 
deposits/total 
deposits 
Off-balance 
activity/ta 
Ownership status 
(dummy) 
Listed on Stock 
Exchange (dummy) 
In the 
second 
stage: 
PR H-
statistics 
CR3 
In the second 
stage: 
GDP growth 
 
Staikouras et 
al (2008) 
In
te
rm
e
d
ia
ti
o
n
    Price of non-financial inputs 
(non-interest expenses/TA) 
Price of funds (interest paid 
on borrowed funds/total 
fund. 
level of equity 
cash and due to 
banks/TA LLP/total 
loans, on aggregate 
level 
ownership status 
 
In the second stage: 
loans/TA; bank 
deposits/total funds; 
equity/TA; LLP/loans; 
ROA; MS (in terms of 
assets); bank’s age; 
GDP growth rate 
 
HHI GDP per capita  
Population density 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES USED IN 
CHAPTER 4 
Descriptive statics of the variables used for estimation of the banks’ cost efficiency in SEECs  
Legend of the abbreviations of the variables 
Abbreviation  Full name of the variable 
tc Total costs in ’000 USD 
q1ta Total net loans over total assets ratio 
q2ta Total other earning assets over total assets ratio 
p1 Price of borrowed funds (total interest expenses over total deposits ratio) 
p2 Price of physical capital (non-interest operating) expenses to fixed assets ratio) 
p3 Price of labour (personnel expenses divided over total assets ratio) 
llictac Loan impairment charges to total assets ratio 
mixed 1=if the share of foreign owners is between 21 and 89 per cent, otherwise 0 
foreign9 1=if the share of foreign owners is = or >90 per cent, otherwise 0 
eta Capital (total equity to total assets ratio) 
hhi Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
inm Intermediation ratio (total loans to total deposits in the banking sector ratio) 
dd Demand density (total deposits of the banking sector per km2 ratio) 
inflation Inflation based on Consumer Price Index 
gdpc GDP per capita in constant 2005 prices (USD ’000) 
lpop Population density (number of inhabitants per km2) 
 
by country_name, sort : summarize tc q1ta q2ta p1 p2 p3 llictac mixed foreign9 eta eu hhi 
inm dd inflation gdpc lpop 
 
-> country_name = ALBANIA 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          tc |       107    35834.31    36633.31        700     152614 
        q1ta |       107    .3955908    .1925715   .0021518   .8750516 
        q2ta |       107    .4600925    .2169455   .0270606   .9709077 
          p1 |       107    .0339577    .0100538   .0079051   .0676193 
          p2 |       107    .8879398    .4420119   .0285714    3.06247 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          p3 |       107    .0102573    .0040521   .0043079   .0254289 
     llictac |       107   -2.877299    .1415482  -3.294038  -2.472275 
       mixed |       107    .2336449    .4251401          0          1 
    foreign9 |       107    .6074766    .4906101          0          1 
         eta |       107    .1078123    .0632944   .0234952   .3378863 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          eu |       107           0           0          0          0 
         hhi |       107     2085.61    849.9135   1367.395   4345.261 
         inm |       107    .4007737    .2124605   .1015209   .6784759 
          dd |       107    202.5841    88.11915   58.55817   333.0271 
   inflation |       107    2.846825    1.687135   .0500181   7.770526 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        gdpc |       107    2845.792    518.0856   1949.281    3549.45 
        lpop |       107    4.758715    .0147686    4.74466   4.792633 
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-> country_name = BIH 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          tc |       280    23446.61    32287.43     190.08   183726.5 
        q1ta |       280    .5619537    .1404547   .1515691       .848 
        q2ta |       280    .1862785    .1476853   .0000997   .7980583 
          p1 |       280     .027252    .0224007   .0004028        .25 
          p2 |       280    .8201034    1.107531   .0413223    15.6875 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          p3 |       280    .0243466    .0133864   .0071722   .0789359 
     llictac |       280   -2.722394    .2570872  -3.398018  -1.301839 
       mixed |       280    .0821429    .2750739          0          1 
    foreign9 |       280    .5392857    .4993467          0          1 
         eta |       280     .216568    .1687371   .0465995   .9447853 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          eu |       280           0           0          0          0 
         hhi |       280    737.2004    244.0119   134.4333   1002.159 
         inm |       280    1.142644    .1169051   .9804901   1.544213 
          dd |       280    114.5893    59.16649   18.22544   178.3865 
   inflation |       280    2.736175    2.389849  -.3901942   7.416856 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        gdpc |       280    2944.974    407.6704   2241.695   3391.468 
        lpop |       280     4.32835    .0055061   4.319817   4.336285 
 
-> country_name = BULGARIA 
   Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          tc |       241    79344.77    91801.92   1385.838   358624.7 
        q1ta |       241     .582962    .1695622   .1665924   .9038815 
        q2ta |       241    .2796971    .1778533    .004017   .7303082 
          p1 |       241    .0414275     .046832   .0062156   .4242424 
          p2 |       241    1.503868    2.305935   .2193033   23.67073 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          p3 |       241    .0130945    .0062156   .0029914    .047259 
     llictac |       241   -2.859455    .1978295  -3.698795  -1.939022 
       mixed |       241    .1742739    .3801343          0          1 
    foreign9 |       241    .5767635    .4951005          0          1 
         eta |       241    .1390867    .1054714    .051521   .8204483 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          eu |       241    .6431535     .480066          0          1 
         hhi |       241    737.7292    74.96388   631.1074    891.093 
         inm |       241    .9176791    .0582502   .7932223   .9981217 
          dd |       241    264.9783    133.1914   39.61499    427.227 
   inflation |       241    5.594228     2.98468   2.157107   12.34877 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        gdpc |       241    4027.607    533.7319   2872.957   4634.631 
        lpop |       241    4.252373    .0217465   4.208961   4.283537 
 
-> country_name = CROATIA 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          tc |       329    108375.5      198856   1716.496    1208221 
        q1ta |       329     .581893    .0956783   .2814412   .7507784 
        q2ta |       329     .262978    .1219082   .0216509   .6516115 
          p1 |       329    .0400092    .0190681   .0152017   .2731164 
          p2 |       329    1.284113    1.525116   .0855346         11 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          p3 |       329    .0161193    .0068832   .0049042   .0514286 
     llictac |       329   -2.872334    .2336222  -3.574766   .5169301 
       mixed |       329    .0699088    .2553817          0          1 
    foreign9 |       329    .3130699    .4644489          0          1 
         eta |       329    .1356956    .0677465   .0242274   .3979177 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          eu |       329    .0759878    .2653823          0          1 
         hhi |       329    1631.098     58.6022   1544.922   1754.916 
         inm |       329     1.05975    .1581293   .7196448   1.287084 
          dd |       329     540.381    203.8937   154.8855   753.4911 
   inflation |       329    2.929091    1.308676   1.035615   6.091649 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        gdpc |       329    10089.08    942.3944   8141.477   11376.47 
        lpop |       329    4.367284     .013534   4.334029   4.374666 
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-> country_name = MACEDONIA 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          tc |       147    21065.73    24290.28   889.5174   102071.7 
        q1ta |       147    .5193515    .1411967   .1591262   .7721533 
        q2ta |       147    .2517826     .162239   .0026882   .7344576 
          p1 |       147    .0330381    .0124774   .0075065   .0694861 
          p2 |       147    .9111828    1.106895   .1571299   9.258741 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          p3 |       147    .0183067    .0067244   .0094439   .0516662 
     llictac |       147   -2.796527    .2828785  -4.479529  -1.283205 
       mixed |       147    .2721088    .4465672          0          1 
    foreign9 |       147    .4421769    .4983432          0          1 
         eta |       147    .2075774    .1328879   .0679182    .665464 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          eu |       147           0           0          0          0 
         hhi |       147    1121.251    129.2089   734.1375   1257.581 
         inm |       147    .7908921    .1013917   .5983645   1.002173 
          dd |       147    131.2825    70.59025   22.10143   226.8739 
   inflation |       147    2.843698    2.517929   -.739634   8.331897 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        gdpc |       147    3061.005    334.9232   2560.248   3490.222 
        lpop |       147    4.413409    .0103666   4.390704   4.424706 
 
 
 
-> country_name = MONTENEGRO 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          tc |        79    20187.14    21605.89    1434.88   102150.2 
        q1ta |        79    .6367747    .1375432   .3333333   .8884486 
        q2ta |        79    .1297791     .097255   9.33e-06   .3728663 
          p1 |        79    .0356088    .0169649   .0053476   .0967742 
          p2 |        79    1.133069    .5270005   .4813206   2.647059 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          p3 |        79    .0276825    .0151836   .0051227   .0652174 
     llictac |        79   -2.771804    .5139787   -6.73727  -1.633929 
       mixed |        79    .1898734    .3947069          0          1 
    foreign9 |        79    .5822785    .4963352          0          1 
         eta |        79    .2086625    .1562291   .0405735   .7794872 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          eu |        79           0           0          0          0 
         hhi |        79    1594.693    372.3834   1050.323    2330.12 
         inm |        79    1.090302    .2289004   .7428108   1.365682 
          dd |        79    145.1682     73.6305   19.81435   228.8677 
   inflation |        79    4.220613    2.196549   .6549466   8.758728 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        gdpc |        79    4232.007    451.4703   3382.366   4688.969 
        lpop |        79    3.827592     .003706   3.820116   3.832482 
 
 
-> country_name = SERBIA 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          tc |       269    110497.4    200473.2   1563.411    1648594 
        q1ta |       269    .5441101    .1238057   .1185164   .8319448 
        q2ta |       269    .1643793    .1222969   7.41e-07   .7507664 
          p1 |       269     .042477    .0240481    .004232   .2051444 
          p2 |       269    2.949892    5.284288   .0719501   43.39926 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          p3 |       269    .0269474    .0156229   .0042455   .1019022 
     llictac |       269   -2.615218    .4366264  -3.647738  -.6682643 
       mixed |       269    .1449814    .3527384          0          1 
    foreign9 |       269    .5799257    .4944905          0          1 
         eta |       269    .2271636    .1209686   .0075599    .917936 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          eu |       269           0           0          0          0 
         hhi |       269    508.2773    77.10771   265.5162   575.1907 
         inm |       269    1.178909    .1050029   .9890644   1.291758 
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          dd |       269    139.8881    60.80814   32.53541   205.5473 
   inflation |       269    10.28424    3.367343   6.142554   19.49083 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        gdpc |       269    3607.772    317.3958   2844.504   3903.545 
        lpop |       269    4.432868    .0113162   4.413967   4.451481 
 
 
-> country_name = SLOVENIA 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          tc |       215    142162.2    235968.2   3040.009    1595018 
        q1ta |       215    .6001949    .1628065   .0097242   .8996958 
        q2ta |       215    .3363015    .1650154   .0785721   .9518926 
          p1 |       215    .0396868    .0171839   .0111371    .130141 
          p2 |       215    .8596509     .624665   .1826625   3.648649 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          p3 |       215    .0116785    .0042242   .0020557   .0221966 
     llictac |       215   -2.844082    .1415345  -3.394656  -2.295864 
       mixed |       215    .0232558    .1510666          0          1 
    foreign9 |       215    .3209302    .4679235          0          1 
         eta |       215    .0910403    .0434409   .0207913   .3228184 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          eu |       215    .7906977      .40776          0          1 
         hhi |       215    1886.438    343.3017   1189.411   2279.941 
         inm |       215    .9015864    .1254658   .7318537   1.101928 
          dd |       215    1811.569    852.4128   485.1053   2907.524 
   inflation |       215     4.12934     2.50925   .8559201   8.878803 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        gdpc |       215    18021.42    1671.915   15033.47   20706.67 
        lpop |       215    4.606692    .0119845   4.592642   4.626856 
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4.2 BATTESE AND COELLI MODELS (PRINTOUTS) 
4.2.1 BC1 
BC1 MODEL (THE BASELINE MODEL WITH YEARS) 
FRONTIER;cost; LHS = ltcp3ta ; rhs=vicka, llictac, leta, foreign9, mixed, lpop, 
lDD, linm, lgdpc, lhhi, infl,eu, 
y01,y02,y03,y04,y05,y06,y07,y08,y09,y10,y11,y12; output=3$  
FRONTIER;cost; LHS = ltcp3ta ; rhs=vicka, llictac, leta, foreign9, mixed, lpop, 
lDD, linm, lgdpc, lhhi, infl,eu, 
y01,y02,y03,y04,y05,y06,y07,y08,y09,y10,y11,y12; output=3;  
PDS=bank ; MODEL = BC ; halton=500; table=ebc1; EFF = UI_BC1$ create; 
ebc1=exp(-ui_bc1)$ dstat; rhs=ebc1$ 
Vicka= one, LQ1TA, LQ2TA, LP1P3, LP2P3, lq1q2, lqq1, lqq2, lp1p3h, lp2p3h, 
lp1p2, lq1p1, lq1p2, lq2p1, lq2p2$ 
 
Initial iterations cannot improve function.Status=3 
  Error   805: Initial iterations cannot improve function.Status=3 
Function= -.19074973211D+03, at entry, -.18924131118D+03 at exit 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 25, 2014 at 06:56:29PM.| 
| Dependent variable              LTCP3TA     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             1667     | 
| Iterations completed                  1     | 
| Log likelihood function        190.7497     | 
| Number of parameters                 41     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          -.17966     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          -.17839     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          -.04639     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          -.13028     | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Frontier model estimated with PANEL data.   | 
| Estimation based on   153 individuals.      | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .02296   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .08023   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .15152   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .28325   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=       .32123   | 
| Stochastic Cost Frontier, e=v+u.            | 
| Time varying u(i,t)=exp[-eta(t-T)]*|U(i)|   | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    -.27442714       .52121555     -.527   .5985 
 LQ1TA   |     .14557255       .07945724     1.832   .0669   -.63996924 
 LQ2TA   |     .16379424       .02340377     6.999   .0000  -1.70110077 
 LP1P3   |     .07331971       .01566386     4.681   .0000    .70390787 
 LP2P3   |     .01075605       .02012142      .535   .5930   3.99750610 
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 LQ1Q2   |     .09317155       .01840439     5.062   .0000    .89627491 
 LQQ1    |     .03944467       .01508079     2.616   .0089    .30782592 
 LQQ2    |     .00352202       .00237294     1.484   .1377   1.98486666 
 LP1P3H  |    -.00410371       .00446204     -.920   .3577    .59791174 
 LP2P3H  |     .01659100       .00282820     5.866   .0000   8.54926267 
 LP1P2   |     .03877715       .00326936    11.861   .0000   3.26625619 
 LQ1P1   |    -.00610029       .01070171     -.570   .5687   -.43396599 
 LQ1P2   |    -.01320987       .01444229     -.915   .3604  -2.51821860 
 LQ2P1   |    -.01743471       .00659343    -2.644   .0082  -1.11658896 
 LQ2P2   |    -.03323895       .00291041   -11.421   .0000  -6.75933772 
 LLICTAC |    -.03407762       .01537716    -2.216   .0267  -2.78902282 
 LETA    |    -.08082214       .00731075   -11.055   .0000  -1.99239234 
 FOREIGN9|    -.02958759       .01586149    -1.865   .0621    .47630474 
 MIXED   |     .05449419       .01802930     3.023   .0025    .12717457 
 LPOP    |     .25801813       .10916026     2.364   .0181   4.38920813 
 LDD     |    -.00482979       .02889653     -.167   .8673   5.45846806 
 LINM    |     .02295658       .03046951      .753   .4512   -.06002421 
 LGDPC   |    -.05763781       .04610449    -1.250   .2112   8.55381656 
 LHHI    |     .03255689       .02397702     1.358   .1745   6.93438002 
 INFL    |    1.54408298       .18437855     8.375   .0000    .04672069 
 EU      |    -.05606941       .01667397    -3.363   .0008    .20995801 
 Y01     |     .00692600       .04091871      .169   .8656    .04499100 
 Y02     |     .03928108       .03244601     1.211   .2260    .06118776 
 Y03     |     .01589432       .03584439      .443   .6575    .07678464 
 Y04     |    -.02602512       .03554562     -.732   .4641    .08458308 
 Y05     |    -.08895267       .04071543    -2.185   .0289    .08878224 
 Y06     |    -.09014305       .04763967    -1.892   .0585    .08998200 
 Y07     |    -.04925609       .05130728     -.960   .3370    .09058188 
 Y08     |    -.07849009       .05210571    -1.506   .1320    .08998200 
 Y09     |     .02489374       .05277275      .472   .6371    .08878224 
 Y10     |     .01113372       .05045829      .221   .8254    .08398320 
 Y11     |    -.01480029       .05121715     -.289   .7726    .08398320 
 Y12     |     .00463596       .04957604      .094   .9255    .08218356 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    1.86936024       .07006574    26.680   .0000 
 Sigma(u)|     .28325305       .00473259    59.852   .0000 
---------+Eta parameter for time varying inefficiency 
 Eta     |     .01000000       .00486271     2.056   .0397 
 
--> create; ebc1=exp(-ui_bc1)$ 
--> dstat; rhs=ebc1$ 
Descriptive Statistics 
All results based on nonmissing observations. 
=============================================================================== 
Variable     Mean       Std.Dev.     Minimum      Maximum        Cases Missing 
=============================================================================== 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
All observations in current sample 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
EBC1    |  .809146      .103707      .360280      .993644         1667       0 
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4.2.2 BC2 
BC2 MODEL (HETEROSCEDASTIC WITH YEARS) 
FRONTIER;cost; LHS = ltcp3ta ; rhs=vicka, lpop, lDD, linm, lgdpc, lhhi, infl, 
eu, y01,y02,y03,y04,y05,y06,y07,y08,y09,y10,y11,y12; output=3$ 
FRONTIER;cost; LHS = ltcp3ta ; rhs=vicka, lpop, lDD, linm, lgdpc, lhhi, infl, 
eu, y01,y02,y03,y04,y05,y06,y07,y08,y09,y10,y11,y12; output=3 
;HFU = llictac, leta, foreign9, mixed; PDS=bank ;MODEL = BC 
;EFF = UI_BC2; table=ebc2$ create; ebc2=exp(-ui_bc2)$ dstat; rhs=ebc2$ 
Vicka= one, LQ1TA, LQ2TA, LP1P3, LP2P3, lq1q2, lqq1, lqq2, lp1p3h, lp2p3h, 
lp1p2, lq1p1, lq1p2, lq2p1, lq2p2$ 
 
Initial iterations cannot improve function.Status=3 
  Error   805: Initial iterations cannot improve function.Status=3 
Function= -.25062052975D+03, at entry, -.24869659489D+03 at exit 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 25, 2014 at 06:57:55PM.| 
| Dependent variable              LTCP3TA     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             1667     | 
| Iterations completed                  1     | 
| Log likelihood function        250.6205     | 
| Number of parameters                 40     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          -.25269     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          -.25148     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          -.12267     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          -.20451     | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Frontier model estimated with PANEL data.   | 
| Estimation based on   153 individuals.      | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .02832   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .06935   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .16829   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .26335   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=       .31253   | 
| Stochastic Cost Frontier, e=v+u.            | 
| Time varying u(i,t)=exp[eta*z(i,t)]*|U(i)|  | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|     .21575655       .48411686      .446   .6558 
 LQ1TA   |     .21754597       .09857589     2.207   .0273   -.63996924 
 LQ2TA   |     .19167183       .02843799     6.740   .0000  -1.70110077 
 LP1P3   |     .10769724       .02086058     5.163   .0000    .70390787 
 LP2P3   |     .01588409       .02434510      .652   .5141   3.99750610 
 LQ1Q2   |     .10465513       .02097521     4.989   .0000    .89627491 
 LQQ1    |     .05504690       .01629188     3.379   .0007    .30782592 
 LQQ2    |     .00399459       .00279886     1.427   .1535   1.98486666 
 LP1P3H  |    -.01097500       .00442994    -2.477   .0132    .59791174 
 LP2P3H  |     .01288854       .00349260     3.690   .0002   8.54926267 
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 LP1P2   |     .03738222       .00379395     9.853   .0000   3.26625619 
 LQ1P1   |     .00645657       .01120186      .576   .5644   -.43396599 
 LQ1P2   |    -.02671772       .01704097    -1.568   .1169  -2.51821860 
 LQ2P1   |    -.01354711       .00721703    -1.877   .0605  -1.11658896 
 LQ2P2   |    -.03850793       .00377010   -10.214   .0000  -6.75933772 
 LPOP    |     .23981502       .08788274     2.729   .0064   4.38920813 
 LDD     |     .03179375       .03366025      .945   .3449   5.45846806 
 LINM    |     .01784252       .03531406      .505   .6134   -.06002421 
 LGDPC   |    -.09372585       .05121329    -1.830   .0672   8.55381656 
 LHHI    |     .03360655       .02663336     1.262   .2070   6.93438002 
 INFL    |    1.54143441       .18449729     8.355   .0000    .04672069 
 EU      |    -.05224444       .02023288    -2.582   .0098    .20995801 
 Y01     |     .01118437       .04885555      .229   .8189    .04499100 
 Y02     |     .03614124       .03888133      .930   .3526    .06118776 
 Y03     |     .00662208       .04130037      .160   .8726    .07678464 
 Y04     |    -.04288146       .04158310    -1.031   .3024    .08458308 
 Y05     |    -.10644815       .04810400    -2.213   .0269    .08878224 
 Y06     |    -.12101581       .05319853    -2.275   .0229    .08998200 
 Y07     |    -.10185548       .06155094    -1.655   .0980    .09058188 
 Y08     |    -.13242822       .05942903    -2.228   .0259    .08998200 
 Y09     |    -.03085888       .06217421     -.496   .6197    .08878224 
 Y10     |    -.04163935       .05968513     -.698   .4854    .08398320 
 Y11     |    -.06615051       .05677290    -1.165   .2439    .08398320 
 Y12     |    -.04857798       .05688788     -.854   .3931    .08218356 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    1.56490629       .12074857    12.960   .0000 
 Sigma(u)|     .26335165       .00665737    39.558   .0000 
---------+Coefficients in u(i,t)=[exp{eta*z(i,t)}]*|U(i)| 
 LLICTAC |     .00010000       .06498135      .002   .9988 
 LETA    |     .00010000       .02937305      .003   .9973 
 FOREIGN9|     .00010000       .08500599      .001   .9991 
 MIXED   |     .00010000       .08355841      .001   .9990 
 
--> create; ebc2=exp(-ui_bc2)$ 
--> dstat; rhs=ebc2$ 
Descriptive Statistics 
All results based on nonmissing observations. 
=============================================================================== 
Variable     Mean       Std.Dev.     Minimum      Maximum        Cases Missing 
=============================================================================== 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
All observations in current sample 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
EBC2    |  .817771      .100316      .398910      .993823         1667       0 
  
 336 
 
4.2.3 BC3 
BC3 MODEL (DISTRIBUTION OF UNDERLYING MEAN WITH YEARS) 
FRONTIER;cost; LHS = ltcp3ta ; rhs=vicka, lpop, lDD, linm, lgdpc, lhhi, infl, 
eu, y01,y02,y03,y04,y05,y06,y07,y08,y09,y10,y11,y12; output=3 
;RH2 = one, llictac, leta, foreign9, mixed; PDS=bank ;MODEL = BC; table=bc3 
;EFF = UI_BC3$ create; ebc3=exp(-ui_bc3)$ dstat; rhs=ebc3$ 
vicka= one, LQ1TA, LQ2TA, LP1P3, LP2P3, lq1q2, lqq1, lqq2, lp1p3h, lp2p3h, 
lp1p2, lq1p1, lq1p2, lq2p1, lq2p2$ 
 
Initial iterations cannot improve function.Status=3 
  Error   805: Initial iterations cannot improve function.Status=3 
Function=  .73137687010D+02, at entry,  .29546147282D+02 at exit 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 25, 2014 at 06:58:37PM.| 
| Dependent variable              LTCP3TA     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             1667     | 
| Iterations completed                  2     | 
| Log likelihood function       -27.14132     | 
| Number of parameters                 42     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =           .08295     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =           .08429     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =           .21948     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =           .13355     | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Frontier model estimated with PANEL data.   | 
| Estimation based on   153 individuals.      | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .06212   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .91686   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .24925   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .95753   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=       .98944   | 
| Stochastic Cost Frontier, e=v+u.            | 
| Time varying u(i,t)=exp[-eta(t-T)]*|U(i)|   | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|     .72306052       .79728090      .907   .3645 
 LQ1TA   |     .26917213       .19464756     1.383   .1667   -.63996924 
 LQ2TA   |     .19406333       .05029139     3.859   .0001  -1.70110077 
 LP1P3   |     .00806643       .04309799      .187   .8515    .70390787 
 LP2P3   |     .15758950       .05980579     2.635   .0084   3.99750610 
 LQ1Q2   |     .08881018       .03848794     2.307   .0210    .89627491 
 LQQ1    |     .05143407       .03488092     1.475   .1403    .30782592 
 LQQ2    |     .00127157       .00500948      .254   .7996   1.98486666 
 LP1P3H  |    -.07456416       .00927473    -8.040   .0000    .59791174 
 LP2P3H  |    -.05195280       .00876753    -5.926   .0000   8.54926267 
 LP1P2   |     .08418035       .00722807    11.646   .0000   3.26625619 
 LQ1P1   |     .00390184       .02398936      .163   .8708   -.43396599 
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 LQ1P2   |    -.04401561       .03737207    -1.178   .2389  -2.51821860 
 LQ2P1   |    -.01548468       .01437903    -1.077   .2815  -1.11658896 
 LQ2P2   |    -.03694369       .00485074    -7.616   .0000  -6.75933772 
 LPOP    |     .17088068       .10444369     1.636   .1018   4.38920813 
 LDD     |     .08421152       .06410860     1.314   .1890   5.45846806 
 LINM    |     .02192161       .08221411      .267   .7897   -.06002421 
 LGDPC   |    -.15010416       .10099121    -1.486   .1372   8.55381656 
 LHHI    |     .03653431       .05586477      .654   .5131   6.93438002 
 INFL    |    1.36472786       .54229547     2.517   .0119    .04672069 
 EU      |    -.03996249       .04388080     -.911   .3625    .20995801 
 Y01     |     .01162910       .09433016      .123   .9019    .04499100 
 Y02     |     .01948998       .08053427      .242   .8088    .06118776 
 Y03     |    -.01766742       .09101121     -.194   .8461    .07678464 
 Y04     |    -.08201526       .08813943     -.931   .3521    .08458308 
 Y05     |    -.12289747       .10381217    -1.184   .2365    .08878224 
 Y06     |    -.14901090       .10917265    -1.365   .1723    .08998200 
 Y07     |    -.14808066       .13461570    -1.100   .2713    .09058188 
 Y08     |    -.17507095       .12583874    -1.391   .1642    .08998200 
 Y09     |    -.10386458       .13171791     -.789   .4304    .08878224 
 Y10     |    -.11235994       .12092821     -.929   .3528    .08398320 
 Y11     |    -.12847939       .12776392    -1.006   .3146    .08398320 
 Y12     |    -.11128975       .11457985     -.971   .3314    .08218356 
---------+Offset [mean=mu(i)] parameters in one sided error 
 Constant|    1.51104170      15.1658287      .100   .9206   1.00000000 
 LLICTAC |    1.15601553      11.2300330      .103   .9180  -2.78902282 
 LETA    |    2.17439002      18.9078663      .115   .9084  -1.99239234 
 FOREIGN9|     .13984995      2.25473986      .062   .9505    .47630474 
 MIXED   |     .52863747      4.30286577      .123   .9022    .12717457 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    3.84168086      1.10837084     3.466   .0005 
 Sigma(u)|     .95753060      4.26042016      .225   .8222 
---------+Eta parameter for time varying inefficiency 
 Constant|     .00868717       .01263757      .687   .4918 
 
--> create; ebc3=exp(-ui_bc3)$ 
--> dstat; rhs=ebc3$ 
Descriptive Statistics 
All results based on nonmissing observations. 
=============================================================================== 
Variable     Mean       Std.Dev.     Minimum      Maximum        Cases Missing 
=============================================================================== 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
All observations in current sample 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
EBC3    |  .825763      .108165      .285669      .988428         1667       0 
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4.2.4 BC1T 
BC1T MODEL (THE BASELINE MODEL WITH TIME TREND) 
FRONTIER;cost; LHS = ltcp3ta ; rhs=vicka, llictac, leta, foreign9,mixed, lpop, 
lDD, linm, lgdpc, lhhi, infl,eu, t,th,tq1, tq2, tp1, tp2,y08,y09; output=3$ 
FRONTIER;cost; LHS = ltcp3ta ; rhs=vicka, llictac, leta, foreign9,mixed, lpop, 
lDD, linm, lgdpc, lhhi, infl,eu, t,th,tq1, tq2, tp1, tp2,y08,y09; 
halton;pts=500;output=3; PDS=bank ; MODEL = BC ;table=ebc1t;EFF = UI_BC1T$ 
create; ebc1T=exp(-ui_bc1T)$ dstat; rhs=ebc1T$ 
vicka= one, LQ1TA, LQ2TA, LP1P3, LP2P3, lq1q2, lqq1, lqq2, lp1p3h, lp2p3h, 
lp1p2, lq1p1, lq1p2, lq2p1, lq2p2$ 
 
 
Initial iterations cannot improve function.Status=3 
  Error   805: Initial iterations cannot improve function.Status=3 
Function= -.15957729140D+03, at entry, -.14894774831D+03 at exit 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 25, 2014 at 06:59:41PM.| 
| Dependent variable              LTCP3TA     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             1667     | 
| Iterations completed                  1     | 
| Log likelihood function        159.5773     | 
| Number of parameters                 37     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          -.14706     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          -.14603     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          -.02679     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          -.10249     | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Frontier model estimated with PANEL data.   | 
| Estimation based on   153 individuals.      | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .02184   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .08389   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .14777   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .28963   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=       .32515   | 
| Stochastic Cost Frontier, e=v+u.            | 
| Time varying u(i,t)=exp[-eta(t-T)]*|U(i)|   | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|     .13951851       .57072118      .244   .8069 
 LQ1TA   |     .15042806       .06639421     2.266   .0235   -.63996924 
 LQ2TA   |     .16611148       .02428300     6.841   .0000  -1.70110077 
 LP1P3   |     .02101575       .01486898     1.413   .1575    .70390787 
 LP2P3   |     .00118903       .01895428      .063   .9500   3.99750610 
 LQ1Q2   |     .09590063       .01995518     4.806   .0000    .89627491 
 LQQ1    |     .03494627       .01278680     2.733   .0063    .30782592 
 LQQ2    |     .00665020       .00247235     2.690   .0071   1.98486666 
 LP1P3H  |    -.00545892       .00446207    -1.223   .2212    .59791174 
 LP2P3H  |     .02018239       .00264312     7.636   .0000   8.54926267 
 LP1P2   |     .02902523       .00328657     8.831   .0000   3.26625619 
 339 
 
 LQ1P1   |    -.02027437       .01004483    -2.018   .0436   -.43396599 
 LQ1P2   |    -.01868831       .01223663    -1.527   .1267  -2.51821860 
 LQ2P1   |    -.01680619       .00654430    -2.568   .0102  -1.11658896 
 LQ2P2   |    -.04229389       .00341730   -12.376   .0000  -6.75933772 
 LLICTAC |    -.03099743       .01386793    -2.235   .0254  -2.78902282 
 LETA    |    -.07940294       .00793940   -10.001   .0000  -1.99239234 
 FOREIGN9|    -.02982772       .01679750    -1.776   .0758    .47630474 
 MIXED   |     .05195322       .01935192     2.685   .0073    .12717457 
 LPOP    |     .22931282       .12579643     1.823   .0683   4.38920813 
 LDD     |     .03448410       .02866108     1.203   .2289   5.45846806 
 LINM    |     .02040247       .03386750      .602   .5469   -.06002421 
 LGDPC   |    -.10111773       .04840555    -2.089   .0367   8.55381656 
 LHHI    |     .03550615       .02348220     1.512   .1305   6.93438002 
 INFL    |    1.54818484       .16676372     9.284   .0000    .04672069 
 EU      |    -.08359009       .01952350    -4.282   .0000    .20995801 
 T       |    -.03377495       .00958795    -3.523   .0004   7.62267546 
 TH      |     .00600535       .00095242     6.305   .0000   34.9109178 
 TQ1     |     .00537385       .00398355     1.349   .1773  -4.37594550 
 TQ2     |     .00526132       .00127405     4.130   .0000  -14.0808136 
 TP1     |     .01130258       .00175748     6.431   .0000   5.99915400 
 TP2     |    -.00285947       .00092112    -3.104   .0019   31.7636015 
 Y08     |    -.02986275       .02592450    -1.152   .2494    .08998200 
 Y09     |     .06136098       .02487653     2.467   .0136    .08878224 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    1.96000710       .06177932    31.726   .0000 
 Sigma(u)|     .28963271       .00448146    64.629   .0000 
---------+Eta parameter for time varying inefficiency 
 Eta     |     .01000000       .00479432     2.086   .0370 
 
--> create; ebc1T=exp(-ui_bc1T)$ 
--> dstat; rhs=ebc1T$ 
Descriptive Statistics 
All results based on nonmissing observations. 
=============================================================================== 
Variable     Mean       Std.Dev.     Minimum      Maximum        Cases Missing 
=============================================================================== 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
All observations in current sample 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
EBC1T   |  .806124      .104502      .353852      .994078         1667       0 
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4.2.5 BC2T 
BC2T MODEL (HETEROSCEDASTIC WITH TIME TREND) 
FRONTIER;cost; LHS = ltcp3ta ; rhs=vicka, lpop, lDD, linm, lgdpc, lhhi, infl, 
eu, t,th,tq1, tq2, tp1, tp2,y08,y09; output=3 
;HFU = llictac, leta, foreign9, mixed; PDS=bank ;MODEL = BC; table=ebc2t 
;EFF = UI_BC2T$ create; ebc2T=exp(-ui_bc2T)$ dstat; rhs=ebc2T$ 
vicka= one, LQ1TA, LQ2TA, LP1P3, LP2P3, lq1q2, lqq1, lqq2, lp1p3h, lp2p3h, 
lp1p2, lq1p1, lq1p2, lq2p1, lq2p2$ 
 
 
Initial iterations cannot improve function.Status=3 
  Error   805: Initial iterations cannot improve function.Status=3 
Function= -.24192340780D+03, at entry, -.23222893417D+03 at exit 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 25, 2014 at 07:00:30PM.| 
| Dependent variable              LTCP3TA     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             1667     | 
| Iterations completed                  1     | 
| Log likelihood function        241.9234     | 
| Number of parameters                 36     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          -.24706     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          -.24608     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          -.13004     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          -.20369     | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Frontier model estimated with PANEL data.   | 
| Estimation based on   153 individuals.      | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .02740   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .07189   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .16554   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .26812   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=       .31511   | 
| Stochastic Cost Frontier, e=v+u.            | 
| Time varying u(i,t)=exp[eta*z(i,t)]*|U(i)|  | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|     .50722085       .51768413      .980   .3272 
 LQ1TA   |     .22209911       .08378136     2.651   .0080   -.63996924 
 LQ2TA   |     .19748889       .02798217     7.058   .0000  -1.70110077 
 LP1P3   |     .05181622       .01846197     2.807   .0050    .70390787 
 LP2P3   |     .00442164       .02325288      .190   .8492   3.99750610 
 LQ1Q2   |     .10642623       .02234433     4.763   .0000    .89627491 
 LQQ1    |     .05001484       .01419658     3.523   .0004    .30782592 
 LQQ2    |     .00688837       .00264025     2.609   .0091   1.98486666 
 LP1P3H  |    -.01016765       .00435806    -2.333   .0196    .59791174 
 LP2P3H  |     .01871123       .00336902     5.554   .0000   8.54926267 
 LP1P2   |     .02607966       .00417727     6.243   .0000   3.26625619 
 LQ1P1   |    -.01094138       .01130393     -.968   .3331   -.43396599 
 LQ1P2   |    -.03042854       .01482605    -2.052   .0401  -2.51821860 
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 LQ2P1   |    -.01158703       .00737468    -1.571   .1161  -1.11658896 
 LQ2P2   |    -.04819601       .00432292   -11.149   .0000  -6.75933772 
 LPOP    |     .22065861       .09902155     2.228   .0259   4.38920813 
 LDD     |     .05740557       .03538544     1.622   .1047   5.45846806 
 LINM    |     .01242589       .03935969      .316   .7522   -.06002421 
 LGDPC   |    -.12019182       .05323415    -2.258   .0240   8.55381656 
 LHHI    |     .03779245       .02648086     1.427   .1535   6.93438002 
 INFL    |    1.54533030       .18398828     8.399   .0000    .04672069 
 EU      |    -.07612770       .02493726    -3.053   .0023    .20995801 
 T       |    -.03974805       .01137634    -3.494   .0005   7.62267546 
 TH      |     .00644374       .00107536     5.992   .0000   34.9109178 
 TQ1     |     .00486406       .00412231     1.180   .2380  -4.37594550 
 TQ2     |     .00495278       .00153110     3.235   .0012  -14.0808136 
 TP1     |     .01244830       .00207420     6.001   .0000   5.99915400 
 TP2     |    -.00361450       .00113722    -3.178   .0015   31.7636015 
 Y08     |    -.03983170       .03302396    -1.206   .2278    .08998200 
 Y09     |     .05448884       .03112602     1.751   .0800    .08878224 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    1.61965141       .10329392    15.680   .0000 
 Sigma(u)|     .26812095       .00592728    45.235   .0000 
---------+Coefficients in u(i,t)=[exp{eta*z(i,t)}]*|U(i)| 
 LLICTAC |     .00010000       .05402059      .002   .9985 
 LETA    |     .00010000       .02666754      .004   .9970 
 FOREIGN9|     .00010000       .07747811      .001   .9990 
 MIXED   |     .00010000       .07453970      .001   .9989 
 
--> create; ebc2T=exp(-ui_bc2T)$ 
--> dstat; rhs=ebc2T$ 
Descriptive Statistics 
All results based on nonmissing observations. 
=============================================================================== 
Variable     Mean       Std.Dev.     Minimum      Maximum        Cases Missing 
=============================================================================== 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
All observations in current sample 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
EBC2T   |  .815739      .101173      .392813      .994188         1667       0 
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4.2.6 BC3T 
BC3 MODEL (DISTRIBUTION OF UNDERLYING MEAN WITH TIME TREND) 
 
FRONTIER;cost; LHS = ltcp3ta ; rhs=vicka, lpop, lDD, linm, lgdpc, lhhi, infl, 
eu, t,th,tq1, tq2, tp1, tp2,y08,y09; output=3 
;RH2 = one, llictac, leta, foreign9, mixed; PDS=bank ;MODEL = BC; table=ebc3t 
;EFF = UI_BC3T$ create; ebc3T=exp(-ui_bc3T)$ dstat; rhs=ebc3T$ 
vicka= one, LQ1TA, LQ2TA, LP1P3, LP2P3, lq1q2, lqq1, lqq2, lp1p3h, lp2p3h, 
lp1p2, lq1p1, lq1p2, lq2p1, lq2p2$ 
 
Initial iterations cannot improve function.Status=3 
  Error   805: Initial iterations cannot improve function.Status=3 
Function=  .20493342945D+03, at entry,  .21061553074D+03 at exit 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 25, 2014 at 07:00:55PM.| 
| Dependent variable              LTCP3TA     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             1667     | 
| Iterations completed                  1     | 
| Log likelihood function       -204.9334     | 
| Number of parameters                 38     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =           .29146     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =           .29255     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =           .41499     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =           .33724     | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Frontier model estimated with PANEL data.   | 
| Estimation based on   153 individuals.      | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .02169   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=      1.70218   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .14727   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =      1.30467   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      1.31296   | 
| Stochastic Cost Frontier, e=v+u.            | 
| Time varying u(i,t)=exp[-eta(t-T)]*|U(i)|   | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|     .87161009       .31795659     2.741   .0061 
 LQ1TA   |     .26037112       .06990755     3.725   .0002   -.63996924 
 LQ2TA   |     .18951986       .01838243    10.310   .0000  -1.70110077 
 LP1P3   |    -.05569111       .01495373    -3.724   .0002    .70390787 
 LP2P3   |     .16301229       .02170781     7.509   .0000   3.99750610 
 LQ1Q2   |     .08316172       .01396363     5.956   .0000    .89627491 
 LQQ1    |     .04677644       .01163503     4.020   .0001    .30782592 
 LQQ2    |     .00373811       .00177011     2.112   .0347   1.98486666 
 LP1P3H  |    -.09485200       .00358576   -26.452   .0000    .59791174 
 LP2P3H  |    -.03758874       .00307866   -12.209   .0000   8.54926267 
 LP1P2   |     .07406705       .00323630    22.886   .0000   3.26625619 
 LQ1P1   |    -.00365433       .00939396     -.389   .6973   -.43396599 
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 LQ1P2   |    -.04625590       .01410230    -3.280   .0010  -2.51821860 
 LQ2P1   |    -.00656136       .00484262    -1.355   .1754  -1.11658896 
 LQ2P2   |    -.04621699       .00307550   -15.027   .0000  -6.75933772 
 LPOP    |     .14802293       .05214039     2.839   .0045   4.38920813 
 LDD     |     .08950476       .02521375     3.550   .0004   5.45846806 
 LINM    |     .01257644       .02996296      .420   .6747   -.06002421 
 LGDPC   |    -.15892462       .03964392    -4.009   .0001   8.55381656 
 LHHI    |     .04019020       .02114240     1.901   .0573   6.93438002 
 INFL    |    1.35705137       .16336413     8.307   .0000    .04672069 
 EU      |    -.05284859       .01783674    -2.963   .0030    .20995801 
 T       |    -.04782630       .00932837    -5.127   .0000   7.62267546 
 TH      |     .00604645       .00086627     6.980   .0000   34.9109178 
 TQ1     |     .00123557       .00322626      .383   .7017  -4.37594550 
 TQ2     |     .00275889       .00127735     2.160   .0308  -14.0808136 
 TP1     |     .01440435       .00133683    10.775   .0000   5.99915400 
 TP2     |    -.00375445       .00092603    -4.054   .0001   31.7636015 
 Y08     |    -.03228641       .02367219    -1.364   .1726    .08998200 
 Y09     |     .03322352       .02131559     1.559   .1191    .08878224 
---------+Offset [mean=mu(i)] parameters in one sided error 
 Constant|    2.17951646      32.6111629      .067   .9467   1.00000000 
 LLICTAC |    1.94343654      29.6857553      .065   .9478  -2.78902282 
 LETA    |    3.72556382      55.0026789      .068   .9460  -1.99239234 
 FOREIGN9|     .10881189      3.30451040      .033   .9737    .47630474 
 MIXED   |     .80318361      12.0499360      .067   .9469    .12717457 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    8.85884630       .84116292    10.532   .0000 
 Sigma(u)|    1.30467499      16.9680964      .077   .9387 
---------+Eta parameter for time varying inefficiency 
 Constant|     .01000000       .00418585     2.389   .0169 
 
--> create; ebc3T=exp(-ui_bc3T)$ 
--> dstat; rhs=ebc3T$ 
Descriptive Statistics 
All results based on nonmissing observations. 
=============================================================================== 
Variable     Mean       Std.Dev.     Minimum      Maximum        Cases Missing 
=============================================================================== 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
All observations in current sample 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
EBC3T   |  .844513      .110302      .320541      .995611         1667       0 
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4.3 RANDOM PARAMETERS MODELS 
4.3.1 TRE1 
TRE1 MODEL (THE BASELINE MODEL WITH YEARS) 
fron;cost;lhs=ltcp3ta;rhs=vicka,leta,llictac,foreign9, mixed,lpop, 
lDD,linm,lgdpc,lhhi,infl,eu, y01,y02,y03,y04,y05,y06,y07,y08,y09,y10,y11,y12; 
output=3 $ 
fron;cost;lhs=ltcp3ta;rhs=vicka,leta,llictac,foreign9, mixed,lpop, 
lDD,linm,lgdpc,lhhi,infl,eu, y01,y02,y03,y04,y05,y06,y07,y08,y09,y10,y11,y12; 
;pds=bank;rpm;fcn=one(n) ;halton;pts=500;output=3; eff=u_tr1; table=etr1$ 
create; etr1=exp(-u_tr1)$ dstat; rhs=etr1$ kernel;rhs=etr1$ 
vicka= one, LQ1TA, LQ2TA, LP1P3, LP2P3, lq1q2, lqq1, lqq2, lp1p3h, lp2p3h, 
lp1p2, lq1p1, lq1p2, lq2p1, lq2p2$ 
 
      * Converged 
Normal exit from iterations. Exit status=0. 
Function= -.13018196230D+03, at entry, -.49474407225D+03 at exit 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Random Coefficients  Frontier Model         | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 25, 2014 at 06:21:22PM.| 
| Dependent variable              LTCP3TA     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             1667     | 
| Iterations completed                 51     | 
| Log likelihood function        494.7441     | 
| Number of parameters                 41     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          -.54438     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          -.54311     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          -.41111     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          -.49500     | 
| Restricted log likelihood      .0000000     | 
| Chi squared                    989.4881     | 
| Degrees of freedom                    1     | 
| Prob[ChiSqd > value] =         .0000000     | 
| Unbalanced panel has     153 individuals.   | 
| Stochastic frontier (half normal)           | 
| Simulation based on 500 Halton draws        | 
| Sigma( u) (1 sided)  =      .22174          | 
| Sigma( v) (symmetric)=      .09243          | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Production / Cost parameters, nonrandom first 
 LQ1TA   |     .16510482       .07109498     2.322   .0202   -.63996924 
 LQ2TA   |     .18132081       .02557437     7.090   .0000  -1.70110077 
 LP1P3   |     .16675514       .01851236     9.008   .0000    .70390787 
 LP2P3   |    -.01882624       .01955638     -.963   .3357   3.99750610 
 LQ1Q2   |     .08040451       .01716940     4.683   .0000    .89627491 
 LQQ1    |     .01613077       .01621761      .995   .3199    .30782592 
 LQQ2    |     .00638684       .00249671     2.558   .0105   1.98486666 
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 LP1P3H  |     .08516862       .00629463    13.530   .0000    .59791174 
 LP2P3H  |     .04210840       .00303916    13.855   .0000   8.54926267 
 LP1P2   |     .00111331       .00410175      .271   .7861   3.26625619 
 LQ1P1   |    -.03937156       .01261680    -3.121   .0018   -.43396599 
 LQ1P2   |    -.01452042       .01301702    -1.115   .2646  -2.51821860 
 LQ2P1   |     .01287013       .00638274     2.016   .0438  -1.11658896 
 LQ2P2   |    -.03621685       .00398988    -9.077   .0000  -6.75933772 
 LETA    |    -.03924540       .00657453    -5.969   .0000  -1.99239234 
 LLICTAC |    -.02970646       .01320245    -2.250   .0244  -2.78902282 
 FOREIGN9|    -.04760175       .00895126    -5.318   .0000    .47630474 
 MIXED   |    -.00645082       .01312287     -.492   .6230    .12717457 
 LPOP    |     .23146067       .03263158     7.093   .0000   4.38920813 
 LDD     |     .02697741       .02284399     1.181   .2376   5.45846806 
 LINM    |     .11200524       .02998448     3.735   .0002   -.06002421 
 LGDPC   |    -.10643633       .03554248    -2.995   .0027   8.55381656 
 LHHI    |     .07011296       .02015208     3.479   .0005   6.93438002 
 INFL    |     .68393462       .16271694     4.203   .0000    .04672069 
 EU      |    -.02704988       .01417936    -1.908   .0564    .20995801 
 Y01     |    -.00463397       .04273983     -.108   .9137    .04499100 
 Y02     |    -.01119594       .03307470     -.339   .7350    .06118776 
 Y03     |    -.05972645       .03285819    -1.818   .0691    .07678464 
 Y04     |    -.10587144       .03350757    -3.160   .0016    .08458308 
 Y05     |    -.14886971       .03500529    -4.253   .0000    .08878224 
 Y06     |    -.16665136       .03986064    -4.181   .0000    .08998200 
 Y07     |    -.14160563       .04235169    -3.344   .0008    .09058188 
 Y08     |    -.13422553       .04409041    -3.044   .0023    .08998200 
 Y09     |    -.09336941       .04381924    -2.131   .0331    .08878224 
 Y10     |    -.11429474       .04140474    -2.760   .0058    .08398320 
 Y11     |    -.13010779       .04555267    -2.856   .0043    .08398320 
 Y12     |    -.12899958       .04258509    -3.029   .0025    .08218356 
---------+Means for random parameters 
 Constant|     .04030437       .24608021      .164   .8699 
---------+Scale parameters for dists. of random parameters 
 Constant|     .22896342       .00513221    44.613   .0000 
---------+Variance parameter for v +/- u 
 Sigma   |     .24023341       .00428472    56.068   .0000 
---------+Asymmetry parameter, lambda 
 Lambda  |    2.39903266       .16745290    14.327   .0000 
 
 
Implied standard deviations of random parameters 
 
Matrix S.D_Beta has  1 rows and  1 columns. 
               1 
        +-------------- 
       1|     .22896 
--> create; etr1=exp(-u_tr1)$ 
--> dstat; rhs=etr1$ 
Descriptive Statistics 
All results based on nonmissing observations. 
=============================================================================== 
Variable     Mean       Std.Dev.     Minimum      Maximum        Cases Missing 
=============================================================================== 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
All observations in current sample 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ETR1    |  .850855      .860377E-01  .326686      .982816         1667       0 
  
 346 
 
4.3.2 TRE2 
TRE2 MODEL (HETEROSCEDASTIC WITH YEARS) 
fron;cost;lhs=ltcp3ta;rhs=vicka,lpop,lDD,linm,lgdpc,lhhi,infl,eu,y01,y02,y03,y0
4,y05,y06,y07,y08,y09,y10,y11,y12; output=3$ 
fron;cost;lhs=ltcp3ta;rhs=vicka,lpop,lDD,linm,lgdpc,lhhi,infl,eu,y01,y02,y03,y0
4,y05,y06,y07,y08,y09,y10,y11,y12  
;hfn=one,llictac,leta,foreign9,mixed; rpm; pds=bank; output=3 
;fcn=one(n);halton;pts=500 ;maxit=200; eff=u_tr2; table=etr2$  
create;etr2=exp(-u_tr2)$ dstat;rhs=etr2$ kernel; rhs=etr2$ 
vicka= one, LQ1TA, LQ2TA, LP1P3, LP2P3, lq1q2, lqq1, lqq2, lp1p3h, lp2p3h, 
lp1p2, lq1p1, lq1p2, lq2p1, lq2p2$ 
 
          * Converged 
Normal exit from iterations. Exit status=0. 
Function=  .23278782375D+04, at entry, -.60059387533D+03 at exit 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Random Coefficients  FrntrTrn Model         | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 25, 2014 at 06:33:29PM.| 
| Dependent variable              LTCP3TA     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             1667     | 
| Iterations completed                108     | 
| Log likelihood function        600.5939     | 
| Number of parameters                 41     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          -.67138     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          -.67011     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          -.53810     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          -.62199     | 
| Restricted log likelihood      .0000000     | 
| Chi squared                    1201.188     | 
| Degrees of freedom                    1     | 
| Prob[ChiSqd > value] =         .0000000     | 
| Unbalanced panel has     153 individuals.   | 
| Stochastic frontier, trunc./hetero.         | 
| Simulation based on 500 Halton draws        | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Random Coefficients  FrntrTrn Model         | 
| Estimated parameters of efficiency distn.   | 
| s(u)  =     .244006      s(v)=     .062882  | 
| avgE[u|e]=   .29182   avgE[TE|e]=   .77700  | 
| Lambda  =su/sv               =    3.880382  | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Nonrandom parameters 
 LQ1TA   |     .19467927       .05942357     3.276   .0011   -.63996924 
 LQ2TA   |     .20275622       .02313974     8.762   .0000  -1.70110077 
 LP1P3   |     .22829781       .01855004    12.307   .0000    .70390787 
 LP2P3   |    -.01582227       .01767754     -.895   .3708   3.99750610 
 LQ1Q2   |     .05462572       .01420077     3.847   .0001    .89627491 
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 LQQ1    |     .01758185       .01166352     1.507   .1317    .30782592 
 LQQ2    |     .00400847       .00303768     1.320   .1870   1.98486666 
 LP1P3H  |     .05997302       .00768798     7.801   .0000    .59791174 
 LP2P3H  |     .02271923       .00284729     7.979   .0000   8.54926267 
 LP1P2   |     .02328416       .00414015     5.624   .0000   3.26625619 
 LQ1P1   |    -.01388835       .01157680    -1.200   .2303   -.43396599 
 LQ1P2   |    -.03650815       .01193325    -3.059   .0022  -2.51821860 
 LQ2P1   |     .03069575       .00581988     5.274   .0000  -1.11658896 
 LQ2P2   |    -.04790493       .00414343   -11.562   .0000  -6.75933772 
 LPOP    |     .21821693       .02485668     8.779   .0000   4.38920813 
 LDD     |     .02305511       .01835651     1.256   .2091   5.45846806 
 LINM    |     .07980316       .02051279     3.890   .0001   -.06002421 
 LGDPC   |    -.06608728       .02739438    -2.412   .0158   8.55381656 
 LHHI    |     .06268980       .01583036     3.960   .0001   6.93438002 
 INFL    |     .60811004       .13585520     4.476   .0000    .04672069 
 EU      |    -.00997249       .01111084     -.898   .3694    .20995801 
 Y01     |     .03236769       .03486309      .928   .3532    .04499100 
 Y02     |     .02544322       .02786956      .913   .3613    .06118776 
 Y03     |    -.00399336       .02786918     -.143   .8861    .07678464 
 Y04     |    -.05664813       .02747717    -2.062   .0392    .08458308 
 Y05     |    -.08198049       .02895224    -2.832   .0046    .08878224 
 Y06     |    -.10015961       .03078268    -3.254   .0011    .08998200 
 Y07     |    -.09553992       .03624278    -2.636   .0084    .09058188 
 Y08     |    -.10116787       .03326036    -3.042   .0024    .08998200 
 Y09     |    -.07446552       .03536568    -2.106   .0352    .08878224 
 Y10     |    -.08937891       .03530949    -2.531   .0114    .08398320 
 Y11     |    -.10656813       .03576426    -2.980   .0029    .08398320 
 Y12     |    -.11029079       .03442668    -3.204   .0014    .08218356 
 suONE   |    3.05155796       .11457468    26.634   .0000   1.00000000 
 suLLICTA|     .16710347       .04051427     4.125   .0000  -2.78902282 
 suLETA  |     .61200792       .02012101    30.416   .0000  -1.99239234 
 suFOREIG|    -.11534422       .02225819    -5.182   .0000    .47630474 
 suMIXED |    -.46314287       .04884374    -9.482   .0000    .12717457 
---------+Means for random parameters 
 Constant|    -.08813692       .19874908     -.443   .6574 
---------+Scale parameters for dists. of random parameters 
 Constant|     .32865640       .00565364    58.132   .0000 
---------+Sigma(v) from symmetric disturbance. 
 Sigma(v)|     .06288195       .00325464    19.321   .0000 
 
 
Implied standard deviations of random parameters 
 
Matrix S.D_Beta has  1 rows and  1 columns. 
               1 
        +-------------- 
       1|     .32866 
--> create;etr2=exp(-u_tr2)$ 
--> dstat;rhs=etr2$ 
Descriptive Statistics 
All results based on nonmissing observations. 
=============================================================================== 
Variable     Mean       Std.Dev.     Minimum      Maximum        Cases Missing 
=============================================================================== 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
All observations in current sample 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ETR2    |  .855476      .703923E-01  .387555      .994199         1667       0 
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4.3.3 TRE3 
TRE3 MODEL (HETEROSCEDASTIC WITH YEARS AND RANDOM PARAMETERS) 
fron;cost;lhs=ltcp3ta;  rhs=vicka, lpop, lDD, linm, lgdpc, lhhi, 
infl,eu,y01,y02,y03,y04,y05,y06,y07,y08,y09,y10,y11,y12;halton;pts=500;maxit=20
0;output=3$ 
fron;cost;lhs=ltcp3ta;  rhs=vicka, lpop, lDD, linm, lgdpc, lhhi, 
infl,eu,y01,y02,y03,y04,y05,y06,y07,y08,y09,y10,y11,y12   
; hfn=one, llictac,foreign9,mixed,leta;rpm; pds=bank; output=3 
; fcn=one(n),lq1ta(n),lq2ta(n),llictac<n>;halton;pts=500 ; maxit=200; 
eff=u_tr3; table=etr3$  
create; etr3=exp(-u_tr3)$ dstat; rhs=etr3$ kernel; rhs=etr3$ 
vicka= one, LQ1TA, LQ2TA, LP1P3, LP2P3, lq1q2, lqq1, lqq2, lp1p3h, lp2p3h, 
lp1p2, lq1p1, lq1p2, lq2p1, lq2p2$ 
 
              * Converged 
Normal exit from iterations. Exit status=0. 
Function=  .89149604990D+04, at entry, -.10351776014D+04 at exit 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Random Coefficients  FrntrTrn Model         | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 25, 2014 at 06:49:24PM.| 
| Dependent variable              LTCP3TA     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             1667     | 
| Iterations completed                 96     | 
| Log likelihood function        1035.178     | 
| Number of parameters                 44     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =         -1.18918     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =         -1.18771     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =         -1.04615     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =         -1.13617     | 
| Restricted log likelihood      .0000000     | 
| Chi squared                    2070.355     | 
| Degrees of freedom                    4     | 
| Prob[ChiSqd > value] =         .0000000     | 
| Unbalanced panel has     153 individuals.   | 
| Stochastic frontier, trunc./hetero.         | 
| Simulation based on 500 Halton draws        | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Random Coefficients  FrntrTrn Model         | 
| Estimated parameters of efficiency distn.   | 
| s(u)  =     .246943      s(v)=     .046640  | 
| avgE[u|e]=   .22604   avgE[TE|e]=   .83094  | 
| Lambda  =su/sv               =    5.294693  | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Nonrandom parameters 
 LP1P3   |     .19798786       .01456089    13.597   .0000    .70390787 
 LP2P3   |     .22306791       .01454839    15.333   .0000   3.99750610 
 LQ1Q2   |     .00930369       .00954542      .975   .3297    .89627491 
 LQQ1    |    -.03699621       .00985123    -3.755   .0002    .30782592 
 LQQ2    |     .00402230       .00164244     2.449   .0143   1.98486666 
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 LP1P3H  |     .08105009       .00429940    18.851   .0000    .59791174 
 LP2P3H  |    -.03400976       .00276552   -12.298   .0000   8.54926267 
 LP1P2   |     .02647208       .00296668     8.923   .0000   3.26625619 
 LQ1P1   |    -.01234349       .00744694    -1.658   .0974   -.43396599 
 LQ1P2   |    -.01240270       .00833266    -1.488   .1366  -2.51821860 
 LQ2P1   |     .02120873       .00381937     5.553   .0000  -1.11658896 
 LQ2P2   |    -.02482907       .00299498    -8.290   .0000  -6.75933772 
 LPOP    |     .57966936       .01689109    34.318   .0000   4.38920813 
 LDD     |     .06008498       .00973054     6.175   .0000   5.45846806 
 LINM    |     .22039738       .01310512    16.818   .0000   -.06002421 
 LGDPC   |    -.23608485       .01504877   -15.688   .0000   8.55381656 
 LHHI    |     .07533215       .00854205     8.819   .0000   6.93438002 
 INFL    |     .29122093       .07687192     3.788   .0002    .04672069 
 EU      |    -.00971540       .00555290    -1.750   .0802    .20995801 
 Y01     |     .01627275       .01096744     1.484   .1379    .04499100 
 Y02     |    -.01044262       .01240722     -.842   .4000    .06118776 
 Y03     |    -.05614186       .01175173    -4.777   .0000    .07678464 
 Y04     |    -.10826774       .01363960    -7.938   .0000    .08458308 
 Y05     |    -.13432954       .01328799   -10.109   .0000    .08878224 
 Y06     |    -.14712207       .01544870    -9.523   .0000    .08998200 
 Y07     |    -.15919126       .01825655    -8.720   .0000    .09058188 
 Y08     |    -.16588827       .01883251    -8.809   .0000    .08998200 
 Y09     |    -.16820120       .01832312    -9.180   .0000    .08878224 
 Y10     |    -.17516200       .01822042    -9.614   .0000    .08398320 
 Y11     |    -.18556713       .01991451    -9.318   .0000    .08398320 
 Y12     |    -.17727370       .01854601    -9.559   .0000    .08218356 
 suONE   |    2.45360704       .13664746    17.956   .0000   1.00000000 
 suFOREIG|    -.04316834       .05161874     -.836   .4030    .47630474 
 suMIXED |    -.38822214       .07888144    -4.922   .0000    .12717457 
 suLETA  |     .26665173       .03894481     6.847   .0000  -1.99239234 
---------+Means for random parameters 
 Constant|    -.89253687       .12533011    -7.121   .0000 
 LQ1TA   |    -.05615514       .04268412    -1.316   .1883   -.63996924 
 LQ2TA   |     .08974550       .01685306     5.325   .0000  -1.70110077 
 suLLICTA|     .31849051       .04383617     7.265   .0000  -2.78902282 
---------+Scale parameters for dists. of random parameters 
 Constant|     .42886437       .00511198    83.894   .0000 
 LQ1TA   |     .14257786       .00300312    47.477   .0000 
 LQ2TA   |     .07803539       .00148349    52.603   .0000 
 suLLICTA|     .41362486       .01697916    24.361   .0000 
---------+Sigma(v) from symmetric disturbance. 
 Sigma(v)|     .04663969       .00148137    31.484   .0000 
 
Implied standard deviations of random parameters 
 
Matrix S.D_Beta has  4 rows and  1 columns. 
               1 
        +-------------- 
       1|     .42886 
       2|     .14258 
       3|     .07804 
       4|     .41362 
--> create; etr3=exp(-u_tr3)$ 
--> dstat; rhs=etr3$ 
Descriptive Statistics 
=============================================================================== 
Variable     Mean       Std.Dev.     Minimum      Maximum        Cases Missing 
=============================================================================== 
ETR3    |  .865415      .677366E-01  .328384      .995721         1667       0  
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4.3.4 TRE1T 
TRE1T MODEL (BASELINE MODEL WITH TIME TREND) 
fron;cost;lhs=ltcp3ta;rhs=vicka,leta,llictac,foreign9,mixed,lpop,lDD,linm,lgdpc
,lhhi,infl, eu,t,th,tq1, tq2, tp1, tp2, Y08, Y09; output=3 $ 
fron;cost;lhs=ltcp3ta;rhs=vicka,leta,llictac,foreign9,mixed,lpop,lDD,linm,lgdpc
,lhhi,infl,eu,t,th, tq1, tq2, tp1, tp2, Y08,y09; 
;pds=bank;rpm;fcn=one(n) ;halton;pts=500; eff=u_tr1t; table=etr1t$ 
create; etr1t=exp(-u_tr1t)$ dstat; rhs=etr1t$ kernel;rhs=etr1t$ 
vicka= one, LQ1TA, LQ2TA, LP1P3, LP2P3, lq1q2, lqq1, lqq2, lp1p3h, lp2p3h, 
lp1p2, lq1p1, lq1p2, lq2p1, lq2p2$ 
 
Normal exit from iterations. Exit status=0. 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Random Coefficients  Frontier Model         | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 25, 2014 at 06:07:28PM.| 
| Dependent variable              LTCP3TA     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             1667     | 
| Iterations completed                 47     | 
| Log likelihood function        491.1071     | 
| Number of parameters                 37     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          -.54482     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          -.54378     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          -.42455     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          -.50025     | 
| Restricted log likelihood      .0000000     | 
| Chi squared                    982.2142     | 
| Degrees of freedom                    1     | 
| Prob[ChiSqd > value] =         .0000000     | 
| Unbalanced panel has     153 individuals.   | 
| Stochastic frontier (half normal)           | 
| Simulation based on 500 Halton draws        | 
| Sigma( u) (1 sided)  =      .22254          | 
| Sigma( v) (symmetric)=      .09229          | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Production / Cost parameters, nonrandom first 
 LQ1TA   |     .17027634       .07224179     2.357   .0184   -.63996924 
 LQ2TA   |     .16038799       .02756764     5.818   .0000  -1.70110077 
 LP1P3   |     .15871516       .01772580     8.954   .0000    .70390787 
 LP2P3   |    -.00964713       .02025240     -.476   .6338   3.99750610 
 LQ1Q2   |     .05848167       .01893814     3.088   .0020    .89627491 
 LQQ1    |     .02517955       .01734504     1.452   .1466    .30782592 
 LQQ2    |     .00674873       .00277610     2.431   .0151   1.98486666 
 LP1P3H  |     .08315364       .00569777    14.594   .0000    .59791174 
 LP2P3H  |     .04460453       .00327287    13.629   .0000   8.54926267 
 LP1P2   |    -.00120977       .00400447     -.302   .7626   3.26625619 
 LQ1P1   |    -.03823174       .01350441    -2.831   .0046   -.43396599 
 LQ1P2   |    -.00738274       .01361131     -.542   .5875  -2.51821860 
 LQ2P1   |     .01010281       .00661616     1.527   .1268  -1.11658896 
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 LQ2P2   |    -.04180616       .00419047    -9.976   .0000  -6.75933772 
 LETA    |    -.03736936       .00662690    -5.639   .0000  -1.99239234 
 LLICTAC |    -.02414905       .01353645    -1.784   .0744  -2.78902282 
 FOREIGN9|    -.05109314       .00901250    -5.669   .0000    .47630474 
 MIXED   |    -.00752920       .01308507     -.575   .5650    .12717457 
 LPOP    |     .24720271       .03278515     7.540   .0000   4.38920813 
 LDD     |     .04205587       .02213654     1.900   .0575   5.45846806 
 LINM    |     .11413455       .02796561     4.081   .0000   -.06002421 
 LGDPC   |    -.13772576       .03387459    -4.066   .0000   8.55381656 
 LHHI    |     .07892062       .01813106     4.353   .0000   6.93438002 
 INFL    |     .47153621       .15445365     3.053   .0023    .04672069 
 EU      |    -.04181871       .01467405    -2.850   .0044    .20995801 
 T       |    -.05840065       .00803766    -7.266   .0000   7.62267546 
 TH      |     .00756164       .00081495     9.279   .0000   34.9109178 
 TQ1     |    -.00948655       .00370616    -2.560   .0105  -4.37594550 
 TQ2     |     .00384939       .00137335     2.803   .0051  -14.0808136 
 TP1     |     .00237611       .00168128     1.413   .1576   5.99915400 
 TP2     |    -.00276707       .00099740    -2.774   .0055   31.7636015 
 Y08     |     .02904067       .02362971     1.229   .2191    .08998200 
 Y09     |     .05404420       .02356132     2.294   .0218    .08878224 
---------+Means for random parameters 
 Constant|     .19984785       .25950641      .770   .4412 
---------+Scale parameters for dists. of random parameters 
 Constant|     .22923750       .00511155    44.847   .0000 
---------+Variance parameter for v +/- u 
 Sigma   |     .24092039       .00425056    56.680   .0000 
---------+Asymmetry parameter, lambda 
 Lambda  |    2.41119560       .16639148    14.491   .0000 
 
 
Implied standard deviations of random parameters 
 
Matrix S.D_Beta has  1 rows and  1 columns. 
               1 
        +-------------- 
       1|     .22924 
--> create; etr1t=exp(-u_tr1t)$ 
--> dstat; rhs=etr1t$ 
Descriptive Statistics 
All results based on nonmissing observations. 
=============================================================================== 
Variable     Mean       Std.Dev.     Minimum      Maximum        Cases Missing 
=============================================================================== 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
All observations in current sample 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ETR1T   |  .850211      .865358E-01  .323710      .982062         1667       0 
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4.3.5 TRE2T 
TRE2T MODEL (HETEROSCEDASTIC WITH TIME TREND) 
fron;cost;lhs=ltcp3ta;rhs=vicka,lpop,lDD,linm,lgdpc,lhhi,infl,eu,t,th,tq1, tq2, 
tp1, tp2, y08, y09; output=3$ 
fron;cost;lhs=ltcp3ta;rhs=vicka,lpop,lDD,linm,lgdpc,lhhi,infl,eu,t,th,tq1, tq2, 
tp1, tp2, y08, y09   
;hfn=one,llictac,leta,foreign9,mixed; rpm; pds=bank; output=3 
;fcn=one(n);halton;pts=500;maxit=200; eff=u_tr2t; table=etr2t $ 
create;etr2t=exp(-u_tr2t)$ dstat;rhs=etr2t$ 
kernel; rhs=etr2t$ 
vicka= one, LQ1TA, LQ2TA, LP1P3, LP2P3, lq1q2, lqq1, lqq2, lp1p3h, lp2p3h, 
lp1p2, lq1p1, lq1p2, lq2p1, lq2p2$ 
 
                * Converged 
Normal exit from iterations. Exit status=0. 
Function=  .19369382925D+04, at entry, -.60167429468D+03 at exit 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Random Coefficients  FrntrTrn Model         | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 25, 2014 at 05:58:59PM.| 
| Dependent variable              LTCP3TA     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             1667     | 
| Iterations completed                104     | 
| Log likelihood function        601.6743     | 
| Number of parameters                 37     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          -.67747     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          -.67644     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          -.55720     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          -.63290     | 
| Restricted log likelihood      .0000000     | 
| Chi squared                    1203.349     | 
| Degrees of freedom                   37     | 
| Prob[ChiSqd > value] =         .0000000     | 
| Unbalanced panel has     153 individuals.   | 
| Stochastic frontier, trunc./hetero.         | 
| Simulation based on 500 Halton draws        | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Random Coefficients  FrntrTrn Model         | 
| Estimated parameters of efficiency distn.   | 
| s(u)  =     .241690      s(v)=     .065720  | 
| avgE[u|e]=   .28392   avgE[TE|e]=   .78162  | 
| Lambda  =su/sv               =    3.677590  | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Nonrandom parameters 
 LQ1TA   |     .15577777       .05736767     2.715   .0066   -.63996924 
 LQ2TA   |     .18242404       .02462208     7.409   .0000  -1.70110077 
 LP1P3   |     .22238698       .01842603    12.069   .0000    .70390787 
 LP2P3   |     .00294867       .01797717      .164   .8697   3.99750610 
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 LQ1Q2   |     .02464743       .01545145     1.595   .1107    .89627491 
 LQQ1    |     .01840423       .01307892     1.407   .1594    .30782592 
 LQQ2    |     .00230768       .00357137      .646   .5182   1.98486666 
 LP1P3H  |     .05651052       .00647987     8.721   .0000    .59791174 
 LP2P3H  |     .02903901       .00304193     9.546   .0000   8.54926267 
 LP1P2   |     .01127268       .00385153     2.927   .0034   3.26625619 
 LQ1P1   |    -.02824592       .01228727    -2.299   .0215   -.43396599 
 LQ1P2   |    -.01357696       .01135879    -1.195   .2320  -2.51821860 
 LQ2P1   |     .03231624       .00607653     5.318   .0000  -1.11658896 
 LQ2P2   |    -.05044171       .00423719   -11.905   .0000  -6.75933772 
 LPOP    |     .24965615       .02630999     9.489   .0000   4.38920813 
 LDD     |     .02645864       .01775370     1.490   .1361   5.45846806 
 LINM    |     .06388808       .02057799     3.105   .0019   -.06002421 
 LGDPC   |    -.09782850       .02600313    -3.762   .0002   8.55381656 
 LHHI    |     .07226355       .01543272     4.682   .0000   6.93438002 
 INFL    |     .49664534       .12976927     3.827   .0001    .04672069 
 EU      |    -.02426617       .01216756    -1.994   .0461    .20995801 
 T       |    -.04136436       .00684715    -6.041   .0000   7.62267546 
 TH      |     .00443988       .00064075     6.929   .0000   34.9109178 
 TQ1     |    -.01281876       .00277157    -4.625   .0000  -4.37594550 
 TQ2     |     .00090432       .00117611      .769   .4419  -14.0808136 
 TP1     |     .00778714       .00149114     5.222   .0000   5.99915400 
 TP2     |    -.00368624       .00091837    -4.014   .0001   31.7636015 
 Y08     |     .00774100       .01690064      .458   .6469    .08998200 
 Y09     |     .02738306       .01673260     1.637   .1017    .08878224 
 suONE   |    3.04655459       .11441217    26.628   .0000   1.00000000 
 suLLICTA|     .16933821       .04192595     4.039   .0001  -2.78902282 
 suLETA  |     .63959999       .01998850    31.998   .0000  -1.99239234 
 suFOREIG|    -.10547884       .02198043    -4.799   .0000    .47630474 
 suMIXED |    -.46337093       .05073995    -9.132   .0000    .12717457 
---------+Means for random parameters 
 Constant|     .01057807       .20357835      .052   .9586 
---------+Scale parameters for dists. of random parameters 
 Constant|     .31898017       .00539231    59.155   .0000 
---------+Sigma(v) from symmetric disturbance. 
 Sigma(v)|     .06571968       .00327691    20.055   .0000 
 
 
Implied standard deviations of random parameters 
 
Matrix S.D_Beta has  1 rows and  1 columns. 
               1 
        +-------------- 
       1|     .31898 
--> create;etr2t=exp(-u_tr2t)$ 
--> dstat;rhs=etr2t$ 
Descriptive Statistics 
All results based on nonmissing observations. 
=============================================================================== 
Variable     Mean       Std.Dev.     Minimum      Maximum        Cases Missing 
=============================================================================== 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
All observations in current sample 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ETR2T   |  .857363      .701052E-01  .384733      .993934         1667       0 
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4.3.6 TRE3T 
TRE3T MODEL (HETEROSCEDASTIC WITH TIME TREND AMD RANDOM 
PARAMETERS) 
fron;cost;lhs=ltcp3ta;  rhs=vicka, lpop, lDD, linm, lgdpc, lhhi, 
infl,eu,t,th,tq1, tq2, tp1, tp2, y08, y09; output=3$ 
fron;cost;lhs=ltcp3ta;  rhs=vicka, lpop, lDD, linm, lgdpc, lhhi, 
infl,eu,t,th,tq1, tq2, tp1, tp2, y08, y09   
; hfn=one, llictac, leta, foreign9,mixed;rpm; pds=bank;  
; fcn=one(n),lq1ta(n),lq2ta(n),llictac<n>;halton;pts=500 ; output=3; maxit=200; 
eff=u_tr3t; table=etr3t$  
create; etr3t=exp(-u_tr3t)$ dstat; rhs=etr3t$ kernel; rhs=etr3t$ 
vicka= one, LQ1TA, LQ2TA, LP1P3, LP2P3, lq1q2, lqq1, lqq2, lp1p3h, lp2p3h, 
lp1p2, lq1p1, lq1p2, lq2p1, lq2p2$ 
 
  * Converged 
Normal exit from iterations. Exit status=0. 
Function=  .19345463448D+04, at entry, -.10278089529D+04 at exit 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Random Coefficients  FrntrTrn Model         | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 25, 2014 at 05:34:35PM.| 
| Dependent variable              LTCP3TA     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             1667     | 
| Iterations completed                132     | 
| Log likelihood function        1027.809     | 
| Number of parameters                 40     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =         -1.18513     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =         -1.18392     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =         -1.05511     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =         -1.13695     | 
| Restricted log likelihood      .0000000     | 
| Chi squared                    2055.618     | 
| Degrees of freedom                   40     | 
| Prob[ChiSqd > value] =         .0000000     | 
| Unbalanced panel has     153 individuals.   | 
| Stochastic frontier, trunc./hetero.         | 
| Simulation based on 500 Halton draws        | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Random Coefficients  FrntrTrn Model         | 
| Estimated parameters of efficiency distn.   | 
| s(u)  =     .192869      s(v)=     .047130  | 
| avgE[u|e]=   .20324   avgE[TE|e]=   .84520  | 
| Lambda  =su/sv               =    4.092293  | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Nonrandom parameters 
 LP1P3   |     .22272538       .01378380    16.158   .0000    .70390787 
 LP2P3   |     .17179667       .01452801    11.825   .0000   3.99750610 
 LQ1Q2   |     .00526019       .01002167      .525   .5997    .89627491 
 LQQ1    |    -.04072519       .00934913    -4.356   .0000    .30782592 
 LQQ2    |     .00607771       .00151888     4.001   .0001   1.98486666 
 LP1P3H  |     .06779360       .00439807    15.414   .0000    .59791174 
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 LP2P3H  |    -.02309269       .00295809    -7.807   .0000   8.54926267 
 LP1P2   |     .02444179       .00308512     7.922   .0000   3.26625619 
 LQ1P1   |    -.00473519       .00830590     -.570   .5686   -.43396599 
 LQ1P2   |    -.01462952       .00889439    -1.645   .1000  -2.51821860 
 LQ2P1   |     .04105510       .00438958     9.353   .0000  -1.11658896 
 LQ2P2   |    -.03322468       .00325653   -10.202   .0000  -6.75933772 
 LPOP    |     .25038834       .01464025    17.103   .0000   4.38920813 
 LDD     |     .07868867       .00998636     7.880   .0000   5.45846806 
 LINM    |     .15047199       .01241398    12.121   .0000   -.06002421 
 LGDPC   |    -.21054292       .01518939   -13.861   .0000   8.55381656 
 LHHI    |     .07592949       .00819543     9.265   .0000   6.93438002 
 INFL    |     .21193010       .07868648     2.693   .0071    .04672069 
 EU      |    -.01513093       .00596502    -2.537   .0112    .20995801 
 T       |    -.04579310       .00414963   -11.035   .0000   7.62267546 
 TH      |     .00521560       .00034947    14.924   .0000   34.9109178 
 TQ1     |     .00017912       .00229861      .078   .9379  -4.37594550 
 TQ2     |     .00292487       .00086652     3.375   .0007  -14.0808136 
 TP1     |     .00397621       .00088469     4.494   .0000   5.99915400 
 TP2     |    -.00207380       .00069801    -2.971   .0030   31.7636015 
 Y08     |     .01322113       .00896522     1.475   .1403    .08998200 
 Y09     |     .01308490       .00831384     1.574   .1155    .08878224 
 suONE   |    2.61230976       .13890320    18.807   .0000   1.00000000 
 suLETA  |     .34856805       .03865308     9.018   .0000  -1.99239234 
 suFOREIG|    -.22113586       .04840130    -4.569   .0000    .47630474 
 suMIXED |    -.36950375       .07904355    -4.675   .0000    .12717457 
---------+Means for random parameters 
 Constant|     .45664393       .11855905     3.852   .0001 
 LQ1TA   |    -.02890309       .04393141     -.658   .5106   -.63996924 
 LQ2TA   |     .09308759       .01682043     5.534   .0000  -1.70110077 
 suLLICTA|     .34468990       .04329664     7.961   .0000  -2.78902282 
---------+Scale parameters for dists. of random parameters 
 Constant|     .35906399       .00472015    76.070   .0000 
 LQ1TA   |     .25920611       .00498701    51.976   .0000 
 LQ2TA   |     .06940342       .00138817    49.996   .0000 
 suLLICTA|     .37775530       .01594214    23.695   .0000 
---------+Sigma(v) from symmetric disturbance. 
 Sigma(v)|     .04712983       .00144847    32.538   .0000 
 
 
Implied standard deviations of random parameters 
 
Matrix S.D_Beta has  4 rows and  1 columns. 
               1 
        +-------------- 
       1|     .35906 
       2|     .25921 
       3|     .06940 
       4|     .37776 
--> create; etr3t=exp(-u_tr3t)$ 
--> dstat; rhs=etr3t$ 
Descriptive Statistics 
All results based on nonmissing observations. 
=============================================================================== 
Variable     Mean       Std.Dev.     Minimum      Maximum        Cases Missing 
=============================================================================== 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
All observations in current sample 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ETR3T   |  .874514      .699672E-01  .324833      .995680         1667       0 
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4.4 TECHNICAL CHANGE ACROSS COUNTRIES AND TIME 
(TRE3T) 
 
Table A4.1. Technical change and its component across countries and time (TRE3T) 
 
−(𝜌𝑇 + 𝜌𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝜃1𝑇𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜃2𝑇𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐸𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜗1𝑇𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜗2𝑇𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  
Technical Radial Scale 
Augmenting  
Disembodied  Technical Radial Scale 
Augmenting  
Disembodied 
 ALBANIA  BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA 
2000 0.0444 0.0406 0.0017 0.0022  0.0515 0.0406 0.0049 0.0060 
2001 0.0403 0.0354 0.0016 0.0034  0.0477 0.0354 0.0058 0.0065 
2002 0.0365 0.0301 0.0019 0.0044  0.0442 0.0301 0.0062 0.0078 
2003 0.0312 0.0249 0.0021 0.0042  0.0386 0.0249 0.0061 0.0076 
2004 0.0270 0.0197 0.0026 0.0048  0.0321 0.0197 0.0053 0.0071 
2005 0.0223 0.0145 0.0025 0.0053  0.0270 0.0145 0.0052 0.0073 
2006 0.0172 0.0093 0.0028 0.0051  0.0217 0.0093 0.0055 0.0070 
2007 0.0115 0.0041 0.0032 0.0042  0.0161 0.0041 0.0058 0.0062 
2008 0.0062 -0.0011 0.0040 0.0033  0.0111 -0.0011 0.0062 0.0061 
2009 0.0016 -0.0064 0.0042 0.0037  0.0062 -0.0064 0.0069 0.0057 
2010 -0.0038 -0.0116 0.0035 0.0043  0.0022 -0.0116 0.0074 0.0063 
2011 -0.0085 -0.0168 0.0035 0.0047  -0.0022 -0.0168 0.0080 0.0066 
2012 -0.0137 -0.0220 0.0036 0.0046  -0.0065 -0.0220 0.0086 0.0070  
BULGARIA 
 
CROATIA 
2000  
   
 0.0466 0.0406 0.0029 0.0031 
2001 0.0456 0.0354 0.0022 0.0081  0.0421 0.0354 0.0031 0.0037 
2002 0.0402 0.0301 0.0029 0.0071  0.0377 0.0301 0.0032 0.0044 
2003 0.0340 0.0249 0.0033 0.0058  0.0333 0.0249 0.0034 0.0050 
2004 0.0297 0.0197 0.0039 0.0061  0.0290 0.0197 0.0041 0.0052 
2005 0.0245 0.0145 0.0040 0.0060  0.0244 0.0145 0.0044 0.0055 
2006 0.0187 0.0093 0.0037 0.0057  0.0193 0.0093 0.0044 0.0055 
2007 0.0146 0.0041 0.0051 0.0054  0.0136 0.0041 0.0043 0.0052 
2008 0.0093 -0.0011 0.0061 0.0044  0.0081 -0.0011 0.0048 0.0045 
2009 0.0039 -0.0064 0.0058 0.0045  0.0029 -0.0064 0.0051 0.0042 
2010 -0.0021 -0.0116 0.0050 0.0044  -0.0015 -0.0116 0.0052 0.0049 
2011 -0.0074 -0.0168 0.0050 0.0044  -0.0060 -0.0168 0.0055 0.0053 
2012 -0.0118 -0.0220 0.0055 0.0047  -0.0115 -0.0220 0.0054 0.0052 
 MACEDONIA  SLOVENIA 
2000 0.0479 0.0406 0.0034 0.0039  0.0461 0.0406 0.0030 0.0025 
2001 0.0434 0.0354 0.0038 0.0043  0.0397 0.0354 0.0028 0.0016 
2002 0.0369 0.0301 0.0027 0.0040  0.0352 0.0301 0.0027 0.0023 
2003 0.0328 0.0249 0.0029 0.0049  0.0310 0.0249 0.0029 0.0032 
2004 0.0311 0.0197 0.0046 0.0068  0.0270 0.0197 0.0029 0.0044 
2005 0.0241 0.0145 0.0033 0.0063  0.0226 0.0145 0.0030 0.0051 
2006 0.0189 0.0093 0.0037 0.0059  0.0174 0.0093 0.0033 0.0047 
2007 0.0154 0.0041 0.0056 0.0057  0.0122 0.0041 0.0041 0.0040 
2008 0.0106 -0.0011 0.0068 0.0049  0.0060 -0.0011 0.0044 0.0027 
2009 0.0049 -0.0064 0.0062 0.0050  0.0023 -0.0064 0.0042 0.0044 
2010 -0.0010 -0.0116 0.0057 0.0049  -0.0021 -0.0116 0.0044 0.0051 
2011 -0.0046 -0.0168 0.0069 0.0054  -0.0079 -0.0168 0.0046 0.0043 
2012 -0.0093 -0.0220 0.0072 0.0055  -0.0124 -0.0220 0.0046 0.0050 
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SERBIA  MONTENEGRO 
2002 0.0413 0.0301 0.0032 0.0080      
2003 0.0377 0.0249 0.0043 0.0084  0.0388 0.0249 0.0062 0.0077 
2004 0.0335 0.0197 0.0054 0.0083  0.0330 0.0197 0.0058 0.0075 
2005 0.0291 0.0145 0.0068 0.0078  0.0284 0.0145 0.0062 0.0077 
2006 0.0228 0.0093 0.0073 0.0062  0.0248 0.0093 0.0062 0.0093 
2007 0.0163 0.0041 0.0068 0.0054  0.0186 0.0041 0.0070 0.0076 
2008 0.0106 -0.0011 0.0075 0.0042  0.0152 -0.0011 0.0112 0.0051 
2009 0.0061 -0.0064 0.0063 0.0061  0.0070 -0.0064 0.0079 0.0055 
2010 0.0022 -0.0116 0.0069 0.0069  0.0025 -0.0116 0.0083 0.0058 
2011 -0.0031 -0.0168 0.0069 0.0068  -0.0037 -0.0168 0.0075 0.0055 
2012 -0.0068 -0.0220 0.0076 0.0076  -0.0094 -0.0220 0.0069 0.0057 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
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4.5 COST EFFICIENCY ESTIMATES ACROSS COUNTRIES & TIME  
Table A4.2. Cost efficiency estimates across countries through time  
TRE1T TRE2T TRE3T  TRE1T TRE2T TRE3T 
 ALBANIA  BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA 
2000 83.9% 88.0% 84.4%  81.9% 83.4% 87.5% 
2001 84.2% 88.6% 80.3%  84.1% 83.8% 86.8% 
2002 84.2% 88.6% 83.2%  83.0% 82.8% 87.1% 
2003 84.5% 88.9% 84.3%  83.1% 82.9% 87.6% 
2004 85.3% 89.0% 86.4%  86.6% 86.4% 90.0% 
2005 87.6% 89.0% 88.8%  86.2% 86.6% 89.9% 
2006 87.6% 88.8% 89.3%  86.3% 87.0% 90.1% 
2007 84.3% 87.9% 89.3%  85.3% 86.5% 89.8% 
2008 82.0% 86.4% 88.7%  86.3% 86.6% 89.9% 
2009 86.2% 87.6% 89.1%  86.2% 86.4% 89.8% 
2010 86.1% 88.5% 89.6%  83.7% 85.6% 88.9% 
2011 88.2% 89.3% 89.9%  85.2% 86.3% 88.9% 
2012 89.9% 90.0% 90.6%  81.6% 83.6% 86.8% 
 BULGARIA  CROATIA 
2000  
  
 86.9% 88.5% 90.1% 
2001 88.1% 85.2% 86.9%  85.2% 87.3% 88.8% 
2002 87.0% 83.6% 85.8%  83.0% 86.0% 88.0% 
2003 85.7% 84.4% 87.1%  85.5% 87.0% 89.0% 
2004 89.0% 86.0% 88.4%  85.4% 87.0% 88.7% 
2005 88.4% 86.6% 88.1%  85.8% 87.6% 89.0% 
2006 85.1% 85.7% 87.4%  86.8% 87.9% 89.2% 
2007 85.3% 86.5% 88.4%  85.5% 87.8% 89.1% 
2008 86.0% 86.2% 87.9%  85.9% 87.8% 89.3% 
2009 83.5% 84.6% 87.0%  86.4% 87.6% 89.0% 
2010 81.4% 84.3% 87.0%  85.7% 87.4% 89.0% 
2011 84.1% 84.9% 87.1%  88.0% 87.9% 89.1% 
2012 85.2% 85.3% 86.9%  86.9% 87.8% 88.9% 
 MACEDONIA  SLOVENIA 
2000 89.1% 87.1% 89.6%  86.4% 88.5% 89.3% 
2001 85.3% 85.2% 87.2%  79.0% 86.2% 87.2% 
2002 78.9% 82.8% 85.7%  80.0% 87.3% 88.2% 
2003 85.8% 86.0% 88.8%  81.4% 87.8% 88.9% 
2004 87.7% 87.3% 89.8%  87.1% 90.0% 91.0% 
2005 87.4% 87.4% 89.7%  88.8% 90.4% 91.0% 
2006 88.6% 87.8% 90.1%  87.1% 89.9% 90.6% 
2007 85.5% 86.4% 88.9%  85.8% 89.4% 90.5% 
2008 84.6% 85.7% 88.3%  81.9% 87.8% 89.0% 
2009 85.7% 85.9% 88.7%  90.2% 90.3% 91.2% 
2010 84.2% 85.5% 88.1%  90.4% 90.5% 91.5% 
2011 89.1% 87.5% 88.9%  87.1% 89.2% 90.3% 
2012 89.7% 87.5% 88.7%  90.0% 89.7% 90.5% 
 SERBIA  MONTENEGRO 
2002 84.1% 83.0% 83.2%     
2003 84.7% 80.2% 82.9%  85.2% 84.8% 86.4% 
2004 77.4% 76.6% 78.8%  84.9% 84.0% 86.3% 
2005 83.1% 80.6% 82.8%  84.2% 84.9% 86.6% 
2006 83.9% 82.2% 84.2%  89.0% 85.5% 87.6% 
2007 85.6% 84.0% 85.9%  88.3% 86.6% 88.7% 
2008 88.9% 86.0% 88.0%  87.6% 86.5% 88.3% 
2009 81.4% 79.7% 80.2%  83.2% 83.7% 86.2% 
2010 77.9% 77.6% 78.2%  82.2% 85.1% 87.3% 
2011 76.9% 77.2% 76.3%  85.4% 86.2% 88.3% 
2012 78.1% 77.7% 75.7%  86.7% 87.0% 88.5% 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 6 
6.1 REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES 
OVERALL ACTIVITIY RESTRICTIONS (OAR): 
Questions included in the index for Activity Restrictiveness: 
 Securities: What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in securities 
activities (the ability of banks to engage in the business of securities underwriting, brokering, 
dealing, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry)? 
 Insurance: What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in insurance 
activities (the ability of banks to engage in insurance underwriting and selling)? 
 Real Estate: What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in real 
estate activities (the ability of banks to engage in real estate investment, development, and 
management)? 
Possible answers: 
Unrestricted=1; A full range of activities in the given category can be conducted directly in the bank? 
Permitted=2; A full range of activities can be conducted, but all or some must be conducted in 
subsidiaries. 
Restricted=3; Less than a full range of activities can be conducted in the bank or subsidiaries. 
Prohibited=4; The activity cannot be conducted in either the bank or subsidiaries. 
These types of regulations determine the degree to which a bank may diversify its business operations 
as well as to capitalize on any synergies that may arise from complimentary activities. 
The Overall Activity Restrictiveness Index is calculated as a sum of the values of the three answers. 
 
CAPITAL REGULATORY INDEX (CRINDEX) 
Questions included in the index for Capital Regulatory Index: 
Overall Capital Stringency: whether the capital requirement reflects certain risk elements and deducts 
certain market value losses from capital before minimum capital adequacy is determined.    
(1) Is the minimum capital-to asset ratio requirement risk weighted in line with Basel I/II guidelines?; 
(2) Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of an individual bank’s credit risk?;  
(3) Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk?;  
(4) Before minimum capital adequacy is determined is the market value of loan losses not realized on 
accounting books deducted from the book value of capital?;  
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(5) Before minimum capital adequacy is determined, are unrealized losses in securities deducted from 
the book value of capital?; 
(6) Before minimum capital adequacy is determined, are unrealized foreign exchange losses deducted 
from the book value of capital?  
(7) What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital? 
Initial Capital Stringency: whether certain funds may be used to initially capitalize a bank and whether 
they are officially verified. 
(8) Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? 
(9) Can the initial disbarments of capital can be done with borrowed funds?; and 
(10) Can initial disbarments or subsequent injection of capital be done with assets other than cash or 
government securities?;  
Possible answers: YES/NO.  
If the answer is YES=1, for NO=0. Only for questions 9 and 10 YES=0 and NO=1 and 1 if (7)<0.75. 
Capital Regulatory Index: is simply the sum of overall capital stringency and initial capital stringency, 
therefore captures both the amount of capital and verifiable sources of capital that a bank is required 
to possess.  
 
MITIGATING MORAL HAZARD INDEX (MORALH) 
Questions included in Mitigating Moral Hazard Index: 
(1) Is explicit deposit insurance protection system funded by (check one): the government, the banks, 
or both? 
(2) Do deposit insurance fees charged to banks vary based on some assessment of risk? 
(3) Is there formal coinsurance, that is, are depositors explicitly insured for less than 100% of their 
deposits? 
Possible answers: YES/NO 
If YES=1 and if NO=0. If regarding (1) the answer is banks then 1, otherwise 0.  
 
OFFICIAL SUPERVISORY POWER INDEX (OSPOWER) 
Questions included in Official Supervisory Power Index: 
(1) Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to discuss their reports 
without the approval of the bank?; 
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(2) Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed 
involvement of bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse?; 
(3) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to the supervisors?;  
(4) Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence?;  
(5) Can supervisors force a bank to change its internal organizational structure?  
(6) Can the supervisory agency order a bank’s directors or management to constitute provisions to 
cover actual or potential losses?;  
(7) Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors’ decision to distribute dividends?;  
(8) Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors’ decision to distribute bonuses?; 
(9) Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors’ decision to distribute management fees?; 
(10) Who can legally declare – such that this declaration supersedes some of the rights of shareholders 
– that a bank is insolvent?; 
- Bank supervisor 
- Court 
- Deposit Insurance agency 
- Bank restructuring or Asset Management Agency 
- Other  
(11) According to the Banking Law, who has authority to intervene – that is, suspend some or all 
ownership rights – a problem bank?;  
- Bank supervisor 
- Court 
- Deposit Insurance agency 
- Bank restructuring or Asset Management Agency 
- Other 
(12) Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other 
government agency supersede shareholder rights?;  
- Bank supervisor 
- Court 
- Deposit Insurance agency 
- Bank restructuring or Asset Management Agency 
- Other 
(13) Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other 
government agency remove or replace management?; 
- Bank supervisor 
- Court 
- Deposit Insurance agency 
- Bank restructuring or Asset Management Agency 
- Other 
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(14) Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other 
government agency remove or replace directors?  
- Bank supervisor 
- Court 
- Deposit Insurance agency 
- Bank restructuring or Asset Management Agency 
- Other 
Possible answers: 
For questions 1-9 YES=1 and NO=0; For questions 10-14 if: Bank supervisor=1; Court=0; Deposit 
Insurance agency=0.5; Bank restructuring or Asset Management Agency=0.5; Other=0. 
The index is created as a sum of the values for each answer.  
PRIVATE MONITORING INDEX (PMINDEX) 
Questions included in Private Monitoring Index: 
(1) Is an external audit a compulsory obligation for banks? 
(2) How many of the top ten banks (in terms of total domestic assets) are rated by international credit 
rating agencies (e.g., Moody's, Standard and Poor)? 
(3) How many of the top ten banks (in terms of total domestic assets) are rated by domestic credit 
rating agencies? 
(4) Is there an explicit deposit insurance protection system?  
(5)And/or Were insured depositors wholly compensated (to the extent of legal protection) the last 
time a bank failed?  
(5) Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the income statement while the loan is still 
performing? 
(6) Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the income statement while the loan is still 
non-performing? 
(7) Are financial institutions required to produce consolidated accounts covering all bank and any 
nonk-bank financial subsidiaries (including affiliates of common holding companies)? 
(8) Are bank directors legally liable if information disclosed is erroneous or misleading? 
(10) Is subordinated debt allowable as part of regulatory capital? 
(11) Is subordinated debt required as part of regulatory capital? 
(12) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to the public? 
(13) Must banks disclose their risk management procedures to the public? 
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(14) Are bank regulators/supervisors required to make public formal enforcement actions, which 
include cease and desist orders and written agreements between a bank regulatory/supervisory body 
and a banking organization 
Possible answers: YES=1 and NO=0, except for (2) and (3) where the answer is expressed in percent. 
The index is created as follows: 1+[1 if (2) equals 100%, otherwise 0]+[1 if (3) equals 100%, otherwise 
0]+[1 if (4)=0 and/or (5)=0, otherwise 0]+(6)+[(7)-1]*1+(8)+(9)+[1 if (10) or (11) equals 
“yes”]+(12)+(13)+(14) 
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6.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
6.2.1 Median Z-score and median capital ratio across countries and time 
. by country_name year, sort : summarize mzscore meqratio (To be incorporated. Same for the 
collinearity matrices. 
 
-> country_name = ALBANIA, year = 2002 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |         8    21.40908           0   21.40908   21.40908 
    meqratio |         8    9.022774           0   9.022774   9.022774 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = ALBANIA, year = 2003 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |         9    14.59159           0   14.59159   14.59159 
    meqratio |         9    7.587985           0   7.587985   7.587985 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = ALBANIA, year = 2004 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        10     14.7713           0    14.7713    14.7713 
    meqratio |        10    8.937478           0   8.937478   8.937478 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = ALBANIA, year = 2005 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |         9    12.62851           0   12.62851   12.62851 
    meqratio |         9    6.971005           0   6.971005   6.971005 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = ALBANIA, year = 2006 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |         8    20.91444           0   20.91444   20.91444 
    meqratio |         8    5.393842           0   5.393842   5.393842 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = ALBANIA, year = 2007 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |         9    23.12221           0   23.12221   23.12221 
    meqratio |         9    7.747523           0   7.747523   7.747523 
 
-> country_name = BIH, year = 2002 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        23    32.87799           0   32.87799   32.87799 
    meqratio |        23    19.42857           0   19.42857   19.42857 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BIH, year = 2003 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
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     mzscore |        24    33.03078           0   33.03078   33.03078 
    meqratio |        24    17.32929           0   17.32929   17.32929 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BIH, year = 2004 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        22    25.07537           0   25.07537   25.07537 
    meqratio |        22    15.93368           0   15.93368   15.93368 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BIH, year = 2005 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        23    23.80123           0   23.80123   23.80123 
    meqratio |        23    12.95702           0   12.95702   12.95702 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BIH, year = 2006 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        23    21.77667           0   21.77667   21.77667 
    meqratio |        23    14.34994           0   14.34994   14.34994 
 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BIH, year = 2007 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        24    19.88685           0   19.88685   19.88685 
    meqratio |        24    12.10414           0   12.10414   12.10414 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BIH, year = 2008 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        23    22.38288           0   22.38288   22.38288 
    meqratio |        23    10.39604           0   10.39604   10.39604 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BIH, year = 2009 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        23    22.22865           0   22.22865   22.22865 
    meqratio |        23    12.14155           0   12.14155   12.14155 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BIH, year = 2010 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        21    19.77815           0   19.77815   19.77815 
    meqratio |        21    12.30689           0   12.30689   12.30689 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BIH, year = 2011 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        21    23.50443           0   23.50443   23.50443 
    meqratio |        21    14.05628           0   14.05628   14.05628 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BIH, year = 2012 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        21     22.0195           0    22.0195    22.0195 
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    meqratio |        21    13.56713           0   13.56713   13.56713 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BULGARIA, year = 2002 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        14    18.61655           0   18.61655   18.61655 
    meqratio |        14    10.40186           0   10.40186   10.40186 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BULGARIA, year = 2003 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        19    20.64908           0   20.64908   20.64908 
    meqratio |        19     12.6734           0    12.6734    12.6734 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BULGARIA, year = 2004 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        22    17.56775           0   17.56775   17.56775 
    meqratio |        22    11.29424           0   11.29424   11.29424 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BULGARIA, year = 2005 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        24    16.08247           0   16.08247   16.08247 
    meqratio |        24    10.40606           0   10.40606   10.40606 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BULGARIA, year = 2006 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        24    14.49736           0   14.49736   14.49736 
    meqratio |        24    10.09247           0   10.09247   10.09247 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BULGARIA, year = 2007 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        23    17.30852           0   17.30852   17.30852 
    meqratio |        23    10.01473           0   10.01473   10.01473 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BULGARIA, year = 2008 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        23    15.98937           0   15.98937   15.98937 
    meqratio |        23    11.18912           0   11.18912   11.18912 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BULGARIA, year = 2009 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        23    19.38023           0   19.38023   19.38023 
    meqratio |        23    12.59668           0   12.59668   12.59668 
 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BULGARIA, year = 2010 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
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     mzscore |        21    19.82916           0   19.82916   19.82916 
    meqratio |        21    11.96537           0   11.96537   11.96537 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BULGARIA, year = 2011 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        21    17.11117           0   17.11117   17.11117 
    meqratio |        21    11.92966           0   11.92966   11.92966 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = BULGARIA, year = 2012 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        20     19.7517           0    19.7517    19.7517 
    meqratio |        20     11.8236           0    11.8236    11.8236 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = CROATIA, year = 2002 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        24    28.32521           0   28.32521   28.32521 
    meqratio |        24    11.36379           0   11.36379   11.36379 
 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = CROATIA, year = 2003 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        27     23.3094           0    23.3094    23.3094 
    meqratio |        27    10.52075           0   10.52075   10.52075 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = CROATIA, year = 2004 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        27    24.24134           0   24.24134   24.24134 
    meqratio |        27    9.987146           0   9.987146   9.987146 
 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = CROATIA, year = 2005 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        28    25.30219           0   25.30219   25.30219 
    meqratio |        28    10.26927           0   10.26927   10.26927 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = CROATIA, year = 2006 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        28    22.88859           0   22.88859   22.88859 
    meqratio |        28    11.44208           0   11.44208   11.44208 
 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
-> country_name = CROATIA, year = 2007 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
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     mzscore |        28    26.26147           0   26.26147   26.26147 
    meqratio |        28    12.63552           0   12.63552   12.63552 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = CROATIA, year = 2008 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        28    27.86552           0   27.86552   27.86552 
    meqratio |        28    12.86811           0   12.86811   12.86811 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = CROATIA, year = 2009 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        27     24.5365           0    24.5365    24.5365 
    meqratio |        27    13.18873           0   13.18873   13.18873 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = CROATIA, year = 2010 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        25    20.34022           0   20.34022   20.34022 
    meqratio |        25    12.93627           0   12.93627   12.93627 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = CROATIA, year = 2011 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        25    19.41292           0   19.41292   19.41292 
    meqratio |        25    12.53843           0   12.53843   12.53843 
 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = CROATIA, year = 2012 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        25    20.34139           0   20.34139   20.34139 
    meqratio |        25    13.15463           0   13.15463   13.15463 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = MACEDONIA, year = 2002 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |         9    15.95917           0   15.95917   15.95917 
    meqratio |         9    27.27615           0   27.27615   27.27615 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = MACEDONIA, year = 2003 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |         9    15.12254           0   15.12254   15.12254 
    meqratio |         9    28.25365           0   28.25365   28.25365 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = MACEDONIA, year = 2004 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        12    16.98734           0   16.98734   16.98734 
    meqratio |        12    25.48431           0   25.48431   25.48431 
 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = MACEDONIA, year = 2005 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
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     mzscore |        12    15.54517           0   15.54517   15.54517 
    meqratio |        12    19.09271           0   19.09271   19.09271 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = MACEDONIA, year = 2006 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        13     14.2442           0    14.2442    14.2442 
    meqratio |        13     17.0867           0    17.0867    17.0867 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = MACEDONIA, year = 2007 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        13    14.09849           0   14.09849   14.09849 
    meqratio |        13    14.80051           0   14.80051   14.80051 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = MACEDONIA, year = 2008 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        13      11.925           0     11.925     11.925 
    meqratio |        13    12.65285           0   12.65285   12.65285 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = MACEDONIA, year = 2009 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        13     10.8514           0    10.8514    10.8514 
    meqratio |        13    11.62113           0   11.62113   11.62113 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = MACEDONIA, year = 2010 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        12    9.504449           0   9.504449   9.504449 
    meqratio |        12    11.64633           0   11.64633   11.64633 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = MACEDONIA, year = 2011 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        12    10.87278           0   10.87278   10.87278 
    meqratio |        12    12.46909           0   12.46909   12.46909 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = MACEDONIA, year = 2012 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        11    10.17664           0   10.17664   10.17664 
    meqratio |        11     11.5886           0    11.5886    11.5886 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = MONTENEGRO, year = 2003 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |         5     34.2201           0    34.2201    34.2201 
    meqratio |         5    28.81041           0   28.81041   28.81041 
 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = MONTENEGRO, year = 2004 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
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     mzscore |         6    29.15806           0   29.15806   29.15806 
    meqratio |         6    29.42649           0   29.42649   29.42649 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = MONTENEGRO, year = 2005 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |         9    21.44777           0   21.44777   21.44777 
    meqratio |         9     23.4657           0    23.4657    23.4657 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = MONTENEGRO, year = 2006 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |         9    16.86323           0   16.86323   16.86323 
    meqratio |         9     14.8728           0    14.8728    14.8728 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = MONTENEGRO, year = 2007 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |         9    10.96963           0   10.96963   10.96963 
    meqratio |         9    12.66179           0   12.66179   12.66179 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = SERBIA, year = 2002 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |         7    10.04769           0   10.04769   10.04769 
    meqratio |         7    15.22322           0   15.22322   15.22322 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = SERBIA, year = 2003 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        18    13.73723           0   13.73723   13.73723 
    meqratio |        18    24.09228           0   24.09228   24.09228 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = SERBIA, year = 2004 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        25    9.023963           0   9.023963   9.023963 
    meqratio |        25    21.02032           0   21.02032   21.02032 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = SERBIA, year = 2005 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        26    11.35772           0   11.35772   11.35772 
    meqratio |        26    18.58267           0   18.58267   18.58267 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = SERBIA, year = 2006 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        28    12.19102           0   12.19102   12.19102 
    meqratio |        28    21.13504           0   21.13504   21.13504 
 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = SERBIA, year = 2007 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
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     mzscore |        28    14.07311           0   14.07311   14.07311 
    meqratio |        28    22.70097           0   22.70097   22.70097 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = SLOVENIA, year = 2002 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        16    12.18303           0   12.18303   12.18303 
    meqratio |        16    9.482502           0   9.482502   9.482502 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = SLOVENIA, year = 2003 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        17    12.93736           0   12.93736   12.93736 
    meqratio |        17      8.5569           0     8.5569     8.5569 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = SLOVENIA, year = 2004 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        17    12.37467           0   12.37467   12.37467 
    meqratio |        17    8.172556           0   8.172556   8.172556 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = SLOVENIA, year = 2005 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        17    13.17817           0   13.17817   13.17817 
    meqratio |        17    8.539326           0   8.539326   8.539326 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = SLOVENIA, year = 2006 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        17    12.94133           0   12.94133   12.94133 
    meqratio |        17    7.318168           0   7.318168   7.318168 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = SLOVENIA, year = 2007 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        17    12.13407           0   12.13407   12.13407 
    meqratio |        17    7.763221           0   7.763221   7.763221 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = SLOVENIA, year = 2008 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        17    11.62269           0   11.62269   11.62269 
    meqratio |        17    7.815962           0   7.815962   7.815962 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = SLOVENIA, year = 2009 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        17    10.70814           0   10.70814   10.70814 
    meqratio |        17     7.90565           0    7.90565    7.90565 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 
-> country_name = SLOVENIA, year = 2010 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
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-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        17    10.52102           0   10.52102   10.52102 
    meqratio |        17    7.614955           0   7.614955   7.614955 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = SLOVENIA, year = 2011 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        17    9.856792           0   9.856792   9.856792 
    meqratio |        17     7.49342           0    7.49342    7.49342 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country_name = SLOVENIA, year = 2012 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     mzscore |        17    9.098861           0   9.098861   9.098861 
    meqratio |        17     7.98761           0    7.98761    7.98761 
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6.2.2 Descriptive statistics of the baseline model 
Table A.6.1: Printout of the descriptive statistics conducted after 
estimation of the baseline dynamic panel model. 
 
. estat summarize 
 
  Estimation sample xtabond2             Number of obs =   1069 
 
  ------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Variable |        Mean     Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
  -------------+----------------------------------------------- 
          lmsa | 
           --. |    .8807052     1.328827   -3.30295    3.89291 
           L1. |     .841625      1.34002   -3.30295    3.99009 
               | 
          leff |    4.480671     .0700428    3.69333    4.60073 
        bden10 |    9.852569     11.57999    .091946    84.4091 
           dzs |    6.790243     37.90319   -32.0342    544.637 
           deq |     2.45849     10.50219   -20.0642    70.3052 
      foreign9 |    .4733396     .4995224          0          1 
          lpop |    4.391394      .160404    3.82211     4.7726 
         lgdpc |    8.652325     .6984335    7.74693    9.93821 
            eu |     .303087     .4598076          0          1 
           oar |    6.872778     .9080878          6          8 
       ospower |    11.14266     2.269835        5.5         14 
       crindex |    6.359214      1.57463          4         10 
        moralh |     1.29841     .6329049          0          2 
       pmindex |    5.968195     .8724447          4          7 
           y04 |    .1000935     .3002652          0          1 
           y05 |    .1178672     .3226017          0          1 
           y06 |    .1262862     .3323272          0          1 
           y07 |    .1328344     .3395546          0          1 
           y08 |    .0935454     .2913315          0          1 
           y09 |    .0916745     .2887009          0          1 
           y10 |    .0860617     .2805865          0          1 
           y11 |    .0860617     .2805865          0          1 
           y12 |    .0860617     .2805865          0          1 
  ------------------------------------------------------------- 
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6.3 BASELINE MODELS (PRINTOUTS) 
Table A.6.2: Printout of baseline dynamic panel system GMM estimation for 
the bank’s market share determinants in SEECs, 2002-2012 (Dependent variable 
MSA) 
. xtabond2 lmsa l.lmsa leff bden10 dzs deq foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu oar ospower crindex moralh 
pmindex y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12, gmm(l.lmsa, lag(3 3)coll) gmm(leff, lag(2 3)coll) 
gmm(bden10, lag(2 2)coll) gmm(dzs, lag(4 .)coll) gmm(deq, lag(2 2)coll) iv(foreign9 lpop lgdpc 
eu) iv(oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex) iv(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12) two robust 
orthogonal 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1069 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       148 
Number of instruments = 36                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(23) =   4612.27                                      avg =      7.22 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lmsa | 
         L1. |   .8652739   .0406499    21.29   0.000     .7856016    .9449463 
             | 
        leff |   .3038362   .5469671     0.56   0.579    -.7681996    1.375872 
      bden10 |   .0181853   .0073297     2.48   0.013     .0038194    .0325513 
         dzs |  -.0014579   .0005138    -2.84   0.005    -.0024649   -.0004509 
         deq |  -.0092091   .0029329    -3.14   0.002    -.0149575   -.0034608 
    foreign9 |   .0314756   .0627668     0.50   0.616    -.0915452    .1544963 
        lpop |   .0757773   .0929446     0.82   0.415    -.1063908    .2579454 
       lgdpc |  -.0625507   .0507386    -1.23   0.218    -.1619965    .0368952 
          eu |   .0419253   .0353258     1.19   0.235    -.0273121    .1111626 
         oar |   .0951986   .0430302     2.21   0.027     .0108608    .1795363 
     ospower |   -.025138   .0121103    -2.08   0.038    -.0488739   -.0014022 
     crindex |  -.0377869   .0148874    -2.54   0.011    -.0669656   -.0086082 
      moralh |  -.0269566   .0567056    -0.48   0.635    -.1380977    .0841844 
     pmindex |  -.0341685   .0194597    -1.76   0.079    -.0723089    .0039719 
         y04 |   .0145411   .0216964     0.67   0.503    -.0279831    .0570653 
         y05 |   .0017635   .0261398     0.07   0.946    -.0494696    .0529965 
         y06 |  -.0359942   .0281255    -1.28   0.201    -.0911191    .0191307 
         y07 |  -.0591399    .031585    -1.87   0.061    -.1210454    .0027656 
         y08 |  -.1483051   .0736921    -2.01   0.044     -.292739   -.0038712 
         y09 |  -.1720891   .0746383    -2.31   0.021    -.3183775   -.0258007 
         y10 |  -.1484349   .0724616    -2.05   0.041    -.2904571   -.0064128 
         y11 |   -.176618   .0713699    -2.47   0.013    -.3165006   -.0367355 
         y12 |   -.188624   .0712535    -2.65   0.008    -.3282784   -.0489696 
       _cons |  -.9781973   2.375554    -0.41   0.681    -5.634197    3.677803 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12) 
    FOD.(oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex) 
    FOD.(foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.deq collapsed 
    L(4/10).dzs collapsed 
    L2.bden10 collapsed 
    L(2/3).leff collapsed 
    L3.L.lmsa collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 
    oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex 
    foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.deq collapsed 
    DL3.dzs collapsed 
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    DL.bden10 collapsed 
    DL.leff collapsed 
    DL2.L.lmsa collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.19  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.59  Pr > z =  0.555 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(12)   =   5.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.947 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(12)   =   9.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.680 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   7.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.404 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   2.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.846 
  gmm(L.lmsa, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   7.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.631 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.29  Prob > chi2 =  0.526 
  gmm(leff, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =   8.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.497 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.827 
  gmm(bden10, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   6.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.735 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.307 
  gmm(dzs, collapse lag(4 .)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   0.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.945 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   8.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.385 
  gmm(deq, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   7.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.687 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.393 
  iv(foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =   3.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.896 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   5.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.221 
  iv(oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   4.41  Prob > chi2 =  0.731 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   4.85  Prob > chi2 =  0.434 
  iv(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   1.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.616 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =   7.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.589 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LONG RUN COEFFICIENTS 
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. nlcom (LRleff: _b[leff]/(1-_b[l.lmsa])) (LRbden10: _b[bden10]/(1-_b[l.lmsa])) (LRdzs: 
_b[dzs]/(1-_b[l.lmsa])) (LRdeq: _b[deq]/(1-_b[l.lmsa])) (LRforeign9: _b[foreign9]/(1-
_b[l.lmsa])) (LRlpop: _b[lpop]/(1-_b[l.lmsa])) (LRlgdpc: _b[lgdpc]/(1-_b[l.lmsa]))  (LReu: 
_b[eu]/(1-_b[l.lmsa])) (LRoar: _b[oar]/(1-_b[l.lmsa])) (LRospower: _b[ospower]/(1-_b[l.lmsa])) 
(LRcrindex: _b[crindex]/(1-_b[l.lmsa])) (LRmoralh: _b[moralh]/(1-_b[l.lmsa])) (LRpmindex: 
_b[pmindex]/(1-_b[l.lmsa])) 
      LRleff:  _b[leff]/(1-_b[l.lmsa]) 
    LRbden10:  _b[bden10]/(1-_b[l.lmsa]) 
       LRdzs:  _b[dzs]/(1-_b[l.lmsa]) 
       LRdeq:  _b[deq]/(1-_b[l.lmsa]) 
  LRforeign9:  _b[foreign9]/(1-_b[l.lmsa]) 
      LRlpop:  _b[lpop]/(1-_b[l.lmsa]) 
     LRlgdpc:  _b[lgdpc]/(1-_b[l.lmsa]) 
        LReu:  _b[eu]/(1-_b[l.lmsa]) 
       LRoar:  _b[oar]/(1-_b[l.lmsa]) 
   LRospower:  _b[ospower]/(1-_b[l.lmsa]) 
   LRcrindex:  _b[crindex]/(1-_b[l.lmsa]) 
    LRmoralh:  _b[moralh]/(1-_b[l.lmsa]) 
   LRpmindex:  _b[pmindex]/(1-_b[l.lmsa]) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      LRleff |   2.255215   4.089419     0.55   0.581    -5.759899    10.27033 
    LRbden10 |   .1349801   .0608934     2.22   0.027     .0156311     .254329 
       LRdzs |  -.0108211   .0053974    -2.00   0.045    -.0213999   -.0002424 
       LRdeq |  -.0683543   .0280293    -2.44   0.015    -.1232907   -.0134179 
  LRforeign9 |   .2336263   .4256344     0.55   0.583    -.6006018    1.067854 
      LRlpop |   .5624545   .7441696     0.76   0.450     -.896091       2.021 
     LRlgdpc |  -.4642804    .396623    -1.17   0.242    -1.241647    .3130864 
        LReu |    .311189   .2589289     1.20   0.229    -.1963023    .8186804 
       LRoar |   .7066082   .3104439     2.28   0.023     .0981493    1.315067 
   LRospower |  -.1865863   .0828764    -2.25   0.024     -.349021   -.0241515 
   LRcrindex |  -.2804722   .1147506    -2.44   0.015    -.5053793   -.0555652 
    LRmoralh |  -.2000848   .3870832    -0.52   0.605    -.9587539    .5585843 
   LRpmindex |  -.2536146   .1818698    -1.39   0.163    -.6100728    .1028437 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table A.6.3. Printout of baseline dynamic panel model estimated by fixed-
effect panel model for the bank’s market share determinants in SEECs, 2002-
2012 (Dependent variable MSA) 
. xtreg lmsa l.lmsa leff bden10 dzs deq foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu oar ospower crindex moralh  
pmindex y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12, fe 
note: oar omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1069 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =       148 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6530                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.7690                                        avg =       7.2 
       overall = 0.7272                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(22,899)          =     76.89 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1235                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lmsa | 
         L1. |   .6690711   .0197032    33.96   0.000     .6304014    .7077408 
             | 
        leff |   .0335798   .1149889     0.29   0.770    -.1920981    .2592577 
      bden10 |   .0056255   .0021726     2.59   0.010     .0013616    .0098894 
         dzs |   .0000327   .0005738     0.06   0.955    -.0010936    .0011589 
         deq |  -.0077902   .0011985    -6.50   0.000    -.0101425   -.0054379 
    foreign9 |    .086135   .0257285     3.35   0.001       .03564      .13663 
        lpop |  -1.159705   .6897471    -1.68   0.093    -2.513407     .193997 
       lgdpc |  -.7852739   .2865834    -2.74   0.006    -1.347724   -.2228236 
          eu |   .0385913   .0275808     1.40   0.162     -.015539    .0927215 
         oar |  (omitted) 
     ospower |   .1025049   .0376745     2.72   0.007     .0285647     .176445 
     crindex |   .0566561   .0264503     2.14   0.032     .0047447    .1085676 
      moralh |   .0083571   .0379773     0.22   0.826    -.0661774    .0828916 
     pmindex |  -.0721347   .0206773    -3.49   0.001    -.1127161   -.0315533 
         y04 |   .0507662   .0255375     1.99   0.047     .0006461    .1008863 
         y05 |   .0938402   .0354079     2.65   0.008     .0243485     .163332 
         y06 |   .1273581   .0489526     2.60   0.009     .0312835    .2234327 
         y07 |    .162965   .0655283     2.49   0.013     .0343587    .2915713 
         y08 |   .2681898   .1138239     2.36   0.019     .0447983    .4915812 
         y09 |    .222664   .0998271     2.23   0.026     .0267426    .4185854 
         y10 |   .2499807   .1015274     2.46   0.014     .0507224    .4492391 
         y11 |   .2339768    .106466     2.20   0.028     .0250259    .4429276 
         y12 |   .2140568   .1047919     2.04   0.041     .0083915    .4197221 
       _cons |   10.72309   4.104778     2.61   0.009     2.667032    18.77916 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .63584672 
     sigma_e |  .13944687 
         rho |   .9541107   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(147, 899) =     4.37            Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Table A.6.4 Printout of baseline dynamic panel model estimated by Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) for the bank’s market share determinants in SEECs, 2002-
2012 (Dependent variable MSA) 
 
. reg lmsa l.lmsa leff bden10 dzs deq foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu oar ospower crindex moralh  pmindex 
y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 
 
Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1069 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 23,  1045) = 2814.00 
       Model |  1855.88972    23  80.6908573           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  29.9651692  1045  .028674803           R-squared     =  0.9841 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.9838 
       Total |  1885.85489  1068  1.76578173           Root MSE      =  .16934 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lmsa | 
         L1. |   .9554135   .0060655   157.52   0.000     .9435116    .9673154 
             | 
        leff |  -.1031567   .0809406    -1.27   0.203    -.2619813    .0556679 
      bden10 |   .0006759   .0006337     1.07   0.286    -.0005675    .0019193 
         dzs |  -.0000781   .0001504    -0.52   0.604    -.0003732    .0002169 
         deq |  -.0039526   .0005906    -6.69   0.000    -.0051115   -.0027936 
    foreign9 |   .0485743    .011782     4.12   0.000     .0254553    .0716933 
        lpop |   .1423298    .047769     2.98   0.003     .0485956    .2360639 
       lgdpc |  -.0232191   .0184388    -1.26   0.208    -.0594005    .0129623 
          eu |   .0616478   .0215194     2.86   0.004     .0194217    .1038739 
         oar |   .0255486   .0224876     1.14   0.256    -.0185774    .0696745 
     ospower |  -.0108615    .006497    -1.67   0.095    -.0236102    .0018872 
     crindex |  -.0130792   .0109379    -1.20   0.232     -.034542    .0083835 
      moralh |  -.0115309   .0208945    -0.55   0.581    -.0525308    .0294691 
     pmindex |  -.0224888   .0118019    -1.91   0.057    -.0456468    .0006692 
         y04 |   .0167761   .0247516     0.68   0.498    -.0317925    .0653446 
         y05 |   .0232622   .0240607     0.97   0.334    -.0239507     .070475 
         y06 |   .0010907   .0241878     0.05   0.964    -.0463714    .0485528 
         y07 |  -.0134915   .0242736    -0.56   0.578    -.0611221    .0341392 
         y08 |  -.0611171   .0387339    -1.58   0.115    -.1371221    .0148879 
         y09 |  -.0672611   .0382247    -1.76   0.079    -.1422671    .0077448 
         y10 |  -.0454893   .0386846    -1.18   0.240    -.1213976    .0304191 
         y11 |  -.0707304   .0391978    -1.80   0.071    -.1476457    .0061849 
         y12 |  -.0950659    .040841    -2.33   0.020    -.1752057   -.0149262 
       _cons |   .2817007    .397271     0.71   0.478     -.497839     1.06124 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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6.4 ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATION (PRINTOUTS: 
DIFFERENT BANK SIZE-CLASSES) 
Table A.6.5 Printout of the alternative dynamic panel model specification 
examining the systematic variation in determinants across different size-
classes (only bank-specific variables are interacted with the four biggest 
banks in each country) 
xtabond2 lmsa l.lmsa leff leffc4 bden10 bden10c4 dzs dzsc4 deq deqc4 foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu 
oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 c4, gmm(l.lmsa, lag(3 
.)coll) gmm(leff, lag(2 2)coll) gmm(leffc4, lag(2 5)coll) gmm(bden10, lag(2 2)coll) 
gmm(bden10c4, lag(2 3)coll) gmm(dzs, lag(4 .)coll) gmm(dzsc4, lag(4 .)coll) gmm(deq, lag(2 
2)coll)gmm(deqc4, lag(2 .)coll) iv(foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu) iv(oar ospower crindex moralh 
pmindex) iv(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 c4) two robust orthogonal 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor space, perm. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1068 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       148 
Number of instruments = 68                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(28) =  13482.98                                      avg =      7.22 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lmsa | 
         L1. |   .8891942   .0396685    22.42   0.000     .8114453     .966943 
             | 
        leff |   .6665467   .6411527     1.04   0.299    -.5900895    1.923183 
      leffc4 |  -2.426776   1.039264    -2.34   0.020    -4.463695   -.3898567 
      bden10 |   .0182309   .0086658     2.10   0.035     .0012461    .0352156 
    bden10c4 |   -.004713   .0092963    -0.51   0.612    -.0229335    .0135074 
         dzs |  -.0020725   .0009959    -2.08   0.037    -.0040244   -.0001206 
       dzsc4 |   .0037601   .0032191     1.17   0.243    -.0025492    .0100694 
         deq |  -.0057667   .0032788    -1.76   0.079     -.012193    .0006597 
       deqc4 |  -.0193227   .0081848    -2.36   0.018    -.0353646   -.0032807 
    foreign9 |   .0225053   .0347668     0.65   0.517    -.0456364    .0906471 
        lpop |   .1567467   .0951221     1.65   0.099    -.0296891    .3431825 
       lgdpc |  -.0532572   .0391295    -1.36   0.173    -.1299497    .0234352 
          eu |   .0326697   .0304544     1.07   0.283    -.0270198    .0923593 
         oar |   .0799278   .0396632     2.02   0.044     .0021893    .1576662 
     ospower |  -.0241172   .0115244    -2.09   0.036    -.0467046   -.0015297 
     crindex |   -.025804   .0167825    -1.54   0.124    -.0586971    .0070891 
      moralh |  -.0390816   .0387757    -1.01   0.314    -.1150806    .0369174 
     pmindex |  -.0317227   .0200958    -1.58   0.114    -.0711097    .0076644 
         y04 |   .0320541   .0224635     1.43   0.154    -.0119737    .0760818 
         y05 |   .0385151   .0256605     1.50   0.133    -.0117785    .0888088 
         y06 |   .0005213   .0252995     0.02   0.984    -.0490648    .0501074 
         y07 |  -.0237478   .0313988    -0.76   0.449    -.0852884    .0377927 
         y08 |  -.1264354   .0569312    -2.22   0.026    -.2380185   -.0148523 
         y09 |  -.1364055   .0614817    -2.22   0.027    -.2569074   -.0159037 
         y10 |  -.1173627   .0599213    -1.96   0.050    -.2348064    .0000809 
         y11 |  -.1423489   .0592345    -2.40   0.016    -.2584464   -.0262513 
         y12 |  -.1485205   .0593834    -2.50   0.012    -.2649099   -.0321311 
          c4 |   10.79354   4.634889     2.33   0.020     1.709322    19.87775 
       _cons |  -3.041175   2.811632    -1.08   0.279    -8.551872    2.469523 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 c4) 
    FOD.(oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex) 
    FOD.(foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/10).deqc4 collapsed 
    L2.deq collapsed 
    L(4/10).dzsc4 collapsed 
    L(4/10).dzs collapsed 
    L(2/3).bden10c4 collapsed 
    L2.bden10 collapsed 
    L(2/5).leffc4 collapsed 
    L2.leff collapsed 
    L(3/10).L.lmsa collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 c4 
    oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex 
    foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.deqc4 collapsed 
    DL.deq collapsed 
    DL3.dzsc4 collapsed 
    DL3.dzs collapsed 
    DL.bden10c4 collapsed 
    DL.bden10 collapsed 
    DL.leffc4 collapsed 
    DL.leff collapsed 
    DL2.L.lmsa collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.55  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.72  Pr > z =  0.469 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(39)   =  23.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.972 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(39)   =  31.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.782 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(30)   =  26.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.640 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =   5.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.812 
  gmm(L.lmsa, collapse lag(3 .)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(31)   =  25.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.735 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   6.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.624 
  gmm(leff, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(37)   =  31.22  Prob > chi2 =  0.736 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.700 
  gmm(leffc4, collapse lag(2 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(34)   =  27.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.778 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   4.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.486 
  gmm(bden10, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(37)   =  31.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.734 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.720 
  gmm(bden10c4, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(36)   =  30.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.738 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.643 
  gmm(dzs, collapse lag(4 .)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(31)   =  24.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.795 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   7.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.477 
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  gmm(dzsc4, collapse lag(4 .)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(31)   =  27.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.672 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   4.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.766 
  gmm(deq, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(37)   =  29.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.816 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.257 
  gmm(deqc4, collapse lag(2 .)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(29)   =  23.29  Prob > chi2 =  0.763 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(10)   =   8.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.566 
  iv(foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(35)   =  30.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.677 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.870 
  iv(oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(34)   =  30.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.640 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   1.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.920 
  iv(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 c4) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(29)   =  25.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.638 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(10)   =   6.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.800 
 
. lincom bden10+bden10c4 
 
 ( 1)  bden10 + bden10c4 = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .0135178   .0071168     1.90   0.058    -.0004309    .0274666 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. lincom leff+leffc4 
 
 ( 1)  leff + leffc4 = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -1.760229   .8702079    -2.02   0.043    -3.465806   -.0546531 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. lincom dzs+dzsc4 
 
 ( 1)  dzs + dzsc4 = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .0016876   .0030243     0.56   0.577    -.0042399    .0076151 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. lincom deq+deqc4 
 
 ( 1)  deq + deqc4 = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0250893   .0072102    -3.48   0.001    -.0392212   -.0109575 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table A.6.6: Printout of the alternative dynamic panel model specification 
examining the systemic variation in determinants across different size-
classes (only bank-specific variables are interacted with the four biggest 
banks in each country) 
 
. xtreg lmsa l.lmsa leff leffc4 bden10 bden10c4 dzs dzsc4 deq deqc4 foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu oar 
ospower crindex moralh pmindex y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 c4, fe 
note: oar omitted because of collinearity 
note: c4 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1068 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =       148 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6560                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0165                                        avg =       7.2 
       overall = 0.0084                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(26,894)          =     65.58 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6291                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lmsa | 
         L1. |   .6699948   .0199365    33.61   0.000     .6308671    .7091226 
             | 
        leff |   .2027172   .1323781     1.53   0.126    -.0570908    .4625253 
      leffc4 |  -.7179753   .2825145    -2.54   0.011    -1.272444   -.1635063 
      bden10 |   .0071954   .0027886     2.58   0.010     .0017224    .0126685 
    bden10c4 |  -.0009549   .0037518    -0.25   0.799    -.0083183    .0064086 
         dzs |   .0002178   .0006077     0.36   0.720    -.0009748    .0014105 
       dzsc4 |  -.0017553   .0015436    -1.14   0.256    -.0047847    .0012741 
         deq |  -.0070894    .001267    -5.60   0.000    -.0095759   -.0046028 
       deqc4 |  -.0054875   .0040635    -1.35   0.177    -.0134626    .0024876 
    foreign9 |   .0775921   .0259757     2.99   0.003     .0266117    .1285726 
        lpop |  -1.222057   .6876862    -1.78   0.076    -2.571724    .1276106 
       lgdpc |  -.7676483   .2863744    -2.68   0.007    -1.329693   -.2056038 
          eu |    .035342   .0275031     1.29   0.199    -.0186362    .0893201 
         oar |          0  (omitted) 
     ospower |   .0965886   .0376038     2.57   0.010     .0227865    .1703907 
     crindex |   .0569911    .026488     2.15   0.032     .0050052     .108977 
      moralh |     .00256   .0378936     0.07   0.946    -.0718108    .0769308 
     pmindex |  -.0664921   .0206335    -3.22   0.001     -.106988   -.0259963 
         y04 |    .050224   .0254578     1.97   0.049     .0002601    .1001879 
         y05 |   .0966648   .0353162     2.74   0.006     .0273524    .1659772 
         y06 |   .1292575   .0489492     2.64   0.008     .0331888    .2253262 
         y07 |   .1643151   .0655081     2.51   0.012     .0357475    .2928828 
         y08 |   .2629767   .1134977     2.32   0.021     .0402238    .4857296 
         y09 |   .2189562   .0995145     2.20   0.028     .0236469    .4142654 
         y10 |    .245667   .1012401     2.43   0.015     .0469712    .4443629 
         y11 |   .2329565   .1061714     2.19   0.028     .0245822    .4413308 
         y12 |   .2157787   .1045512     2.06   0.039     .0105844     .420973 
          c4 |          0  (omitted) 
       _cons |   10.85567   4.113087     2.64   0.008     2.783238     18.9281 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.6359689 
     sigma_e |   .1386139 
         rho |  .99287218   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(147, 894) =     4.22            Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Table A.6.7: Printout of the alternative dynamic panel model specification 
examining the systemic variation in determinants across different size-
classes (only bank-specific variables are interacted with the four biggest 
banks in each country) 
. reg lmsa l.lmsa leff leffc4 bden10 bden10c4 dzs dzsc4 deq deqc4 foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu oar 
ospower crindex moralh pmindex y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 c4 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1068 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 28,  1039) = 2375.29 
       Model |  1855.51745    28  66.2684804           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  28.9872064  1039   .02789914           R-squared     =  0.9846 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.9842 
       Total |  1884.50466  1067  1.76617119           Root MSE      =  .16703 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lmsa | 
         L1. |   .9459217   .0068325   138.44   0.000     .9325146    .9593288 
             | 
        leff |  -.0712842   .0858752    -0.83   0.407    -.2397927    .0972243 
      leffc4 |  -.3664003   .2189415    -1.67   0.095    -.7960182    .0632176 
      bden10 |   .0010009   .0009866     1.01   0.311    -.0009351     .002937 
    bden10c4 |  -.0004254   .0011668    -0.36   0.716    -.0027149    .0018641 
         dzs |  -.0002701   .0001555    -1.74   0.083    -.0005753    .0000351 
       dzsc4 |   .0023461   .0005653     4.15   0.000     .0012368    .0034554 
         deq |  -.0034157   .0006082    -5.62   0.000     -.004609   -.0022223 
       deqc4 |  -.0100129   .0027236    -3.68   0.000    -.0153573   -.0046685 
    foreign9 |   .0453882   .0118275     3.84   0.000     .0221797    .0685967 
        lpop |   .1448536   .0471944     3.07   0.002     .0522464    .2374609 
       lgdpc |   -.032954   .0182922    -1.80   0.072    -.0688479    .0029399 
          eu |   .0565938   .0213678     2.65   0.008     .0146649    .0985228 
         oar |   .0258724   .0227685     1.14   0.256     -.018805    .0705498 
     ospower |    -.00791   .0065495    -1.21   0.227    -.0207618    .0049418 
     crindex |  -.0044474   .0110983    -0.40   0.689    -.0262251    .0173303 
      moralh |  -.0202446   .0207874    -0.97   0.330    -.0610347    .0205455 
     pmindex |  -.0155451    .011743    -1.32   0.186    -.0385878    .0074975 
         y04 |   .0170133   .0244192     0.70   0.486    -.0309033      .06493 
         y05 |   .0322675   .0238258     1.35   0.176    -.0144846    .0790196 
         y06 |   .0127798   .0240303     0.53   0.595    -.0343736    .0599333 
         y07 |  -.0000237   .0241698    -0.00   0.999    -.0474509    .0474034 
         y08 |  -.0460577   .0386682    -1.19   0.234    -.1219343    .0298188 
         y09 |  -.0522663   .0381706    -1.37   0.171    -.1271666     .022634 
         y10 |    -.03324   .0387154    -0.86   0.391    -.1092094    .0427293 
         y11 |  -.0540854    .039256    -1.38   0.169    -.1311155    .0229447 
         y12 |  -.0752102   .0410197    -1.83   0.067    -.1557012    .0052808 
          c4 |   1.647071   .9794546     1.68   0.093    -.2748633    3.569006 
       _cons |   .0798839   .4184505     0.19   0.849    -.7412206    .9009884 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table A.6.8 Printout of the alternative dynamic panel model specification 
examining the systemic variation in determinants across different size-
classes (only regulatory and supervisory practices are interacted with the 
four biggest banks in each country) 
 
. xtabond2 lmsa l.lmsa leff bden10 dzs deq foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu oar oarc4 ospower ospowerc4 
crindex crindexc4 moralh moralhc4 pmindex pmindexc4 c4 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12, 
gmm(l.lmsa, lag(3 3)coll) gmm(leff, lag(2 2)coll) gmm(bden10, lag(2 2)coll) gmm(dzs, lag(4 
.)coll) gmm(deq, lag(2 2)coll) iv(foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu) iv(oar oarc4 ospower ospowerc4 
crindex crindexc4 moralh moralhc4 pmindex pmindexc4 c4) iv(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 
y12) two robust orthogonal 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1069 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       148 
Number of instruments = 41                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(29) =  12012.43                                      avg =      7.22 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lmsa | 
         L1. |   .8271412   .0506185    16.34   0.000     .7279308    .9263517 
             | 
        leff |    .327164   .5860441     0.56   0.577    -.8214613    1.475789 
      bden10 |    .017055   .0073454     2.32   0.020     .0026583    .0314517 
         dzs |  -.0015289   .0005897    -2.59   0.010    -.0026847   -.0003731 
         deq |  -.0072128    .003174    -2.27   0.023    -.0134337    -.000992 
    foreign9 |       .072   .0421507     1.71   0.088    -.0106138    .1546138 
        lpop |   .0618039   .0984335     0.63   0.530    -.1311221    .2547299 
       lgdpc |  -.0607379   .0467501    -1.30   0.194    -.1523664    .0308905 
          eu |   .0488753   .0357442     1.37   0.172    -.0211821    .1189327 
         oar |   .1124461   .0446492     2.52   0.012     .0249353     .199957 
       oarc4 |  -.0834744   .0793732    -1.05   0.293    -.2390431    .0720942 
     ospower |  -.0273036   .0127224    -2.15   0.032    -.0522391   -.0023682 
   ospowerc4 |   .0061418   .0221031     0.28   0.781    -.0371795    .0494632 
     crindex |  -.0261539   .0177889    -1.47   0.141    -.0610196    .0087117 
   crindexc4 |   -.034935   .0320509    -1.09   0.276    -.0977536    .0278836 
      moralh |  -.0707007   .0504182    -1.40   0.161    -.1695185    .0281171 
    moralhc4 |   .0798583     .06583     1.21   0.225    -.0491662    .2088827 
     pmindex |   -.020966   .0249305    -0.84   0.400    -.0698289     .027897 
   pmindexc4 |  -.0168773   .0561529    -0.30   0.764     -.126935    .0931804 
          c4 |   .7391124   .6983643     1.06   0.290    -.6296565    2.107881 
         y04 |   .0155587   .0212548     0.73   0.464       -.0261    .0572174 
         y05 |  -.0008535   .0256792    -0.03   0.973    -.0511839    .0494769 
         y06 |  -.0350442   .0265004    -1.32   0.186    -.0869841    .0168957 
         y07 |  -.0613501   .0305916    -2.01   0.045    -.1213086   -.0013916 
         y08 |  -.1669199   .0628517    -2.66   0.008     -.290107   -.0437329 
         y09 |  -.1892781   .0634691    -2.98   0.003    -.3136753   -.0648809 
         y10 |  -.1639691     .06129    -2.68   0.007    -.2840953   -.0438428 
         y11 |  -.1880611   .0611385    -3.08   0.002    -.3078903   -.0682319 
         y12 |  -.1997679   .0615924    -3.24   0.001    -.3204868    -.079049 
       _cons |  -1.209122   2.548733    -0.47   0.635    -6.204546    3.786302 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12) 
    FOD.(oar oarc4 ospower ospowerc4 crindex crindexc4 moralh moralhc4 pmindex 
    pmindexc4 c4) 
    FOD.(foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.deq collapsed 
    L(4/10).dzs collapsed 
    L2.bden10 collapsed 
    L2.leff collapsed 
    L3.L.lmsa collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
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  Standard 
    y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 
    oar oarc4 ospower ospowerc4 crindex crindexc4 moralh moralhc4 pmindex 
    pmindexc4 c4 
    foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.deq collapsed 
    DL3.dzs collapsed 
    DL.bden10 collapsed 
    DL.leff collapsed 
    DL2.L.lmsa collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.93  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.59  Pr > z =  0.554 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   =   4.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.940 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   =   8.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.710 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =   6.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.405 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   1.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.866 
  gmm(L.lmsa, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =   7.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.623 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.636 
  gmm(leff, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =   7.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.593 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.735 
  gmm(bden10, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =   7.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.620 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.647 
  gmm(dzs, collapse lag(4 .)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   0.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.933 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   7.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.473 
  gmm(deq, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =   5.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.751 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.341 
  iv(foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   2.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.890 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   5.10  Prob > chi2 =  0.278 
  iv(oar oarc4 ospower ospowerc4 crindex crindexc4 moralh moralhc4 pmindex pmindexc4 c4) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(11)   =   8.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.710 
  iv(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   0.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.975 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =   7.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.535 
 
 
 
. lincom oar+oarc4 
 
 ( 1)  oar + oarc4 = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .0289717   .0750896     0.39   0.700    -.1182013    .1761447 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. lincom ospower+ospowerc4 
 
 ( 1)  ospower + ospowerc4 = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0211618   .0199108    -1.06   0.288    -.0601864    .0178627 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. lincom crindex+crindexc4 
 
 ( 1)  crindex + crindexc4 = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0610889   .0280271    -2.18   0.029    -.1160211   -.0061568 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. lincom pmindex + pmindexc4 
 
 ( 1)  pmindex + pmindexc4 = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0378433   .0481224    -0.79   0.432    -.1321614    .0564748 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. lincom moralh+moralhc4 
 
 ( 1)  moralh + moralhc4 = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .0091576   .0676204     0.14   0.892     -.123376    .1416911 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table A.6.9: Printout of the alternative dynamic panel model specification 
examining the systemic variation in determinants across different size-
classes (only regulatory and supervisory practices are interacted with the 
four biggest banks in each country) (using fixed-effects) 
xtreg lmsa l.lmsa leff bden10 dzs deq foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu oar oarc4 ospower ospowerc4 
crindex crindexc4 moralh moralhc4 pmindex pmindexc4 c4 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12, fe 
note: oar omitted because of collinearity 
note: oarc4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c4 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1069 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =       148 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6588                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.8017                                        avg =       7.2 
       overall = 0.7724                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(26,895)          =     66.46 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4531                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lmsa | 
         L1. |    .663117   .0197416    33.59   0.000     .6243718    .7018622 
             | 
        leff |   .0296949   .1143484     0.26   0.795    -.1947273    .2541171 
      bden10 |   .0062221   .0022583     2.76   0.006     .0017899    .0106544 
         dzs |   .0003327   .0005824     0.57   0.568    -.0008102    .0014757 
         deq |  -.0082752   .0012135    -6.82   0.000    -.0106568   -.0058935 
    foreign9 |   .0884352   .0259685     3.41   0.001     .0374689    .1394015 
        lpop |  -1.213924   .6856533    -1.77   0.077      -2.5596    .1317512 
       lgdpc |  -.7869887   .2849309    -2.76   0.006    -1.346199   -.2277781 
          eu |   .0379334   .0274308     1.38   0.167    -.0159028    .0917695 
         oar |          0  (omitted) 
       oarc4 |          0  (omitted) 
     ospower |    .100552   .0385211     2.61   0.009     .0249497    .1761543 
   ospowerc4 |   .0144062    .052808     0.27   0.785    -.0892358    .1180481 
     crindex |   .0400592   .0271889     1.47   0.141    -.0133022    .0934205 
   crindexc4 |   .0548503   .0307097     1.79   0.074    -.0054211    .1151217 
      moralh |   .0283295   .0398782     0.71   0.478    -.0499361    .1065951 
    moralhc4 |  -.0596991   .0494695    -1.21   0.228    -.1567889    .0373906 
     pmindex |  -.0997658   .0226313    -4.41   0.000    -.1441824   -.0553492 
   pmindexc4 |   .0861596   .0415887     2.07   0.039     .0045369    .1677823 
          c4 |          0  (omitted) 
         y04 |   .0499366   .0253848     1.97   0.049      .000116    .0997572 
         y05 |   .0929588   .0351942     2.64   0.008      .023886    .1620317 
         y06 |   .1267663   .0486618     2.61   0.009     .0312617    .2222709 
         y07 |   .1615745   .0651378     2.48   0.013     .0337339    .2894152 
         y08 |   .2625629   .1131641     2.32   0.021     .0404649    .4846609 
         y09 |   .2159091   .0992567     2.18   0.030     .0211061    .4107121 
         y10 |   .2429282   .1009571     2.41   0.016     .0447878    .4410685 
         y11 |   .2262618   .1058746     2.14   0.033     .0184704    .4340533 
         y12 |   .2064618   .1042206     1.98   0.048     .0019166    .4110069 
       _cons |   11.04424   4.080409     2.71   0.007     3.035955    19.05252 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .64698741 
     sigma_e |  .13858557 
         rho |  .95613061   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(147, 895) =     4.31            Prob > F = 0.0000
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Table A.6.10: Printout of the alternative dynamic panel model specification 
examining the systemic variation in determinants across different size-
classes (only regulatory and supervisory practices are interacted with the 
four biggest banks in each country)(using OLS) 
 
reg lmsa l.lmsa leff bden10 dzs deq foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu oar oarc4 ospower ospowerc4 crindex 
crindexc4 moralh moralhc4 pmindex pmindexc4 c4 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1069 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 29,  1039) = 2268.94 
       Model |   1856.5393    29  64.0185966           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  29.3155846  1039  .028215192           R-squared     =  0.9845 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.9840 
       Total |  1885.85489  1068  1.76578173           Root MSE      =  .16797 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lmsa | 
         L1. |   .9468567   .0068814   137.60   0.000     .9333536    .9603599 
             | 
        leff |  -.1289463    .080644    -1.60   0.110    -.2871899    .0292973 
      bden10 |    .000342   .0006984     0.49   0.624    -.0010285    .0017125 
         dzs |  -.0001565   .0001524    -1.03   0.305    -.0004556    .0001426 
         deq |  -.0038509   .0005948    -6.47   0.000     -.005018   -.0026839 
    foreign9 |   .0489052   .0117507     4.16   0.000     .0258474    .0719629 
        lpop |   .1613602   .0488949     3.30   0.001     .0654163    .2573042 
       lgdpc |  -.0258983   .0185078    -1.40   0.162    -.0622152    .0104186 
          eu |   .0624658   .0214918     2.91   0.004     .0202934    .1046381 
         oar |   .0245989   .0238944     1.03   0.303    -.0222878    .0714857 
       oarc4 |  -.0021102   .0340957    -0.06   0.951    -.0690144    .0647941 
     ospower |  -.0089148   .0070361    -1.27   0.205    -.0227213    .0048918 
   ospowerc4 |  -.0039739   .0104487    -0.38   0.704     -.024477    .0165291 
     crindex |  -.0059084   .0114992    -0.51   0.607    -.0284726    .0166559 
   crindexc4 |   -.025679   .0158853    -1.62   0.106      -.05685    .0054919 
      moralh |  -.0221183   .0216701    -1.02   0.308    -.0646404    .0204038 
    moralhc4 |   .0422878   .0248495     1.70   0.089    -.0064731    .0910486 
     pmindex |  -.0296801   .0128108    -2.32   0.021    -.0548181    -.004542 
   pmindexc4 |   .0431121   .0191552     2.25   0.025     .0055247    .0806994 
          c4 |  -.0494616   .1514535    -0.33   0.744    -.3466513     .247728 
         y04 |   .0160936    .024558     0.66   0.512    -.0320953    .0642825 
         y05 |   .0249624   .0238803     1.05   0.296    -.0218967    .0718215 
         y06 |   .0043277   .0240279     0.18   0.857    -.0428211    .0514765 
         y07 |  -.0083008   .0241605    -0.34   0.731    -.0557099    .0391082 
         y08 |  -.0584018   .0386852    -1.51   0.131    -.1343118    .0175081 
         y09 |  -.0643587   .0381774    -1.69   0.092    -.1392722    .0105548 
         y10 |  -.0421409   .0386436    -1.09   0.276    -.1179692    .0336875 
         y11 |   -.066673   .0391785    -1.70   0.089     -.143551    .0102049 
         y12 |   -.091252   .0408191    -2.24   0.026    -.1713493   -.0111547 
       _cons |   .3317843   .3959859     0.84   0.402     -.445239    1.108808 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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6.5 ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATION (PRINTOUTS: 
DIFFERENT RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOUR 
Table A.6.11: Printout of the alternative dynamic panel model specification: 
Is there systematic variation in regulatory and supervisory practices across 
different risk-taking behaviour (the bank-level effect)? 
. xtabond2 lmsa l.lmsa leff bden10 dzs deq foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu oar oarrisk ospower 
ospowerrisk crindex crindexrisk moralh moralhrisk pmindex pmindexrisk y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 
y10 y11 y12, gmm(l.lmsa, lag(3 4)coll) gmm(leff, lag(2 2)coll) gmm(bden10,lag(2 3)coll) 
gmm(dzs, lag(2 3)coll) gmm(deq, lag(3 3)coll) gmm(oarrisk, lag(2 3)coll) gmm(ospowerrisk, 
lag(3 6)coll) gmm(crindexrisk, lag(3 6)coll) gmm(moralhrisk, lag(3 .)coll) gmm(pmindexrisk, 
lag(3 5)coll) iv(foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu) iv(oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex) iv(y04 y05 y06 
y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12) two robust orthogonal 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, perm. 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1069 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       148 
Number of instruments = 58                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(28) =   6980.07                                      avg =      7.22 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lmsa | 
         L1. |   .8756762   .0383872    22.81   0.000     .8004387    .9509137 
             | 
        leff |   .1454218   .6360844     0.23   0.819    -1.101281    1.392124 
      bden10 |   .0190698   .0069023     2.76   0.006     .0055416    .0325979 
         dzs |   .0245805   .0199514     1.23   0.218    -.0145236    .0636846 
         deq |  -.0092229   .0030562    -3.02   0.003     -.015213   -.0032329 
    foreign9 |   .0688434   .0430629     1.60   0.110    -.0155583    .1532451 
        lpop |    .153104   .2026691     0.76   0.450    -.2441202    .5503282 
       lgdpc |  -.0580044   .0517141    -1.12   0.262    -.1593621    .0433534 
          eu |   .0484716    .030058     1.61   0.107    -.0104409    .1073841 
         oar |    .056671   .0624452     0.91   0.364    -.0657193    .1790613 
     oarrisk |   .0041668   .0023079     1.81   0.071    -.0003566    .0086902 
     ospower |  -.0086711   .0188471    -0.46   0.645    -.0456107    .0282685 
 ospowerrisk |  -.0031206   .0010719    -2.91   0.004    -.0052214   -.0010197 
     crindex |  -.0281949   .0241457    -1.17   0.243    -.0755195    .0191298 
 crindexrisk |  -.0027923   .0012592    -2.22   0.027    -.0052603   -.0003244 
      moralh |  -.0143072   .0512301    -0.28   0.780    -.1147164    .0861019 
  moralhrisk |   .0076984   .0036329     2.12   0.034     .0005781    .0148188 
     pmindex |  -.0406303   .0200732    -2.02   0.043    -.0799731   -.0012875 
 pmindexrisk |  -.0022021   .0018171    -1.21   0.226    -.0057636    .0013593 
         y04 |  -.0128501   .0219021    -0.59   0.557    -.0557775    .0300773 
         y05 |  -.0092885   .0284692    -0.33   0.744    -.0650871    .0465101 
         y06 |  -.0518922   .0283549    -1.83   0.067    -.1074667    .0036824 
         y07 |  -.0843747   .0330778    -2.55   0.011     -.149206   -.0195433 
         y08 |  -.1464798   .0813053    -1.80   0.072    -.3058352    .0128755 
         y09 |  -.1843078   .0835477    -2.21   0.027    -.3480582   -.0205574 
         y10 |  -.1501583   .0812784    -1.85   0.065     -.309461    .0091445 
         y11 |  -.1761175    .085131    -2.07   0.039    -.3429712   -.0092638 
         y12 |  -.1908724   .0844121    -2.26   0.024    -.3563171   -.0254278 
       _cons |  -.6502145   2.747609    -0.24   0.813    -6.035429       4.735 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12) 
    FOD.(oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex) 
    FOD.(foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(3/5).pmindexrisk collapsed 
    L(3/10).moralhrisk collapsed 
    L(3/6).crindexrisk collapsed 
    L(3/6).ospowerrisk collapsed 
    L(2/3).oarrisk collapsed 
    L3.deq collapsed 
    L(2/3).dzs collapsed 
    L(2/3).bden10 collapsed 
    L2.leff collapsed 
    L(3/4).L.lmsa collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 
    oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex 
    foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL2.pmindexrisk collapsed 
    DL2.moralhrisk collapsed 
    DL2.crindexrisk collapsed 
    DL2.ospowerrisk collapsed 
    DL.oarrisk collapsed 
    DL2.deq collapsed 
    DL.dzs collapsed 
    DL.bden10 collapsed 
    DL.leff collapsed 
    DL2.L.lmsa collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.38  Pr > z =  0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.72  Pr > z =  0.470 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(29)   =  19.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.917 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(29)   =  25.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.636 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(19)   =  19.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.447 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(10)   =   6.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.758 
  gmm(L.lmsa, collapse lag(3 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(26)   =  21.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.729 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   4.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.207 
  gmm(leff, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(27)   =  25.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.553 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.809 
  gmm(bden10, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(26)   =  24.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.576 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.614 
  gmm(dzs, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(26)   =  23.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.612 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.488 
  gmm(deq, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(27)   =  24.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.626 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.420 
  gmm(oarrisk, collapse lag(2 3)) 
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    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(26)   =  23.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.590 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.561 
  gmm(ospowerrisk, collapse lag(3 6)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(24)   =  21.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.616 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   4.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.491 
  gmm(crindexrisk, collapse lag(3 6)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(24)   =  21.70  Prob > chi2 =  0.597 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   4.10  Prob > chi2 =  0.535 
  gmm(moralhrisk, collapse lag(3 .)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(20)   =  17.29  Prob > chi2 =  0.634 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =   8.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.483 
  gmm(pmindexrisk, collapse lag(3 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(25)   =  24.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.480 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.891 
  iv(foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(25)   =  21.96  Prob > chi2 =  0.638 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   3.85  Prob > chi2 =  0.427 
  iv(oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(24)   =  22.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.570 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   3.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.600 
  iv(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(20)   =  15.11  Prob > chi2 =  0.770 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =  10.70  Prob > chi2 =  0.297 
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MARGINAL EFFECTS 
OAR 
. margins oar, at (dzs=( -32 (38) 545)) force vsquish noestimcheck 
(note: default prediction is a function of possibly stochastic quantities other than e(b)) 
 
Predictive margins                                Number of obs   =       1069 
Model VCE    : Corrected 
 
Expression   : Fitted Values, predict() 
1._at        : dzs             =         -32 
2._at        : dzs             =           6 
3._at        : dzs             =          44 
4._at        : dzs             =          82 
5._at        : dzs             =         120 
6._at        : dzs             =         158 
7._at        : dzs             =         196 
8._at        : dzs             =         234 
9._at        : dzs             =         272 
10._at       : dzs             =         310 
11._at       : dzs             =         348 
12._at       : dzs             =         386 
13._at       : dzs             =         424 
14._at       : dzs             =         462 
15._at       : dzs             =         500 
16._at       : dzs             =         538 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     _at#oar | 
        1 6  |  -1.295854   1.035412    -1.25   0.211    -3.325223    .7335158 
        1 7  |  -1.226577    1.59428    -0.77   0.442    -4.351308    1.898154 
        1 8  |   -1.41478   1.040256    -1.36   0.174    -3.453645    .6240849 
        2 6  |   .7260781   .1034217     7.02   0.000     .5233752    .9287809 
        2 7  |   .8970316   .1896884     4.73   0.000     .5252491    1.268814 
        2 8  |   .9225874   .0796129    11.59   0.000      .766549    1.078626 
        3 6  |    2.74801   .9188491     2.99   0.003     .9470985    4.548921 
        3 7  |    3.02064   1.829001     1.65   0.099    -.5641358    6.605416 
        3 8  |   3.259955   1.091614     2.99   0.003      1.12043    5.399479 
        4 6  |   4.769941   1.890196     2.52   0.012     1.065226    8.474657 
        4 7  |   5.144248    3.53122     1.46   0.145    -1.776816    12.06531 
        4 8  |   5.597322   2.153598     2.60   0.009     1.376348    9.818296 
        5 6  |   6.791873   2.862929     2.37   0.018     1.180634    12.40311 
        5 7  |   7.267857   5.235341     1.39   0.165    -2.993223    17.52894 
        5 8  |   7.934689    3.21643     2.47   0.014     1.630602    14.23878 
        6 6  |   8.813804   3.835995     2.30   0.022     1.295392    16.33222 
        6 7  |   9.391465   6.939963     1.35   0.176    -4.210612    22.99354 
        6 8  |   10.27206   4.279479     2.40   0.016     1.884432    18.65968 
        7 6  |   10.83574   4.809191     2.25   0.024     1.409894    20.26158 
        7 7  |   11.51507   8.644789     1.33   0.183    -5.428402    28.45855 
        7 8  |   12.60942   5.342615     2.36   0.018      2.13809    23.08076 
        8 6  |   12.85767   5.782452     2.22   0.026      1.52427    24.19107 
        8 7  |   13.63868   10.34972     1.32   0.188    -6.646395    33.92376 
        8 8  |   14.94679   6.405795     2.33   0.020     2.391663    27.50192 
        9 6  |    14.8796   6.755749     2.20   0.028     1.638573    28.12062 
        9 7  |   15.76229   12.05471     1.31   0.191    -7.864505    39.38909 
        9 8  |   17.28416      7.469     2.31   0.021     2.645187    31.92313 
       10 6  |   16.90153    7.72907     2.19   0.029     1.752832    32.05023 
       10 7  |    17.8859   13.75974     1.30   0.194    -9.082688    44.85449 
       10 8  |   19.62153   8.532221     2.30   0.021      2.89868    36.34437 
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       11 6  |   18.92346   8.702405     2.17   0.030     1.867062    35.97986 
       11 7  |   20.00951   15.46479     1.29   0.196    -10.30092    50.31994 
       11 8  |   21.95889   9.595452     2.29   0.022     3.152152    40.76563 
       12 6  |   20.94539   9.675751     2.16   0.030      1.98127    39.90952 
       12 7  |   22.13312   17.16986     1.29   0.197    -11.51919    55.78542 
       12 8  |   24.29626   10.65869     2.28   0.023      3.40561    45.18691 
       13 6  |   22.96733    10.6491     2.16   0.031     2.095463    43.83919 
       13 7  |   24.25672   18.87494     1.29   0.199    -12.73748    61.25093 
       13 8  |   26.63363   11.72193     2.27   0.023     3.659057     49.6082 
       14 6  |   24.98926   11.62246     2.15   0.032     2.209645    47.76887 
       14 7  |   26.38033   20.58003     1.28   0.200    -13.95579    66.71645 
       14 8  |   28.97099   12.78518     2.27   0.023     3.912497    54.02949 
       15 6  |   27.01119   12.59583     2.14   0.032     2.323819    51.69856 
       15 7  |   28.50394   22.28513     1.28   0.201    -15.17411      72.182 
       15 8  |   31.30836   13.84843     2.26   0.024      4.16593    58.45079 
       16 6  |   29.03312    13.5692     2.14   0.032     2.437986    55.62825 
       16 7  |   30.62755   23.99024     1.28   0.202    -16.39245    77.64755 
       16 8  |   33.64573   14.91169     2.26   0.024     4.419359     62.8721 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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OSPOWERRISK 
. margins, dydx(ospower) at (dzs=( -32 (38) 545)) force vsquish noestimcheck 
(note: default prediction is a function of possibly stochastic quantities other than e(b)) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =       1069 
Model VCE    : Corrected 
 
Expression   : Fitted Values, predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : ospower 
1._at        : dzs             =         -32 
2._at        : dzs             =           6 
3._at        : dzs             =          44 
4._at        : dzs             =          82 
5._at        : dzs             =         120 
6._at        : dzs             =         158 
7._at        : dzs             =         196 
8._at        : dzs             =         234 
9._at        : dzs             =         272 
10._at       : dzs             =         310 
11._at       : dzs             =         348 
12._at       : dzs             =         386 
13._at       : dzs             =         424 
14._at       : dzs             =         462 
15._at       : dzs             =         500 
16._at       : dzs             =         538 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ospower      | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .0911874   .0365412     2.50   0.013     .0195679    .1628069 
          2  |  -.0273945   .0208185    -1.32   0.188     -.068198    .0134089 
          3  |  -.1459765   .0533823    -2.73   0.006    -.2506038   -.0413492 
          4  |  -.2645584     .09265    -2.86   0.004    -.4461491   -.0829677 
          5  |  -.3831403   .1328025    -2.89   0.004    -.6434284   -.1228523 
          6  |  -.5017223   .1732255    -2.90   0.004     -.841238   -.1622065 
          7  |  -.6203042   .2137657    -2.90   0.004    -1.039277   -.2013312 
          8  |  -.7388861    .254367    -2.90   0.004    -1.237436   -.2403361 
          9  |  -.8574681   .2950042    -2.91   0.004    -1.435666   -.2792706 
         10  |    -.97605   .3356642    -2.91   0.004     -1.63394   -.3181603 
         11  |  -1.094632   .3763397    -2.91   0.004    -1.832244   -.3570197 
         12  |  -1.213214   .4170261    -2.91   0.004     -2.03057   -.3958577 
         13  |  -1.331796   .4577206    -2.91   0.004    -2.228912     -.43468 
         14  |  -1.450378   .4984211    -2.91   0.004    -2.427265   -.4734904 
         15  |   -1.56896   .5391262    -2.91   0.004    -2.625628   -.5122917 
         16  |  -1.687542   .5798351    -2.91   0.004    -2.823998   -.5510857 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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CRINDEXRISK 
 
. margins, dydx(crindex) at (dzs=( -32 (38) 545)) force vsquish noestimcheck 
(note: default prediction is a function of possibly stochastic quantities other than e(b)) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =       1069 
Model VCE    : Corrected 
 
Expression   : Fitted Values, predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : crindex 
1._at        : dzs             =         -32 
2._at        : dzs             =           6 
3._at        : dzs             =          44 
4._at        : dzs             =          82 
5._at        : dzs             =         120 
6._at        : dzs             =         158 
7._at        : dzs             =         196 
8._at        : dzs             =         234 
9._at        : dzs             =         272 
10._at       : dzs             =         310 
11._at       : dzs             =         348 
12._at       : dzs             =         386 
13._at       : dzs             =         424 
14._at       : dzs             =         462 
15._at       : dzs             =         500 
16._at       : dzs             =         538 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
crindex      | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .0611593   .0453472     1.35   0.177    -.0277197    .1500383 
          2  |  -.0449488   .0258508    -1.74   0.082    -.0956154    .0057179 
          3  |  -.1510568   .0621227    -2.43   0.015    -.2728151   -.0292986 
          4  |  -.2571649   .1078391    -2.38   0.017    -.4685256   -.0458042 
          5  |  -.3632729   .1548495    -2.35   0.019    -.6667724   -.0597734 
          6  |   -.469381   .2022537    -2.32   0.020     -.865791    -.072971 
          7  |   -.575489   .2498276    -2.30   0.021    -1.065142    -.085836 
          8  |  -.6815971   .2974897    -2.29   0.022    -1.264666   -.0985279 
          9  |  -.7877052   .3452036    -2.28   0.022    -1.464292   -.1111185 
         10  |  -.8938132   .3929504    -2.27   0.023    -1.663982   -.1236446 
         11  |  -.9999213   .4407194    -2.27   0.023    -1.863715   -.1361272 
         12  |  -1.106029    .488504    -2.26   0.024     -2.06348    -.148579 
         13  |  -1.212137   .5363002    -2.26   0.024    -2.263266   -.1610084 
         14  |  -1.318245    .584105    -2.26   0.024     -2.46307   -.1734207 
         15  |  -1.424353   .6319165    -2.25   0.024    -2.662887   -.1858199 
         16  |  -1.530462   .6797333    -2.25   0.024    -2.862714   -.1982087 
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MORALH 
. margins moralh, at (dzs=( -32 (38) 545)) force vsquish noestimcheck 
(note: default prediction is a function of possibly stochastic quantities other than e(b)) 
 
Predictive margins                                Number of obs   =       1069 
Model VCE    : Corrected 
 
Expression   : Fitted Values, predict() 
1._at        : dzs             =         -32 
2._at        : dzs             =           6 
3._at        : dzs             =          44 
4._at        : dzs             =          82 
5._at        : dzs             =         120 
6._at        : dzs             =         158 
7._at        : dzs             =         196 
8._at        : dzs             =         234 
9._at        : dzs             =         272 
10._at       : dzs             =         310 
11._at       : dzs             =         348 
12._at       : dzs             =         386 
13._at       : dzs             =         424 
14._at       : dzs             =         462 
15._at       : dzs             =         500 
16._at       : dzs             =         538 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  _at#moralh | 
        1 0  |  -.4339251   .9838082    -0.44   0.659    -2.362154    1.494304 
        1 1  |  -.5416805   .9434972    -0.57   0.566    -2.390901     1.30754 
        1 2  |  -.8296209   1.077745    -0.77   0.441    -2.941961     1.28272 
        2 0  |   .8186692   .0824243     9.93   0.000     .6571205    .9802179 
        2 1  |   .8233246   .0364839    22.57   0.000     .7518175    .8948316 
        2 2  |   .8617646   .0396609    21.73   0.000     .7840307    .9394984 
        3 0  |   2.071264   .9943813     2.08   0.037     .1223119    4.020215 
        3 1  |    2.18833   .8903689     2.46   0.014     .4432386    3.933421 
        3 2  |    2.55315   1.039395     2.46   0.014     .5159728    4.590327 
        4 0  |   3.323858   1.978353     1.68   0.093    -.5536425    7.201358 
        4 1  |   3.553335   1.806783     1.97   0.049     .0121055    7.094564 
        4 2  |   4.244535   2.097103     2.02   0.043     .1342888    8.354782 
        5 0  |   4.576452   2.963453     1.54   0.123    -1.231808    10.38471 
        5 1  |    4.91834   2.723317     1.81   0.071    -.4192626    10.25594 
        5 2  |   5.935921   3.155007     1.88   0.060    -.2477797    12.11962 
        6 0  |   5.829047   3.948836     1.48   0.140     -1.91053    13.56862 
        6 1  |   6.283345    3.63988     1.73   0.084    -.8506881    13.41738 
        6 2  |   7.627306    4.21296     1.81   0.070    -.6299429    15.88456 
        7 0  |   7.081641   4.934334     1.44   0.151    -2.589475    16.75276 
        7 1  |    7.64835   4.556454     1.68   0.093    -1.282136    16.57884 
        7 2  |   9.318692   5.270931     1.77   0.077    -1.012144    19.64953 
        8 0  |   8.334235   5.919888     1.41   0.159    -3.268532      19.937 
        8 1  |   9.013355   5.473035     1.65   0.100    -1.713596    19.74031 
        8 2  |   11.01008   6.328913     1.74   0.082    -1.394364    23.41452 
        9 0  |    9.58683   6.905475     1.39   0.165    -3.947653    23.12131 
        9 1  |   10.37836   6.389618     1.62   0.104    -2.145062    22.90178 
        9 2  |   12.70146     7.3869     1.72   0.086    -1.776594    27.17952 
       10 0  |   10.83942   7.891083     1.37   0.170    -4.626814    26.30566 
       10 1  |   11.74336   7.306204     1.61   0.108    -2.576532    26.06326 
       10 2  |   14.39285    8.44489     1.70   0.088    -2.158832    30.94453 
       11 0  |   12.09202   8.876704     1.36   0.173    -5.306001    29.49004 
       11 1  |   13.10837   8.222791     1.59   0.111    -3.008005    29.22475 
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       11 2  |   16.08423   9.502882     1.69   0.091    -2.541073    34.70954 
       12 0  |   13.34461   9.862334     1.35   0.176    -5.985207    32.67443 
       12 1  |   14.47338    9.13938     1.58   0.113     -3.43948    32.38623 
       12 2  |   17.77562   10.56088     1.68   0.092    -2.923318    38.47456 
       13 0  |   14.59721   10.84797     1.35   0.178    -6.664427    35.85884 
       13 1  |   15.83838   10.05597     1.58   0.115    -3.870956    35.54772 
       13 2  |     19.467   11.61887     1.68   0.094    -3.305565    42.23957 
       14 0  |    15.8498   11.83361     1.34   0.180    -7.343657    39.04326 
       14 1  |   17.20339   10.97256     1.57   0.117    -4.302433     38.7092 
       14 2  |   21.15839   12.67687     1.67   0.095    -3.687814    46.00459 
       15 0  |    17.1024   12.81926     1.33   0.182    -8.022894    42.22769 
       15 1  |   18.56839   11.88915     1.56   0.118    -4.733911    41.87069 
       15 2  |   22.84978   13.73486     1.66   0.096    -4.070064    49.76962 
       16 0  |   18.35499   13.80491     1.33   0.184    -8.702138    45.41212 
       16 1  |    19.9334   12.80574     1.56   0.120    -5.165389    45.03218 
       16 2  |   24.54116   14.79286     1.66   0.097    -4.452315    53.53464 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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6.6 CEHCK FOR ROBUSTNESS (PRITNOUTS) 
Table A.6.12: Printout of dynamic panel system GMM estimation for the bank’s 
market share determinants in SEECs, 2002-2012 (Dependent variable MSA)(check 
for robustness using ETR2T) 
 
xtabond2 lmsa l.lmsa leff2 bden10 dzs deq foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu oar ospower crindex moralh 
pmindex y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12, gmm(l.lmsa, lag(3 3)coll) gmm(leff2, lag(2 
3)coll) gmm(bden10, lag(2 2)coll) gmm(dzs, lag(4 .)coll) gmm(deq, lag(2 2)coll) iv(foreign9 
lpop lgdpc eu) iv(oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex) iv(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12) 
two robust orthogonal 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1069 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       148 
Number of instruments = 36                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(23) =   4465.78                                      avg =      7.22 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lmsa | 
         L1. |   .8642398   .0406795    21.25   0.000     .7845094    .9439701 
             | 
       leff2 |   .1376973    .527293     0.26   0.794    -.8957779    1.171173 
      bden10 |   .0178559   .0074431     2.40   0.016     .0032677    .0324441 
         dzs |  -.0014618   .0005163    -2.83   0.005    -.0024738   -.0004499 
         deq |  -.0094209   .0033732    -2.79   0.005    -.0160323   -.0028095 
    foreign9 |   .0351244   .0634741     0.55   0.580    -.0892826    .1595315 
        lpop |   .0730514   .0915525     0.80   0.425    -.1063881    .2524909 
       lgdpc |  -.0572502   .0496902    -1.15   0.249    -.1546411    .0401408 
          eu |   .0411709   .0370655     1.11   0.267    -.0314761    .1138179 
         oar |    .101176   .0424338     2.38   0.017     .0180072    .1843448 
     ospower |  -.0257987   .0124894    -2.07   0.039    -.0502775   -.0013199 
     crindex |  -.0396488   .0145628    -2.72   0.006    -.0681915   -.0111062 
      moralh |  -.0301292    .056957    -0.53   0.597    -.1417629    .0815046 
     pmindex |  -.0342256     .02014    -1.70   0.089    -.0736993     .005248 
         y04 |   .0148812   .0223029     0.67   0.505    -.0288316    .0585941 
         y05 |   .0034304   .0278881     0.12   0.902    -.0512292      .05809 
         y06 |  -.0336503   .0283212    -1.19   0.235    -.0891588    .0218582 
         y07 |  -.0564649   .0309301    -1.83   0.068    -.1170868     .004157 
         y08 |  -.1509271   .0730421    -2.07   0.039     -.294087   -.0077673 
         y09 |  -.1740292   .0737463    -2.36   0.018    -.3185694   -.0294891 
         y10 |  -.1505984   .0716676    -2.10   0.036    -.2910644   -.0101324 
         y11 |  -.1803395   .0707529    -2.55   0.011    -.3190125   -.0416664 
         y12 |  -.1922001   .0708973    -2.71   0.007    -.3311563   -.0532439 
       _cons |  -.2780708   2.293656    -0.12   0.904    -4.773554    4.217413 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12) 
    FOD.(oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex) 
    FOD.(foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.deq collapsed 
    L(4/10).dzs collapsed 
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    L2.bden10 collapsed 
    L(2/3).leff2 collapsed 
    L3.L.lmsa collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 
    oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex 
    foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.deq collapsed 
    DL3.dzs collapsed 
    DL.bden10 collapsed 
    DL.leff2 collapsed 
    DL2.L.lmsa collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.15  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.66  Pr > z =  0.511 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(12)   =   5.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.928 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(12)   =   9.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.633 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   6.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.524 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   3.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.597 
  gmm(L.lmsa, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   8.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.599 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.50  Prob > chi2 =  0.473 
  gmm(leff2, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =   8.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.492 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.710 
  gmm(bden10, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   7.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.720 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.253 
  gmm(dzs, collapse lag(4 .)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   0.85  Prob > chi2 =  0.932 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   8.96  Prob > chi2 =  0.346 
  gmm(deq, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   7.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.655 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.355 
  iv(foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =   2.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.964 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   7.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.118 
  iv(oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   4.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.668 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   4.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.432 
  iv(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.22  Prob > chi2 =  0.527 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =   7.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.577 
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Table A.6.13: Printout of dynamic panel system GMM estimation for the bank’s 
market share determinants in SEECs, 2002-2012 (Dependent variable MSA)(check 
for robustness using EBC2T) 
 
 
. xtabond2 lmsa l.lmsa leffbc2 bden10 dzs deq foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu oar ospower crindex 
moralh pmindex y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12, gmm(l.lmsa, lag(3 3)coll) gmm(leffbc2, 
lag(2 3)coll) gmm(bden10, lag(2 2)coll) gmm(dzs, lag(4 .)coll) gmm(deq, lag(2 2)coll) 
iv(foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu) iv(oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex) iv(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 
y10 y11 y12) two robust orthogonal 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1069 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       148 
Number of instruments = 36                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(23) =   4952.71                                      avg =      7.22 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lmsa | 
         L1. |   .8698131   .0444167    19.58   0.000      .782758    .9568682 
             | 
     leffbc2 |   .2599135   1.367617     0.19   0.849    -2.420566    2.940393 
      bden10 |   .0182439   .0087088     2.09   0.036      .001175    .0353128 
         dzs |  -.0013551   .0006003    -2.26   0.024    -.0025317   -.0001785 
         deq |  -.0098124   .0031435    -3.12   0.002    -.0159736   -.0036513 
    foreign9 |   .0265142   .0954383     0.28   0.781    -.1605415    .2135699 
        lpop |   .0965325   .1232375     0.78   0.433    -.1450087    .3380736 
       lgdpc |  -.0578305   .0839735    -0.69   0.491    -.2224155    .1067545 
          eu |   .0380898   .0410872     0.93   0.354    -.0424396    .1186192 
         oar |   .0981984   .0496066     1.98   0.048     .0009712    .1954255 
     ospower |  -.0271474   .0159389    -1.70   0.089     -.058387    .0040923 
     crindex |  -.0381951   .0237511    -1.61   0.108    -.0847465    .0083562 
      moralh |  -.0291089   .0610393    -0.48   0.633    -.1487438     .090526 
     pmindex |   -.032959    .027867    -1.18   0.237    -.0875773    .0216593 
         y04 |   .0130498   .0229881     0.57   0.570    -.0320061    .0581056 
         y05 |   .0065203   .0277892     0.23   0.814    -.0479456    .0609861 
         y06 |  -.0311826   .0298394    -1.05   0.296    -.0896667    .0273016 
         y07 |  -.0550578   .0355875    -1.55   0.122    -.1248081    .0146925 
         y08 |  -.1494691   .0886777    -1.69   0.092    -.3232741     .024336 
         y09 |  -.1734345   .0885181    -1.96   0.050    -.3469269    .0000578 
         y10 |  -.1500465   .0858372    -1.75   0.080    -.3182844    .0181914 
         y11 |  -.1777782   .0857644    -2.07   0.038    -.3458733    -.009683 
         y12 |  -.1894059   .0830867    -2.28   0.023    -.3522529   -.0265589 
       _cons |   -.895779   5.854676    -0.15   0.878    -12.37073    10.57917 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12) 
    FOD.(oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex) 
    FOD.(foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.deq collapsed 
    L(4/10).dzs collapsed 
    L2.bden10 collapsed 
    L(2/3).leffbc2 collapsed 
    L3.L.lmsa collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
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  Standard 
    y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 
    oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex 
    foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.deq collapsed 
    DL3.dzs collapsed 
    DL.bden10 collapsed 
    DL.leffbc2 collapsed 
    DL2.L.lmsa collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.02  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.63  Pr > z =  0.531 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(12)   =   7.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.790 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(12)   =   9.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.677 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   6.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.464 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   2.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.756 
  gmm(L.lmsa, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   7.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.644 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.481 
  gmm(leffbc2, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =   8.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.503 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.803 
  gmm(bden10, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   6.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.756 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.268 
  gmm(dzs, collapse lag(4 .)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   1.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.838 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   7.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.446 
  gmm(deq, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   7.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.705 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.351 
  iv(foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =   4.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.855 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   5.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.260 
  iv(oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   4.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.755 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   5.10  Prob > chi2 =  0.404 
  iv(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   1.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.631 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =   7.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.577 
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Table A.6.14: Printout of dynamic panel system GMM estimation for the bank’s 
market share determinants in SEECs, 2002-2012 (Dependent variable MSA)(check 
for robustness using LIC instead of Z-score) 
 
. xtabond2 lmsa l.lmsa leff bden10 dliclp deq foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu oar ospower crindex 
moralh pmindex y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12, gmm(l.lmsa, lag(3 .)coll) gmm(leff, lag(2 
2)coll) gmm(bden10, lag(2 3)coll) gmm(dliclp, lag(2 2)coll) gmm(deq, lag(2 3)coll) iv(foreign9 
lpop lgdpc eu) iv(oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex) iv(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12) 
two robust orthogonal 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, perm. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1070 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       148 
Number of instruments = 37                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(23) =   4965.42                                      avg =      7.23 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
        lmsa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lmsa | 
         L1. |   .8454914    .045291    18.67   0.000     .7567227    .9342601 
             | 
        leff |   .0799571   .6375991     0.13   0.900    -1.169714    1.329628 
      bden10 |   .0166983   .0076275     2.19   0.029     .0017487     .031648 
      dliclp |   .0020776   .0025687     0.81   0.419    -.0029569    .0071121 
         deq |  -.0128114   .0029481    -4.35   0.000    -.0185897   -.0070332 
    foreign9 |   .0711703   .0445578     1.60   0.110    -.0161613    .1585019 
        lpop |   .1022337   .0842056     1.21   0.225    -.0628062    .2672735 
       lgdpc |  -.0904822   .0447475    -2.02   0.043    -.1781857   -.0027787 
          eu |   .0617683   .0310917     1.99   0.047     .0008297    .1227069 
         oar |   .0870229   .0442248     1.97   0.049     .0003438     .173702 
     ospower |  -.0229247   .0126236    -1.82   0.069    -.0476665    .0018171 
     crindex |  -.0354949   .0166118    -2.14   0.033    -.0680534   -.0029363 
      moralh |  -.0426995   .0496345    -0.86   0.390    -.1399814    .0545823 
     pmindex |  -.0206744   .0204546    -1.01   0.312    -.0607647    .0194159 
         y04 |   .0071731   .0248785     0.29   0.773     -.041588    .0559341 
         y05 |    .006334   .0280583     0.23   0.821    -.0486592    .0613272 
         y06 |  -.0281644   .0281687    -1.00   0.317    -.0833741    .0270453 
         y07 |  -.0677375   .0313931    -2.16   0.031    -.1292668   -.0062082 
         y08 |  -.1548493   .0659318    -2.35   0.019    -.2840732   -.0256255 
         y09 |  -.1769243   .0707477    -2.50   0.012    -.3155873   -.0382614 
         y10 |   -.160607   .0667336    -2.41   0.016    -.2914025   -.0298115 
         y11 |   -.178703   .0691418    -2.58   0.010    -.3142185   -.0431874 
         y12 |  -.1998111   .0687865    -2.90   0.004    -.3346302    -.064992 
       _cons |   .1082122   2.735419     0.04   0.968     -5.25311    5.469534 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12) 
    FOD.(oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex) 
    FOD.(foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).deq collapsed 
    L2.dliclp collapsed 
    L(2/3).bden10 collapsed 
    L2.leff collapsed 
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    L(3/10).L.lmsa collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12 
    oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex 
    foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.deq collapsed 
    DL.dliclp collapsed 
    DL.bden10 collapsed 
    DL.leff collapsed 
    DL2.L.lmsa collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.98  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.58  Pr > z =  0.565 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(13)   =  18.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.157 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(13)   =  13.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.398 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =   9.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.270 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   3.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.588 
  gmm(L.lmsa, collapse lag(3 .)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   4.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.482 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   9.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.327 
  gmm(leff, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(11)   =  12.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.298 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.692 
  gmm(bden10, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =  10.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.390 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.381 
  gmm(dliclp, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(11)   =  10.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.462 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.235 
  gmm(deq, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =  10.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.366 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.428 
  iv(foreign9 lpop lgdpc eu) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =  11.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.226 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.758 
  iv(oar ospower crindex moralh pmindex) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =   9.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.267 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   3.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.594 
  iv(y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10 y11 y12) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   3.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.413 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =   9.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.374 
 
